ORDER : 1. The present Civil Revision Application is filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for challenging the legality and validity of an order dated 9.10.2017 passed below Exh.1 in Civil Misc. Application No.264 of 2016 by the learned Additional District Judge, Mehsana. 2. The case of the applicant is that a Special Civil Suit came to be disposed of by judgment and decree dated 9.9.2016, as a result of this, the applicant had preferred an appeal before the District Court, Mehsana, in which there was a delay of 60 days in preferring the said appeal. Along with that, a separate application for seeking condonation of delay of 60 days was preferred, upon which the learned District Judge was pleased to issue notice. A reply came to be filed at Exh.9 contesting the said application, but then vide order dated 9.10.2017, the learned Additional District Judge, Mehsana was pleased to dismiss the application for non-prosecution by observing additionally that there is no justifiable reason shown for condonation of delay and it is this judgment which is made the subject matter of present Civil Revision Application. 3. Mr.Vibhuti Nanavati, learned advocate appearing for the applicant, has submitted that there is an error committed by the learned Judge in exercising the discretion. It has also been submitted that there was a delay of 60 days only in preferring an appeal, which was cogently explained by filing even an additional affidavit, the same has not been condoned. It has further been submitted that by virtue of not condoning the delay, the substantive right of appeal is turned down which has caused a far reaching consequences. There appears to be a strong prima facie case in favour of the applicant since there are serious infirmities left out in the disposal of the main civil suit i.e. Special Civil Suit No.137 of 2011. It has further been submitted that on the basis of concept of fair opportunity to the litigant, this meager delay of 60 days ought to have been condoned. It has further been submitted that on the basis of concept of fair opportunity to the litigant, this meager delay of 60 days ought to have been condoned. 3.1 Learned advocate for the applicant has further submitted that on the contrary, on account of the fault on the part of lawyer, who could not remain present when the matter was called out, since it was conveyed to the applicant that he was engaged with some another work, that cause cannot be attributed to the applicant and this legitimate right of appeal may not be scuttled. Learned advocate has further submitted that if the application is rejected for want of prosecution, then the merit could not have been examined by the court about no sufficient ground made out for seeking condonation of delay. As a result of this, there appears to be material irregularity in exercising the jurisdiction. 4. To meet with the stand taken by learned advocate for the applicant, Ms.Kamlesh S. Kotai, though has filed the appearance on behalf of the respondent, not remained present even in the second call when the matter was called out. As a result of this, the Court looking to the peculiar set of circumstance, took up the hearing of present Civil Revision Application and heard the learned advocate, as stated above. 5. Having heard the learned advocate appearing for the applicant and having gone through the material on record, it prima facie appears to the Court that on account of not remaining present by a lawyer, the learned Judge has exercised the discretion in rejecting the delay condonation application. It has also been found that there is no whisper in the order which is reflecting as to why and under which circumstance, the delay is not sufficiently explained. It has been stated before the Court that additional affidavit was also filed, but there is no word about the same. However, be that as it may, this delay of 60 days is not that much large which cannot be condoned, more particularly when the substantive right of appeal is availed by the applicant. 6. It has been stated before the Court that additional affidavit was also filed, but there is no word about the same. However, be that as it may, this delay of 60 days is not that much large which cannot be condoned, more particularly when the substantive right of appeal is availed by the applicant. 6. It is well settled by now in catena of decisions that whenever there is a conflict between the substantial justice and technical consideration, the substantial justice must be given a predominance and further the procedural laws are not to be aimed at thwarting the justice rather than to be utilized for administering the justice. As a result of this, keeping in view this proposition of law in mind also, this Court is of the opinion that the delay of 60 days is not that much large which cannot be condoned, more particularly when an attempt is made to explain the same by way of filing within an additional affidavit. That being so, the exercise undertaken by the trial court is not justice and proper. 7. Additionally, it is also kept in mind by the Court that right from 18 GLR onwards, this Court as well as the Apex Court have taken the view that for fault on the part of advocate, no litigant should be made to suffer. When that be so, the learned Judge ought not to have ignored this principle of law and passed an order, whereby delay application could have been dismissed. That being the position, the delay deserves to be condoned. However, while condoning the delay, for lapse on the part of applicant - original plaintiff, no premium also can be given and, therefore, some conditions deserve to be imposed upon to see that in future, no such event may occur. As a result of this, since the learned advocate for the applicant has also shown willingness to abide by any of the terms which this Court deems it proper to impose upon while condoning the delay, this Court is of the opinion that the applicant is liable to pay the cost of Rs.10,000/to be deposited in the trial court and upon such condition, the impugned order dated 9.10.2017 is hereby quashed and set aside and the prayer contained in Misc. Civil Application No.264 of 2016 is granted hereby. Civil Application No.264 of 2016 is granted hereby. The aforesaid amount of cost to be deposited within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of writ of this Court. 8. In view of above, the present Civil Revision Application stands allowed. Direct service is permitted.