JUDGMENT : Heard the parties. 2. This appeal has been preferred by the appellant-Insurance Co. against the judgment dated 23.01.2016 read with corrected order dated 10.02.2016, passed by District Judge-I-cum-Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Simdega in M.A.C.C. No. 11 of 2010, whereby the learned Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs.13,71,541 with Simple Interest of 9% w.e.f. 01.04.2011 till final realization of the awarded amount. 3. Facts of the case in short is that on 11.11.2008, the Claimant- Ajay Sahu @ Ajay Nag was riding a Tempo bearing Reg. No. OR 14Q 9627 and going towards weekly market at Lamboi for the business purposes. In the meantime, another Tempo bearing Reg. No. OR 14 Q 6505, coming from the opposite directions dashed the tempo of Ajay Nag, as a result of which he along with other co-passengers got injured. In the said accident Ajay Sahu @ Ajay Nag sustained grievous injuries on his person especially on his right femer and right patella, proximal phalange (RT), metatarsal (RT) and other injuries. Resultantly, the Claimant-Ajay Nag became a disabled person in his prime period of life and compelled to lead a crippled life unable to perform even his routine works. In this connection Jaldega (Orga O.P.) P.S. Case No. 35 of 2008 dated 11.11.2008, under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC against the driver of Tempo bearing Reg. No. OR 14Q 6506, namely, Baliram Baraik was filed. It is the further case of the Claimant that at the time of accident, he was a businessman earning a monthly income of Rs.12,000/- per month from his business and due to said grievous injury, he became permanently disabled person and thus, unable to do his business and since his family members were fully dependent upon his income, are facing acute financial hardship. 4. Opposite Party No. 1, namely, Narayan Lohar, who is the Owner of the offending vehicle, filed his written statements denying the claim of the Claimant. It was stated that no occurrence, as claimed by the Claimant, took place. The vehicle bearing Reg. No. OR 14Q 6506 belongs to opposite party No. 1, who is the registered owner of the said vehicle and the vehicle was duly insured with the Opposite Party No. 2, Insurance Co. It was stated that no occurrence, as claimed by the Claimant, took place. The vehicle bearing Reg. No. OR 14Q 6506 belongs to opposite party No. 1, who is the registered owner of the said vehicle and the vehicle was duly insured with the Opposite Party No. 2, Insurance Co. and the same was valid from 15.01.2008 to midnight of 14.01.2009 and all the required documents of the said vehicles were valid and legal and the said vehicle was driven by a competent Driver holding a valid driving license. 5. On the other hand, case of the appellant-Insurance Co. was that no cause of action arises against Insurance Co. and the claim case filed by the Claimant, is barred by principles of limitation, estoppel and acquiescence and is liable to be dismissed. Insurance Co. has also challenged the reliability of place of occurrence of accident and also the monthly income of the Claimant to the tune of Rs.12,000/- per month and requested the Tribunal to direct the Claimant for producing the evidence in support of above contention. It was further alleged that the injuries sustained by the Claimant is not admitted and the Claimant ought to have produced the doctor who has examined him medically. The Claimant has also not produced the disability certificate. It was further alleged that Owner of the offending vehicle be directed to produce the necessary vehicular documents, like tax token, R.C. book and valid driving licence of the driver, who was driving the alleged vehicle at the time of accident and if it is found that the driver of the offending vehicle was not having the valid driving licence, then the Insurance Co. cannot be held liable to indemnify any compensation to the Claimant. 6. The parties appeared before the Tribunal and were heard. On the basis of the rival pleadings of the parties, the learned Tribunal framed the followings issues:- (I) Whether the claimant has any valid cause of action against the opposite parties for this claim case? (II) Whether the disablement of Ajay Sahu has resulted on account of the accident arising out of use of the vehicle bearing Reg. No. OR-14Q-6505? (III) Whether the O.Ps. are owner and Insurer of the above vehicle and are liable to compensate the claimants? (IV) Whether the Claimant is entitled to get any compensation? (II) Whether the disablement of Ajay Sahu has resulted on account of the accident arising out of use of the vehicle bearing Reg. No. OR-14Q-6505? (III) Whether the O.Ps. are owner and Insurer of the above vehicle and are liable to compensate the claimants? (IV) Whether the Claimant is entitled to get any compensation? If yes, what will be the just and proper amount of compensation and from whom to what extent? 7. The learned Tribunal, after hearing the parties and upon perusal of the records, written statements filed by the opposite parties and the evidences adduced, decided all the issues in favour of the Claimant and vide its order dated 23.01.2016 read with corrected order dated 10.02.2016, allowed the M.A.C.C. No. 11 of 2010, whereby a sum of Rs.13,71,541 with Simple Interest of 9% w.e.f. 01.04.2011 till final realization of the awarded amount was directed to be paid by the Insurance Co. to the Claimants. 8. The order of the Tribunal has been assailed by the Insurance Co. mainly on the following three grounds:- (I) The driver of the offending vehicle was not having a valid and effective driving license; (II) Auto rickshaw in question was also not having valid permit to ply in the district of Simdega where the accident has taken place; and (III) Ext.-16 (Disability Certificate) filed by the Claimants has not been proved by any medical expert and in absence of any expert opinion, the same could not have been taken into consideration for awarding compensation and holding Insurance Co. liable to pay the same 9. Mr. Alok Lal, learned counsel appearing for the Insurance Co. emphatically argued that the driver of the offending vehicle was not having a valid license in the eyes of law as Ext.-19 in clear terms mentions that although the driver was having license to drive L.M.V. but there was no endorsement to drive public service commercial vehicle and hence, the driving license in any view of the matter cannot be said to be effective or valid. It was further argued that the Auto Rickshaw was not having valid permit to ply in the district of Simdega where accident has taken place. The permit for plying auto rickshaw was valid and effective for plying only within the district of Sundergarh (Odisha) and as such, the Tribunal has wrongly held Insurance Co. liable to pay compensation. It was further argued that the Auto Rickshaw was not having valid permit to ply in the district of Simdega where accident has taken place. The permit for plying auto rickshaw was valid and effective for plying only within the district of Sundergarh (Odisha) and as such, the Tribunal has wrongly held Insurance Co. liable to pay compensation. The other ground for assailing the impugned judgment was Ext.-16 i.e. disability certificate filed by the Claimants. As disability certificate was not proved and author of the said certificate was not examined neither any expert medical witness was there to prove the disability certificate and as such, in absence of all three, the Insurance Co. cannot be held liable for compensation 10. Learned counsel for the appellant-Insurance Co. assailing the impugned judgment of the learned Tribunal argued that the Tribunal has assessed and awarded the compensation amount without any cogent and valid evidence inasmuch as there was no substantial evidence to assess the extent of disability and the finding of the Tribunal was based merely on assumption. Learned counsel further argues that the functional disability does not correspond to loss of earning capacity and as such, assessment of loss equivalent to functional disability is incorrect and unsustainable in the eyes of law. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that mere production of certificate is not enough for assessment of disability and non-examination of either the treating doctor or other qualified orthopaedic medical practitioner to prove the genuineness of the document is detrimental to the claim and the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is forcefully applicable to the facts of the present case. 11. To buttress his arguments, learned counsel places heavy reliance on the following judgments/orders:- (I) Amrit Paul Singh & Ors. Vs. Tata AIG General Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. [ (2018) 7 SCC 558 ]; & (II) National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Geeta Burnwal & Ors. [M.A. No. 352 of 2014]. 12. Mr. Arshad Hussain, learned counsel appearing for the Claimants and Mr. Gaurav, learned counsel appearing for the Owner of the offending Vehicle, supported and justified the impugned judgment. It was submitted that the vehicle was fully insured and the driver of the offending vehicle was having valid driving license and further, the permit was not required and as such, the Insurance Co. was rightly held liable for payment of compensation to the Claimant. 13. It was submitted that the vehicle was fully insured and the driver of the offending vehicle was having valid driving license and further, the permit was not required and as such, the Insurance Co. was rightly held liable for payment of compensation to the Claimant. 13. Heard the parties and perused the documents brought on record. 14. The Hon’ble Apex Court in catena of decisions have specifically held that the Insurance Co. can avoid its liability only on the basis of statutory limitation provided under Section 149(2) of Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 and not on the basis of Insurance Policy. It has been further held that only violation of condition of Section 149(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 is not enough to avoid its liability rather it has been seen that the owner was not sufficiently vigilant in observing the terms and conditions of the insurance policy. In fact, in catena of decisions rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court, it is clear that to avoid liability by the Insurer, it has to be proved that Insured was negligent in plying the vehicle and has not taken sufficient precaution and on that basis only the liability can be avoided. 15. In the instant Appeal, the Insurance Co. confines its arguments mainly on three grounds:- (I) As regards Ext.-16, i.e. the disability certificate, the arguments of the learned counsel for the Insurance Co. is that the said certificate cannot be taken into consideration as the author of the said certificate was never examined and the certificate has not been proved. The said argument of the learned counsel is not acceptable to this Court as there is a clear-cut finding of the Tribunal that the disability certificate (Ext.16) transpires that the Medical Board has found 45% permanent disability and opined that “in my considered view the said disability will cause (A) profusion of distress and the original claimant has to deal with the same for the rest of his life”, meaning thereby that it was the opinion of the Medical Board, who had found 45% disability, that the claimant has to deal with the said disability for the rest of his life. It is not in dispute that the disability was proved by the Medical Board and not by a single doctor and as such, the opinion of the Medical Board was taken into consideration in right prospect. It is not in dispute that the disability was proved by the Medical Board and not by a single doctor and as such, the opinion of the Medical Board was taken into consideration in right prospect. (II) The other argument advanced by the learned counsel for the Insurance Co. that although the driver was having license to drive L.M.V. but there was no endorsement to drive public service commercial vehicle and hence, the driving license in any view of the matter cannot be said to be effective or valid, is also falsified on the ground that while deciding the issue Nos. 2 and 3, the Tribunal came to a finding that, “from perusal of the photocopy of insurance policy it transpires to this Tribunal that the offending vehicle was duly insured with the Opposite Party No. 2 and the same was valid from 15.01.2008 to midnight of 14.01.2009 and from perusal of the photocopy of R.C. Book (Ext. 18), driving license (Ext. 19), it also transpires that the driving license was valid upto 05.09.2010 and the R.C. Book was issued in favour of the Opposite Party No. 2, who is the owner of the vehicle in question”. This goes to prove that the driver was having valid driving license. (III) Regarding validity of permit to ply the vehicle, the said issue was never raised before the Tribunal and the same is raised only in the instant Appeal by way of arguments. This plea was never put to test or gone into by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal since the Insurance Co. neither took this plea nor adduced any evidence to that effect so as to give a cause to the High Court to accept this plea of the Insurance Co. straightaway at the appellate stage. Emphasis is led on the judgment passed in case of Ramchandra Vs. Regional Manager, United India Insurance Co. Ltd., reported (2013) 12 SCC 84 . However, law is well settled that plying a vehicle without permit is an infraction and the Insurer is not liable. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in para-11 of the judgment passed in case of Bharti Telecom Ltd. Vs. Regional Manager, United India Insurance Co. Ltd., reported (2013) 12 SCC 84 . However, law is well settled that plying a vehicle without permit is an infraction and the Insurer is not liable. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in para-11 of the judgment passed in case of Bharti Telecom Ltd. Vs. the Commissioner of Customs, reported in 2001 (8) SC 240, has held that “the appellant had at no stage took the plea that it was not reasonably possible for it to segregate inputs utilized in the manufacture of the dutiable final products from the final products which are exempted from duty. Now, the appellant cannot be permitted to raise such a new plea”. The same view was reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Union of India Vs. E.I.D. Parry (India) Ltd., reported in (2000) 2 SCC 223 , wherein it has been held that, “In the absence of the pleading to that effect, the trial court did not frame any issue on that question. The High Court of its own proceeded to consider the validity of the Rule and ultimately held that it was not in consonance with the relevant provisions of the Railways Act, 1980 and consequently held that it was ultra vires. This view is contrary to the settled law that a question, which did not form part of the pleadings or in respect of which the parties were not at variance and which was not the subject-matter of any issue, could not be decided by the Court”. The judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the Insurance Co. is of no help to him as it was never the finding of the Tribunal that the offending vehicle in question was plying on the road without any permit. On the basis of above, I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the order of the learned Tribunal. Hence, it is not open for the Insurance Co. to raise the issue regarding valid permit at this stage. 16. The Insurance Co. is directed to make payments to the Claimants, as per the terms and conditions laid down by the learned Tribunal vide its judgment dated 10.02.2016, passed in M.A.C.C. No. 11 of 2010 and after proper verification of the identities of the Claimants, within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. 17. is directed to make payments to the Claimants, as per the terms and conditions laid down by the learned Tribunal vide its judgment dated 10.02.2016, passed in M.A.C.C. No. 11 of 2010 and after proper verification of the identities of the Claimants, within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. 17. However, applying the dictum in case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Swaran Singh, reported in (2004) 3 SCC 297 , to subserve the ends of justice, the Insurer shall pay the claim amount awarded by the Tribunal to the Claimants in the first instance, with a liberty to recover the same from the Owner of the vehicle in accordance with law. 18. Accordingly, compensation amount awarded by the Tribunal shall be paid and satisfied by the Insurer in the first instance, with a liberty to recover the same from the Owner of the vehicle, in accordance with law. 19. The Insurance Co. is permitted to withdraw the statutory amount deposited before this Court. 20. Resultantly, the appeal is disposed of in the aforementioned terms.