JUDGMENT : SURESHWAR THAKUR, J. 1. The instant appeal, stands, directed by the State, against, the pronouncement made by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate Lahaul Spiti at Kullu, H.P., upon, Criminal Case No. 140-1/2003, where through, the accused/respondent herein hence stood acquitted. 2. Briefly, stated the facts of the case are that on 30.10.2002, at about 9.30 a.m., accused Subhash Chand was driving maruti van No. HP-01-2735 on Kullu to Bhunter public Highway in a rash or negligent manner so as to endanger human life. It is alleged that the speed of the vehicle being driven by the accused was very high. It is alleged that accused while driving the said vehicle on the highway in high speed, all of sudden, applied brakes just in front of the complainant's shop at Mohal. However, the vehicle stopped at a distance of 50-60 feet. One Ajay Sood, who was crossing the highway, got hit by the said vehicle. He sustained injuries on his person. Accused made abortive attempt to fled away from the scene. The complainant asked him to take injured Ajay Sood for medical treatment to the hospital. However, accused acceded to the request and took the injured person in his vehicle to the hospital. During the course of investigation, the statement of the complainant, under Section 154, Cr.P.C. was recorded on the basis of which FIR was registered at police station Kullu. Thereafter, the police completed all the investigating formalities. 3. On conclusion of the investigations, into the offences, allegedly committed by the accused, a report, under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was prepared, and, filed before the learned trial Court. 4. The accused/respondent herein stood charged, by the learned trial Court, for, his committing offences, punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC. In proof of the prosecution case, the prosecution examined 6 witnesses. On conclusion of recording, of, the prosecution evidence, the statement of the accused, under, Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was, recorded by the learned trial Court, wherein, the accused claimed innocence, and, pleaded false implication in the case. 5. On an appraisal of the evidence on record, the learned trial Court, returned findings of acquittal in favour of the accused/respondents herein. 6. The appellant herein/State, stands aggrieved, by the findings of acquittal, recorded, by the learned trial Court. 5. On an appraisal of the evidence on record, the learned trial Court, returned findings of acquittal in favour of the accused/respondents herein. 6. The appellant herein/State, stands aggrieved, by the findings of acquittal, recorded, by the learned trial Court. The Additional Advocate General, has, concertedly and vigorously contended, qua the findings of acquittal, recorded by the learned trial Court, standing not, based on a proper appreciation of the evidence on record, rather, theirs standing sequelled by gross mis-appreciation, by it, of the material on record. Hence, he contends qua the findings of acquittal warranting reversal by this Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, and, theirs being replaced by findings of conviction. 7. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, has, with considerable force and vigour, contended qua the findings of acquittal, recorded, by the learned trial Court, rather standing based, on a mature and balanced appreciation, by it, of the evidence on record, and, theirs not necessitating any interference, rather theirs meriting vindication. 8. This Court with the able assistance of the learned counsel on either side, has, with studied care and incision, evaluated the entire evidence on record. 9. The victim/injured one Ajay Sood, was struck, on the national highway, by the offending vehicle, driven by the accused/respondent herein. In sequel to the afore offending vehicle hence striking the victim/injured, the latter sustained injuries, on his person. The prosecution ascribed, vis-a-vis, the accused/respondent, hence, inculpable/incriminatory negligence, arising, from his driving the offending vehicle, rather at an excessive, and, brazen pace. Though, the ocular witnesses, to the occurrence, rendered testifications with inter se corroboration, vis-a-vis, the afore collision, hence, occurring, inter se, the injured/victim and, the offending vehicle, driven by the accused, rather happening hence with the afore victim standing, on, the side of the road, (i) testification whereof is meted corroboration by PW-2. However, the afore rendered corroborative testification(s), vis-a-vis, the site, of, the relevant occurrence, is/are rather shred of its/their efficacy(ies), (ii) given the victim (PW-3), upon his being subjected, to an ordeal of a scathing cross-examination, by the learned counsel for the accused, his rather thereat acquiescing, to a suggestion, put thereat to him qua, upon, his crossing the national highway, hence, rather thereat the offending vehicle, driven by the accused, hence, colliding/striking him. The effect of the afore admission, is, qua reiteratedly hence the site, of, occurrence, as enunciated, in, the consistent testifications, as, rendered, by the purported ocular witnesses, to the occurrence, and, who stepped into witness box as PW-1, and, PW-2, rather getting belied, (iii) and, when the uncontested predominant factum qua the relevant mishap, hence, occurring on the national highway, and, besides entwining therewith, the, afore admission(s) emanating from PW-3, victim/injured, (iv) thereupon, the purported excessive brazen speed, at which, the offending vehicle, was driven by the accused/respondent, hence, pales into insignificance, (v) as, the speed of 40 to 60 kilometers per hour at which the offending vehicle, was driven, at the relevant time, is, the normal speed employed by the drivers concerned, while theirs taking to ply hence vehicles, on, national highway(s). (vi) The further concomitant effect thereof, is, that the afore speed, cannot be construed, to be either brazen or rash nor would enable this Court, to conclude qua the prosecution hence solitarily therefrom hence proving the charge, against, the accused/respondent, (vii) unless forthright evidence exists, on record, and, it rather making vivid display(s) that the relevant site, of, occurrence rather constituted the reserved portion, of the national highway, whereon, the pedestrian(s) could hence trudge, and, whereat the accused/respondent, hence, struck the offending vehicle, against the victim, thereupon, his breaching the standards of due care and caution, (viii) and, concomitantly his committing offences, punishable under Section 279, and, under Section 337 of the IPC. However, the afore evidence is not existing, on record, and, when as aforestated, with the offending vehicle, being plied at a speed of 50 to 60 kilometers per hour, on the national highway, and, with the afore speed being the normal pliable speed, of, vehicles, on, the national highway(s), (ix) thereupon, when the victim/injured rather took to negligently, cross the national highway, besides when the offending vehicle, is not, displayed in the apposite site plan borne in Ex.PW5/D, to occupy hence, at the relevant time, the inappropriate side of the road, thereupon, its striking the person of the victim/injured, also cannot, beget any inference, that, the accused/respondent while driving, the offending vehicle, hence, committed any incriminatory offence. 10. 10. For the reasons which have been recorded hereinabove, this Court holds that the learned trial Court, has appraised the entire evidence on record in a wholesome and harmonious manner, apart therefrom, the analysis of the material, on record, by the learned trial court, hence, not suffering from any gross perversity or absurdity of misappreciation, and, non appreciation of germane evidence on record. 11. Consequently, there is no merit in the instant appeal, and, it is dismissed accordingly. In sequel, the impugned judgment is affirmed and maintained. All pending applications also stand disposed of. Records be sent back forthwith.