JUDGMENT : K.Vinod Chandran, J. The appellants are two teachers, who claimed seniority over the 1st respondent. The learned counsel for the appellants submits that the judgment impugned in W.A.No.1603 of 2017 specifically looks at the observations in the earlier judgment and also finds that the 2nd respondent has attempted to overrule the judgment passed earlier. We hence consider both the Appeals together since the issue is identical. 2. The 1st respondent herein and the appellants, who were respondents 4 and 5 in the Writ Petitions, were appointed respectively on 04.09.1991, 09.09.1991 and 23.09.1991 on consolidated pay. They continued uninterruptedly till 07.04.1992, on which date they were made Higher Secondary School Teacher (Junior). Again they continued in that post till 15.7.1992, on which date they became Higher Secondary School Teachers (HSST). The bone of contention between them is as to seniority in the cadre of HSST. The Regional Deputy Director (RDD) found that it has to be fixed on the basis of age. The respondents 4 and 5 being older, they were assigned seniority at 1 and 2 positions while the writ petitioner was assigned seniority at position No.3. The RDD relied on Rule 37 of Chapter XIVA, which speaks of determining the seniority on the basis of age, when the appointment date is identical. 3. The learned counsel for the appellants has two contentions against the judgment; one is that the service spent on consolidated pay is not qualifying service and hence there can be no seniority determined on the basis of the first appointment, on consolidated pay. Further contention is that the service of the petitioner between 04.9.1991 to 07.4.1992 was on consolidated pay, not reckoned for qualifying service and if the petitioner had a different claim, it should have been challenged at that point. For the first time, the challenge was made only in the year 2016. The Manager supports the appellants and seeks to uphold seniority as determined by him, which stands approved by the RDD. The appellants rely on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Nanminda Higher Secondary School v. Director of Higher Secondary Education [ 2015 (3) KLT 307 ]. For advancing the ground of the writ petitioner being estopped from raising a stale claim on the principles of theory of sit back, the appellants rely on Pavithran v. State of Kerala [ 2009 (4) KLT 20 (F.B.)]. For advancing the ground of the writ petitioner being estopped from raising a stale claim on the principles of theory of sit back, the appellants rely on Pavithran v. State of Kerala [ 2009 (4) KLT 20 (F.B.)]. The learned Government Pleader refers to Rule 7 of Chapter XXXII to contend that probation commences only from the date of first appointment as an HSST(Junior) and the appointment on consolidated pay cannot be reckoned at all. 4. The learned counsel for the respondents counters that for promotion under Rule 6, what is required is approved teaching experience, though not specifically in the post of HSST. Chapter XXXII speaks of approved teaching experience, for the purpose of reckoning qualification for the purpose of promotion which necessarily has to commence from the date of first appointment, whether it be on consolidated pay or otherwise, which period admittedly has been approved by the educational authority. The learned counsel would also rely on the judgment of this Court in Ramesan v. Manoj Kumar K. and Others [ 2019 (3) KHC 942 (D.B.)], wherein it was specifically found that Rule 37 under Chapter XIVA has no application to Chapter XXXII. 5. We have to first notice that Chapter XIVA has no application to Chapter XXXII as already found by us. As pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent, in Ramesan, we specifically found the absence of a suitable rule in Chapter XXXII for the purpose of fixing the seniority of the HSST appointed to a school, especially when they are appointed on direct recruitment. As against the promotees or by transfer appointees, we found that it has to be on the basis of the first arising vacancy with the promotees being assigned the positions at 1, 5, 9 and so on and so forth, the ratio being 1:3. There is an absence of a rule prescribing a norm in so far as the seniority of the directly recruited teachers. 6. Nanminda Higher Secondary School is a case in which certain teachers, who were appointed first to the post of HSST (Junior), claimed that seniority in the cadre of HSST has to be reckoned from the first appointment as an HSST(Junior). Therein the persons who were appointed first to the post of HSST(Junior) were only later promoted to the post of HSST. Therein the persons who were appointed first to the post of HSST(Junior) were only later promoted to the post of HSST. This was for reason of an upgradation to the post of HSST being possible when a HSST(Junior) is called upon to engage students for more than 15 periods as is provided in Rule-1(d)&(e). It was in such circumstance that the Division Bench of this Court found that the seniority in the cadre of HSST can be reckoned only on the basis of the first appointment to that post. 7. Here, admittedly, all the persons were appointed on the very same day to the post of HSST (Junior) and HSST. As we noticed, there is no Rule available in Chapter XXXII as is there in Chapter XIVA, which prescribes age to be reckoned for the purpose of fixing seniority among persons who are appointed on the very same day. In fact Rule 37(3) first speaks of the seniority of teachers, whose date of commencement of continuous service is the same, to be decided first with reference to the date of first appointment and only if that is also identical; age becomes the determinate factor. Hence the finding of the learned Single Judge that the writ petitioner who was first appointed, though in a part time post, has to be assigned seniority above the others is perfectly in tune with even Rule 37 of Chapter XIVA. 8. We further notice that Rule 6 of Chapter XXXII speaks of approved teaching experience and not qualifying service, and that too at the Higher Secondary level as the minimum qualification for promotion. Hence the service on consolidated pay also can be reckoned for the purpose of deciding the eligibility since it is approved teaching experience at the higher secondary level. Qualifying service is for the purpose of computing pensionary benefits. As far as approved teaching experience is concerned, which is spoken of in Rule 6, the petitioner has an earlier approved service from 04.09.1991, though till 07.04.1992 it was on a consolidated pay. The fact that the period spent on consolidated pay would not enure to the benefit of the teacher as qualifying service would not detract from the position that the seniority has to be assigned from the date of commencement of approved teaching experience as spoken of in Chapter XXXII; when the date of appointment as HSST (Junior) & HSST are identical. Yet again, we notice that the learned single Judge has arrived at the said decision, which definitely is a reasonable way of looking at the seniority issue, especially in the absence of a specific rule in Chapter XXXII. We, sitting in Appeal, are not expected to substitute our reasonableness over that of the learned Single Judge. 9. As far as the 'sit back theory' is concerned, the writ petitioner does not seek any qualifying service from 04.09.1991 onwards. What the petitioner seeks is only reckoning of seniority on the basis of the commencement of approved service, which we find to have been validly raised at the first instance itself, when the Manager came out with a seniority list. The petitioner challenged the same by a writ petition, the judgment in which is impugned in the first appeal before us. We do not think that Pavithran has any application to the present case. 10. The contention raised by the learned Senior Government Pleader on Rule 7 of Chapter XXXII also is of no consequence since, though probation commences only from the appointment in a regular vacancy, we have assigned seniority on the basis of approved teaching experience; which obviously will not count for probation or as qualifying service for reckoning pension. In the above circumstances, we refuse to interfere with the judgment of the learned single Judge. The appointment to any promotion post, from the rival claimants in this case, shall be made in accordance with the seniority as directed by the learned Single Judge; affirmed by us. The appeals are dismissed. No costs.