JUDGMENT G. S. AHLUWALIA, J. – This Second Appeal under section 100 of Civil Procedure Code has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 24-8-2000, passed by Second Additional District Judge, Morena in Civil Appeal Nos. 13-A/97, 14-A/1997 and 3A/1998 arising out of the judgment and decree dated 11-10-1996, passed by Second Additional Civil Judge, Class-I, Morena in the consolidated suits bearing Civil Suit No. 1-A of 1995 and 2-A of 1995. 2. The necessary facts for disposal of the present appeal in short are that the respondents No. 1 and 2, namely, Smt. Ramdai and Sheela filed a Civil Suit No. 2A of 1995 against the appellant as well as respondents No. 3 and 4, namely, Dayaram and Manmohan for declaration of title and permanent injunction. Shyamlal, Devi and Jagannath were made defendants but their names were subsequently deleted from the cause title. It was the claim of the respondents No. 1 and 2 that respondent No. 1 Smt. Ramdai is the legally wedded wife of Jagannath, whereas respondent No. 2 is the daughter born out of the wedlock of the respondent No. 1 and Jagannath. It was the claim of the respondents No. 1 and 2 that the appellant was born out of wedlock of Kunwar Devi and Adiram and had no relation with Jagannath. Thus, it is pleaded that the respondents No. 1 and 2 are the legal representatives of Jagannath and, therefore, after death of Jagannath, they had became “Bhoomiswami” of the Survey Nos. 457, 470, 522, 523, 525, 526, 692 and 948 situated in Village Dhanela, Patwari Halka No. 51, Tahsil and District Morena. Thus, a suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction was filed. 3. Respondent No. 3 Dayaram submitted his written statement denying the claim of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. Dayaram also instituted another suit i.e. Civil Suit No. 1-A of 1995 (original Civil Suit No. 28-A of 1987) against the appellant as well as the respondents No. 1 and 2 for possession and mesne profit in respect of the suit land. It was further claimed that Jagannath executed a “Will” dated 2-11-1997 in his favour and by virtue of the same, he became “Bhoomiswami”. It was further claimed that he was forcibly dispossessed by the appellant in the year 1985. It was further claimed that Jagannath executed a “Will” dated 2-11-1997 in his favour and by virtue of the same, he became “Bhoomiswami”. It was further claimed that he was forcibly dispossessed by the appellant in the year 1985. A Criminal Case No. 113 of 1985 was registered in the Court of SDM, Morena and the appellant by order dated 8-7-1985, was allowed to retain the possession of the suit land. 4. The appellant filed his written statement as well as the counter-claim in the suit instituted by respondents No. 1 and 2 and filed his written statement in Civil Suit No. 1-A/1995 (original Civil Suit No. 28-A of 1987) instituted by Dayaram. It was the claim of the appellant that Kunwar Devi is the wife of Jagannath and the appellant was born out of their wedlock. It was further claimed that respondents No. 1 and 2 are not the legal heirs of Jagannath. Neither Ramdai was married to Jagannath nor Sheela is the daughter of Jagannath. In fact, the respondent No. 1 was the daughter of one Biharilal who was married to Juju Brahmin of Village Pagara, Tahsil Jaura, District Morena. The respondent No. 2 was born out of the wedlock of respondent No. 1 and Juju Brahmin. During lifetime of Juju Brahmin, the respondent No. 1 had abandoned him and started living with one Gokul Brahmin. Gokul Brahmin was in Military service, who had kept the respondent No. 1 at village Dhanela of Purushottam Seth. Gokul Brahmin used to send money to respondent No. 1 by money order. However, services of Gokul Brahmin were terminated and thereafter, he renowned the World. Thereafter, the respondent No. 1 started serving Jagannath by preparing food etc. Since the respondent No. 2 was without father, therefore, the villagers arranged her marriage and Kanyadan was performed by Bhogiram, who was distantly related to Jagannath and respondent No. 1 used to reside in the property of Bhogiram. For some reasons, Jagannath got annoyed with his wife Kunwar Devi, therefore, he stopped maintaining her and ousted her from the house. At that time, Kunwar Devi was pregnant. Adiram took her to the matrimonial house of one Gyaso, resident of Ajnoda, Tahsil Mehgaon, who was daughter of the sister of Jagannath. It was further pleaded that the alleged “Will” set up by Adiram is a forged and concocted and the suit is barred by limitation. 5. At that time, Kunwar Devi was pregnant. Adiram took her to the matrimonial house of one Gyaso, resident of Ajnoda, Tahsil Mehgaon, who was daughter of the sister of Jagannath. It was further pleaded that the alleged “Will” set up by Adiram is a forged and concocted and the suit is barred by limitation. 5. The suit filed by respondents No 1 and 2 was dismissed by judgment and decree dated 23-9-1987. However, in appeal the matter was remanded back to the trial Court by judgment dated 6-9-1990. 6. Similarly, the Civil Suit filed by Dayaram was pending in the trial Court in which the appellant also filed his written statement and disputed the “Will” executed by Dayaram and claimed the same to be a forged and concocted. It was further claimed that the appellant is in possession of the land since the death of Jagannath and has acquired “Bhoomiswami” rights and if it is found that the appellant has no right or title, then he has perfected the title by way of adverse possession. It was further pleaded that the suit is barred by limitation. 7. This Court, by order dated 6-4-1991, directed for the consolidation of suits. 8. The civil suit filed by Smt. Ramdai and Sheela (respondents No. 1 and 2) was dismissed by judgment and decree dated 11-10-1996 as well as the counter-claim filed by the appellant was dismissed. However, the suit instituted by Dayaram (respondent No. 3) for restoration of possession was decreed and prayer for mesne profit was rejected. 9. Since the counter-claim filed by the appellant was dismissed, therefore, he filed a separate appeal. The suit filed by the respondents No. 1 and 2 was dismissed, therefore, they filed a separate appeal and since the prayer of respondent No. 3 Dayaram for grant of mesne profit from the date of dispossession was dismissed, therefore, he too filed a separate appeal. The appeal filed by respondent No. 3 Dayaram was registered as Civil Appeal No. 13-A of 1997, the appeal filed by respondents No. 1 and 2 was registered as Civil Appeal No. 14-A of 1997 and the appeal filed by the appellant was registered as Civil Appeal No. 3-A of 1998. All the three appeals were decided by common judgment and decree dated 24-8-2000. All the three appeals were decided by common judgment and decree dated 24-8-2000. The appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed in toto, the appeal filed by Smt. Ramdai and Sheela (respondents No. 1 and 2) was also dismissed in toto, whereas the appeal filed by Dayaram (respondent No. 3) was partially allowed and it was held that he shall be entitled for mesne profit @ Rs. 1100/- per month from 11-10-1996. 10. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court, Dayaram filed a separate appeal which was registered as Second Appeal No. 468 of 2000 as his prayer for mesne profit from the date of dispossession was not granted, whereas the present appeal has been filed by the appellant against the common judgment and decree dated 24-8-2000, by which three different Civil Appeals were decided. 11. Second Appeal No. 468/2000 filed by Dayaram was dismissed for want of prosecution by order dated 22-4-2008 and the said order has attained finality, as no attempt was made to get the second appeal restored to its original number. 12. The present appeal has been admitted on 13-5-2002 on the following substantial questions of law : – “1. What is the effect of order of consolidation passed by this Court on 9-4-91 in M.A. No. 160/90? 2. Whether the first Appellate Court has erroneously applied the presumption under section 112 of the Evidence Act when marriage between Jagannath and Kunwardevi was not dissolved ? 3. Whether the Will dated 2-11-1972 is proved in accordance with section 63 and 68 of the Indian Succession Act?” 13. Substantial question of law No. 1:- What is the effect of order of consolidation passed by this Court on 9-4-91 in M.A. No. 160/90 ? Merely because two suits were consolidated, would not mean that both the suits had merged in each other. There is no specific provision in Civil Procedure Code for consolidation of suits and the said power is to be exercised only under section 151 of Civil Procedure Code. The purpose of consolidation of suits is to save costs, time and effort and to make conduct of severe actions more convenient by treating them as one action. The Supreme Court in the case of Mahalaxmi Co-operative Housing Society Limited and others vs. Ashabhai Atmaram Patel (Dead) through LRs. The purpose of consolidation of suits is to save costs, time and effort and to make conduct of severe actions more convenient by treating them as one action. The Supreme Court in the case of Mahalaxmi Co-operative Housing Society Limited and others vs. Ashabhai Atmaram Patel (Dead) through LRs. and others, reported in (2013) 4 SCC 404 has held as under : – “45. We are also not much impressed by the argument of the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent that the trial Court has committed an error in not consolidating the various suits including Civil Suits No. 292/1993 and 681/1992 to be tried together as ordered by the District Court in its order dated 29-8-2006 in Civil Misc. Application No. 16/2005. Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code only provides for transfer of any suit from one Court to another. The Court has not passed an order of consolidating all the suits. There is no specific provision in the Civil Procedure Code for consolidation of suits. Such a power has to be exercised only under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. The purpose of consolidation of suits is to save costs, time and effort and to make the conduct of several actions more convenient by treating them as one action. Consolidation of suits is ordered for meeting the ends of justice as it saves the parties from multiplicity of proceedings, delay and expenses and the parties are relieved of the need of adducing the same or similar documentary and oral evidence twice over in the two suits at two different trials. Reference may be made to the judgment of this Court in Prem Lala Nahata and anr. vs. Chandi Prasad Sikaria, (2007) 2 SCC 551 . 46. The transfer of the suits from one Court to another to be tried together will not take away the right of the parties to invoke Order XXIII, Rule 3 and there is also no prohibition under Order XXIII, Rule 3 or section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code to record a compromise in one suit. 46. The transfer of the suits from one Court to another to be tried together will not take away the right of the parties to invoke Order XXIII, Rule 3 and there is also no prohibition under Order XXIII, Rule 3 or section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code to record a compromise in one suit. Suits always retain their independent identity and even after an order of consolidation, the Court is not powerless to dispose of any suit independently once the ingredients of Order XXIII, Rule 3 has been satisfied.” Thus, it is clear that the transfer of suits from one Court to another for being tried together, will not change the independent identity of each suit and still both the suits filed by respondents No. 1 and 2 as well as Dayaram (respondent No. 3) would retain their independent identity, and would not stand merged in each other. On the contrary, at the most, it can be said that consolidation of both the suits would only mean that the trial Court was directed to decide the suits simultaneously so as to avoid inconsistent findings in the matter. The Supreme Court in the case of Shri Gangai Vinayagar Temple and another vs. Meenakshi Anmal and others, reported in (2015) 3 SCC 624 has held as under : – “27. Procedural norms, technicalities and processual law evolve after years of empirical experience, and to ignore them or give them short shrift inevitably defeats justice. Where a common judgment has been delivered in cases in which consolidation orders have specifically been passed, we think it irresistible that the filing of a single appeal leads to the entire dispute becoming sub judice once again. Consolidation orders are passed by virtue of the bestowal of inherent powers on the Courts by section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, as clarified by this Court in Chitivalasa Jute Mills vs. Jaypee Rewa Cement, (2004) 3 SCC 85 . In the instance of suits in which common issues have been framed and a common Trial has been conducted, the losing party must file appeals in respect of all adverse decrees founded even on partially adverse or contrary speaking judgments. In the instance of suits in which common issues have been framed and a common Trial has been conducted, the losing party must file appeals in respect of all adverse decrees founded even on partially adverse or contrary speaking judgments. While so opining we do not intend to whittle down the principle that appeals are not expected to be filed against every inconvenient or disagreeable or unpropitious or unfavourable finding or observation contained in a judgment, but that this can be done by way of cross-objections if the occasion arises. The decree not assailed thereupon metamorphoses into the character of a “former suit”. If this is not to be so viewed, it would be possible to set at naught a decree passed in Suit A by only challenging the decree in Suit B. Law considers it an anathema to allow a party to achieve a result indirectly when it has deliberately or negligently failed to directly initiate proceedings towards this purpose. Laws of procedure have picturesquely been referred to as handmaidens to justice, but this does not mean that they can be wantonly ignored because, if so done, a miscarriage of justice inevitably and inexorably ensues. Statutory law and the processual law are two sides of the judicial drachma, each being the obverse of the other. In the case in hand, had the tenant diligently filed an appeal against the decree at least in respect of O. S. No. 5 of 1978, the legal conundrum that has manifested itself and exhausted so much judicial time, would not have arisen at all.” 14. It is submitted by the Counsel for the appellant that where two different appeals are filed arising of one suit and if those appeals are decided by a common judgment, then the single appeal against the common judgment could be sufficient and it is not necessary to file two separate appeals. To buttress his contention, the counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgment passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Bhagchand vs. Administrator, Municipal Corporation, Indore and others, reported in 2005(2) M.P.L.J. 262 . 15. To buttress his contention, the counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgment passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Bhagchand vs. Administrator, Municipal Corporation, Indore and others, reported in 2005(2) M.P.L.J. 262 . 15. So far as the judgment passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Bhagchand (supra) is concerned, it is suffice to say that two different appeals arising out of one suit were dismissed by common judgment, therefore, this Court had held that the solitary appeal against the common judgment would be sufficient. However, in the present case, two different suits were decided by the common judgment in view of the order of consolidation passed by this Court. As already held that merely the suits are consolidated would not mean that both the suits had lost their independent identity. 16. The trial Court by common judgment and decree dated 11-10-1996 had dismissed the suit filed by Smt. Ramdai and Sheela as well as dismissed the counter-claim filed by the appellant in Civil Suit instituted by Smt. Ramdai and Sheela and had partially decreed the suit filed by Dayaram. Thus, for all practical purposes, the appellant was aggrieved by the decree passed by the trial Court in favour of Dayaram as well as dismissal of his counter-claim. 17. The High Court of Himachal Pradesh in the case of H. P. State Forest Corporation vs. Kahan Singh and ors., reported in ILR (2016) 6 H. P. 1137 has held as under : – “22. …......As the adjudication on the suit filed by the plaintiff-Corporation and adjudication on the counter claim filed by the defendant assumed the status of two distinct decrees, they were required to be challenged by way of separate appeals by paying the requisite Court fee on each of them. Defendant having failed to do so he could not have been granted the relief which was granted by learned Appellate Court in one single appeal which was filed by defendant against the decree passed in favour of the plaintiff-Corporation by learned trial Court as well as against the dismissal of his counter-claim. Learned Appellate Court failed to appreciate that in the absence of two appeals, one appeal so filed was not maintainable, as the findings returned on plaint and counter claim acted as res judicata vis-à-vis each other which necessitated the filing of two appeals. Learned Appellate Court failed to appreciate that in the absence of two appeals, one appeal so filed was not maintainable, as the findings returned on plaint and counter claim acted as res judicata vis-à-vis each other which necessitated the filing of two appeals. Learned Appellate Court also failed to appreciate that non filing of two distinct and separate appeals amounted to having the same effect where no appeal was filed from a decree in connected case and the effect of non filing of appeal against judgment or decree that has become final. In other words because only one appeal was filed, therefore, finality of finding recorded in connected claim on account of non filing of appeal precluded the Court from proceeding with appeal in the other connected claim.” 18. This Court in the case of Smt. Vidyabai and others vs. Smt. Laxmi Rajoriya and others, 2020(1) M.P.L.J. 156 vide judgment dated 19-8-2019 passed in Second Appeal No. 38 of 2018, has held as under : – “23.Under these circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that once the suit was decreed against the appellants and their counterclaim was rejected, then they should have filed two separate appeals under section 96 of Civil Procedure Code and they could not have filed a cross-objection in an appeal filed by the co-defendant against the decree passed in favour of the plaintiffs. The cross-objection can be filed by a successful party challenging some of the findings which according to the said party should have been answered in his favour, but the cross-objection cannot be filed challenging the entire decree passed against the party filing the cross-objection. Under these circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that the cross-objection filed by the appellants before the first Appellate Court was not maintainable.” 19. Similarly, the present appeal has been filed against the common judgment and decree passed in Civil Appeal Nos. 13-A of 1997, 14-A of 1997 and 3-A of 1998. This Court by order dated 5-9-2019 had passed the following order : – “Shri Dhakad prays for some time to examine that whether single appeal against common judgment and decree passed in two different civil suits is maintainable or not and whether the said defect can be rectified by paying another set of Court fee or not ? Call on 12-9-2019.” 20. Call on 12-9-2019.” 20. It is submitted by the Counsel for the appellant that the appellant should have filed two separate appeals before the First Appellate Court which was not done by him. However, he would like to limit his appeal to the decree by which his counter-claim was rejected. 21. In the present case, not only the counterclaim of the appellant was rejected but the suit filed by Dayaram was also decreed and if the decree passed in favour of Dayaram remains unchallenged, then the consequence would be that there is a decree in favour of Dayaram, by which he has been declared as “title-holder” of the land in dispute by virtue of “Will” executed by Jagannath. Until and unless the decree passed in favour of Dayaram is set aside, no relief can be granted to the appellant by allowing his counterclaim. As the appellant has confined his appeal to the decree by which his counter-claim was rejected, this Court is of the considered view that no fruitful purpose would be served by deciding this appeal on merits because even if the appeal filed by the appellant against dismissal of his counter-claim is allowed, no consequential relief can be granted to the appellant. Accordingly, without deciding the substantial questions of law No. 2 and 3 which were framed by this Court, this appeal is hereby dismissed.