JUDGMENT : This appeal by the husband challenges judgment and order dated 24.09.2018 whereby the learned Family Court Judge at Dharwad, dismissed appellant’s M.C.No.45/2016 that was filed seeking a decree for dissolution of marriage on the grounds of mental ailment of the respondent-wife and adultery. 2. The parties are Hindus; marriage was solemnized on 02.04.2004 at Mansur village in accordance with the customary Hindu law; from the wedlock, the parties begot two male children, one born on 09.10.2005 and the other on 25.03.2008. 3. It is the specific case of the appellant-husband that the respondent-wife had mental ailment that came in maintaining the marital relationship which was not revealed to him prior to the marriage; and subsequent to the marriage, the respondent-wife was living in adultery and roaming with other men. 4. After service of notice, the respondent-wife entered appearance and filed her Objection Statement resisting the petition of the husband. She specifically denied the allegations and took up the contention that the appellant-husband himself had perpetrated acts of cruelty on her. 5. The Court below had framed the following issues which are reflected at internal page 5 of the impugned judgment and order: 1. “Whether the petitioner proves that after the solemnization of his marriage with the respondent, she had treated him with cruelty? 2. Whether he further proves that the respondent is suffering from continuous or intermittent mental disorder of such a kind and to such an extent that he could not reasonably be expected to live with her? 3. Whether the respondent proves that she was ill-treated by the petitioner and he himself being the wrong doer he is not entitled to seek the decree as prayed for in his petition? 4. Whether the petitioner is entitled to seek the petition relief as sought for in the petition?” 6. To prove his case, appellant was examined as PW-1; his father Mr. Kallappa Kurubar was examined as PW-2, and one medical witness from DIMHANS namely Dr. Shreenivas Kosagi was examined as PW-3. In the deposition of PWs-1, 2 and 3, in all seventeen documents came to be marked as Exs.P-1 to P-17. The documents at Exs.P-7, P-10 to P-17 relate to medical records concerning the respondent-wife. Kallappa Kurubar was examined as PW-2, and one medical witness from DIMHANS namely Dr. Shreenivas Kosagi was examined as PW-3. In the deposition of PWs-1, 2 and 3, in all seventeen documents came to be marked as Exs.P-1 to P-17. The documents at Exs.P-7, P-10 to P-17 relate to medical records concerning the respondent-wife. From the side of the respondent, she herself was examined as RW-1; in her deposition, four documents came to be marked which comprised of RTC extracts of the property and the school records of the two children. 7. The trial Court, by its impugned judgment and order, has denied relief to the appellant specifically holding that none of the two charges was proved. Incidentally, it also recorded a finding that the alleged perpetration of cruelty on the respondent-wife was not proved, either. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant is before this Court. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contends that the respondent-wife had the mental ailment even prior to the marriage and he was clandestinely kept in darkness; the Court below is not justified in discounting the version of the medical expert witness namely PW-3 who hails from DIMHANS. The appellant herein and his father having been examined as PWs-1 and 2 have specifically stated as to the adulterous character of the respondent-wife and that no man reasonably trained in law, would have disbelieved the same. Lastly, he contends that the respondent-wife herself having perpetrated cruelty on the appellant-husband by lodging a police complaint and by manhandling, there was sufficient ground for granting a decree of dissolution of marriage, even otherwise also. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and having heard the version of the witness which the learned counsel for the appellant, from the records at his hands, loudly read out. We have carefully perused the findings recorded by the learned Judge of the Family Court. 10. The first contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that there is sufficient material to show that the respondent-wife was suffering from severe mental ailment that came in the way of marital boat sailing smoothly and therefore the Court below on the basis of the material on record ought to have granted a decree for dissolution of the marriage has been substantiated by material on record. Although it was specifically pleaded by the appellant-husband that the respondent-wife had contracted this ailment even much before the marriage, it is the specific statement of PW-3, who is an expert medical witness that alleged ailment, the respondent-wife has acquired after the birth of the second child. This witness was examined from the side of appellant himself. Therefore, the very bonafidy as to the allegation of wife contracting the ailment much before the marriage, is put in crisis. 11. The nature of ailment which the appellant-husband wanted to show as big as coming in the way of marital life, is justifiably disbelieved by the Court below. PW-3, who is an expert medical witness, has specifically stated in his cross-examination that the nature and extent of the mental ailment of respondent-wife would not come in the way of peaceful marital life. The ailments come and go and some ailments stay with us. That per se cannot be a sufficient ground to seek a decree for dissolution of marriage. If that were to be the ground for the dissolution of the marriage, the very institution of the marriage would been unstable. Therefore, it is only a very sever level of mental disorder which is incurable has been recognized by the Parliament as a ground for seeking dissolution of marriage and not every ailment. This aspect of the matter, the trial Court had borne in mind and has recorded a finding on the basis of cogent evidence. No reasonable person prudent in law in the armchair the trial Judge would have arrived at a finding in variance with what is recorded in the impugned judgment. 12. The second ground of adultery is rightly held by the trial Court as having not been proved. True it is, that the adultery cannot be proved by direct evidence. But requirement of the cogent circumstantial evidence cannot be dispensed with. Adultery is a serious charge which often is made by the disgruntled husbands and very rarely proved. To prove this allegation, the appellant got himself examined as PW-1 and got examined his father Kallappa as PW-2. Kallappa has stated in his cross-examination that the respondent-wife had illicit relationship with 2-3 neighbours and that she was seen a number of time in the company of other men. To prove this allegation, the appellant got himself examined as PW-1 and got examined his father Kallappa as PW-2. Kallappa has stated in his cross-examination that the respondent-wife had illicit relationship with 2-3 neighbours and that she was seen a number of time in the company of other men. No material particulars of these men are revealed to the Court either in the deposition or in a sealed cover nor has he offered any explanation for not furnishing the necessary particulars of these people, let alone they being impleaded. He also admits in the cross-examination that no action is taken against these persons with whom allegedly his daughter-in-law has illicit relationship. This appears to be unbecoming of a prudent and reasonable father-in-law. The same applies to the appellant-husband as well who too has not taken any action against these men. In our society, when such things happen, normally, people seek revenge or express anguish against such intruders. There is not even a whisper either in the pleadings or in the deposition. The trial Court having accumulated wisdom has considered this aspect of the matter in the right perspective. We do not have any reason to disagree with the same. 13. Lastly, learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that the respondent herself has made wild allegation against the appellant herein and accordingly the trial Court had framed issue No.3 which the respondent failed to prove and therefore said allegation itself constitutes a cruelty which would be a sufficient ground for granting a decree for dissolution of the marriage. We are afraid, that is not the correct position of law. The appellant had approached the Court with his pleadings. Respondent having appeared before the Court had filed her pleadings. It was open to the appellant herein to amend his pleadings to make the alleged cruelty a ground pleaded. That course was not adopted. Even otherwise also there is no reason as to whether a finding recorded against the wife as to the husband perpetrating cruelty against her being held in the negative, enures to the benefit of the appellant husband for granting a decree of dissolution of marriage. An argument to the contrary would spurn at law, reason and justice of matrimony. 14. In the above circumstances, no other ground having been urged, the appeal being devoid of merits, stands rejected at the admission stage itself. 15. An argument to the contrary would spurn at law, reason and justice of matrimony. 14. In the above circumstances, no other ground having been urged, the appeal being devoid of merits, stands rejected at the admission stage itself. 15. Since we have heard the appeal on merits, the consideration of application in I.A.No.1/2019 for condonation of delay, pales into insignificance. A copy of this judgment shall be sent by the Registry to the respondent-wife forthwith.