JUDGMENT : Sureshwar Thakur, J. Through the instant petition, the petitioner has claimed rendition (s) of hereinafter extracted relief (s):- (a) restrain the respondent from invoking/encashing the performance bank guarantee bearing No. 6288BG00006714 dated 6.11.2013 issued by ICICI bank amounting to Rs.12,53,00,000/-; (b) restrain the respondent from receiving any amount under the aforesaid bank guarantee No. 6288BG00006714 dated 6.11.2013 issued by ICICI bank amounting to Rs.12,53,00,000/- if the said bank guarantee is already invoked; (c) pass an ad-interim ex-parte order in terms of prayer (a) above; (d) award the costs of the present petition in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent; and (e) grant such other or further relief (s) in favour of the petitioner and against Respondent as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.” In pursuance to clause 4.7, as, embodied in the apposite arbitration agreement, clause whereof stands extracted hereinafter:- “4.7 Guarantee and Performance Security (A) The Contractor shall provide to ITNL with a Performance Bank Guarantee in the form set out in Appendix 7 from any scheduled Bank and having a place of business in India (Draft of the Performance Bank Guarantee as per Appendix 7 shall be approved by ITNL before the issuance). The performance security amounting to 5% of the contract Price shall be submitted along with the signing of the contract document. The Performance Security shall be valid upto 6 months after completion of works. (B) The Contractor shall not less than 30 days before the expiry of the Performance Security and any other guarantee issued by the Contractor to ITNL (and any substitute Performance Security if required under this clause 4.7) provide ITNL with a substitute Performance Security which commences on the expiration of the existing Performance Security and is in an amount equivalent to the existing Performance Security and otherwise in the form of the existing Performance Security. If the Contractor fails to provide a substitute Performance Security by the date required in this Clause 4.7 ITNL shall be entitled to call the entire amount of the existing Performance Security and retain it as security for the Contractor's obligations under this Agreement until a substitute Performance Security is provided. (C) Each Performance Security shall be returned to the Contractor within a reasonable time following the expiration of its validity. (C) Each Performance Security shall be returned to the Contractor within a reasonable time following the expiration of its validity. The cost of complying with the requirements of this Clause shall be borne by the Contractor. Hence, at page 37 of the paper book, the contentious bank guarantee stands borne, and, the beneficiary of the afore bank guarantee, is, IL& FS Transportation Networks Ltd. 2. A reading of the pleadings reared before this Court, hence, by the contesting litigants, make (s) candid disclosure (s), qua a dispute arising inter se both, vis-a-vis, satisfactory or unsatisfactory execution (s), rather by the petitioner, of works assigned/awarded thereto, by the respondent herein. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has contended much vigour, before this Court, (i) while relying, upon, a communication embodied in page 242 of the paper book, and, bearing Annexure P-4, that, with graphic reflections being borne therein qua, on 2nd June, 2017, hence, vis-a-vis, the petitioner, hence, trade balance (s) rather being borne in a sum of Rs.17,92,39,270/-, (ii) and, therefrom he draws leverage to contend, that the afore reflections tantamounting, to acquiescence (s), of, the respondent qua the afore sums of money, being amenable for liquidation, hence, by the respondent, to the petitioner, (iii) and, he has also therefrom proceeded, to, hence concomitantly make an argument qua the afore performance security or bank guarantee , upon, its being permitted, to be ecashed by the respondent herein, (iv) would besides causing irreparable loss or injury to the petitioner herein, (v) rather would also slight the underlying salutary purpose, vis-a-vis, its execution, underlying purpose whereof, being qua, despite, the petitioner herein, given the afore trade balance leaning, vis-a-vis, it, and, thereupon also rather, it, naturally satisfactorily executing the awarded works, and, rather upon the respondent being permitted to make encashment (s), of, the afore bank guarantee, it, being encumbered with a gross prejudice. Furthermore, the further dependence (s), in his making, the afore submission, stand (s), also rested, upon, Annexure P- 21, existing at page 454 and 455, of the paper book, wherein, in consonance therewith, the, inclining (s), vis-a-vis, the petitioner, hence, the trade payable, qua it, on 10th January, 2018, stands echoed therein, to be borne, in a sum, of, Rs.17,92,39, 270/-. The learned counsel for the petitioner, in making the afore conjoint reliance (s), upon, the afore, has proceeded to strengthen, his submission, that, hence when the works, were prior thereto, (vi) hence rescinded on 10 January, 2017, rather renders, even the rescinding of the contract, being construable, to, prima facie hence breaching the afore executed contract, (vii) rather emphasisingly, when the afore reflections, stir an inference, qua the contract being satisfactorily executed by the petitioner herein, and, thereupon, the performance security or guarantee also outliving its salutary purpose, and, it being not legally permissible, hence, to be encashable by the respondent. 3. However, before proceeding to mete adjudication (s), upon, the afore espousals, it is also necessary to allude, to the relevant law appertaining, to the validity (ies), of the afore espousals, as, made before this Court. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent, has placed reliance, upon, a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court, as, rendered in a case titled as U.P. State Sugar Corporation vs. SUMAC International Ltd., reported in (1997) 1 SCC 568 , the relevant paragraphs No.11 and 12 whereof, stand extracted hereinafter :- “11. These bank guarantees which are irrevocable in nature, in terms, provide that they are payable by the guarantor to the appellant on demand without demur. They further provide that the appellant shall be the sole judge of whether and to what extent the amount has become recoverable from the respondent or whether the respondent has committed any breach of the terms and conditions of the agreement. The bank guarantees further provide that the right of the purchaser to recover from the guarantor any amount shall not be affected or suspended by reason of any disputes that may have been raised by the respondent with regard to its liability or on the ground that proceedings are pending before any Tribunal, Arbitrator or Court with regard to such dispute. The guarantor shall immediately pay the guaranteed amount to the appellant-purchasers on demand. 12. The law relating to invocation of such bank guarantees is by now well settled. When in the course of commercial dealings an unconditional bank guarantee is given or accepted, the beneficiary is entitled to realize such a bank guarantee in terms thereof irrespective of any pending disputes. The bank giving such a guarantee is bound to honour it as per its terms irrespective of any dispute raised by its customer. When in the course of commercial dealings an unconditional bank guarantee is given or accepted, the beneficiary is entitled to realize such a bank guarantee in terms thereof irrespective of any pending disputes. The bank giving such a guarantee is bound to honour it as per its terms irrespective of any dispute raised by its customer. The very purpose of giving such a bank guarantee would otherwise be defeated. The courts should, therefore, be slow in granting an injunction to restrain the realization of such a bank guarantee. The courts have carved out only two exceptions. A fraud in connection with such a bank guarantee would vitiate the very foundation of such a bank guarantee. Hence if there is such a fraud of which the beneficiary seeks to take advantage, he can be restrained from doing so. The second exception relates to cases where allowing the encashment of an unconditional bank guarantee would result in irretrievable harm or injustice to one of the parties concerned. Since in most cases payment of money under such a bank guarantee would adversely affect the bank and its customer at whose instance the guarantee is given, the harm or injustice contemplated under this head must be of such an exceptional and irretrievable nature as would override the terms of the guarantee and the adverse effect of such an injunction on commercial dealings in the country. The two grounds are not necessarily connected, though both may co-exist in some cases. In the case of U.P. Cooperative Federation Ltd. v. Singh Consultants and Engineers (P) Ltd. (988 [1] SCC 174), which was the case of works contract where the performance guarantee given under the contract was sought to be invoked, this Court, after referring extensively to English and Indian cases on the subject, said that the guarantee must be honoured in accordance with its terms. The bank which gives the guarantee is not concerned in the least with the relations between the supplier and the customer; nor with the question whether the suppler has performed his contractual obligation or not, nor with the question whether the supplier is in default or not. The bank must pay according to the tenor of its guarantee on demand without proof or condition. There are only two exceptions to this rule. The first exception is a case when there is a clear fraud of which the bank has notice. The bank must pay according to the tenor of its guarantee on demand without proof or condition. There are only two exceptions to this rule. The first exception is a case when there is a clear fraud of which the bank has notice. The fraud must be of an agregious nature such as to vitiate the entire underlying transaction. Explaining the kind of fraud that may absolve a bank from honouring its guarantee, this Court in the above case quoted with approval the observations of Sir John Donaldson, M.R. in Bolivinter Oil SA v. Chase Manhattan Bank NA (1984 [1] AER 351 at 352): "The wholly exceptional case where an injunction may be granted is where it is proved that the bank knows that any demand for payment already made or which may thereafter be made will clearly be fraudulent. But the evidence must be clear both as to the fact of fraud and as to the bank's knowledge. It would certainly not normally be sufficient that this rests on the uncorroborated statement of the customer, for irreparable damage can be done to a bank's credit in the relatively brief time which must elapse between the granting of such an injunction and an application by the bank to have it charged". This Court set aside an injunction granted by the High Court to restrain the realisation of the bank guarantee.” wherein, the Hon'ble Apex Court, has settled, the law appertaining to the entitlement (s) or disentitlement (s) of the beneficiary (ies), of, the apposite bank guarantee. The hereinabove extracted paragraphs, make clear, and, candid expostulations of law qua (i) the beneficiary of the bank guarantee, rather holding an infeasible right, to ensure its realization or its encashment, dehors, any or all pending disputes, arising from the apposite contract (ii) and, the bank issuing, the requisite, guarantee rather being enjoined with a sacrosanct obligation, and, irrespective of any dispute raised, by its customer, hence to ensure its encashment, at the instance, of, beneficiary (ies) thereof, (iii) and, if the afore apposite realization is not ensured, and, the beneficiary's right, to seek its realization is scuttled, thereupon, the salutary purpose, underlying the making of the bank guarantee, rather being untenably defeated. However, therein two exceptions to the afore principles are carved. However, therein two exceptions to the afore principles are carved. (iv) A fraud in connection with such a bank guarantee, hence, vitiating the very foundation, of, the apposite bank guarantee, (v) thereupon permitting, the, encashment, of, an unconditional bank guarantee, hence, sequelling irretrievable harm or injustice being encumbered, upon, one of the party concerned. The genre of fraud, hence, vitiating, and, shaking the foundation, of the bank guarantee, should rather evidently, hold concomitant cascadings deleterious effects, upon, commercial dealings, in the country. The afore principle of law, finds reiteration (s), in a verdict rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court, in a case titled, as, Himadari Chemicals Industries Ltd. vs. Coal Tar Refining Co., reported in (2007)8 SCC 110 , and, the requisite principles, as enshrined therein, are, borne in paragraph No.14, paragraph No.14 whereof reads as under:- “14. From the discussions made hereinabove relating to the principles for grant or refusal to grant of injunction to restrain enforcement of a Bank Guarantee or a Letter of Credit, we find that the following principles should be noted in the matter of injunction to restrain the encashment of a Bank Guarantee or a Letter of Credit :- (i) While dealing with an application for injunction in the course of commercial dealings, and when an unconditional Bank Guarantee or Letter of Credit is given or accepted, the Beneficiary is entitled to realize such a Bank Guarantee or a Letter of Credit in terms thereof irrespective of any pending disputes relating to the terms of the contract. (ii) The Bank giving such guarantee is bound to honour it as per its terms irrespective of any dispute raised by its customer. (iii) The Courts should be slow in granting an order of injunction to restrain the realization of a Bank Guarantee or a Letter of Credit. (iv) Since a Bank Guarantee or a Letter of Credit is an independent and a separate contract and is absolute in nature, the existence of any dispute between the parties to the contract is not a ground for issuing an order of injunction to restrain enforcement of Bank Guarantees or Letters of Credit. (v) Fraud of an egregious nature which would vitiate the very foundation of such a Bank Guarantee or Letter of Credit and the beneficiary seeks to take advantage of the situation. (v) Fraud of an egregious nature which would vitiate the very foundation of such a Bank Guarantee or Letter of Credit and the beneficiary seeks to take advantage of the situation. (vi) Allowing encashment of an unconditional Bank Guarantee or a Letter of Credit would result in irretrievable harm or injustice to one of the parties concerned.” A reading of clause (iv) of para 14, of, the judgment supra, makes a categorical and explicit expression, of law, (a) that, an unconditional bank guarantee, or a letter of credit, being an independent, and, a separate contract, and, is absolute in nature, (b) and, its clout, even, upon emergence or existence of any dispute inter se the parties qua the contract rather not constituting any valid ground, for, restraining, through, court injunction, the, encashment or enforcement, of, a bank guarantee or letter (s) of credit. Even, the, afore trite excepting principle, borne therein vis-a-vis, no injunction being grantable against, the, encashment, of, a bank guarantee, and, trite exception (s) whereof, is, rested, upon, evident irretrievable harm being encumbered, upon, the party concerned, (c) and, also further when it rather stands hence fully expatiated, and, dilated in paragraph No. 17 (i), borne in Himadari Chemicals's case (supra), and, the apt dilation thereof, is, rested, (d) upon, evident exceptional emergences, of, emergent circumstances, rather personificatory qua, the guarantor being precluded, to reimburse himself, vis-a-vis, the amount (s) borne, in, the bank guarantee, upon its/his ultimately succeeding, in a dispute arising/emerging, from the apposite contract, conspicuously, upon, declining, of, injunction, qua its encashment, vis-a-vis, it/him. 4. The dependence (s), by the learned counsel appearing, upon, the afore material existing on record, and, his thereafter relying, upon clause (vi) borne, in, of para 14 embodied, in the verdict rendered, by Hon'ble Apex Court, in Himadari Chemicals' case (supra), is/are gross mis-dependence (s) thereon, as (a) both the afore annexures, are, apparently made, at the instance, and, at the motion of the petitioner herein, (b) and, hence, the making of the afore obviously, cannot be concluded, to be bilateral, rather is/are to be concluded, to be unilateral, (c) whereupon, the afore reflection (s), as stand, echoed therein, rather engendering a conclusion qua theirs, being prima facie engineered, and, motivated by the petitioner herein. Even otherwise, the underlying subtle nuance, of, clause (vi) of Para 14 borne, in, the verdict rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court, in Himadri Chemicals' case (supra), and, thereafter, in, extenso dilated, in paragraph No.17 thereof, (d) and, when derivation (s) of leverage, if any, upon, clause (iv) thereof, also enjoins existence, of, material, exemplificatory qua an imminent disability being encumbered, upon, the guarantor, vis-avis, reimbursements, of, amounts borne therein, and, the apposite disability (ies), rather standing sparked by evident emergences, of, exceptional emergent circumstances, (e) conspicuously, upon, his/its ultimately hence succeeding in the lis rather engaging the beneficiary and the guarantor, thereupon, its being defficult, to realise the awarded sums/decretal sums, from the respondent, hence, the espoused injunction being renderable. However, no material in tandem therewith hence exists on record, excepting a stray averment, borne in the petition, qua upon, the espoused permission being granted, vis-a-vis, the respondent to encash the bank guarantee, it sequeling great irretrievable harm, and, hardship, to the petitioner, and, hence also leading, to, financially destablizing, the petitioner company, despite, its, already reeling under huge financial stress. However, the afore bald averments, without any further averment nor supporting material qua, the, extant bankruptcy, or imminent/impeding bankcruptcy, of the respondent, or are, hence insufficient to constitute, the requisite emergent circumstances, qua, hence, even upon the guarantor, rather succeeding in the lis, arising out, of the contract, drawn, inter se it, and, the respondent therein, (f) thereupon, it being precluded to realize, from, the respondents, the amount borne, in the bank guarantee. Thereupon, the afore lack of tandem therewith or concurrent therewith material, for, hence ensuring satiation, of, the afore principle encapsulated in clause (vi) of para 14, of, Himadri Chemicals' case (supra), (g) principle whereof, is, further fully expatiated, in paragraph 17 thereof, rather begets a conclusion, qua, the petitioner hence abysmally failing to establish qua, upon, his securing success, in the apt litigation, thereupon, upon, permission being granted, vis-a-vis, encashment of the bank guarantee, hence irretrievable harm, and, injustice being encumbered upon it. The further reason hence constraining this Court to conclude, qua even the afore submission, harboured, upon, anvil qua despite, it, satisfactorily rather executing works, as, awarded to it, (h) yet, the, apposite contract (s) being untenably rescinded, and, hence, there, is imminent likelihood of its succeeding in the lis, as has, arisen or may arise, vis-a-vis, sums of money payable, in pursuance, to, purported complete satisfactory execution, of, apt work, (I) is, also prima facie, eclipsed by an averment, cast in paragraph No.23 of the petition, qua the respondent rather beseeching the petitioner for joint verification, and, reconciliation of the works, hence at a belated stage, and, also claiming amounts towards rectification costs. The afore bald averment, is construable, to be an acquiescence of the petitioner, qua the afore request (s) being made, upon it, for joint verification of works, and, when thereafter, no scribed communication stands placed on record, and, it rather unveiling qua the afore request being acceded or declined, rather upon, only valid, and, tangible reasons, (j) thereupon, it is to be concluded, that, the entire edifice, of the petitioner's submission, that prima facie, the petitioner, despite, satisfactorily completing the works, (k) yet the contract being unjustifiably rescinded by the respondent, rather being jettisoned, (l) hence, it being also estopped to make any submission, before this Court, that, any validly, due and outstanding sums of money, yet, remaining unliquidated, vis-a-vis, it by the respondent, (m) AND, obviously hence, no further submission, can also, be justifiably reared before this Court, that, prima facie, the petitioner company, would validly succeed, in the lis which may arise or has already arisen inter se it, and, the respondent, (n) and, that in case the espoused interim injunction is not accorded, vis-a-vis, it, thereupon, rather vis-a-vis, the amounts validly determined, vis-a-vis, the petitioner, rather being unamenable, for, realisation rather excepting, upon, the bank guarantee being kept alive, for the afore purpose. 5. Be that as it may, the afore conundrum besetting this Court, is, also settled, by a judgment rendered, by the Hon'ble Apex Court, in a case titled, as General Electric Technical Services Company Inc. Punj Sons (P) Ltd. And another, reported in (1991)4 SCC 230 , the relevant paragraph No.9 whereof stands extracted hereinafter:- “9. The question is whether the Court was justified in restraining the Bank from paying to GETSCO under the bank guarantee at the instance of respondent-1. Punj Sons (P) Ltd. And another, reported in (1991)4 SCC 230 , the relevant paragraph No.9 whereof stands extracted hereinafter:- “9. The question is whether the Court was justified in restraining the Bank from paying to GETSCO under the bank guarantee at the instance of respondent-1. The law as to the contractual obligations under the bank guarantee has been well settled in a catenae of cases. Almost all such cases have been considered in a recent judgment of this Court in U.P. Cooperative Federation Ltd. v. Singh Consultants and Engineers (P) Ltd., [1988] 1 SCC 174 wherein Sabyasachi Mukherji, J., as he then was, observed (at 189) 'that in order to restrain the operation either of irrevocable letter of credit or of confirmed letter of credit or of bank guarantee, there should be serious dispute and there should be good prima facie case of fraud and special equities in the form of preventing irretrievable injustice between the parties. Otherwise, the very purpose of bank guarantees would be negatived and the fabric of trading operations will get jeopardised'. It was further observed that the Bank must honour the bank guarantee free from interference by the Courts. Otherwise, trust in commerce internal and international would be irreparably damaged. It is only in exceptional cases that is to say in case of fraud or in case of irretrievable injustice, the Court should interfere. In the concurring opinion one of us (K. Jagannatha Shetty, J.) has observed that whether it is a traditional bond or performance guarantee, the obligation of the Bank appears to be the same. If the documentary credits are irrevocable and independent, the Bank must pay when demand is made. Since the Bank pledges its own credit involving its reputation, it has no defence except in the case of fraud. The Bank's obligations of course should not be extended to protest the unscrupulous party, that is, the party who is responsible for the fraud. But the banker must be sure of his ground before declining to pay. The nature of the fraud that the courts talk about is fraud of an "egregious nature as to vitiate the entire underlying transaction". The Bank's obligations of course should not be extended to protest the unscrupulous party, that is, the party who is responsible for the fraud. But the banker must be sure of his ground before declining to pay. The nature of the fraud that the courts talk about is fraud of an "egregious nature as to vitiate the entire underlying transaction". It is fraud of the beneficiary, not the fraud of somebody else.” Further the afore principle qua the bank, being rather obliged, hence, to honour the bank guarantee, since, the bank concerneds' credit and repudiation, in declining, to the beneficiary, the encashment, of, the bank guarantee, hence, is at stake, (a) thereupon, its encashment, being the rule, and, the apposite exception, qua its declining, rather the bank guarantee, hence, vis-a-vis, the beneficiary, being, recoursable, and, also being well founded, upon, prima facie echoings, made, by cogent material, qua his/its beneficiary thereof, hence indulging in fraud. In consonance therewith, (b) however, the petitioner, has except its, making only a stray and bald afore averment, hence has not made any further averment, qua upon declining, of, the espoused injunction, rather thereupon this Court condoning, hence, elements of deep vice (s), of, vitiatory fraud (s), and, it hence evidently concomitantly shaking the foundation of the bank guarantee, and, all rather fully surfacing. Furthermore, even the afore material, as placed on record in support, of the afore submission, also, omits to beget satiation, of the afore principle, (b) importantly when, the, contemplated therein genre, of, fraud, rather enjoins, it, being well rested, upon, clear averments besides satiating therewith material, hence, also making amplifying echoings qua elements, of, deepest fraud rather permeating, the, execution, and, the making of the bank guarantee. Consequently, abysmal lack, of, afore averments, in the petition, do not, visibly permit the petitioner to encash, upon, the afore contemplated, hence, genre, of, fraud, borne in the judgment supra, nor hence, the petitioner can constrain this Court, to, grant the espoused relief qua it. 6. Even otherwise, the egregious nature, of, hence fraud rather underlying the bank guarantee, stands dwelt upon, by the Hon'ble Apex Court, in a verdict rendered, in a case titled, as U.P. State Sugar Corporation versus SUMAC international Ltd., reported in (1997)1 SCC 568 , wherein, it stands enshrined qua it being generated, upon, it also carrying adverse effect (s), on commercial transactions, in the country. However, in succoring, the afore expostulation of law, vis-a-vis, egregious fraud rather underlying the making of, the, extant bank guarantee, and, also with want, of, satiating therewith, hence, material on record, (a) and, rather when, for reasons aforestated, the petitioner, has, an indefeasible right to encash it, irrespective, of, any dispute likely to emerge or subsisting inter se the parties at contest, and, appertaining , vis-a-vis, the covenanted therewith hence contracts, (b) thereupon, when reiteratedly, the, afore genre, of, fraud, rather remains un-displayed, by any tangible material hence on record, nor when, upon, the espoused injunction being declined, rather hence the commercial dealing (s) in the country, being the ensuing catastrophe, is, displayed to beget satiation. In sequel, the afore submission is entirely rudderless, and, merits dismissal. Consequently, the prayer of the petitioner, for, grant, of, interim injunction qua the respondent being restrained, from, encashing the bank guarantee, is, rejected. 7. The learned counsel, appearing for the petitioner, and,l for the respondent, make contra submissions, qua this Court not holding jurisdiction, and, this Court holding jurisdiction, to make an order, upon, the instant petition, and, for determining, the afore submission, clause 18.3 of the agreement, stands extracted hereinafter:- “18.3 Arbitration. (A) In the event that the parties are unable to resolve any dispute, controversy, or claim in accordance with 18.1. or 18.2, such dispute, controversy or claim shall be finally settled by a panel of arbitrators (the “Arbitration Panel”) in accordance with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 with re-enactments or amendments thereof. The Arbitration Panel shall consist of three parties. ITNL and Contractor shall appoint one arbitrator each and such arbitrators shall, within seven days of their appointment, designate a third Person to act as presiding arbitrator in order to organize an Arbitration Panel. The arbitral proceedings shall take place in Mumbai and shall be conducted in English language. The award of the arbitrators shall be a reasoned one giving reasons for each claim allowed and disallowed and shall be final and binding on the parties. (B) Any dispute, controversy or claim referred to the Arbitration Panel in accordance with subsection (a) above shall be considered a commercial dispute arising under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.” The relevant portion thereof, echoes, qua all arbitral proceedings, being, conducted at Mumbai, and, the afore proceedings hence being conducted in English language. (B) Any dispute, controversy or claim referred to the Arbitration Panel in accordance with subsection (a) above shall be considered a commercial dispute arising under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.” The relevant portion thereof, echoes, qua all arbitral proceedings, being, conducted at Mumbai, and, the afore proceedings hence being conducted in English language. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent, has placed reliance,upon, a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court, rendered in a case titled as Indus Mobile Distribution Private Ltd. vs. Datawind Innovations Private Limited, reported in (2017)7 SCC 678 , and,l has hence contended, that, the afore clause, is in tandem with the afore verdict, and, when therein, it stands enshrined qua where (a) upon contracting parties, hence, determining, the, arbitration seat or the venue, of, arbitration, thereupon, the afore contractual covenant, visa- vis, seat of arbitration, also per se vesting jurisdiction in the court (s), wherewithin whose territorial limits, the, contractually covenanted seat, of arbitration also exists, (b) and, hence on anvil, of the afore clause, rather this Court also being barred to render a decision, upon, the extant petition. He has also proceeded, to contend that, when in the extant agreement, the parties, contractually designate Mumbai, to be the place of arbitration, hence, the afore venue, entails, upon, the parties rather an obligation, to succumb to the jurisdiction, of courts located at Mumbai. 8. However, the afore submission, addressed by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent, is, anvilled, upon, a piecemeal reading, of, the verdict supra, and, is also anchored, upon, his being oblivious, to, the striking distinguishing therefrom factual scenario hence hereat, (a) and, appertaining to, vis-a-vis, the afore judgment, rather not emanating, from, any alike herewith apposite clause, rather, therein, the, covenanted and designated seat, of arbitration, being also contractually constituted, to, hence therethrough (s) jurisdiction, being also vested in Courts rather located at Mumbai, for, theirs holding trial, of, all disputes, hence arising inter se the litigating parties, from, the thereat contract. However, reiteratedly, the afore extracted clause, existing in the extant agreement, excepting, its, designating Mumbai, to be, the, venue of arbitration, and, also qua it covenanting, all proceedings being carried in English language, rather does not, in tandem with, the afore clause, occurring in Indus Mobile case (supra), (b) carry any further, contractual covenant, qua the courts located, within, the territory of the afore designated arbitration venue, also holding jurisdiction, to try and entertain or render adjudication (s), vis-a-vis, all differences, and, disputes arising out of or in connection, with, the extant contract. Even otherwise, the afore judgment, is not, in departure, from, the decision rendered, by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Bharat Aluminium Company vs. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., reported in (2012)9 SCC 552 , rather, (a) is, in consonance therewith, it also has made apposite segregations, and, thereupon, clear expostulations, of, law qua there being no overlapping, vis-a-vis, the provisions contained in Part-I, and, in Part-II, of the Arbitration Act, and, also it has declared qua all laws articulated in Part-I of the Arbitration Act, only holding, applicability, vis-a-vis, arbitration proceedings, held within the country, and, the afore part also rather hence, being applicable, only, vis-a-vis, domestic arbitration, (b) and, in addition, the verdict of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in Indus Mobile's case (supra), alike the verdict rendered in Bharat Aluminium Company's case (supra), also dwells, upon, the statutory definition assigned, vis-a-vis, court, and, as existing in Section 2 (e), of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, provisions whereof stand extracted hereinafter:- “2. Definitions.- (1) In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires- (e) “Court” means the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction in a district, and, includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having, jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, but does not include any civil court of a grade inferior to such Principal Civil Court or any Court of Small Causes;” (c) AND, has, in consonance, with, the, verdict rendered in Bharat Aluminim Company's case (supra), and, upon, applying the afore statutory definition, of, Courts, vis-a-vis, the afore relevant clause, wherethrough, exclusive jurisdiction, is, also contractually vested, visa- vis, the subject matter, in dispute, in the courts located at Mumbai, dehors, the afore venue of arbitration, being the contractual arbitral seat, (d) rather hence reiteratedly, on cumulative construction (s) thereof hence concluded, that the contracting parties, upon, designating Mumbai to be venue, of, arbitration, also, contractually rather conferring the apt jurisdiction, and, for all relevant purposes, upon, Courts hence located thereat, (e) thereupon, reiteratedly when rather in contradistinction therefrom, the clause, existing hereat, though, designates Mumbai to be the seat, of the arbitral situs, yet when it is reticent, vis-a-vis, the subject matter of arbitration being also triable by the Courts located, at Mumbai, thereupon, this Court has the jurisdiction, to try, and, entertain the extant lis. 9. Even though at the fag end, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent, has placed reliance, upon, a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in a case titled as Union of India Vs. Hardy Exploration and Production, Civil Appeal No.4628 of 2018, and, hence contends, that, with, in the afore decision, a reference being made to the larger Bench, and, the decision, of the Hon'ble Apex Court, rendered in Bharat Aluminus Company's case (supra) being also encapsulated, in the apposite reference, hence, no reliance can be placed thereon. However, the afore submission is not amenable for acceptance, given, a reading of the paragraph No.23 thereof, para whereof stands extracted hereinafter:- “23. However, the afore submission is not amenable for acceptance, given, a reading of the paragraph No.23 thereof, para whereof stands extracted hereinafter:- “23. In our opinion, though, the question regarding the “seat” and “venue” for holding arbitration proceedings by the arbitrators arising under the Arbitration Agreement/International Commercial Arbitration Agreement is primarily required to be decided, keeping in view the terms of the arbitration agreement itself, but having regard the law laid down by this Court in several decisions by the Benches of variable strength as detailed above, and, further taking into consideration the aforementioned submissions urged by the learned counsel for the parties and also keeping in view the issues involved in the appeal, which frequently arise in International Commercial Arbitration matters, we are of the considered view that this is a fit case to exercise our power under Order VI Rule 2 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 and refer this case (appeal) to be dealt with by the larger Bench of this Court for its hearing.” (c) rather with clarity making clear bespeaking qua the afore reference hence appertaining to International Commercial Arbitration matters, and, when the category, of the lis, engaging the parties at contest hereat, does not fall, within the afore category, (d) rather is candidly, and, uncontestedly, a domestic arbitration, and, whereto Part-I of the Arbitration Act applies, (e) and, when, vis-a-vis, the afore part of the Arbitration Act, therein is no wrangle, qua both the subject matter, of, the relevant Arbitration clause, as, also the arbitral jurisdictional seat, both being fathomable, from, rather in consonance therewith, clear and explicit expression (s) hence, existing in the contract, (f) and, when rather the afore distinctive clause hereat, vis-a-vis, the verdict supra, hence, constrains this Court to exercise jurisdiction, upon, the extant lis, (g) thereupon, the afore reference when reiteratedly, does not, appertain, vis-a-vis, the genre, of, the extant lis, hence, this Court, is, of the firm view, that, in consonance with the verdict, rendered in Indus Mobile Distribution case (supra), this Court hence holding jurisdiction (s), to try, the extant lis. 10. In view of the above, it is held that this Court has the jurisdiction to try and entertain the instant petition, and, further the prayer of the petitioner qua ad-inter injunction, hence, restraining the respondent from invoking/encashing the bank guarantee, is, also rejected. 10. In view of the above, it is held that this Court has the jurisdiction to try and entertain the instant petition, and, further the prayer of the petitioner qua ad-inter injunction, hence, restraining the respondent from invoking/encashing the bank guarantee, is, also rejected. Any observations made hereinabove is only for deciding the prayer made for interim injunction, and, shall not have any bearings, on the merits, of, the case (s) of the contesting parties.