JUDGMENT : The insurer in a proceedings for compensation before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal has come up in this appeal challenging the decision of the Tribunal in granting compensation to the claimant, on the ground that the claim was not live and surviving. 2. The relevant facts are the following:- The claimant in the proceedings sustained injuries in a motor accident took place on 02.05.2006 involving a vehicle insured with the appellant. The claim petition was instituted after about 9 years, on 24.03.2015. The owner and driver of the vehicle contested the claim petition contending that they are unable to trace the records of the vehicle. The insurer of the vehicle contested the claim petition contending that the claim petition is not maintainable as the claim is not one which is live and surviving. The Tribunal rejected the contentions raised by the respondents in the proceedings and permitted the claimant to realise a sum of Rs.11,80,800/-by way of compensation from the insurer. As noted, the insurer is aggrieved by the said decision of the Tribunal. 3. Heard the learned senior counsel for the appellant as also the learned counsel for the claimant in the proceedings. 4. The learned senior counsel for the appellant contended that though there is no period of limitation prescribed for preferring applications for compensation before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, the same shall be preferred within a reasonable time. According to the learned senior counsel, the claim petition in the instant case which was instituted after about nine years of the accident can never be treated as one instituted within a reasonable time. It was also contended by the learned senior counsel that a liberal approach in a matter like this, as one adopted by the Tribunal, would cause substantial prejudice to the other parties. The submission of the learned senior counsel, therefore, was that the Tribunal ought not have entertained the claim petition. 5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the claimant submitted that the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 being social welfare in nature, in the absence of any time limit prescribed under the statute, an application for compensation cannot be rejected by the Tribunal as belated. 5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the claimant submitted that the provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 being social welfare in nature, in the absence of any time limit prescribed under the statute, an application for compensation cannot be rejected by the Tribunal as belated. It was also contended by the learned counsel that in a case of this nature, where there is no dispute as to the insurance coverage, there is absolutely no reason for this court to interfere with the decision taken by the Tribunal. 6. I have bestowed my anxious consideration to the facts and the submissions made by the learned counsel on either side. 7. Prior to the introduction of appropriate provisions in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the victims of motor accidents and their legal representatives had to institute suits for realisation of compensation. The period of limitation then was two years for fatal accident claims and three years for other claims. Later, when appropriate provisions were introduced by way of amendment in the said statute, a period six months was prescribed for lodging the claims. Of course, the proviso to sub section (3) of Section 110A of the said Act which prescribed the said period of limitation provided that the Tribunal may entertain an application even after the expiry of six months, if the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application on time. When the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was substituted by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, sub section (3) of Section 166 of the statute provided that no application for compensation shall be entertained by the Tribunal unless it is made within six months. A similar proviso as in sub section (3) of Section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was there in sub section (3) of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 also which provided that the Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of six months, but not later than 12 months, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application on time. It can, therefore, be taken that in terms of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the period of limitation for preferring applications for compensation was one year, as the Tribunal was precluded from entertaining claim petitions after one year. It can, therefore, be taken that in terms of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the period of limitation for preferring applications for compensation was one year, as the Tribunal was precluded from entertaining claim petitions after one year. Sub section (3) of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was deleted by way of an amendment to the statute w.e.f. 14.11.1994. The question whether the said amendment was intended to enable the victims of motor accidents or their legal representatives to approach the Tribunal for compensation at their own sweet time, has been considered by the Apex Court in Purohit & Co. v. Khatoonbee [ (2017)4 SCC 783 ]. It was held in the said case that, even though there may no longer be a defined period of limitation for approaching the Tribunal for compensation after the amendment to the statute referred to above, yet the claimants have to approach the Tribunal for compensation within a reasonable time. It was also held by the Apex Court in that case that only a live and surviving claim can be considered by the Tribunal and it is not open to all and sundry to approach the Tribunal raising a claim for compensation, as and when choose. In other words, the period during which the claim can be said to be live and surviving, can be considered as the reasonable time for preferring the claim petition. In every case where a plea as to the maintainability is taken on the ground of delay, the question to be examined is whether the claim raised is live and surviving, or has it become stale. 8. Before examining the question whether the claim raised by the respondent before the Tribunal is a stale one, it is necessary to refer to the principles behind the rule of practice that a stale claim shall not be adjudicated by a court. 8. Before examining the question whether the claim raised by the respondent before the Tribunal is a stale one, it is necessary to refer to the principles behind the rule of practice that a stale claim shall not be adjudicated by a court. The principles behind the said rule are that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them; that one with a good cause would pursue the action in natural course of events within a reasonable time; that it is unfair to expect one to keep and maintain proof of all that is happening in life indefinitely for the mere chance of litigations at some point of time, and that it is unfair to expect a person to lead a life with a claim hanging over him for an indefinite period. A claim that has long remained un-asserted; one that is first asserted after an unexplained delay which is so long as to render it difficult or impossible for the court to ascertain the truth of the matter in controversy and do justice between the parties or as to create a presumption against the existence or validity of the claim or a perception that the claim has been abandoned or satisfied, can be said to be a stale claim [See Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition)]. A claim which is not stale alone can be said to be live and surviving. 9. Reverting to the facts, as noted, the claim petition was filed almost after nine years of the accident. A victim of a motor accident placed in identical or similar circumstances would not have taken such a long period of time to prefer an application for compensation, as the injuries sustained in the accident and the consequent sufferings would, in normal and natural course of events, instigate him to avail the remedies available to him for redressal of his grievance. Now, let us see whether there has been any reason that precluded the claimant from preferring the application within the time normally and reasonably taken by others. No explanation, whatsoever, is furnished by the claimant in the claim petition for the inordinate delay, and the claim petition is preferred as if the claimant is entitled to prefer the same at his sweet time in the absence of any period of limitation prescribed for the same. No explanation, whatsoever, is furnished by the claimant in the claim petition for the inordinate delay, and the claim petition is preferred as if the claimant is entitled to prefer the same at his sweet time in the absence of any period of limitation prescribed for the same. In column 25 of the application, it was, however, stated by the claimant that he was bedridden completely for an year after the accident; that he was bedridden partially for almost two years thereafter and that thereafter he was on a very restricted movement for about three years. The averments made in column 25 of the application read thus: “The petitioner was fully bed ridden for one year from the date of the accident and was partially bed ridden for next 2 years and was with highly restricted movement of further 3 years. Thus, for 5 years from the date of the accident he was fully disabled to work and even now he is not able to walk freely and for carrying any weight etc. Thus, his physical life is very much spoiled. Still, his foot is not completely cured to its' original position with sufficient flesh and skin with required firmness. He also suffered great pain and suffering during these days and still continues that.” Even if it is admitted that the extracted statements are true and correct, and the same would preclude a victim of a motor accident from preferring an application for compensation, the aforesaid statements cannot be accepted as a cause or reason for the claimant for having not instituted the claim petition, at least after six years of the accident. It is thus evident that it is a case where the claimant has consciously and voluntarily forgone his right to claim compensation, for reasons best known to him. When a person relinquishes a right available to him with the intention of not reclaiming it, it would amount to abandonment. An abandoned claim cannot be considered as live and surviving. Even otherwise, the proceedings before the Tribunal being inquisitorial in nature, the Tribunal has to find out the truth of the case set out by the parties. When a person relinquishes a right available to him with the intention of not reclaiming it, it would amount to abandonment. An abandoned claim cannot be considered as live and surviving. Even otherwise, the proceedings before the Tribunal being inquisitorial in nature, the Tribunal has to find out the truth of the case set out by the parties. In so far as the proceedings involves adjudication of issues relating to negligence, liability in terms of policy of insurance, and otherwise, it may not be possible for a Tribunal to ascertain the truth of the case set out by the parties correctly, if the proceedings are not instituted within a reasonable time, for, in delayed proceedings, the parties may not be in a position to adduce evidence as in the proceedings instituted promptly after the accident, and the possibility of the opposite parties suffering adverse awards on account of the laches on the part of the claimant in approaching the Tribunal promptly, cannot be ruled out. The claim raised in the case on hand, which was instituted after about nine years of the accident, can be considered only as a stale claim also for the reason that nine years is not a period during which parties involved in matters of this nature are expected to maintain relevant records. In the circumstances, I am constrained to hold that the claim petition as instituted ought not have been entertained by the Tribunal. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned award is set aside and the claim petition is dismissed.