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2019 DIGILAW 672 (JHR)

Bhagwan Singh v. India Oil Corporation Ltd.

2019-03-08

SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

body2019
JUDGMENT : 1. This writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, wherein order dated 16.11.2011 passed in Eviction Appeal No.01 of 2011 by the learned District Judge, Saraikella is under challenge whereby and whereunder the appeal preferred against the order dated 08.09.2011 passed by the Estate Officer (Annexure-2), which has been affirmed by the appellate court in pursuance to the provision conferred to him under Section 9 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971. 2. The brief facts of the case of the petitioner that he has entered into an agreement for retail outlet with the I.B.P. Company Ltd. For a period of 90 years as on 19.11.1999 and thereafter he has started carrying out his business, in course of the subsistence period of the contract as per the decision taken, the I.B.P. has merged with the India Oil Corporation in the year 2007 and thereafter he became the dealer of the Indian Oil Corporation and carried out his business in pursuance to the terms and conditions of the contract but the said contract has been terminated by the Indian Oil Corporation vide order dated 24.07.2009. However the petitioner has assailed the aforesaid order of termination of the contract by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court by filing writ petition before it. The authorities of the Indian Oil Corporation has made an application for initiation of a proceeding for eviction of the petitioner from the premises by invoking the jurisdiction conferred under the Act, 1971, the Estate Officer initiated a proceeding in view of the power conferred to him under Section 5 of the Act wherein the order of eviction has been passed treating the petitioner as unauthorized occupants. The petitioner being aggrieved with the same has invoked the jurisdiction of appellate court as per the provision contained it under Section 9 of the Act, 1971 the appellate court has confirmed the order passed by the Estate Officer against which this writ petition has been filed. 3. Mr. The petitioner being aggrieved with the same has invoked the jurisdiction of appellate court as per the provision contained it under Section 9 of the Act, 1971 the appellate court has confirmed the order passed by the Estate Officer against which this writ petition has been filed. 3. Mr. Mahesh Tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioner has argued out the case by assailing the order passed by the appellate court on the following grounds:- (I) The ground of jurisdiction has not been considered either by the Estate Officer or by the appellate court, since according to him the Estate Officer of the State of Bihar is having no jurisdiction to act as an Estate Officer of the property falling within the territory of the State of Jharkhand, therefore the order is without jurisdiction hence is not sustainable. (II) The factual aspect has been urged before the appellate court but in a very haste manner the appeal has been disposed of by confirming the order passed by the Estate Office therefore, as such there is no proper appreciation of the factual aspects hence not sustainable. (III) The petitioner has vested huge amount of money on the basis of tender of the contract which was for 90 years but due to the said eviction the petitioner will suffer irreparable loss. 4. Mr. A.N. Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the Indian Oil Corporation, has submitted that the Estate Officer or the appellate court has committed no illegality in passing the order, it is for the reason that the Estate Officer acting as Estate Officer is within the jurisdiction since by virtue of the gazette notification dated 12.12.2007 the power has been conferred upon the Senior Law Manager is to act as a Estate Officer, who is having its office in Patna who is having with the jurisdiction to deal with the public premises falling within the jurisdiction of the State of Jharkhand, therefore, the question of jurisdiction as has been urged by the petitioner is having no force. He has submitted that the contract having been terminated on 24.07.2009 and after the termination of the contract the status of the petitioner would be as the unauthorized occupant and hence the Estate Officer after taking into consideration the factual aspect of the matter has passed the order, hence, there is no infirmity in the same. He has submitted that the contract having been terminated on 24.07.2009 and after the termination of the contract the status of the petitioner would be as the unauthorized occupant and hence the Estate Officer after taking into consideration the factual aspect of the matter has passed the order, hence, there is no infirmity in the same. He submits that the order of termination of contract dated 24.07.2009 has been assailed by the petitioner by invoking the writ jurisdiction of the Court but the same has been dismissed however the letters patent appeal has been dismissed against the aforesaid order and therefore the status of the petitioner cannot be said to be changed as an unauthorized occupant. Further submission is that the provision of Act, 1971 is a summary to deal with the cases which are under the unauthorized occupants and therefore, what has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner in a very haste manner the order has been passed and is not correct since as per the provision stipulated either under Section 5 or under Section 9, a reasonable opportunity is required to be given to the petitioner concerned and it is evident from the order passed either by the Estate Officer or by the appellate court an opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner. In view of such submission it has been submitted that the writ petition is having no merit. 5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on appreciation of their rival submissions it is evident from the material available on record and it is the admitted fact that the petitioner has entered into a contract for a period of 90 years in the year 1999 with the I.B.P. Company Ltd. from Bihar State Housing Board through an agreement executed on 19.11.1999 for a period of 90 years upon a total consideration of amount of Rs.90,28,000/- by M/s. I.B.P. Company Ltd. The aforesaid M/s. I.B.P. Company Ltd, has subsequently been merged with the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., the merger was done on the basis of an agreement, which contains a provision under Clause 48 to the effect that the agreement may be terminated at the option of either party with a notice of one month without assigning any reason. The Indian Oil Corporation has made an application on 18.05.2011 before the Estate Officer treating for the eviction from land in possession by the petitioner namely Sri Bhagwan Singh, a Maintenance and Handling (M&H) Contractor. The Estate Officer has initiated a proceeding issuing notice to the petitioner in view of the provision of sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Act, 1971 and reached to the conclusion that the petitioner is an unauthorized occupant as per the definition of unauthorized occupant, found under the provision of Act, 1971, and directed the petitioner to vacate the premises within 15 days from the date of publication of the order. The petitioner has approached before the appellate court in view of the provision contained under Section 9 of the Act, 1971 which was registered as Eviction Appeal No.01 of 2011 which has been dismissed by confirming the order passed by the Estate Officer. 6. The petitioner has approached before the appellate court in view of the provision contained under Section 9 of the Act, 1971 which was registered as Eviction Appeal No.01 of 2011 which has been dismissed by confirming the order passed by the Estate Officer. 6. This Court before entering into the legality and propriety of the order deems it fit and proper to discuss about the relevant provision of the Act, 1971 as per the definition made under Section 2(e) of the Act, 1971 which is quoted herein-below:- [(e)"public premises" means- (1) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of, the Central Government, and includes any such premises which have been placed by that Government, whether before or after the Amendment Act, 1980 (61 of 1980), under the control of the Secretariat of either House of Parliament for providing residential accommodation to any member of the staff of that Secretariat; (2) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease by, or on behalf (i) any company as defined in section 3 of the [the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013)], in which not less than fifty-one per cent of the paid up share capital is held by the Central government or any company which is a subsidiary (within the meaning of that Act) of the first- mentioned company, (ii) any corporation (not being a company as defined in section 3 of [the Companies Act, 2013(18 of 2013)], or a local authority) established by or under a Central Act and owned or controlled by the Central Government, [(iii) any company as defined in clause (20) of section 2 of the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013) in which not less than fifty-one per cent of the paid-up capital is held partly by the Central Government and partly by one or more State Governments and includes a company which is a subsidiary (within the meaning of that Act) of the first-mentioned company and which carries on the business of public transport including metro railway,. (iiia) any University established or incorporated by any Central Act,] (iv) any Institute incorporated by the Institutes of Technology Act, 1961 (59 of 1961), [(v) any board of Trustees or any successor company constituted under or referred to in the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 (38 of 1963),] (vi) the Bhakra Management Board constituted under section 79 of the Punjab Reorganization Act, 1966 (31 of 1966), and that Board as and when re-named as the Bhakra-Beas Management Board under sub-section (6) of section 80 of that Act, (vii) any State Government or the Government of any Union territory situated in the National capital Territory of Delhi or in any other Union territory, (viii) any Cantonment Board constituted under the Cantonments Act, 1924 (2 of 1924); and] (3) in relation to the [National Capital Territory of Delhi],- (i) any premises belonging to the [Council as defined in clause (9) of section 2 of the New Delhi Municipal Council Act, 1994 (44 of 1994) or Corporation or Corporations notified under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Delhi Municipal corporation Act, 1957 (66 of 1957),] of Delhi, or any Municipal Committee or notified area committee, (ii) any premises belonging to the Delhi Development Authority, whether such premises are in the possession of, or leased out by, the said Authority,][and] [(iii) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of any State Government or the Government of any Union Territory,] (iv) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease by, or on behalf of any Government company as defined in clause (45) of section 2 of the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013). [(4) any premises of the enemy property as defined in clause (c) of section 2 of the Enemy Property Act, 1968 (34 of 1968);] It is evident that the public premises as per the definition stipulated under the provision of Section 2(e) of the Act, 1971, meaning thereby, that any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of, the Central Government, and includes any such premises which have been placed by that Government, whether before or after the commencement of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Amendment Act, 1980 (61 of 1080), under the Control of the Secretariat of either House of Parliament for providing residential accommodation to any member of the staff of that Secretariat. The meaning of unauthorized occupation as has been defined under the provision of Section 2(g) of the Act, 1971 which speaks as follows:- [(g) "unauthorized occupation", in relation to any public premises, means the occupation by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation, and includes the continuance in occupation authority for such occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant of any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises, has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever. Admittedly herein the petitioner has occupied the premises by way of the Maintenance and Handling (M & H), was being used as retail outset of the I.B.P. Company Ltd., and after merger with the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., but the said contract has been terminated on 24.07.2009. It cannot be disputed that after having been terminated on 24.07.2009 the petitioner was having any right to occupy the premises for Maintenance and Handling (M & H) rather he will cease to have the said authority and therefore he will come under the fold of the definition of unauthorized occupant as has been defined under the provision of Section 2(g) of the Act, 1971. It is not disputed that the said premises is coming under the fold of the definition of the public premises. Now it is to be seen as to whether the process as stipulated under Section 5 and 9 have been followed by the authority. Section 5 confers power of eviction of unauthorized occupants which can be exercised by the Estate Officer if any application would be made before him, who will decide the issue but after providing an opportunity of hearing will be aggrieved as per the proviso of Section 5 of the Act, 1971. It is evident from the order passed by the Estate Officer that the opportunity of hearing was given and thereafter the detail order has been passed assigning the reasons, the petitioner has questioned the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer on the ground that he is having his office within the State of Bihar, hence is having no jurisdiction to deal with any public premises falling within the jurisdiction of State of Jharkhand. On strength of this argument, learned counsel for the petitioner has referred the definition of Estate Officer as defined under Section 3 of the Act, 1971 and it has submitted that under the provision of Section 3(b) the local limits has been defined and admittedly the Estate Officer sitting in the State of Bihar cannot exceed his jurisdiction by exercising the power of Estate Officer of the premises falling within the jurisdiction of State of Jharkhand as because after bifurcation of the state i.e. after coming into effect the Bihar Reorganisation Act, the jurisdiction has been conferred upon the Sr. Law Manager to exercise the power of Estate Officer for the premises falling within the jurisdiction of the State of Jharkhand. The aforesaid argument by Mr. A.K. Gupta learned counsel appearing for the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. has placed before this Court in course of argument the copy of the gazette notification dated 11.12.2007 and has submitted that the Senior Law Manager has acted as a Estate Officer who has been notified to act as a Estate Officer of the entire area falling within the jurisdiction of State of Jharkhand since the Senior Law Manager is having its office known as Bihar Estate Officer and the premises falling within the jurisdiction of State of Bihar or the State of Jharkhand who is to be looked into by him in the capacity of the Estate Officer. 7. 7. This Court after appreciating their argument advanced on behalf of the parties in this regard and looking to the gazette notification dated 12.12.2007, is of the view that the Estate officer i.e. Senior Law Manager who has passed the order conferred under Section 5 of the Act, 1971 is having power on the basis of the notification dated 12.12.2007, for ready reference the part of the gazette notification dated 12.12.2007 is being referred herein-below:- S.O.211In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 (40 of 1971) and in supersession of the notifications of the Government of India in the Ministry of Petroleum vide number S.O.613, dated the 29th January 1977 and S.O.4487 dated the 3rd December, 1984, except as respects things done or omitted to be done before such supersession, the Central Government hereby appoints the officers mentioned in column (2) of the Table below, being officers of Indian Oil Corporation Limited to be the Estate Officers for the purposes of the said Act, and the said officers shall exercise the powers conferred and perform the duties imposed on an Estate Officer by or under the said Act within the local limits of their jurisdiction, in respect of the premises specified in column (3) of the said Table namely:- Sl. No. Name and designation of the officer Categories of public premises and local limits of jurisdiction. (1) (2) (3) 1. General Manager (Law), Deputy General Manager (Law), Chief Law Manager, Senior Law Manager, Manager (Law),Deputy Manager (Law), Assistant Manager (Law) and Law Officer in the Head Office of the Indian Oil Corporation Limited. Premises in the whole of India under the administrative control of the Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Registered Office and Head Office at Mumbai Including IBP Division. 2. Deputy General Manager (Law), Chief Law Manager, Senior Law Manager, Manager (Law), Deputy Manager (Law), Assistant Manager (Law), and Law Officer in the Regional Offices of Indian Oil Corporation Limited at Mumbai, Delhi, Kolkata, and Chennai. Premises under the administrative control of the Respective Regional Offices of the Indian Oil Corporation, Limited, at Mumbai, Delhi, Kolkata and Chennai, including IBP Division. 3. Chief Law Manager, Senior Law Manager, Manager (Law), Deputy Manager (Law), Assistant Manager (Law) and Law Officer in the State Offices of India Oil Corporation Limited. Premises under the administrative control of the Respective Regional Offices of the Indian Oil Corporation, Limited, at Mumbai, Delhi, Kolkata and Chennai, including IBP Division. 3. Chief Law Manager, Senior Law Manager, Manager (Law), Deputy Manager (Law), Assistant Manager (Law) and Law Officer in the State Offices of India Oil Corporation Limited. Premises under the administrative control of respective State Offices of Indian Oil Corporation Limited including IBP Division. 4. Senior Manager (Estate and Law), Manager (Estate and Law) and Deputy Manager (Estate and Law) Senior Estate and Law Officer, Indian Oil Corporation Limited (Assam Oil Division), Digboi Premises under the administrative control of the Assam Oil Division, of the Indian Oil Corporation Limited Digboi. In view thereof, the submission with respect to the lack of jurisdiction vested with the Estate Officer as has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner has got no force, accordingly rejected. 8. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order passed is in a very haste manner and no consideration of the ground urged by him, this Court is not in agreement with the aforesaid submission of the petitioner for the reason that either the Estate Officer or the appellate court after assessing and appreciating the termination of contract dated 24.07.2009 and discussed it that writ petition was filed which was pending on the date when the Estate Officer has passed the order there was no ad-interim relief, therefore, come to the conclusion that the petitioner is an unauthorized occupant, has passed the order, however, subsequently as has been informed by the learned counsel for parties that the writ petition has also been dismissed, be that as it may, question herein is that after termination of contract as on 24.07.2009 the status of the petitioner would be of unauthorized occupant, on defined under the provision of Section 2(g) of the Act, 1971. The requirement stipulated under Section 9 is to provide an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and it is evident from the bare perusal of the order passed either by the Estate Officer or by the appellate court the opportunity of hearing has been provided to the petitioner. 9. The requirement stipulated under Section 9 is to provide an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and it is evident from the bare perusal of the order passed either by the Estate Officer or by the appellate court the opportunity of hearing has been provided to the petitioner. 9. In view of such aspect of the matter and according to the considered view of this Court, it is not a case where the writ court is to exercise the power looking into the findings with reason recorded by the Estate Officer and the appellate court. Since there is no error apparent on the face of record warranting this Court to exercise the power of issuance of writ of certiorari since it is the settled position of law that the writ of certiorari can be issued if there is error apparent on the face of record or there is jurisdictional error and if the writ court will interfere save and accept these two grounds it will laid to act as a Court of appeal. It needs to refer herein that the scope of interference of the High Court to issue writ of certiorari sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is very limited, as has been discussed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Syed Yakoob Vrs. Radhakrishnan reported in A.I.R. 1964 477 Supreme Court wherein at paragraph no.7 their Lordships have held as follows:- "The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104; Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 . It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104; Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168 . Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Hari Vishnu Vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors. reported in 1955 Supreme Court 233 wherein at Paragraph-21, which is quoted hereinbelow :- "With regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari." In another judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the Case of Sawarn Singh Vrs. State of Punjab reportd in (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 for issuance of writ of certiorari has been please to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as under: "12. State of Punjab reportd in (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 for issuance of writ of certiorari has been please to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as under: "12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra). 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice." In another judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Heinz India (P) Ltd. Vrs. State of U.P. Reported in (2012) 5 SCC 443 their Lordhsips have been please to hold at paragraph no.66 and 67 as under:- "66. That the court dealing with the exercise of power of judicial review does not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or executive or their agents as to matters within the province of either, and that the court does not supplant "the feel of the expert" by its own review, is also fairly well settled by the decisions of this Court. In all such cases judicial examination is confined to finding out whether the findings of fact have a reasonable basis on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. 67. In all such cases judicial examination is confined to finding out whether the findings of fact have a reasonable basis on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. 67. In Dharangahara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra this Court held that decision of a tribunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution unless it is shown to be totally unsupported by any evidence. To the same effect is the view taken by this Court in Thansingh Nathmal case where this Court held that the High Court does not generally determine questions which require an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed." In the case of Thansingh Vrs. Supdt. of Taxes reported in A.I.R. 1964 1419 Supreme Court, Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to hold that the High Court does not jointly determine question which requires elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed. In another judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pepsico India Holding (P) Ltd. Vrs. Krishna Kant Pandey reported in (2015) 4 SCC 270 their Lordships while discussing the scope of Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the matter of interference with the finding of the tribunal has been please to hold by placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao Vrs. Ashalata S. Guram reported in (1986) 4 SCC 447 at para 17 has held as under:- "17. In case of finding of facts, the court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal V. Laxmibai R. Tarta where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and re-appreciating. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and re-appreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J, as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at page 1301 of the report as follows: power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways v. Sukumar Mukherjee to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bose V. Commr. Of Hills Division and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226 the power of interference may extent to quashing an impugned order on the ground of mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeking that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority." This Court after scrutinizing the factual aspects of case is if the view that it is not a fit case of issuance of writ of certiorari since no ground for the same is available as per the proposition of law settled in the aforesaid judgment, rather if it will be interfered with it will amounts to acting as Appellate Court. Therefore this Court refrains itself from exercising extraordinary jurisdiction conferred to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 10. In view thereof, this writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed.