JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner is the hapless mother of a young boy, who unfortunately died of electrocution from a live wire on 19/08/2017. She says that her son was only 13 years at the time of his untimely death and that the electrocution was solely on account of the negligence on the part of the respondents. She, therefore, prays that the 2nd respondent-Kerala State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as 'the KSEB' for short) be directed to pay her the eligible ex-gratia compensation, as per Exts.P6 and P7 orders, without relying on Clause 2 of the said orders, which mandates that 'the dependants/legal heirs of the deceased shall have to agree not to resort to any litigation or approach legal Courts/Forum for enhanced compensation'(sic). 2. The petitioner says that the afore restrictive clause in Exts.P6 and P7 is completely untenable and illegal in law and therefore, that she is entitled to the ex- gratia compensation as also to sue the respondents for eligible damages in terms of the law of torts. 3. In answer to the afore submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri.Sudheer Ganesh Kumar-the learned Standing Counsel for the KSEB, submits that an amount of Rs.5 lakhs, which is the ex-gratia compensation under Exts.P6 and P7 orders, has already been paid to the petitioner in obedience to the interim order of this Court dated 9th August, 2019, and therefore, that this writ petition be closed without granting any other relief to her. He then vehemently asserts that the electrocution and the unfortunate death of the petitioner's son was not on account of any fault attributable to the KSEB and that there were certain extenuating circumstances beyond their control which led to it; particularly because they have reliable information that the electrocution happened on account of an accident caused by another vehicle which had been driven recklessly, thus snapping the electric line. 4. As regards the condition in Exts.P6 and P7 orders-that the dependant/legal heir cannot seek legal remedy after they accept the ex-gratia compensation-is concerned, Shri.Sudheer Ganesh Kumar submits that this has been incorporated so as to enable the KSEB to make payment to the dependant/legal heirs under a virtual no-fault liability concept, but that if the relatives of victims are then allowed to take further legal recourse, the concept of ex-gratia compensation itself becomes otiose. He further says that, going by the applicable Scheme of Ex-gratia compensation, the KSEB has classified accidents into two categories:- one wherein they admit liability and the other way they do not. He submits that, in the present case, the accident comes under the second category and therefore, that the KSEB does not admit to any fault and consequently that this clause in Exts.P6 and P7 is without fault. 5. When I analyse the afore submissions and contentions, it is limpid that, on account of the Ex-gratia compensation having already been paid by the KSEB to the petitioner, the sole surviving issue now germane for my consideration, is whether the restrictive clause in Exts.P6 and P7, that the dependants/legal heirs cannot take legal recourse after they accept the ex-gratia compensation from the KSEB, would obtain favour in law or whether it would have to be struck down. At the first look, the answer to this appears to be negative because Exts.P6 and P7 are only orders of the KSEB and cannot be normally binding on anyone else, if it is contrary to law. 6. However, the axiomatic next question is whether such restrictions are legally permissible and whether they would bind the persons, who are the unfortunate victims of electrocution and such other accidents, after they accept the Ex-gratia compensation, as offered under Exts.P6 and P7, agreeing to this condition therein. 7. Semantically, “Ex-gratia” compensation means money paid when there is no obligation or liability to pay it. It certainly is a payment made voluntarily without the payer conceding to any liability or legal obligation. Hence the very nature of an “Ex gratia” compensation is one without recognising any kind of liability; and consequently, the stand of the KSEB in Exts.P6 and P7, that they will pay this only if the relative of the victim agrees to forego their legal remedies is anachronistic to its very concept. I, resultantly, feel it justified to hold that the impugned restriction cannot bind the petitioner, even if she has accepted it, though I am fully cognizant that when the KSEB had paid her, she admitted to no constraint. 8. I, resultantly, feel it justified to hold that the impugned restriction cannot bind the petitioner, even if she has accepted it, though I am fully cognizant that when the KSEB had paid her, she admitted to no constraint. 8. I am of the view, therefore, that liberty must be left open to the petitioner to approach the competent legal Forum to seek compensation, as per law, if she is so interested, de hors the restriction in Exts.P6 and P7 orders and it will be upto the KSEB to establish, through cogent and reliable evidence and materials, that they are not liable to pay anything more than what has been now offered to the petitioner. In the afore circumstances, I order this writ petition, recording that the ex-gratia compensation under Exts.P6 and P7 has already been paid by the KSEB to the petitioner; thus leaving full liberty to her to invoke other remedies in law in terms of the applicable Statutes and Regulations, de hors the restrictive clause in Exts.P6 and P7. I close this judgment recording my appreciation for the KSEB in having acceded to the request of the petitioner for ex- gratia compensation and I am certain this is the standard of fairness that this Court would like to see exhibited in matters like this.