JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. The appellants are the legal representatives of original defendant and aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned first appellate Court whereby it affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court, have filed the instant appeal. 2. The parties hereinafter shall be referred to as the "plaintiff" and the "defendant". 3. The plaintiff filed a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction on the ground that he along with other co-sharers was in possession of the suit land. The defendant being total strangers had no right, title or interest to interfere with the said possession and in case they were successful in such attempt during the pendency of the suit, then possession thereof be delivered to the plaintiff. 4. The defendant contested the suit wherein preliminary objections regarding cause of action, locus standi, estoppel, maintainability, limitation, non-joinder of necessary parties and valuation etc. were taken. On merits, it was averred that the plaintiff was not owner in possession of the suit land. It was the defendant, who was in possession of the suit land as a co-sharer and had constructed one 'Palli' over the same in the year 1966-67. The defendant further averred that he did not intend to raise any fresh construction, therefore, the suit should be dismissed. 5. Out of the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court on 15.09.1992 framed the following issues:- "1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for decree of permanent prohibitory injunction as prayed for? OPP. 2. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi and cause of action to file the present suit? OPD. 3. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? OPD. 4. Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his act and conduct from filing the present suit? OPD. 5. Whether the suit is barred by time? OPD. 6. Relief." 6. After recording evidence and evaluating the same, the learned trial Court decreed the suit and the judgment and decree so passed by the learned trial Court came to be affirmed by the learned first appellate Court, constraining the defendant to file the instant appeal. 7. OPD. 5. Whether the suit is barred by time? OPD. 6. Relief." 6. After recording evidence and evaluating the same, the learned trial Court decreed the suit and the judgment and decree so passed by the learned trial Court came to be affirmed by the learned first appellate Court, constraining the defendant to file the instant appeal. 7. On 03.04.2003, the appeal was admitted on the following substantial question of law:- "Whether the Courts below have misread and misappreciated the evidence on record, more specifically the revenue record produced by the appellant-defendant to reject his claim that he is not the owner in possession of the suit land and to hold that the respondent-plaintiff is the owner in possession thereof?" 8. During the pendency of the appeal, an application being CMP No. 8744 of 2017 was filed by the appellant for framing of an additional substantial question of law, the same was accordingly allowed and on 26.10.2018 the following substantial question of law came to be framed:- "(a) Whether impugned judgments and decrees passed by both the courts below are illegal, erroneous and perverse inasmuch as they ignored that no replication was ever filed by the respondent-plaintiff, specifically not controverting the defence taken by the appellant-defendant and as such admitting the same?" I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records of the case. 9. Since both the substantial questions of law are intrinsically interlinked and interconnected, therefore, they are taken up together for consideration and are being disposed of by common reasoning. Substantial Questions of Law No.1 and (a) 10. As observed above, the case of the plaintiff was simpliciter for injunction and, therefore, was determined and decided on the basis of the possession of the party. Though, it is the specific case of the plaintiff that he along with other co-sharers is in possession of the suit land, however, it needs to be noticed that the plaintiff himself on 31.10.1992 filed an application for appointment of a Local Commissioner and paras 5 and 6 whereof read as under:- "5. That the plaintiff requested the defendant not to do any interference over the suit land by way of raising construction or in any other manner, but of no use." 6. That the plaintiff requested the defendant not to do any interference over the suit land by way of raising construction or in any other manner, but of no use." 6. That in order to know the nature and extent of construction over the suit land being raised by the defendant, the appointment of local Commissioner is essential." 11. It is, thus, evidently clear that by moving the aforesaid application, the plaintiff candidly admitted the possession of the defendant over the suit land. 12. It is not in dispute that the application filed by the plaintiff for appointment of the Local Commissioner came to be allowed and one Jagdish Chandel, Advocate, was appointed as a Local Commissioner, who after visiting the spot on 04.11.1992 at 2.30 p.m. recorded the nature and extent of the construction as follows:- "5. That the nature and extent of the construction was as follows:- (a) That the disputed structure was based upon four supports of wood only and not upon any wall of bricks or stones and which was covered by the Tin and it was in the shape of shed (Tinposh Palli) and it was open from all sides. The map of the construction was prepared by me at the spot and is appended with this report. (b) (i) The height of this structure was 5 feet 6 inches. (ii) Length of this structure was 12 feet. (iii)Width of the structure was 8 feet. (iv)The construction in the shape of shed (Palli) was completed. (v)That there was vacant land all around this disputed structure. (vi)That this disputed structure was old about two or three months. (vii) That there were wood and Tin used for the making structure. (viii)That there were only few pieces of wood lying there under the roof of this structure (Palli)." 13. Noticeably, the plaintiff did not step into the witness box, however, his brother, who is also one of the co-sharers Rattan Chand, appeared as PW-1 and even though he claimed to be in possession of the suit land, he did not depose about the defendant having raised the construction over the portion of the suit land. This witness being co-sharer in the suit land was well conversant with the facts of the case was competent to depose on behalf of the plaintiff. This witness being co-sharer in the suit land was well conversant with the facts of the case was competent to depose on behalf of the plaintiff. On the other hand, the defendant did not choose to appear in the witness box, thus, constraining the Courts below to draw an adverse inference, however, he did file certain documents, but since the same were not proved on record, therefore, they were rightly discarded from consideration by the learned Courts below. 14. It is vehemently contended by Shri Neeraj Gupta, learned Senior Advocate, that based upon the report of the Local Commissioner, it is proved that the possession is that of the defendant and the same needs to be protected till and so long he is not dispossessed from the suit land. 15. However, I find no merit in this contention for the simple reason that there is nothing on record to suggest that at the time of filing of the suit, the defendant, in fact, was in possession of the suit land, therefore, even if he has been successful in obtaining possession of the suit land during the pendency of the suit, this Court can conveniently mould the relief, while eventually decreeing the suit by granting decree of possession after taking into consideration the subsequent developments and changed circumstances and plaintiff cannot be compelled to file a fresh suit. 16. The legal position in this regard is well settled. In drawing such conclusion, this Court is fortified by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gaiv Dinshaw Irani vs. Tehmtam Irani, (2014) 8 SCC 294 , wherein it was held as under:- "47. Since the lease of 1152 sq.m. executed by BMC in favour of Dinshaw is rendered void ab initio, the construction by the appellants on the said plot is also illegal. The position as it exists today is that the remaining portions of Irani Wadi have been acquired by BMC; and on the other portion, the structure erected by Dinshaw exists and the portion being the residential bungalow occupied by the respondents may also be acquired by BMC in due course. 48. Considering the aforementioned changed circumstances, the High Court taking note of the subsequent events moulded the relief in the appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the same has been challenged by the appellants before us. 48. Considering the aforementioned changed circumstances, the High Court taking note of the subsequent events moulded the relief in the appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the same has been challenged by the appellants before us. In ordinary course of litigation, the rights of parties are crystallised on the date the suit is instituted and only the same set of facts must be considered. However, in the interest of justice, a court including a court of appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not precluded from taking note of developments subsequent to the commencement of the litigation, when such events have a direct bearing on the relief claimed by a party or on the entire purpose of the suit, the courts taking note of the same should mould the relief accordingly. This rule is one of ancient vintage adopted by the Supreme Court of America in Patterson v. Alabama,1935 SCCOnLineUS(SC) 65 followed in Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul vs. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri,1941 53 LW 373. The aforementioned cases were recognised by this Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu vs. Motor and General Traders, (1975) 1 SCC 770 . 17. To similar effect is the ratio of the unreported judgment of this Court in Sewa Dass vs. Balbir Singh, Civil Revision No. 181 of 2017, decided on 24.10.2018, wherein it was observed as under:- "7. That apart, in case, the suit filed by the plaintiff succeeds, even then the trial Court can conveniently mould the relief while eventually decreeing the suit by granting decree for possession and the plaintiff cannot be compelled to file a fresh suit. 8. This position is settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu vs. The Motor & General Traders, (1975) AIR SC 1409, the relevant portion of the judgment read as follows:- 4. We feel the submissions devoid of substance. First about the jurisdiction and propriety vis-a-vis circumstances which come into being subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings. It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fair play is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice, subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial Court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations, for applications of this equitable rule are myriad. We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognisance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed. On both occasions the High Court, in revision, correctly took this view. The later recovery of another accommodation by the landlord, during the pendency of the case has as the High Court twice pointed out, a material bearing on the right to evict, in view of the inhibition written into S. 10 (3) (iii) itself. We are not disposed to disturb this approach in law or finding of fact. 5. The law we have set out is of ancient vintage. We will merely refer to Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri, (1941) AIR F.C. 5 : 1940 FCR 84 which is a leading case on the point. We are not disposed to disturb this approach in law or finding of fact. 5. The law we have set out is of ancient vintage. We will merely refer to Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri, (1941) AIR F.C. 5 : 1940 FCR 84 which is a leading case on the point. Gwyer C. J, in the above case, referred to the rule adopted by the Supreme Court of the United states in Patterson v. State of Alabama,1934 294 US 600 at P. 607: "We have frequently held that in the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction we have power not only to correct in the judgment under review but to make such disposition of the case as justice requires. And in determining what justice does require, the Court is bound to consider any change, either in factor in law, which has supervened since the judgment ,was entered." and said that that view of the Court's powers was reaffirmed once again in the then recent case of Minnesota v. National Tea Co.,1939 309 US 551 at p. 555, Sulaiman J., in the same case 1940 FCR 94 = (AIR 1941 FC 5) relied on English cases and took the view that an appeal is by way of a re-hearing and the Court may make such order as the Judge of the first instance could have made if the case had been heard by him at the date on which the appeal was heard (emphasis, ours). Varadachariar J., dealt with the same point a little more comprehensively. We may content ourselves with excerpting one passage which brings out the point luminously (at p.103 of 1940 FCR) (at p. 13 of AIR): 'It is also on the theory of an appeal being in the nature of a rehearing that the courts in this country have in numerous cases recognized that in moulding the relief to be granted in a case on appeal, the Court of appeal is entitled to take into account even facts and events which have come into existence after the decree appealed against." 9. The endeavour of the Court should be to mould the relief in such a way as to give quietus and not to drive the parties to another litigation. The endeavour of the Court should be to mould the relief in such a way as to give quietus and not to drive the parties to another litigation. Thus, it is always open to the Court to mould the relief so as to advance the cause of justice and not to drive parties to another litigation by approaching hyper-technicality. While doing so, the Court has to act ex debito justa by moulding the relief thereby advancing the cause of justice. The Court below has un-necessarily taken a hyper technical view of the matter, therefore, the order passed by it is not sustainable in the eyes of law. " 18. Now, adverting to the revenue record, it would be noticed that the entries in the Jamabandi for the year 1988-89 (Ext.P1), reflect the suit land comprising Khasra No. 247, measuring 15M is in the exclusive ownership and possession of the plaintiff and his brothers Rattan Chand, Harnam Singh, Dina Nath and Basant Singh in equal shares to the extent of 5 shares, whereas the name of the defendant does not find mention in the said document. No doubt, the defendant has also placed on record the jamabandi for the year 1962- 63 pertaining to the land comprising Khasra No. 319 and another copy of jamabandi for the year 1988-89 which pertains to Khasra No. 247 and is the same document Ext. P1 but the same also carries the defendant no further to prove his possession. 19. The correction application and the statement recorded therein cannot be looked into since these documents have not been proved on record in accordance with law and have, therefore, rightly been discarded from consideration by the learned Courts below. If at all, the defendant wanted to rely upon these documents, then he should have examined the relevant witnesses and should have himself stepped into the witness box to depose and make himself available for cross-examination. 20. As regards the question that the plaintiff did not file a replication to the written statement filed by the defendant, the same is again of no avail to the defendant. The non filing of the replication, which otherwise is not a matter of right, will not amount to deemed admission of fact of the written statement. 21. 20. As regards the question that the plaintiff did not file a replication to the written statement filed by the defendant, the same is again of no avail to the defendant. The non filing of the replication, which otherwise is not a matter of right, will not amount to deemed admission of fact of the written statement. 21. Reference in this regard can conveniently be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Anant Construction (P) Ltd. vs. Ram Niwas, (1994) 31 DRJ 205 , wherein it was observed as under:- "9. It is basic concept of pleadings that a defendant has to deny specifically every averment made in the plaint if he choses to dispute the same. As already stated, a non-specific or evasive denial in written statement may be taken as an admission of plaint facts. A failure to file WS would enable the Court pronouncing judgment against the defaulting defendant. However, a plaintiff is not to be treated similarly. Every material averment made in the written statement is presumed to be denied by the plaintiff and for that purpose he need not file a replication. Xxxx 21..1 The law of pleadings does not require a plaintiff to file a replication merely denying the allegations made in the written statement. Failure to file a replication cannot be treated as an admission of the plea in the written statement. Veemsekhara vs. Amirthavalliammal, (1975) AIR Madras 51 : MANU/TN/014/1975, Laxmansing v. Laxminarayan Deosthan., (1948) AIR Nagpur 127 : MANU/NA/0143/1947, Bank of Behar Ltd. vs. Madhusudan Lal,1937 AIR Patna 4281. 21.2 In Amarjeet Singh vs. Bhagwati Devi, 1982 12 R 156, this Court has held a pleading to mean plaint and written statement only. A plaintiff can claim relief on the basis of pleas in the plaint and not on pleas in the replication. 22. Reference can also be made to another judgment of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Mohan Madan vs. Sheel Gulati, (2015) 223 DLT 57 , wherein it was held as under:- "9(i). Before discussing in detail the aforesaid deposition and pleading of the plaintiff in para 5 of the plaint, it needs to be noted (and I have already stated this in the earlier part of this judgment) that plaintiff has for some strange reason chosen not to file any replication to the written statement filed by the defendant. Before discussing in detail the aforesaid deposition and pleading of the plaintiff in para 5 of the plaint, it needs to be noted (and I have already stated this in the earlier part of this judgment) that plaintiff has for some strange reason chosen not to file any replication to the written statement filed by the defendant. In the written statement, the defendant has pleaded the categorical case that plaintiff out of the sum of Rs.25 lacs paid an amount of Rs. 10 lacs by a cheque of Shri Dharampal Malik and this cheque bounced on presentation. (ii) In my opinion, non-filing of replication in a case such as the present will amount to deemed admission of the facts of the written statement with respect to the amount of Rs.10 lacs being paid by cheque out of the amount of Rs.25 lacs paid on 05.10.2005. Deemed admission will arise in view of Order VIII Rule 9 read with Order VIII Rule 5 and Order VIII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) and which provides that on non-filing of replication (technically called as an additional written statement and not replication in Order VIII Rule 9 CPC), the same will amount to deemed admission of the contents of the written statement filed by a defendant. 23. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the substantial question of law framed on 03.04.2003 is answered by concluding that the learned Courts below have neither mis-read nor mis-appreciated the evidence on record, especially, the revenue record produced by the appellants-defendants and the other substantial question of law framed on 26.10.2018 is answered by concluding that the findings recorded by the learned Courts below are neither illegal nor irregular much less perverse and the mere fact that no replication was filed by the plaintiff to the written statement of the defendant is no avail for the reasons stated above. 24. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I find no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.