JUDGMENT Biswanath Rath, J. - This writ petition involves a challenge to the second showcause notice vide Annexure-1 on the premises that Sri P.K. Bose, Enquiry Officer appointed involving inquiry against the petitioner being not an Officer in the cadre of Balasore Gramya Bank and further not an Officer deployed to the service of Balasore Gramya Bank to hold any of the post of the cadre of Officer of Balasore Gramya Bank has no authority to hold such inquiry and the enquiry conducted by Sri P.K. Bose is hit by the regulation 30 (3) read with Regulation 2(1) and Regulation 3(2) of the Balasore Gramya Bank (Staff) Service Regulation 1980 (hereinafter called as "Regulation, 1980"). 2. Background involving the case is that petitioner joined as Cashier in the Balasore Gramya Bank on 13.1.1982. On 12.6.1985, the petitioner was posted in Mitrapur Branch of the Balasore Gramya Bank. On 31.5.1997, he was promoted to the rank of Officer Scale-1 with effect from 28.4.1989. While continuing as such, petitioner was suspended on the ground of financial irregularity in maintaining certain records and allowing misappropriation during incumbency at Mitrapur Branch vide order dated 24.3.1998. On 24.9.1998, charges were framed and again on 25.10.1999 additional charges were also framed. In the process, on 11.9.2000 one P.K. Bose was appointed as Enquiry Officer and on 17.4.2002 the Enquiry report was submitted resulting issuance of second show-cause notice on 2.12.2002 vide Annexure-1 impugned herein. 3. Advancing his argument, Sri Sanjit Mohanty, learned senior Advocate challenging to the illegality in the appointment of Sri P.K. Bose as the Enquiry Officer, taking this Court to the provision at Section 2(e) of the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976 (for short "R.R.B. Act, 1976") attempted to submit the definition prescribed means prescribed by rules made under this Act. Then taking to the provision at Section 17 of the R.R.B. Act, 1976, Sri Mohanty submitted that for the provision therein, it becomes lawful on the part of the Regional Rural Bank to send such number of Officers or other employees on deputation to the Regional Rural Bank as may be necessary or desirable for the efficient performance of its functions. Referring to Section 30 of the R.R.B. Act, 1976, Sri Mohanty, learned senior counsel contended that for this provision of the Act, the Board of directors of the Regional Rural Bank may after consultation with Sponsor Bank and the National Bank and with the previous sanction of the Central Government make regulations, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act and the rules made there under to provide for all matters for which provision is necessary or expedient for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of this Act. It is here, Sri Mohanty, learned senior counsel taking this Court to the provision at Section 17 of the Act, 1976 contended that even assuming that the Regional Rural Bank on the request of the sponsored Bank send Officers on deputation to this sponsored Bank but that is again should be with the previous sanction of the Central Government. It is in the circumstance, Sri Mohanty, learned senior counsel contended that for the appointment of Sri P.K. Bose in the sponsored Bank i.e. Balasore Gramya Bank is not with the previous sanction of Central Government and thus he was even not competent to hold any such post. Sri Mohanty, learned senior counsel further taking this Court to the provisions of the Balasore Gramya Bank, more particularly, the definition chapter Regulation 2(i) read with Regulation 3 (2) of the Regulation, 1980 contended that for the definition of an Officer and the staffing pattern of the Gramya Bank there is no position of an Officer in its staffing nomenclation. Again for the clear provision at Regulation 3(2), Sri Mohanty, learned senior counsel contended that even assuming that Sri P.K. Bose was deputed to function as an Officer in the Gramya Bank for the Officer post not inclusive in the staffing pattern, there should have been a prior approval of the Central Government to such decision of the Board. It is at this stage, Sri Mohanty, learned senior counsel referring to Regulation 5 and Regulation 30 therein justified his submission that Sri P.K. Bose deputed to function as an Officer is not in accordance with the provisions of the regulation further without prior approval of the Central Government and as such was competent to hold any such enquiry. It is at this stage, Sri Mohanty, learned senior counsel referring to Regulation 5 and Regulation 30 therein justified his submission that Sri P.K. Bose deputed to function as an Officer is not in accordance with the provisions of the regulation further without prior approval of the Central Government and as such was competent to hold any such enquiry. It is in the circumstance, Sri Mohanty, learned senior counsel urged this Court for interfering in the enquiry process and while requesting for declaring appointment of Sri Bose void, set aside the second showcause notice. Sri Mohanty, learned senior counsel to substantiate his above submission has also took this Court to the decisions in the case of Central Bank of India v. C.Bernard, (1991) 1 SCC 319 , Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. D.L.F., Universal Ltd. and another,2005 AIR(SC)4446 , Bharat Co-operative Bank (Mumbai) Ltd. v. Co-operative Bank Employees Union, (2007) AIR SC 2320 , Veer Kunwar Singh University Ad hoc Teachers Association and others v. Bihar State University (C.C.) Service Commission and others, (2009) 17 SCC 184 and in the case of Dipak Babaria and another v. State of Gujarat and others, (2014) 3 SCC 502 Taking this Court to the aforesaid decisions, , Sri Mohanty, learned senior counsel also submitted that for the application of all the decisions cited above to the case at hand has case otherwise to succeed for the settled position of law. 4. Sri D.K. Panda, learned counsel appearing for the opposite party while taking this Court to the stand of the opposite party through counter affidavit as well as further affidavit and the clarification from the NABARD through Annexure-A to the further affidavit, the communication on the Officers on deputation from sponsored bank and appointment of such officers thereof contended that there is no infirmity in the decision of the Management in appointing Sri P.K. Bose as Enquiry Officer to enquire into the allegation involving the petitioner. Sri Panda, learned counsel further also taking this Court to the stage of challenge, more particularly, writ petition being filed at the stage of second show-cause contended that the writ petition becomes premature. Further for a statutory appeal remedy being available to the petitioner, Sri Panda contended that the writ petition is not maintainable at this stage otherwise and thus prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 5. Further for a statutory appeal remedy being available to the petitioner, Sri Panda contended that the writ petition is not maintainable at this stage otherwise and thus prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 5. Considering the rival contentions of the parties, this Court finds petitioner was placed under suspension and charges were framed forcing him to face enquiry proceeding involved herein. For the admitted facts, this Court looking to the appointment of P.K. Bose through Annexure-A, this Court finds Annexure-C finds place with the further affidavit sworn by Sri Nalini Ranjan Das, the Chairman Kalinga Gramya Bank, Balasore discloses the posting of said P.K. Bose, who was functioning as Manager in UCO Bank with the designation as Officer in the head office of Balasore Gramya Bank, Balasore. There is no denial to this aspect by the counsel for the opposite party. Now coming to the document surfacing at Annexure-D, again this Court finds P.K. Bose while being described as an Officer on deputation was designated as the Enquiry Officer involving Sri P.S. Bhattacharya, the petitioner vide this document issued on 26.8.2000. Looking to the provision at Section 17 of the R.R.B. Act, 1976, this Court finds this section reads as follows: "17. Staff of Regional Rural Banks.- (1) A Regional Rural Bank may appoint such number of officers and other employees as it may consider necessary or desirable (in such manner as may be prescribed) for the efficient performance of its functions and may determine the terms and conditions of their appointment and service: Provided that, it shall be lawful for a Sponsor Bank, if requested so to do by a Regional Rural Bank sponsored by it, to send (x x) such number of officers or other employees on deputation to the Regional Rural Bank as may be necessary or desirable for the efficient performance of its functions: Provided further that the remuneration of officers and other employees appointed by a Regional Rural Bank shall be such as may be determined by the Central Government, and, in determining such remuneration, the Central Government shall have due regard to the salary structure of the employees of the State Government and the local authorities of comparable level and status in the notified area. (2) Not withstanding anything contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, or any other law for the time being in force, no award, judgment, decree, decision or order of any industrial tribunal, Court or other authority, made before the commencement of this Act, shall apply to the terms and conditions in relation to the persons appointed by a Regional Rural Bank. (3) The officers and other employees of a Regional Rural Bank shall exercise such powers and perform such duties as may be entrusted or delegated to them by the Board." Reading the above provision, this Court finds there is no problem in the deputation of Officers but they must hold the posts available in the Bank they are deputed. What this Court from AnnexureC dated 17.7.2000 finds that this is letter issued by the UCO Bank to the Regional Rural Bank to act as Officer in the Head Office of Balasore Gramya Bank at Balasore by way of an internal arrangement. For the terms of deputation, as appearing from Annexure-C, this Court finds one P.K. Bose was on deputation from Regional Rural Bank to a sponsored Bank. Now coming back to the appointment of Sri P.K. Bose as an Enquiry Officer, as available from Annexure-D and the clarification at Annexure-A by the NABARD, giving no objection in the matter of appointment of Sri P.K. Bose as an Enquiry Officer taking resort to Section 17 of the R.R.B. Act, 1976 has no application at all to the case at hand, which appears to be wholly misconstrued one. Coming back to examine the provision under the Balasore Gramya Bank, scanning through the Definition- 2 (i) along with Regulation-3(2), this Court finds there is no position of Sri P.K. Bose in the staffing pattern in the concern Gramya Bank. Reading the provision at Section 30(3), this provision of the Regulation of Balasore Gramya Bank makes it clear that inquiry in relation to an Officer can be taken through an Officer, who is senior to such Officer. It is here from the narration made hereinabove, this Court finds petitioner when was suspended was in the post of Officer Scale-I and as such inquiry, if any, involved that could have been conducted by an Officer functioning above the petitioner remaining within the staffing pattern at Regulation 3 (2). It is here from the narration made hereinabove, this Court finds petitioner when was suspended was in the post of Officer Scale-I and as such inquiry, if any, involved that could have been conducted by an Officer functioning above the petitioner remaining within the staffing pattern at Regulation 3 (2). This being not the state of affair involving the case further keeping in view that Sri P.K. Bose since was just an Officer, this Court finds the entire inquiry proceeding remain grounded for being undertaken by an incompetent Officer. It is at this stage, taking into consideration the decisions cited at the instance of the petitioner this Court finds in the case of Chiranjib Parida v. State of Orissa represented by the Secretary to the Govt. in Education & Youth Services and others, 1990 2 OLR 70 , in paragraphs- 2, 3 and 5 it is held as follows: "2. On the aforesaid facts, the only question which really calls for determination is whether the enquiry in the case at hand by the committee as constituted by the Managing Committee was in accordance with Law or not. A reply to this question has to be found in Rule 22 (4) of the Rules which at the relevant time reads as follows: "22.(4). On receipt of the written statement of defence, or if no such statement is received within the time specified, the disciplinary authority may itself make enquiry into such of the charges as are not admitted, or, if he considers necessary so to do, appoint any other person who shall either be a member of the Governing Body or the Headmaster or the Principle; xx xx xx Besides we advert to the submissions made by Dr.Dash relating to the legality of the constitution of the enquiry committee, it may be pointed out that there is no dispute that is the present case it is the Managing Committee of the School who has to be regarded as the disciplinary authority in view of what has been stated in Rule 21(2)(b) of the Rules. It is only in respect of lower grade employee that the Headmaster or the Principal can be regarded as the disciplinary authority. Dr.Dash submits that as the School had no Headmaster at the relevant time, the question of any enquiry by the Headmaster could not arise in the present case. It is only in respect of lower grade employee that the Headmaster or the Principal can be regarded as the disciplinary authority. Dr.Dash submits that as the School had no Headmaster at the relevant time, the question of any enquiry by the Headmaster could not arise in the present case. This being so, it is the Managing Committee alone which could have made the enquiry in the view of what has been stated in Rule 22(4). Dr.Dash submits that in the enquiry committee as constituted in the present case, there was in fact one member of the Managing Committee and so the enquiry must be regarded to have been held by the Managing Committee which was the disciplinary authority in the present case; and induction of two outsiders in the committee would not make the constitution of the committee illegal in the eye of law. It is strenuously urged by the learned counsel that as the Managing Committee of the School consists of 11 persons, enquiry by the entire body was not visualize by the aforesaid rule and as such, enquiry by one member of the Managing Committee in which work he was assisted by two outsiders cannot be said to be in violation of the requirement of law. 3. Before we examine the main contention advanced by Dr.Dash, it is opposite to point out that Rule 22 (4), as it stood at the relevant time, did not permit enquiry even by one member of the Managing Committee inasmuch as the Rule as it then stood stated about enquiry by the member of the Governing Body alone, and not by a member of the Managing Committee which was, however, permitted subsequently when amendment was made in the aforesaid rule by S.R.O. No.20/86 dated 7.1.1986 as published in Orissa Gazette (Extraordinary) No.81 dated 24.1.1986. Even so, we are prepared to concede that Rule 22(4) as it was at the relevant time permitted enquiry even by one member of the Managing Committee. The important question is whether induction of two outsiders in the enquiry committee vitiated the finding arrived at by it. As to this, we may state that Rule 22 (4) having laid down as to who make the enquiry, it is not permissible in law to travel beyond the language of the rule. The important question is whether induction of two outsiders in the enquiry committee vitiated the finding arrived at by it. As to this, we may state that Rule 22 (4) having laid down as to who make the enquiry, it is not permissible in law to travel beyond the language of the rule. Dr.Dash has, however, placed reliance on three decisions of three different High Courts of the country in support of his submissions that no illegality was committed by indicating two outsiders in the committee. These decisions are: (1) Bhagatram v. Union of India,1969 3 SLR 66 (Delhi) , (2) Satpal v. Himachal Pradesh Financial Corporation,1977 2 SLR 447 (Himachal Pradesh) and (3) Bipad Bhanjan v. State of West Bengal, (1978) 1 SLR 656 (Calcutta) . 5. In view of all the above, the contention of Dr. Dash that the finding arrived at by the enquiry committee as appointed in the present case was not vitiated cannot be accepted. This being the state of affairs, it has to be held that the recommendation of the Managing Committee to terminate the service of the petitioner based on the aforesaid findings cannot be sustained." In the case of Central Bank of India v. C.Bernard, (1991) 1 SCC 319 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph-7 held as follows: "7. True it is that the respondent did not attribute any bias or mala fides to the Enquiry Officer nor did he complain that he was in any manner prejudiced on account of the said Enquiry Officer conducting the domestic enquiry but that will not cure the defect as to his competence. Where punishment is imposed by a person who has no authority do so the very foundation on which the edifice is built collapses and with and it fails the entire edifice. It is a case more or less akin to a case tried by a court lacking in inherent jurisdiction. We, are, therefore, of the opinion that absence of bias, prejudice or mala fides, is of no consequence so far as the question of competence is concerned. It is a case more or less akin to a case tried by a court lacking in inherent jurisdiction. We, are, therefore, of the opinion that absence of bias, prejudice or mala fides, is of no consequence so far as the question of competence is concerned. The cases which were cited at the bar (i) Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co., Ltd. v. Labour Court, Tis Hazari & Ors., (1970) 1 LLJ 23 and (ii) Saran Motors, (supra) also have no application to the special facts and circumstances of this case." In the case of Jalandhar Improvement Trust v. Sampuran Singh, (1999) AIR SC 1437 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraphs-13 held as follows: "13. The High Court as well as the lower appellate court also relied upon the fact that the Trust had made similar preferential allotments as local displaced persons in favour of other persons. Therefore, the courts below came to the conclusion that even the plaintiff-respondents were entitled to such allotment. In our opinion, before coming to this conclusion the courts below should have first decided the question whether the allotment in favour of those persons was within the scope of the rules applicable. If it was not within the scope of the rules then even those allotments in favour of other persons will not create a right in the respondents to claim equality with them; maybe, if the allotments were made wrongly in favour of those persons, the same may become liable for cancellation, if permissible in law, but that will not create an enforceable right on the respondents to claim similar wrongful allotments in their favour. In our opinion, even this ground relied upon by the High Court as well as the lower appellate court is unsustainable. The courts below next relied upon the fact that in regard to some of the respondents, the Trust itself at a point of time made allotments and accepted initial deposits towards the consideration of the plots which were subsequently cancelled. Based on those facts, the courts below held that the Trust having once allotted the plots and having collected part of the consideration, it could not have cancelled the allotments, probably basing the respondents' case on the principle of promissory estoppel. Here the courts below have failed to notice the legal principle that there is no estoppel against law. Based on those facts, the courts below held that the Trust having once allotted the plots and having collected part of the consideration, it could not have cancelled the allotments, probably basing the respondents' case on the principle of promissory estoppel. Here the courts below have failed to notice the legal principle that there is no estoppel against law. The allotment of plots by the Trust is controlled by the statutory rules. Any allotment contrary to those rules will be against the law. Since the allotments made in favour of some of the respondents was based on wrong application of the reservation made for "local displaced person" those allotments were contrary to law. Hence, the principle of promissory/equitable estoppel cannot be invoked to protect such illegal allotments. In the said view of the matter, we are unable to sustain the judgments and decrees impugned in these appeals." In the case of Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. D.L.F., Universal Ltd. and another, (2005) AIR SC 4446 , in paragraph- 31, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows: "31. In Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, (1955) 1 SCR 117 : AIR 1954 SC 340 , this Court declared; "It is a fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction strikes at the very authority of the court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties." (emphasis supplied)." In the case of Veer Kunwar Singh University Ad hoc Teachers Association and others v. Bihar State University (C.C.) Service Commission and others, (2009) 17 SCC 184 , in paragraph-32 it is held as follows: "32. We, therefore, are of the opinion that having regard to the legal position obtaining, it is not possible to agree with the submissions of Mr. Misra. It may be that the High Court should not have constituted a committee but then constitution of a committee was directed with consent. By consent the statutory provisions cannot be violated. By consent jurisdiction cannot also be conferred. Misra. It may be that the High Court should not have constituted a committee but then constitution of a committee was directed with consent. By consent the statutory provisions cannot be violated. By consent jurisdiction cannot also be conferred. Here, however, is a case where parties consented to find out the actual number of additional posts which were required for the benefit of the students. However, in view of the order proposed to be passed, we may not enter into the said question." Similarly, in the case of Dipak Babaria and another v. State of Gujarat and others, (2014) 3 SCC 502 , in paragraph61 the Hon'ble Apex Court held as follows: "61 It is well settled that where the statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner and in no other manner. This proposition of law laid down in Taylor Vs. Taylor,1875 1 Ch 426 D ,431 was first adopted by the Judicial Committee in Nazir Ahmed Vs. King Emperor, (1936) AIR PC 253 and then followed by a bench of three Judges of this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh Vs. State of Vindhya Pradesh, (1954) AIR SC 322 . This proposition was further explained in paragraph 8 of State of U.P. Vs. Singhara Singh, (1964) AIR SC 358 , 64 Page 65 by a bench of three Judges, in the following words:- "8. The rule adopted in Taylor v. Taylor is well recognised and is founded on sound principle. Its result is that if a statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed. The principle behind the rule is that if this were not so, the statutory provision might as well not have been enacted1." This proposition has been later on reiterated in Chandra Kishore Jha Vs. Mahavir Prasad, (1999) 8 SCC 266 , Dhananjaya Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka, (2001) 4 SCC 9 and Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited vs. Essar Power Limited, (2008) 4 SCC 755 ." For the settled position of law as narrated hereinabove, this Court finds none of the grounds taken here by the counsel for opposite parties has the legal force. Mahavir Prasad, (1999) 8 SCC 266 , Dhananjaya Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka, (2001) 4 SCC 9 and Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited vs. Essar Power Limited, (2008) 4 SCC 755 ." For the settled position of law as narrated hereinabove, this Court finds none of the grounds taken here by the counsel for opposite parties has the legal force. On the other hand, each of the decisions discussed hereinabove favours the case of the petitioner. 6. For the observation and for the support of the law from the above decisions through the case at hand, this Court finds the enquiry proceeding initiated against the petitioner through Sri P.K. Bose remain unsustainable. In the process, this Court interfering in the inquiry process sets aside the appointment of Sri P.K. Bose as Enquiry Officer along with all proceedings conducted by him including the second show-cause notice. 7. In the result, the writ petition succeeds. However, there is no order as to cost.