JUDGMENT : B.R. Sarangi, J. 1. The petitioners, who are qualified and trained health workers (female), by way of this writ petition, seek to quash the order dated 30.04.2010 passed by opposite party no 2-Chief District Medical Officer (CDMO), Sundergarh in Annexure-3, by which they have been terminated from their contractual engagement w.e.f. the date of passing of the order. They further seek direction to the opposite parties not to fill up of the posts of Additional Health Worker (Female) under the CDMO, Sundergarh, as per fresh advertisement issued under Anriexure-5, and allow them to continue in their respective posts as before. 2. The factual matrix of the case, in hand, is that Zilla Swasthya Samiti, Sundargarh issued an advertisement under Annexure-1, inviting applications from suitable candidates for filling up of the posts of Additional ANM in Sundargarh district on contractual basis under NRHM, Orissa. The petitioners, having satisfied eligibility criteria, applied for the said posts, along with all documents, in prescribed forms to opposite party no. 2-CDMO, Sundargarh. After due verification of the required documents, the petitioners were selected and letters of appointment were issued in their favour to join as Additional Health Worker (Female) in different sub-centers of the said district. In the letters of appointment, the monthly remuneration was fixed at Rs. 5,400/- only, and it was also indicated that at the time of joining, the documents, i.e. all educational qualification certificates, professional qualification certificates and residential certificate, would be verified in original. As per the said instructions, the petitioners submitted all the original documents to opposite party no. 2 and, after due satisfaction, their joining reports were accepted and they were allowed to continue in their respective posts in different sub-centers as Addl. Health Worker (Female) under opposite party no. 2. 2.1. As per eligibility criteria prescribed in the advertisement, the petitioners have passed H.S.C. examination and have undergone 1 and ½ years nursing training from the approved registered institutions, which are duly affiliated by the Nursing Council of India, as well as registered under the Nursing Council of India. The nursing institution, where the petitioners have undergone their nursing training of 1 and 1/2 years, is registered under the Government of West Bengal and approved by the Nursing Council of India. The nursing institution, where the petitioners have undergone their nursing training of 1 and 1/2 years, is registered under the Government of West Bengal and approved by the Nursing Council of India. Therefore, the petitioners have satisfied the eligibility criteria, pursuant to advertisement issued by the CDMO, Sundargarh, and on production of such documents, the authorities were satisfied and then allowed them to continue in service. But, all on a sudden on 30.04.2010, their services were terminated from contractual engagement, without any prior notice or prior intimation, vide Annexure-3. Hence this application. 3. Mr. Y. Das, learned Senior Counsel appearing along with Mrs. B. Dash, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the petitioners, having satisfied the eligibility criteria pursuant to advertisement issued under Annexure-1, were selected and the authorities, after verification of their documents, having satisfied that the petitioners had possessed requisite qualification, issued engagement order with effect from 1.12.2007, which was extended from time, to time and they continued till 30.04.2010. But, without giving any notice or intimation to them, the order of termination was issued on 30.04.2010 vide Annexure-3, which is violative of the principles of natural justice. It is contended that the petitioners belonged to S.C. and S.T category. They filed representation, but the same was not considered. On the other hand, without regularizing their services and ignoring their claim, the opposite parties are going to fill up the said vacancies by issuing fresh advertisement under Annexure-5 on contract basis. It is also contended that one set of contractual employee cannot be replaced by another set of contractual employee, which is contrary to the provision of law. Therefore, engagement of another set of contractual employee cannot sustain in the eye of law as that itself amounts to coercive exercise of power. It is further contended that three similarly situated persons, who have acquired qualification from the selfsame institution, wherefrom the petitioners have acquired, their services have been regularized, but the petitioners have been discriminated and disengaged from their service by issuing order of termination.. Therefore, the petitioners seek interference of this Court. It is further contended that three similarly situated persons, who have acquired qualification from the selfsame institution, wherefrom the petitioners have acquired, their services have been regularized, but the petitioners have been discriminated and disengaged from their service by issuing order of termination.. Therefore, the petitioners seek interference of this Court. To substantiate his contentions, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners has relied upon judgments of the apex Court in State of Haryana v. Piara Singh, (1992) 4 SCC 118 : AIR 1992 2130, Hargurpratap Singh v. State of Punjab, (2007) 13 SCC 292 , Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly, (1986) 3 SCC 156 and Barinder Kaur v. Guru Nanak Dev University,. 4. Mr. D.K. Pani, learned Additional Standing Counsel appearing for the State opposite parties, on the other hand, contended that for the posts which were advertised, eligibility criteria was fixed that the candidates should have acquired qualification from the approved Government training centre. The institution from which the petitioners have completed ANM course does not come under the approved training centre list and the said training institution is not approved by the Director of Medical Education and Training, Odisha or Indian Nursing Council, New Delhi, it is further contended that the petitioners have acquired training qualification from IMTR, Kolkata, which is not a recognized institution, and that the three months practical training possessed by the petitioners from District Headquarter Hospital, Sambalpur, is not the requisite qualification for engagement on contractual basis to the post of Additional ANM. Therefore, action taken by the authority in terminating the petitioners from service, is well justified and the same may not be interfered with. 5. This Court heard Mr. Y. Das, learned Senior Counsel appearing along with Mrs. B. Dash, learned counsel for the petitioners; and Mr. D.K. Pani, learned Additional Standing Counsel appearing for the State opposite parties. Pleadings have been exchanged between the parties and with their consent, the writ petition is being disposed of finally at the stage of admission. 6. There is no dispute with regard to engagement of the petitioners as Multipurpose Health Worker (Female), pursuant to advertisement under Annexure-1. The initial engagement of the petitioners was on 11.12.2007. After completion of 11 months, it was extended from time to time. Accordingly, the petitioners were continuing till the date of their termination, i.e. 30.04.2010. 6. There is no dispute with regard to engagement of the petitioners as Multipurpose Health Worker (Female), pursuant to advertisement under Annexure-1. The initial engagement of the petitioners was on 11.12.2007. After completion of 11 months, it was extended from time to time. Accordingly, the petitioners were continuing till the date of their termination, i.e. 30.04.2010. As per advertisement issued, the petitioners, having requisite qualification, were selected and engaged as Multipurpose Health Worker (Female), but all on a sudden on 30.04.2010, their services were terminated without assigning any reason vide Annexure-3. Though they made representation for continuance of their service w.e.f. 01.05.2010, the same was not considered. 7. The petitioners belonged to S.C. and ST. category. Having satisfied with the qualification acquired by the petitioners, pursuant to advertisement issued under Annexure-1, and on verification of documents, the petitioners were issued with engagement order, pursuant to which they joined in the post and were continuing. But, all on a sudden on 30.04.2010, they were terminated from service. Though representation was filed in Annexure-4 series immediately on 02.05.2010, the same was not considered, rather a fresh advertisement in the name of walk in interview was issued on 11.07.2011 vide Annexure-5 to fill up the vacancies with another set of contractual employee. Fact remains, by rendering services and discharging their duty as assigned to them from 07.12.2007 till the date of termination, i.e. 30.04.2010, the petitioners have gained experience. But subsequently, by filing counter affidavit, the opposite parties have stated the reasons for disengagement of the petitioners from service indicating that the institutions, from where they have acquired qualification, do not come under the approved training centre list, thereby the services of the petitioners were terminated. But, the order of termination does not reflect the said reason and for the first time in the counter affidavit, the aforesaid reason has been stated. Therefore, such reason is an afterthought and cannot be accepted at this stage, and thus the order of termination cannot sustain in the eye of law. 8. But, the order of termination does not reflect the said reason and for the first time in the counter affidavit, the aforesaid reason has been stated. Therefore, such reason is an afterthought and cannot be accepted at this stage, and thus the order of termination cannot sustain in the eye of law. 8. Reasons being a necessary concomitant to passing an order, the authority can thus discharge his duty in a meaningful manner either by furnishing the same expressly or by necessary reference to those given by the original authority In Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor, AIR 1974 SC 87 it has been held: "Reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. They disclose how the mind is applied to the subject-matter for a decision whether it is purely administrative or quasi-judicial and reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and conclusions reached. The reasons assure an inbuilt support to the conclusion and decision reached. Recording of reason's is also an assurance that the authority concerned applied its mind to the facts on record. It is vital for the purpose of showing a person that he is receiving justice." The decisions, referred to above, have been followed in Sanjay Kumar Rout v. State of Orissa, AIR 2018 ORISSA 162, rendered by a Division Bench of this Court, where Dr. Justice B.R. Sarangi is a member. 9. The subsequent explanation given in paragraph-10 of the counter affidavit filed by opposite party no. 4 cannot be taken into consideration, in view of the judgment of this Court in M/s. Shree Ganesh Construction v. State of Orissa, 2016(11) OLR 237, which was passed following the judgment of the apex Court in Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi, AIR 1978 SC 851 . In paragraphs-7 & 8 of the judgment in M/s. Shree Ganesh Construction (supra) this Court held as follows: "7. In the counter affidavit filed, the reasons have been assigned, which are not available in the impugned order of cancellation filed before this Court in Annexure-4 dated 5.2.2016. More so, while cancelling the tender, the principles of natural justice have not been complied with. In the counter affidavit filed, the reasons have been assigned, which are not available in the impugned order of cancellation filed before this Court in Annexure-4 dated 5.2.2016. More so, while cancelling the tender, the principles of natural justice have not been complied with. It is well settled principle of law laid down by the Apex Court in Mohinder Singh Gill and another v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others, AIR 1978 SC 851 that: "When a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise an order bad in the beginning may by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out." 8. In Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR 1952 SC 16 , the Apex Court held as follows: "Public orders publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the acting and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself. Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older." Similar view has also been taken in Bhikhubhai Vithlabhai Patel and others v. State of Gujarat and another, (2008)4 SCC 144 . The aforesaid decision has also been followed by this Court in Lalit Kumar Dalua v. Government of Orissa, 2019 (Suppl. 1) OLR 759. 10. The order of termination has been issued without following the principles of natural justice. The soul of natural justice is 'fair play in action In HK (An Infant) in re, 1967 1 All ER 226 (DC), Lord Parker, CJ, preferred to describe natural justice as 'a duty to act fairly'. In Fairmount Investments Ltd. v. Secy. of State for Environment, 1976 2 All ER 865 (HL), Lord Russel of Kilfowen somewhat picturesquely described natural justice as 'a fair crack of the whip' In R. v. Secy. In Fairmount Investments Ltd. v. Secy. of State for Environment, 1976 2 All ER 865 (HL), Lord Russel of Kilfowen somewhat picturesquely described natural justice as 'a fair crack of the whip' In R. v. Secy. of State for Home Affairs, ex p. Hosenball, Geoffrey Lane, LJ, 1977 3 All ER 452 (DC & CA), preferred the homely phrase 'common fairness' in defining natural justice. Natural justice, another name of which is common sense justice, is the name of those principles which constitute the minimum requirement of justice and without adherence to which justice would be a travesty Natural justice accordingly stands for that "fundamental quality of fairness which being adopted, justice not only be done but also appears to be done". 11. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 818 , the meaning of natural justice came up for consideration and the apex Court held as follows:- "The phase is not capable of a static and precise definition. It "'cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of cast-iron formula. Historically, "natural justice" has been used in a way, "which implies the existence of moral principles of self evident and unarguable truth", "natural justice" by Paul Jackson, 2nd Ed, page-1, In course of time, judges nurtured in the traditions of British jurisprudence, often invoked it in conjunction with a reference to "equity and good conscience". Legal experts of earlier generations did not draw any distinction between "natural justice" and "natural law". "Natural Justice" was considered as "that part of natural law which relates to the administration of justice". 12. In Bhagwan v. Ramchand, AIR 1965 SC 1767 , the apex Court held that the rule of law demands that the power to determine questions affecting rights of citizens would impose the limitation that the power should be exercised in conformity with the principles of natural justice. 13. In Mysore Urban Development Authority by its Commissioner v. Veer Kumar Jain, (2010) 5 SCC 791 : 2010 (II) OLR (SC) 445, the apex Court held in paragraphs 17, 18 and 19, being relevant are extracted hereunder:- "17. We may refer to some of the decisions of this Court having a bearing on the issue. In S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [(1960) 4 SCC 379] this Court rather rigidly and sternly observed. (SCC p. 395, para 24) "24... We may refer to some of the decisions of this Court having a bearing on the issue. In S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [(1960) 4 SCC 379] this Court rather rigidly and sternly observed. (SCC p. 395, para 24) "24... In our view the principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It ill comes from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced." 18. In State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma [ (1996) 3 SCC 364 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 717] this Court stated that the aforesaid observation should be understood in the context of the facts of that case and in the light of the subsequent Constitution Bench judgment in ECIL v. B. Karunakar [ (1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704] and C.B. Gautam v. Union of India [ (1993) 1 SCC 78 ]. This Court observed: (S.K. Sharma case [ (1996) 3 SCC 364 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 717], SCC pp. 385 & 391, paras 28 & 33) "28. The decisions cited above make one thing clear viz. principles of natural justice cannot be reduced to any hard-and-fast formulae. As said in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk [(1949) 1 All ER 109 (CA)] way back in 1949, these principles cannot be put in a straitjacket. Their applicability depends upon the context and the facts" and circumstances of each case. (See Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr. [ (1978) 1 SCC 405 ].), The objective is to ensure a fair hearing, a fair deal, to the person whose rights are going to be affected. *** 33. (6) While applying the rule of audi alteram partem (the primary principle of natural justice) the court/tribunal/authority must always bear in mina" the ultimate and overriding objective underlying the said rule viz. to ensure a fair hearing and to ensure that there is no failure of justice. It is this objective which should guide them in applying the rule to varying situations that arise before them." 19. to ensure a fair hearing and to ensure that there is no failure of justice. It is this objective which should guide them in applying the rule to varying situations that arise before them." 19. Ensuring that there is no failure of justice is as important as ensuring that there is a fair hearing before an adverse order is made. This Court in Roshan Deen v. Preeti Lal [ (2002) 1 SCC 100 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 97] held: (SCC p. 106, para 12) "12. ... Time and again this Court has reminded that the power conferred on the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is to advance justice and not to thwart it (vide State of U.P. v. District Judge, Unnao [ (1984) 2 SCC 673 ]). The very purpose of such constitutional powers being conferred on the High Courts is that no man should be subjected to injustice by violating the law. The lookout of the High Court is, therefore, not merely to pick out any error of law through an academic angle but to see whether injustice has resulted on account of any erroneous interpretation of law. If justice became the by-product of an erroneous view of law the High Court is not expected to erase such justice in the name of correcting the error of law." 14. In Jayendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra and another, (2009) 7 SCC 104 : 2009 (II) OLR (SC)161, the apex Court in paragraph-57 held as follows:- "57. Mr. Naphade would submit that the appellant did not suffer any prejudice. We do not agree. Infringement of such a valuable right itself causes prejudice. In S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan[ (1980) 4 SCC 379 ] this Court clearly held: (SCC p. 395, para 24) "24. ... In our view the principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It ill comes from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced." 15. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It ill comes from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced." 15. Applying the law, as discussed above, to the present context, it appears that the contention that principles of natural justice has not been complied with, while issuing the order dated 30.04.2010 by the CDMO, Sundergarh in Annxure-3 terminating the petitioners from service, is well founded. 16. After the order of termination was issued, opposite party no. 2, vide Annexure-5 dated 11.07.2011, issued a fresh advertisement in the name of walk in interview for contractual appointment to the post of Multipurpose Health Worker (Female) It is well settled principle of law laid down by the apex Court that one set of contractual employee cannot be replaced by another set of contractual employee. In Piara Singh (supra), the apex Court observed as follows: "Before parting with this case, we think it appropriate to say a few words concerning the issue of regularisation of ad hoc/temporary employees in government service. The normal rule, of course, is regular recruitment through the prescribed agency but exigencies of administration may sometimes call for an ad hoc or temporary appointment to be made. In such a situation, effort should always be to replace such an ad hoc/temporary employee by a regularly selected employee as early as possible..... Secondly, an ad hoc or temporary employee should not be replaced by another ad hoc or temporary employee; he must-be replaced only by a regularly selected employee. This is necessary to avoid arbitrary action on the part of the appointing authority. XX XX XX If for any reason, an ad hoc or temporary employee is continued for a fairly long spell, the authorities must consider his case for regularisation provided he is eligible and qualified according to rules and his service record is satisfactory and his appointment does not run counter to the reservation policy of the State. XX XX XX ......If a casual labourer is continued for a fairly long spell - say two or three years - a presumption may arise that there is regular need for his services. In such a situation, it becomes obligatory for the concerned authority to examine the feasibility of his regularisation. XX XX XX ......If a casual labourer is continued for a fairly long spell - say two or three years - a presumption may arise that there is regular need for his services. In such a situation, it becomes obligatory for the concerned authority to examine the feasibility of his regularisation. While doing so, the authorities ought to adopt a positive approach coupled with an empathy for the person....." 17. In Hargurpratap Singh (supra), the apex Court in paragraph-3 held as follows: "3. We have carefully looked into the judgment of the High Court and other pleadings that have been put forth before this Court. It is clear that though the appellants may not be entitled to regular appointment as such it cannot be said that they will not be entitled to the minimum of the pay scale nor that they should not be continued till regular incumbents are appointed. The course adopted by the High Court is to displace one ad hoc arrangement by another ad hoc arrangement which is not at all appropriate for these persons who have gained experience which will be more beneficial and useful to the colleges concerned rather than to appoint persons afresh on ad hoc basis. Therefore, we set aside the orders made by the High Court to the extent the same deny the claim of the appellants of minimum pay scale and continuation in service till regular incumbents are appointed. We direct that they shall be continued in service till regular appointments are made on minimum of the pay scale. The appeals shall stand allowed in part accordingly." Similar view has also been taken by the apex Court in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. (supra) and Punjab and Haryana High Court in Barinder Kaur (supra). 18. In view of such position, by issuing notice in the name of walk in interview vide Annexure-5 dated 11.07.2011, since opposite party no. 2 is going to replace the petitioners by another set of contractual employee, the same cannot sustain in the eye of law and is hereby quashed. 19. It is pertinent to mention here that while entertaining the writ petition, this Court, vide order dated 02.01.2012 in Misc. Case No. 18739 of 2011, directed that nine posts of Addl. Health Worker (Female) in the office of CDMO, Sundergarh, in pursuance of Annexure-5, should not be filled up till the next date. 19. It is pertinent to mention here that while entertaining the writ petition, this Court, vide order dated 02.01.2012 in Misc. Case No. 18739 of 2011, directed that nine posts of Addl. Health Worker (Female) in the office of CDMO, Sundergarh, in pursuance of Annexure-5, should not be filled up till the next date. Since the posts are lying vacant, by virtue of interim order passed by this Court, the opposite parties are directed to engage the petitioners immediately in the said posts and allow them to continue in service. The petitioners may not be entitled to get financial benefits for the period from 30.04.2010 till the date they would be allowed to continue in service, but, however, the said period shall be treated as continuity in service for all other service benefits, as admissible to them in accordance with law. 20. In view of the facts and circumstances, as-well as the propositions of law, as discussed above, this Court is of the considered view that the writ petition has to be allowed and is hereby allowed. No order as to cost.