ORDER : 1. The present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is filed for the purpose of seeking the following reliefs :- “8(a) Your Lordships may be pleased to admit this petition; (b) Your Lordships may be pleased to call for the records of Special Civil Suit No. 29 of 2017 filed before the Ld. Principal Senior Civil Judge, Chikhli, Navsari and this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash and set aside the order passed by Ld. Principal Senior Civil Judge, Chikhli, Navsari on 01.12.2018 below Exhibit-27 in Special Civil Suit No. 29 of 2017. (c) Your Lordships may pending the admission, hearing and final disposal of this petition, stay the effect and operation of the impugned order dated 01.12.2018 passed by Ld. Principal Senior Civil Judge, Chikhli Navsari in Special Civil Suit No. 29 of 2017 and Your Lordships may kindly be pleased to stay the further proceedings in Special Civil Suit No. 29 of 2017’ (d) Your Lordships may kindly be pleased to grant any other and further reliefs as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the larger interest of substantial justice.” 2. The facts in short are as that the petitioner no. 1 – original defendant no. 1 is the proprietorship firm of petitioner no. 2. Petitioner No. 2 is an individual and citizen of India and being a citizen of India, he is entitled to protection of all the rights provided under the Constitution of India and also all the other statutory rights that are available to the citizen of India. The respondent is a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 and is the original plaintiff of the Special Civil Suit No. 29 of 2017 filed before the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Chikhli (Navsari). That the respondent had originally filed Special Civil Suit No. 16 of 2014 before the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Gandevi. However, vide order dated 18.11.2017 the said suit was transferred to the court of learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Chikhli (Navsari) and renumbered as Special Civil Suit No. 29 of 2017. That the petitioner no. 2 is the proprietor of the petitioner no. 1 firm and petitioner no.2 carried on its business activities in the name of the said petitioner no. 1 firm and is engaged in the business of pulses and food grains from tis place of business at Indore, Madhya Pradesh. That the petitioner no. 2 is the proprietor of the petitioner no. 1 firm and petitioner no.2 carried on its business activities in the name of the said petitioner no. 1 firm and is engaged in the business of pulses and food grains from tis place of business at Indore, Madhya Pradesh. The respondent company is engaged in the business of manufacture of sale of Tuvar Dal and having its manufacturing plant at Chikhli, District, Navsari. 2.1. It is further the case of the petitioners that the management of the respondent company was keen to extend its sales and marketing in the State of Madhya Pradesh and therefore, Mr. Bhikhubhai and Prakashbhai Shah of the respondent had personally visited Indore somewhere in the year 2011. The said representative of the respondent company happened to meet Mr. Joginder Fulal, who used to act as an agent/broker in the business of food grains during those days. Mr. Joginder Fulal was sitting at the shop of the present petitioners at that time and thus the respondent was introduced to the present petitioners. Since the present petitioners were the leading name in food grains and pulses market, the representative of the respondent company had requested petitioner no. 2 to accept the dealership of its product i.e. Tuvar Dal and promote the brand of the respondent company in the State of Madhya Pradesh. As a matter of custom prevailing in the business of food grains in the said market, it was mutually agreed by and between the parties that the respondent company shall supply goods to the petitioners exclusively on the agreed margin amount. The petitioners had demanded the margin amount of 8% on the sales whereas, the respondent company had offered 5% of margin. However, ultimately, the margin amount was mutually decided at 6% on the sales. Thus, it was agreed by and between the parties that the petitioners would be entitled to the margin money of 6% on the basis of the sales made by the respondent company in the State of Madhya Pradesh through the dealership of the petitioners. Further, as a matter of common practice prevailing in the business market of food grains and pulses, credit period is 45 days. However, if the payment is made within 45 days then as per the resolution passed by the mutual understanding, 2% discount was to be offered to the petitioners. Further, as a matter of common practice prevailing in the business market of food grains and pulses, credit period is 45 days. However, if the payment is made within 45 days then as per the resolution passed by the mutual understanding, 2% discount was to be offered to the petitioners. This discount is over and above the margin amount promised to the petitioners. That in view of this arrangement, the respondent company started supplying goods i.e. Tuvar Dal to the petitioners from the month of June, 2011. Thereafter the petitioners used to inform the quantity of goods required to be supplied to them over telephone to the respondent company and accordingly the respondent company used to supply the goods to the petitioners through their transport at the workplace of the petitioners situated at the city of Indore. The representative of the respondent company used to periodically visit the shop of the petitioners herein to collect the payment of goods supplied to them. The petitioners used to make prompt payments towards the goods supplied to them to avail 2% cash discount as agreed by the parties and also as per the resolution passed by the Association of the Trade. It is pertinent to note that the petitioners used to issue cheques for such payment and the cheques were handed over to the representative of the respondent company who used to visit the shop of the petitioners. It is also evident from the record that the representative of the respondent company used to deposit such cheques in the Indore Branch of their Bankers for its clearance. It is further the case of the petitioners that thereafter over a period of time, some dispute as to the outstanding amounts against each other arose between the parties which also resulted into criminal complaints filed by the parties against each other. One criminal complaint filed by the petitioner is pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Indore and another criminal complaint filed by the respondent against the petitioner is pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chikhli. Further the respondent filed the aforesaid Special Civil Suit No. 16 of 2014 before the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Gandevi. However, vide order dated 18.11.2017, the said suit was transferred to the court of learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Chikhli, (Navsari) and renumbered as Special Civil Suit No. 29 of 2017. 2.2. Further the respondent filed the aforesaid Special Civil Suit No. 16 of 2014 before the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Gandevi. However, vide order dated 18.11.2017, the said suit was transferred to the court of learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Chikhli, (Navsari) and renumbered as Special Civil Suit No. 29 of 2017. 2.2. It is further the case of the petitioners that when the summons were served upon the petitioner, he immediately contacted to a local counsel at Chikhli, through common reference and handed over the Vakalatnama to advocate Mr. Sunilkumar A Parmar on 21.03.2018. However, the said advocates appeared and submitted his Vakalatnama only on 26.06.2018. In the meanwhile, the petitioner submitted an application for adjournment on 01.05.2018 as a party-in-person. Thereafter on 21.01.2018, the petitioner made an application before the court below stating that due to ill health of his son, he could not manage to prepare his written statement and hence time may be granted to him to file the same in the interest of justice. However, the learned trial court rejected the application of the petitioner by passing the order below Exhibit-27 on the same date and closed the stage of reply. Thereafter the respondent – plaintiff submitted an application dated 21.08.2018 vide Exhibit-25 for closing the stage of rely of the defendant on the ground that the period of more than 90 days has passed. The learned trial court passed an order dated 21.08.2018 below Exhibit-25 holding that since the stage of filing reply by the defendant is already closed, no other order is required to be passed and hence the application is disposed of. It is further the case of the petitioner that under these circumstances, the petitioner replaced his counsel and entrusted his case papers to advocate Mr. Arun A. Sane and Mr. Bharat A. Bhandari who appeared on behalf of the petitioners and submitted their Vakalatnama on 30.10.2018. That on the very same day, the advocate for the petitioners filed an application Exhibit-27 for “opening the stage of reply” and tendered the written statement on behalf of the petitioners. The respondent – plaintiff vide Exhibit-28 filed its objection against the opening the stage of reply and permitting the petitioners to file the written statement. That on the very same day, the advocate for the petitioners filed an application Exhibit-27 for “opening the stage of reply” and tendered the written statement on behalf of the petitioners. The respondent – plaintiff vide Exhibit-28 filed its objection against the opening the stage of reply and permitting the petitioners to file the written statement. The learned trial court passed an order dated 01.12.2018 under Exhibit-27 thereby disallowing the petitioner from filing his reply on the sole ground that the same is tendered beyond the period of 90 days as stated in Order 8 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Hence, the present petition. 3. Feeling aggrieved with and dissatisfied with the said order dated 01.12.2018 passed below Exhibit-18, the petitioner has invoked jurisdiction of this Court with a request to grant relief as prayed for in the application. 4. This Court considering the fact has issued notice for final disposal vide order dated 02.02.2019 and after service of the writ of this court, the respondents have appeared through learned advocate Mr. Shakeel Qureshi and with this background, the court has heard the matter. 5. Learned advocate Mr. Kamlesh Vidankar appearing for the petitioners has contended that the right to submit defence is a valuable right and hence without any just reason and without any fault on the part of the petitioners, the same could not have been curtailed by the court below. By now it has been propounded by the Apex Court that Order 8 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a directory provision and in exceptional cases, the request can be considered for the purpose of allowing the written statement to be placed on record. While propounding this, the Apex Court has conveyed that procedural rules are meant for administering the justice rather than to thwart. As a result of this, when sufficient cause is shown in an application at Exhibit-27, the same could not have been rejected. It has further been submitted that on the day when the application was presented, the said application was submitted along with the written statement and, therefore, the petitioners had not sought any further time to submit, on the contrary, reply was ready which was sought to be submitted and that being so, the court below ought to have taken the lenient view in the matter. It has further been contended that on account of the learned advocate being from Indore and on account of bona fide lack of communication, not with any ulterior motive, some time has taken place, the court below ought to have considered sympathetically in the larger interest. There are series of decisions in which upon payment of some costs amount, the written statement being valuable right has been allowed to be taken on record and for that the petitioners are ready and willing to abide by any of the reasonable costs which may be imposed upon while granting the request at Exhibit-27 and after submitting this, the learned advocate for the petitioners has left the matter to the discretion of the court. 6. To meet with the stand taken by the learned advocate for the petitioners, Mr. Shakeel Qureshi, learned advocate appearing for the respondent has submitted that this is nothing but a dilatory tactics to thwart the proceedings. On the contrary, there is more than sufficient time has elapsed causing delay in the proceedings and, therefore, the court below has rightly passed the order not permitting the same to be taken on record. The discretion which has been exercised by the court below is just and proper and suffers from no material irregularity. Resultantly, the petition being devoid of merit, the same be dismissed in limine. While submitting this, learned advocate Mr. Qureshi has also placed reliance on one of the decision delivered by the co-ordinate Bench in the case of Jaswantsinh @ Kali S/O. Sardar Ramsingh Indrasingh v. Indravadan Chhaganlal Thakar & Ors., reported in 2009 (3) GLR 2513 and then submitted that if such kind of lenient view is taken then the same would frustrate the very object of Order 8 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Since this being the position, a request is made not to allow such application to be considered and the petition be dismissed. 7. Having heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and having gone through the material on record, it appears that on account of lack of communication and on account of the fact that the petitioners could not properly track the issue by meeting the lawyer, the reply could not be submitted. 7. Having heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and having gone through the material on record, it appears that on account of lack of communication and on account of the fact that the petitioners could not properly track the issue by meeting the lawyer, the reply could not be submitted. Further while giving an application along with that, a written statement was kept ready with the presentation and therefore, it appears that there is no further intention of delaying any proceeding as is clearly visible from the tenor of application at Exhibit-27. 7.1. Further it appears to the court that this suit proceedings is of the year 2017 and in the peculiar background of fact, written statement could not be submitted and as such, this court is of the opinion that since a delay of eight months appears to have occurred in submitting the entire defence cannot be made unavailable to the petitioners. Hence, the written statement deserves to be kept on record as has been prima facie found from the record. 7.2. Yet another circumstance which cannot be unnoticed is that the court below has substantially relied upon the decision delivered by the co-ordinate Bench in the case of Jaswantsingh @ Kali (supra), but while considering this request, the recent pronouncement of Apex Court, this view has not been considered and yet another decision which has been brought to the notice is also worth consideration which is decided by the co-ordinate Bench on 26.06.2018 rendered in Special Civil Application No. 9180 of 2017. In the said decision also almost similar circumstance has arisen in which there was delay in submitting the written statement and therefore the right to reopen was dealt with after considering the relevant decisions. It has been observed by the court in para 5.7 and 5.8 that in adversarial system, no party should be ordinarily denied opportunity of participation in the process of administration of the justice. The court after considering and dealing with several decisions of the Apex Court has observed as under and since it is recent pronouncement, the court would like to reproduce hereinafter:- “5.7 The provision of Order VIII Rule 1, C.P.C. is indeed procedural in nature. It deals with the filing of written statement within particular limited by the defendant pursuant to service of summons. It deals with the filing of written statement within particular limited by the defendant pursuant to service of summons. A procedural provision should not receive pedantic interpretation but must be applied so as not to defeat the substantial rights of the parties. 5.8 It is trite that in an adversarial system, no party should be ordinarily denied opportunity of participating in the process of administration of justice. A procedural rule should not operate as a snag to the substantive justice and for agitating substantive rights by the parties to the proceedings. The procedural prescriptions are the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration of justice. It is said by the Apex Court that justice hurried is justice buried. 8. In the wake of the aforesaid position which is prevailing on record and in view of the fact that the Apex Court has also observed that when the substantial justice is pitted against the technical consideration, normally, procedural laws are not to be pressed so technically which may thwart substantial justice and the procedural laws are always meant to administer justice and not to thwart. As has been held by the Apex Court in the case of Banwari Lal (Dead) by Legal Representative & Anr. v. Balbir Singh reported in (2016) 1 SCC 607 , the observations are sufficient enough to indicate hence, reproduced hereinafter :- “9. Provisions of Order XXII, CPC are not penal in nature. It is a rule of procedure and substantial rights of the parties cannot be defeated by pedantic approach by observing strict adherence to the procedural aspects of law. In Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra v. Pramod Gupta (2003) 3 SCC 272 : ( AIR 2003 SC 2588 ), a Five Judge Bench of this Court held as under :- "26. Laws of procedure are meant to regulate effectively, assist and aid the object of doing substantial and real justice and not to foreclose even an adjudication on merits of substantial rights of citizen under personal, property and other laws. Procedure has always been viewed as the handmaid of justice and not meant to hamper the cause of justice or sanctify miscarriage of justice. Procedure has always been viewed as the handmaid of justice and not meant to hamper the cause of justice or sanctify miscarriage of justice. A careful reading of the provisions contained in Order 22, CPC as well as the subsequent amendments thereto would lend credit and support to the view that they were devised to ensure their continuation and culmination in an effective adjudication and not to retard the further progress of the proceedings and thereby non-suit the others similarly placed as long as their distinct and independent rights to property or any claim remain intact and not lost forever due to the death of one or the other in the proceedings. The provisions contained in Order 22 are not to be construed as a rigid matter of principle but must ever be viewed as a flexible tool of convenience in the administration of justice. The fact that the khata was said to be joint is of no relevance, as long as each one of them had their own independent, distinct and separate shares in the property as found separately indicated in the jamabandi itself of the shares of each of them distinctly. We are also of the view that the High Court should have, on the very perception it had on the question of abatement, allowed the applications for impleadment even dehors the cause for the delay in filing the applications keeping in view the serious manner in which it would otherwise jeopardize an effective adjudication on merits, the rights of the other remaining appellants for no fault of theirs. Interests of justice would have been better served had the High Court adopted a positive and constructive approach than merely scuttled the whole process to foreclose an adjudication of the claims of others on merits. The rejection by the High Court of the applications to set aside abatement, condonation and bringing on record the legal representatives does not appear, on the peculiar nature of the case, to be a just or reasonable exercise of the Court's power or in conformity with the avowed object of the Court to do real, effective and substantial justice..." (emphasis supplied) 10. In Sital Prasad Saxena (D) by LRs. In Sital Prasad Saxena (D) by LRs. v. Union of India and Ors., (1985) 1 SCC 163 : ( AIR 1985 SC 1 ), it was observed that the rules of procedure under Order XXII, CPC are designed to advance justice and should be so interpreted as not to make them penal statutes for punishing erring parties. On sufficient cause, delay in bringing the legal representatives of the deceased party on record should be condoned. Procedure is meant only to facilitate the administration of justice and not to defeat the same. The dismissal of the second appeal by the High Court does not constitute a sound and reasonable exercise of its powers and the impugned order cannot be sustained.” 9. In view of the aforesaid situation and in view of the readiness and willingness to pay for reasonable costs, the Court is inclined to consider the request since there is a delay of eight months. In this peculiar background of fact without treating the same as precedent, the court would like to impose costs which has been voluntarily invited of Rs.20,000/- to be paid to the contesting respondent within a period of two weeks from today and upon such payment, the petitioners be permitted to submit their written statement which is stated to be right and the suit proceedings may be dealt with as expeditiously as possible. This view has been taken by the court in view of the specific assurance given to the court by the petitioners that they will not drag on the litigation unnecessarily and with this background of fact the impugned order deserves to be set aside and 10. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 01.02.2018 passed below Exhibit-27 in Special Civil Suit no. 29 of 2017 by is quashed and set aside and consequently the relief sought in Exhibit-27 is granted in Special Civil Suit No. 29 of 2017. The petition stands disposed of with no order as costs.