JUDGMENT : This petition has been Filed by the petitioner under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. seeking to quash the order dated 10.01.2019 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thoubal in Criminal (Petition) Case No.21 of 2017. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was found stocking 39 domestic cooking gas cylinders without any authorization or valid documents and a case in FIR No.201(9)17 on the file of Thoubal Police was registered against him. The petitioner was arrested on 30.09.2017 and the said 39 gas cylinders were seized from his unauthorised possession. On production of the petitioner along with relevant charge sheet, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thoubal took cognizance of the offence under Section 285 IPC and accordingly, charge under Section 285 IPC was framed against the petitioner and on the plea of guilty of the petitioner, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, convicted the petitioner and confiscated the seized gas cylinders vide order dated 01.10.2017 in Criminal (P) Case No.21 of 2017. In the said judgment, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate directed that the said confiscation be done after lapse of two months from that date and after the disposal of the appeal, if any. 3. Assailing the judgment of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thoubal, the petitioner had filed Criminal Appeal No.5 of 2017 before the learned Sessions Judge, Thoubal. By the judgment dated 19.03.2018, the learned Sessions Judge, Thoubal, set aside the conviction and confiscation order dated 01.10.2017 and directed proceeding be initiated de novo from the stage of taking cognizance under Section 190 Cr.P.C. 4. Pursuant to the judgment dated 19.03.2018 passed in Criminal Appeal No.5 of 2017, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thoubal, by an order dated 10.01.2019, has taken cognizance of the offence under Section 7 of Essential Commodities Act, 1955 for contravention of Order 3 and 7 of the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (Regulation of Supply and Distribution) Order, 2000 and issued summons to the petitioner for appearance on 02.02.2019. Challenging the order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate dated 10.01.2019, the petitioner has filed the present petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. 5. Challenging the order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate dated 10.01.2019, the petitioner has filed the present petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the second trial of the petitioner as an accused again in the same Criminal (P) Case No.21 of 2017 dated 01.07.2017 as de novo trial is bad and contrary to spirit of law because of the fact that the same happens to be hit by double jeopardy and is in violation of Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India as well as Section 300 Cr.P.C. Therefore, subsequent prosecution for the same cause happens to be contrary to the spirit of law and accordingly, should be quashed. 6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the State submitted that upon perusing the police report in respect of unauthorised possession and sale of domestic cook gas cylinder of liquefied petroleum gas, the learned Sessions Judge, Thoubal, rightly set aside the conviction and confiscation order dated 01.10.2017 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thoubal and that the order of the learned Sessions Judge, Thoubal, directing to proceed de novo from the stage of taking cognizance under Section 190 Cr.P.C. is perfectly correct. He would submit that pursuant to the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, Thoubal, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thoubal, has rightly taken cognizance of the offence under Section 7 of Essential Commodities Act and therefore, there is no need to quash the proceedings dated 10.01.2019. 7. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on either side and also perused the materials available on record. 8. The grievance of the petitioner is that once the petitioner was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.1000/- for the offence under Section 285 IPC, the second trial of the petitioner as an accused again by setting aside the said conviction and direction to initiate proceeding de novo from the stage of taking cognizance under Section 190 Cr.P.C. would be hit by double jeopardy. The said plea of the petitioner, in my opinion, appears to be sustainable for the reason that once a person has been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and has been either convicted or acquitted shall not be tried for the same offence or for any other offence arising out of the same facts, for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made or for which he might have been convicted under the Code of Criminal Procedure. 9. As rightly argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the second trial of the petitioner as an accused again in Criminal (P) Case No.21 of 2017 as de novo trial is bad and contrary to the spirit of law and also hit by double jeopardy. 10. The concept of double jeopardy originates on the principle of “autrefois acquit and autregois convict” and the same has been elaborately dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, reported in (2012) 7 SCC 621 . 11. In Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel, supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held : “The sole issue raised in this appeal is regarding the scope and application of the doctrine of double jeopardy. The rule against double jeopardy provides foundation for the pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict. The manifestation of this rule is to be found contained in Section 300 CrPC; Section 26 of the General Clauses Act and Section 71 I.P.C. Section 300(1) Cr.P.C. reads: A person who has once been tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under sub-section (1) of Section 221, or for which he might have been convicted under sub-section (2) thereof.” Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 reads: “Provision as to offences punishable under two or more enactments. Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence. Section 71 IPC reads: Limit of punishment of offence made up of several offences. Where anything which is an offence is made up of parts, any of which parts is itself an offence, the offender shall not be punished with the punishment of more than one of such of his offences, unless it be so expressly provided. 6. In Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay, AIR 1953 SC 325 , the Constitution Bench of this Court dealt with the issue wherein the central issue arose in the context of the fact that a person who had arrived at an Indian airport from abroad on being searched was found in possession of gold in contravention of the relevant notification, prohibiting the import of gold. Action was taken against him by the Customs Authorities and the gold seized from his possession was confiscated. Later on, a prosecution was launched against him in the criminal court at Bombay charging him with having committed the offence under Section 8 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 (hereinafter called ‘FERA’) read with the relevant notification. In the background of these facts, the plea of autrefois acquit was raised seeking protection under Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India, 1950 (hereinafter called “the Constitution”). This Court held that the fundamental right which is guaranteed under Article 20(2) enunciates the principle of “autrefois convict” or “double jeopardy” i.e. a person must not be put in peril twice for the same offence. The doctrine is based on the ancient maxim “nemo debet bis punire pro uno delicto”, that is to say, that no one ought to be punished twice for one offence. The plea of autrefois convict or “autrefois acquit” avers that the person has been previously convicted or acquitted on a charge for the same offence as that in respect of which he is arraigned. The plea of autrefois convict or “autrefois acquit” avers that the person has been previously convicted or acquitted on a charge for the same offence as that in respect of which he is arraigned. The test is whether the former offence and the offence now charged have the same ingredients in the sense that the facts constituting the one are sufficient to justify a conviction of the other and not that the facts relied on by the prosecution are the same in the two trials. A plea of autrefois acquit is not proved unless it is shown that the verdict of acquittal of the previous charge necessarily involves an acquittal of the latter.” 12. The Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.A. Venkataraman v. Union of India and another, reported in AIR 1954 SC 375 , explained the scope of doctrine of double jeopardy, observing that in order to attract the provisions of Article 20 (2) of the Constitution of India, there must have been both prosecution and punishment in respect of the same offence. The words “prosecuted” and “punished” are to be taken not distributively so as to mean “prosecuted” or “punished”. Both the factors must coexist in order that the operation of the clause may be attractive. 13. The law is well settled that in order to attract the provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India i.e., doctrine of “autrefois acquit” or Section 300 Cr.P.C. or Section 71 IPC or Section 26 of General Clauses Act, ingredients of the offences in the earlier case as well as in the latter case must be the same and not different. The test to ascertain whether the two offences are the same is not identity of the allegations but the identity of the ingredients of the offence. 14. Thus, it is clear that in order to attract the provisions of Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India, there must have been both prosecution and punishment in respect of the same offence. The words “prosecuted” and “punished” are to be taken not distributive so as to mean “prosecuted” or “punished”. Both the factors must coexist in order that the operation of the clause may be attracted. 15. The words “prosecuted” and “punished” are to be taken not distributive so as to mean “prosecuted” or “punished”. Both the factors must coexist in order that the operation of the clause may be attracted. 15. In Kolla Veera Raghav Rao v. Gorantla Venkateswara Rao and another, reported in (2011) 2 SCC 703 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that once the conviction under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act has been recorded, the question of trying a same person under Section 420 IPC or any other provision of IPC or any other statute is not permissible being hit by Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India and Section 300(1) of Cr.P.C. 16. In the case on hand, same set of allegation has been attributed against the petitioner. In the first case, it has been alleged unauthorised possession of gas cylinders that no valid document was produced by the petitioner for possession of 39 gas cylinders and thus prosecuted for the offence punishable under Section 285 IPC. However, for the same allegation, second case has been directed to be initiated under Section 7 of Essential Commodities Act for contravention of Order 3 and 7 of the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (Regulation of Supply and Distribution) Order, 2000, which is in my opinion, is not permissible. On an analysis of the allegation so attributed, this Court finds that it did not justify instant prosecution as mere application of different Sections. 17. The nature of allegation does inspire sameness of prosecution with regard to intended prosecution under different Sections of penal law which was available to the prosecution at an earlier prosecution. Therefore, the subsequent prosecution for the same cause happens to be contrary to the spirit of law. No man can be punished twice for the same offence. 18. In the instant case, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thoubal, convicted the petitioner under Section 285 IPC and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs.1000/-. In the appeal filed by the petitioner, the learned Sessions Judge, Thoubal, set aside the said conviction and directed that the petitioner could be tried under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act for contravention of Order 3 and 7 of the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (Regulation and Supply and Distribution Order) 2000. Accordingly, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thoubal, by an order dated 10.01.2019, took cognizance of the offence and issued notice to the petitioner. Accordingly, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thoubal, by an order dated 10.01.2019, took cognizance of the offence and issued notice to the petitioner. The initiation of proceedings for the second time would clearly attract double jeopardy and the theory of double jeopardy protects against imposition of multiple punishment for the same offence. 19. Since the petitioner has paid the fine amount, initiation of second prosecution is unwarranted. Therefore, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thoubal, dated 10.01.2019 in Criminal (P) Case No.21 of 2017 alleging that the same is abuse of process of law, which in my opinion is sustainable in law. 20. In Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarkhand and others, reported in (2013) 11 SCC 673 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held : “12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of the court.” 21. Insofar as the power and jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is concerned, it is well settled that while exercising the powers under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court does not function as the Court of appeal or revision. The inherent power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., can be exercised to give effect to an order under the Code to prevent abuse of process of the Court and to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is also well settled that the inherent powers under this provision should not be executed to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The inherent power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., can be exercised to give effect to an order under the Code to prevent abuse of process of the Court and to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is also well settled that the inherent powers under this provision should not be executed to stifle a legitimate prosecution. 22. It is settled position that the High Court normally should refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where all the facts are incomplete and hazy, more so, when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issue involved, whether factual or legal, or of such magnitude that they cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. The wholesome power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. entitles the High Court to quash a proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding would cause serious prejudice to the party against whom allegations are made and the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. 23. In the present case, as stated supra, the concept of double jeopardy clearly applies and therefore, proceeding directed to be initiated de novo from the stage of taking cognizance under Section 190 Cr.P.C. does not arise and thus, the second prosecution is clear abuse of process of law and therefore, the same is liable to be quashed. 24. In the result, (a) this Cril. Petition is allowed. (b) the order dated 10.01.2019 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thoubal, in Criminal (P) Case No.21 of 2017 is quashed.