JUDGMENT : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. The appellant-writ petition (hereinafter referred to as the appellant) is aggrieved of the judgment dated 21.09.2017 passed in W.P.(S) No.7204 of 2006 by which his challenge to the order of his dismissal from service has failed. 2. By an order dated 16.08.2005 passed in a departmental proceeding, the appellant was dismissed from service which was communicated to him by a letter dated 22.08.2005 and the appeal preferred by him against the order dated 16.08.2005 has been dismissed by the appellate-authority by an order dated 09.08.2006. 3. The appellant was appointed as Recorder-cum-Chaser on 27.03.1982 and he has superannuated from service on 31.03.2009. On an allegation that without permission of the Management he has married another woman while his first wife was alive, a charge-memo was served upon the appellant on 08.05.2004. The statement of allegation against the appellant accompanying the charge-sheet dated 08.05.2004 reads as under: “It has been reported that you have married with another woman without prior permission of B.S.L. Management, while your first wife is alive. This is a case of Bigamy which is a misconduct on your part.” 4. The appellant has pleaded that he was married to Bina Sharan in the year 1969 and when he joined the Bokaro Steel Plant in the year 1982 the name of Smt. Bina Sharan was recorded in his personal file with the employer and she has been availing all facilities including the medical facility as his wife from his employer. He has taken a stand that since his wife was not staying with him, on his request the complainant-Anju Sinha was staying in his house as his “care-taker”. He has asserted that the said Anju Sinha did not avail any facility from the employer-company and she has, infact, written letter dated 24.12.2004 withdrawing her previous letter dated 09.04.2003. This letter dated 09.04.2003 was sent by Anju Sinha claiming herself wife of the appellant to the Managing Director, Steel Authority of India for incorporating her name in the service records of the appellant. This is the letter on the basis of which the present departmental proceeding was initiated against the appellant. 5. In the departmental proceeding, two witnesses were examined by the Management in support of the charge framed against him. This is the letter on the basis of which the present departmental proceeding was initiated against the appellant. 5. In the departmental proceeding, two witnesses were examined by the Management in support of the charge framed against him. A copy of the Life Insurance Policy in which Anju Sinha has been shown as wife of the appellant, a joint photograph of the appellant with Anju Sinha, statement of the Principal of the Chinmaya Vidyalaya and the Progress Report card of Miss Gargi Sharan wherein she has been shown as daughter of the appellant were produced by the department to show that the appellant has married Anju Sinha while his first wife namely, Smt. Bina Sharan is still alive. The appellant has examined three witnesses; one of the witnesses was Anju Sinha herself. Her own brother namely, B.P. Srivastava was also examined as a defence witness. The enquiry officer on the basis of the evidences laid during the enquiry has found the charge of ‘bigamy’ proved. The appellant made a detailed representation in response to the second show-cause notice dated 20.06.2005 taking a stand that when the complainant-Anju Sinha herself has admitted that she is not married to the appellant and she has been staying with the appellant as ‘care-taker’, the charge of bigamy framed in the departmental proceeding is not proved. 6. The learned writ Court has held as under : “14. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of W.B. and Others versus Prasenjit Dutta reported in (1994) 2 SCC 37 has held that in a departmental proceeding of a charge of bigamy, the departmental authorities are not precluded from examining the question of second marriage for limited purpose of departmental action. It has also held that the departmental proceeding cannot be suspended till proper adjudication by Civil or Family Court. 15. Thus, applying the said principles in a departmental proceeding, it is not necessary to prove Saptapadi and invocation before sacred fire. It is also not necessary that only the first wife will have a right to make a complaint about a bigamy committed by her husband. In the departmental proceeding, if the misconduct comes to light, may be through any one, the proceeding can be initiated against the delinquent employee. Proving Saptapadi and invocation before sacred fire is required in a civil proceeding for declaration of a valid marriage between the parties. In the departmental proceeding, if the misconduct comes to light, may be through any one, the proceeding can be initiated against the delinquent employee. Proving Saptapadi and invocation before sacred fire is required in a civil proceeding for declaration of a valid marriage between the parties. The same standard of proof cannot be applied in the departmental proceeding as in the departmental proceeding proof on basis of preponderance of probability would suffice. 16. In view of what has been discussed above, I find that the petitioner admits that his first wife is alive. He admits that he is residing with Anju Sinha. It is admitted that there is a life insurance policy purchased by this petitioner showing Anju Devi as his wife. He admits the report card of the daughter Gargi Sharan, wherein it has been entered that this petitioner is her father and Anju Devi is her mother. Combining the effects of all these facts, I find that there is a strong probability and circumstances that this petitioner has married Anju Devi. There cannot be any other conclusion. These circumstances are enough for proving the guilt of the petitioner. Thus, I find that the misconduct of the petitioner has been proved by the employer in the departmental proceeding.” 7. On performance of Saptapadi and invocation before sacred fire before it can be held that the appellant was married to Anju Sinha, the learned Single Judge has held that in a departmental proceeding it is not necessary to prove Saptapadi and invocation before sacred fire. The learned Single Judge has dealt with this issue in paragraph no.12 of the impugned order dated 21.09.2017 and held thus; “12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also in the case of “Tulsa Versus Durghatiya” reported in (2008) 4 SCC 520 in paragraph 15 has held that where the partners live together for long spell as husband and wife, there would be presumption in favour of wedlock. The presumption was rebuttable, but a heavy burden lies on the person, who seeks to deprive the relationship of legal origin to prove that no marriage took place. This presumption can be attracted in this case also to prove the charge against the petitioner on the admitted facts basing on the principle of preponderance of probability.” 8. The presumption was rebuttable, but a heavy burden lies on the person, who seeks to deprive the relationship of legal origin to prove that no marriage took place. This presumption can be attracted in this case also to prove the charge against the petitioner on the admitted facts basing on the principle of preponderance of probability.” 8. Two-fold submissions have been made on behalf of the appellant; (i) the penalty order is a cryptic order and the appellate authority has dismissed the appeal on an erroneous factual premise, and (ii) dismissal of the writ petition on the ground that there is strong probability and circumstances that the appellant has married Anju Sinha, is not the test applied in a departmental proceeding to hold a delinquent-employee guilty of the charge framed against him. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant has tried to fortify her submissions by relying on the judgment rendered in “Santi Deb Berma vs. Smt. Kanchan Prava Devi” AIR 1991 SC 816 ; para nos.6 and 7 of the judgment are extracted below. “6. Mr. Dutta, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant herein assailed the impugned judgment contending that in the absence of acceptable proof that the marriage of the appellant with Namita Ghosh was celebrated or performed with proper ceremonies and in due form, it cannot be said that the marriage had been solemnised within the ambit of the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') and that the finding of the High Court based on the three letters and the oral evidence to the effect that the appellant and Namita Ghosh were living together as husband and wife cannot in any way serve as proof of a valid marriage as per the Act, especially when there is no plea that the marriage was solemnised in accordance with the customary rites and usage which do not include Saptapadi. In other words, it is not the case of the respondent that the marriage was celebrated in accordance with the customs, dispensing with the ceremony of Saptapadi and usage applicable to the parties. In fact, the courts have proceeded on the footing that according to the parties the ceremony of Saptapadi is one of the essential requirements for constituting a valid marriage. 7. In fact, the courts have proceeded on the footing that according to the parties the ceremony of Saptapadi is one of the essential requirements for constituting a valid marriage. 7. The High Court in the instant case has drawn an inference that all the ceremonies essential for a valid marriage had been performed on the strength of the three letters and the oral evidence as aforementioned. We, after going through the judgment of the High Court very carefully are of the opinion that the High Court is not at all justified in drawing such an inference in the absence of any reliable and acceptable - evidence, in regard to the performance of Saptapadi. The result will be that the alleged marriage between the appellant and Namita Ghosh, celebrated in defiance of the law applicable to the parties is held to be a marriage not valid in law. Hence the judgment of the High Court is not sustainable and consequently we allow the appeal by setting aside the conviction and sentence awarded by the High Court and acquit the appellant.” 10. Mr. Gaurav Abhishek, the learned counsel for the respondent-SAIL has contended that strict proof of the second marriage is not necessary to prove the charge framed against the appellant. The learned counsel has relied on the decisions in “Indra Sarma vs. V.K.V. Sarma” - (2013) 15 SCC 755 and “Dhannulal & Ors. Vs. Ganeshram & Anr.” - (2015) 12 SCC 301 , to fortify his submissions. 11. Powers of the writ Court to interfere with the order of punishment passed in a departmental proceeding are very limited, but then limitation on the powers of the judicial review in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be stretched to such an extent that the writ Court would refuse to interfere even in a matter in which the charges framed against a delinquent employee cannot be said to have been proved by the preponderance of probability. It has been held that in cases where penalty has been inflicted upon the delinquent employee either in violation of the rules of natural justice or in breach of the extant rules, a writ of certiorari shall lie. An order, more particularly the penalty order, which neither records the bare facts of the case nor discloses any application of mind is passed in violation of the rules of natural justice. An order, more particularly the penalty order, which neither records the bare facts of the case nor discloses any application of mind is passed in violation of the rules of natural justice. It is also well-settled that where the departmental authority has failed to consider a relevant material or considered irrelevant material which has led the departmental authority to a wrong conclusion, in appropriate cases the writ Court would interfere with the order of punishment. There is another category of cases, such as, a case which is based on ‘no evidence’. In such cases, the writ Court would definitely step in and quash the order of punishment. 12. The charge framed against the appellant under clause-37(xxiii) of the Certified Standing Order specifically records; “this is a case of bigamy which is a misconduct on the part of the employee”. 13. The enquiry officer has recorded a finding that the charge of bigamy, that is, “marriage with another woman without prior permission of the Management while first wife is alive” is proved. 14. What charge has been framed and found proved against the delinquent employee, thus, is no longer in the realm of doubt. 15. A charge of bigamy though framed in the departmental enquiry touches upon the offence of bigamy under section 494 IPC. During the departmental enquiry, the complainant-Anju Sinha herself has admitted that her marriage with the appellant was not solemnized and she has been living with the appellant as his ‘care-taker’. Her brother namely, B.P. Srivastava who has been examined as a defence witness has deposed in the departmental enquiry that he has no knowledge of marriage of the appellant with his sister [question no.2]. He has also admitted that his sister stays with the appellant as his caretaker [question no.4]. 16. Given the specific case of the management against the appellant, that is, the charge of bigamy, we shall take note of some of the judgments on the subject. In “Santi Deb Berma Vs. Kanchan Prava Devi (Smt)” reported in 1991 Supp (2) 616, the appellant was acquitted of the charge under section 494 IPC primarily on the ground that there was no specific evidence regarding performance of Saptapadi in regard to the second marriage, however, the High Court on appeal interefered with the acquittal order by drawing an inference that all the ceremonies essential for a valid marriage were performed. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that in absence of any reliable and acceptable evidence on the performance of Saptapadi which is an essential rite performed during marriage of a Hindu the alleged marriage between the appellant and Namita Ghosh was not a valid marriage so as to prove the charge of bigamy. In “Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande Vs. State of Maharashtra” reported in AIR 1965 SC 1564 , it has been held that for prosecution under section 494 IPC it is necessary to establish that the second marriage was performed in accordance with the essential religious rites. On similar lines is the judgment in “Kanwal Ram Vs. The Himachal Pradesh Admn.” reported in (1966) 1 SCR 539 , wherein also it has been held that for prosecution for bigamy the second marriage has to be proved as a fact and it must be also proved that the necessary ceremonies were performed. In the said case it has also been held that admission of marriage by an accused is no evidence of marriage for the purpose of proving an offence of bigamy. These are the judgments in criminal cases, but, in our opinion, in a departmental proceeding also there must be some evidence of marriage or as held by the Supreme Court evidence that two persons were living as husband and wife for several years. 17. In the present case, we find that there is no evidence led during the departmental enquiry against the appellant that he and Anju Sinha were living together as husband and wife rather the stand taken by the appellant is that Anju Sinha was a care-taker and the said Anju Sinha has also admitted that she was acting as a care-taker of the appellant. She has also specifically denied that she was married to the appellant. Secondly, she is not a witness examined by the department; she has been examined by the appellant as one of his witnesses. Leaving aside the controversy on performance of Saptapadi and invocation before sacred fire, in our opinion, the learned writ Court has erred in law in proceeding on a premise that there is a presumption, a rebuttable presumption, on marriage of the appellant with Anju Sinha and, therefore, it is a heavy burden on the appellant to disprove that no marriage took place. 18. 18. A departmental proceeding is fundamentally different from a criminal trial in the manner of procedure and the test applied in both the proceedings. While strict rules of evidence are not applicable in a departmental proceeding and the test applied in a departmental proceeding is preponderance of probability, in a criminal trial the charge against an accused must be proved to the hilt, that is, beyond all shadows of reasonable doubt. The preponderance of probability is not just a possibility. On a possibility that a delinquent employee might have committed the act alleged which would constitute a misconduct, charge framed against him in a departmental proceeding cannot be held proved. Dictionary meaning of the expression “preponderance of probability” may have some resemblance with “strong probability/possibility”, but in the service jurisprudence preponderance of probability has a distinct connotation and meaning. The preponderance of probability would be examined by assessing evidences laid by both the parties and their probative as well as evidentiary value. Merely by taking note of the evidences laid by the department during a departmental enquiry it cannot be held that the charge framed against the delinquent has been proved. The situation becomes more contentious when it is found that the delinquent employee has also laid evidence, substantial evidence, which has substantially eroded the department’s stand against the delinquent. There cannot be a golden scale but then the departmental authority is obliged in law to weigh the evidences led by both the parties during the departmental proceeding and only when he finds that in the face of the defence of the delinquent which is sought to be supported by leading evidence, preponderance of probability is that the delinquent has committed the misconduct alleged against him, charge framed against him can be found proved. In “M.S. Bindra vs. Union of India & Ors.” (1998) 7 SCC 310 , the Supreme Court has observed that mere possibility is hardly sufficient to assume that the act alleged would have happened. There must be preponderance of probability for a reasonable man regarding that possibility. 19. In “Indra Sarma” and “Dhannulal” cases, the issue was whether two persons were living together as husband and wife. In the present case, as noticed above, no such evidence has been brought on record. There must be preponderance of probability for a reasonable man regarding that possibility. 19. In “Indra Sarma” and “Dhannulal” cases, the issue was whether two persons were living together as husband and wife. In the present case, as noticed above, no such evidence has been brought on record. Description of the appellant as father of Miss Gargi Sharan and the Voter’s Identity Card or the LIC document in which Anju Sinha has been shown as wife of the appellant are not sufficient to conclude that she is married to the appellant, more particularly, when she herself has deposed in the departmental enquiry that her marriage with the appellant was not performed and she has been living with the appellant as his ‘care-taker’. There is a report from the Officer-in-charge, P.S.-Harla sent through letter dated 28.04.2004 in which he has stated that marriage of the appellant with Anju Sinha was solemnized on 14.07.1985. This report was prepared without any notice to the appellant. The said Officer-in-charge of P.S.-Harla is not a witness examined during the departmental enquiry against the appellant. The management has relied on a letter dated 06.08.2003 from the Principal, Chinmaya Vidyalaya in which the said Principal has stated that Anju Sinha is the mother of Miss Gargi Sharan and the name of her father is T. Sharan. During the departmental enquiry, the Principal, Chinmaya Vidyalaya has not been examined by the management. Joint photograph of the appellant with Anju Sinha is said to have been identified by the sister of Anju Sinha, but she has also not been examined during the departmental enquiry. There is no admission by the appellant that Miss Gargi Sharan is his daughter and Anju Sinha is his wife. But, on the basis of the Life Insurance Policy and the Report Card of Miss. Gargi Sharan and the fact that Anju Sinha is residing in the house of the appellant, the learned Single Judge has recorded a finding that there is a strong probability and circumstances that the appellant has married Anju Sinha. 20. There is another aspect of the matter which has rendered the order of the punishment imposed upon the appellant illegal. In the enquiry report dated 20.06.2005, the enquiry officer has simply given details of the documents produced by both the parties. There is no discussion on the defence witnesses who were examined in the departmental proceeding by the appellant. 20. There is another aspect of the matter which has rendered the order of the punishment imposed upon the appellant illegal. In the enquiry report dated 20.06.2005, the enquiry officer has simply given details of the documents produced by both the parties. There is no discussion on the defence witnesses who were examined in the departmental proceeding by the appellant. The defence witnesses including the complainant-Anju Sinha herself have denied her marriage with the appellant. In “M.V. Bijlani vs. Union of India & Ors.” (2006) 5 SCC 88 , the Supreme Court has held; “25. It is true that the jurisdiction of the court in judicial review is limited. Disciplinary proceedings, however, being quasi-criminal in nature, there should be some evidence to prove the charge. Although the charges in a departmental proceeding are not required to be proved like a criminal trial i.e. beyond all reasonable doubt, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the enquiry officer performs a quasi-judicial function, who upon analysing the documents must arrive at a conclusion that there had been a preponderance of probability to prove the charges on the basis of materials on record. While doing so, he cannot take into consideration any irrelevant fact. He cannot refuse to consider the relevant facts. He cannot shift the burden of proof. He cannot reject the relevant testimony of the witnesses only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He cannot enquire into the allegations with which the delinquent officer had not been charged with. 21. Not only the disciplinary authority has not considered the stand taken by the appellant in his second show-cause reply, the appellate authority has erroneously recorded that the delinquent employee has admitted that he was living with Anju Sinha as husband and wife for the last 20 years and Miss Gargi Sharan is his daughter. A bare reading of the enquiry report dated 20.06.2005 would reveal that the delinquent employee has not examined himself as a witness in the departmental proceeding and that precisely is the reason there is no reference of his evidence recorded by the enquiring officer in the enquiry report. In the aforesaid state of affairs, in our opinion, the charge of bigamy, that is, without permission of the department marriage with another woman while the first wife is alive, is not proved. In the aforesaid state of affairs, in our opinion, the charge of bigamy, that is, without permission of the department marriage with another woman while the first wife is alive, is not proved. Mere ipsi dixit of the enquiry officer is not sufficient to hold a delinquent employee guilty of the charge framed against him proved. The penalty order dated 16.08.2005 is cryptic and it reveals that the disciplinary authority has mechanically accepted the enquiry report and passed the order of dismissal from service. 22. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, finding serious infirmity in the impugned judgment dated 21.09.2017 passed in W.P.(S) No.7204 of 2006, it is set-aside and the punishment of dismissal from service vide order dated 16.08.2005 and the appellate order dated 09.08.2006 are quashed. 23. Since the appellant has superannuated from service with effect from 31.03.2009, he cannot be reinstated in service, however, he shall be paid all his post-retiral benefits, in accordance with law. 24. This Letters Patent Appeal is allowed, but without costs.