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2019 DIGILAW 697 (GAU)

Rishi Gupta v. Union of India

2019-06-04

NELSON SAILO

body2019
JUDGMENT : Nelson Sailo, J. 1. Heard Mr. A.R. Malhotra, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Ms. Zairemsangpuii, learned CGC for all the respondents. 2. By filing this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the Order dated 30.08.2016 (Annexure-5) and the Order dated 09.01.2018 (Annexure-8), whereby a penalty of withholding of one increment of pay for one year has been imposed upon the petitioner and the review petition preferred against the said orders was rejected respectively. 3. Brief facts of the case as projected by the petitioner may be narrated at the outset. 4. The petitioner on being selected by the UPSC for the post of Civilian Officer Class-I (Group A) under the Border Roads Organization (BRO), the Border Roads Development Board (BRDB) appointed him as such and he joined the post w.e.f. 16.07.2002 as AEE (Civil). Subsequently, he was promoted to the post of Executive Engineer (Civil) w.e.f. 18.08.2010. 5. For the period w.e.f. August, 2010 to September, 2013, the petitioner was posted as the Officer Commanding 112 RCC (GREF). The respondent No. 4 on assuming the charge and command of Project Setuk, as Chief Engineer, detailed an inspection team to find out the details of vehicles/equipments/plants in which many odometers/hour meters were not working or not available/fitted with equipments under the jurisdiction of the 755 Border Road Task Force (BRTF). After the inspection was completed, the respondent No. 4 ordered for a Court of Inquiry to be conducted vide HQ CE(P) Setuk Routine Order No. 03/2013 dated 04.01.2013. The terms of reference of the Court of Inquiry amongst others was to investigate the circumstances under which many odometers/hour meters of vehicles/equipments/plants of 755 BRTF Sector were found in a defective condition/not working condition. 6. The Court of Inquiry proceeding was directed to be completed in all respect by 11th February, 2013. However, another order was issued on 08.02.2013 changing the composition of the Presiding Officer and the two members of the Court of Inquiry and the completion time of the inquiry was modified to 20th March, 2013. Consequently, the Court of Inquiry submitted its findings which was to the effect that a large numbers of vehicles/ equipments/plants of 755 BRTF were detected with defective/non-functional milometers/ hour meter. Consequently, the Court of Inquiry submitted its findings which was to the effect that a large numbers of vehicles/ equipments/plants of 755 BRTF were detected with defective/non-functional milometers/ hour meter. Out of 313 vehicles, equipments and plants physically checked, 42 of them had defective meters, whereas 28 of them were without any meters i.e. they were either missing or there is no provision for fixing them. The exact cause of the defect could not be specified as no negligence or defect report had been raised by 1077 Field Workshop during its inspection or repair of such defective gauges. Work Orders for defective odometers were not attended timely and there was no proper mechanism to attend such defects. The report of the Court of the Inquiry was accepted by the respondent No. 4 and he, accordingly, recommended administrative/departmental action to be initiated against the Officer concerned, including the writ petitioner vide his letter of Recommendation dated 12.04.2013 (Annexure-1). The recommendation was forwarded to the Director General, Border Roads (respondent No. 3) who upon receiving the same directed disciplinary action under Rule 16 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 in respect of the GREF officials, including the petitioner and also directed administrative action against three Army Officers posted with the BRTF. The direction and recommendation was made vide Order under Memorandum No. 17003/STK/C of 1/128/E1E dated 25.12.2014 (Annexure-2). 7. Following the direction, a memorandum of charge was issued in the name of the President of India vide Memorandum dated 28.12.2015 (Annexure-3). The Memorandum was signed by the Under Secretary to the Govt. of India, Ministry of Defence. Alongwith the Memorandum, a statement of imputations of misconduct or misbehavior on which action was proposed to be taken against the petitioner was enclosed and the petitioner was asked to submit his response to the Memorandum within 10 days of receipt of the same. The petitioner after receiving the Memorandum gave a detailed reply on 23.01.2016 (annexure-4) denying the allegations and the charge made against him. However, the respondent authorities not being satisfied with the reply, vide Order dated 30.08.2016 (Annexure-5) imposed a penalty of withholding of one increment of pay for one year upon the petitioner under Rule 12 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. 8. Aggrieved with the penalty imposed, the petitioner preferred a review under Rule 29-A of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 before the President of India on 19.11.2016. 8. Aggrieved with the penalty imposed, the petitioner preferred a review under Rule 29-A of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 before the President of India on 19.11.2016. The petitioner again on 30.06.2017 submitted additional grounds of review before the President of India (Annexure-7). However, the review petition of the petitioner was rejected vide the impugned Order dated 09.01.2018 (annexure-8). The order of rejection was signed by the Under Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Defence, by order and in the name of the President of India. Being highly aggrieved, the petitioner is before this Court through the instant writ petition. 9. Appearing for the petitioner, Mr. A.R. Malhotra, the learned counsel submits that the impugned penalty imposed upon the petitioner as well as the order of rejection of the review petition is not sustainable in law, inasmuch as the departmental proceedings was initiated against the petitioner on the recommendation of the respondent No. 4 and as directed by the respondent No. 3. Referring to Rule 13 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, the learned counsel submits that in so far as the post held by the petitioner is concerned, it is the President who is the disciplinary authority. However, as noticed, it is neither the President nor was it on his authorization and approval that the departmental proceedings against the petitioner was initiated and therefore, on this ground alone, the impugned order of penalty and the rejection of the review petition of the petitioner is not sustainable in law. 10. To substantiate his submission, the learned counsel has referred to the recommendation of the respondent No. 4, dated 12.04.2013 (annexure 1) and the order of the respondent No. 3, dated 25.12.2014 (annexure-2). He further submits that the law in this regard is well settled as can be gainfully appreciated from the case of Union of India and Others vs. B.V. Gopinath, (2014) 1 SCC 351 . 11. Mr. A.R. Malhotra, the learned counsel by further referring to annexure-VI of the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondents on 26.02.2019, submits that from the said communication dated 23.07.2015 made by the Senior Administrative Officer, on behalf of the respondent No. 3, it can clearly be seen that a draft charge sheet under Rule 16 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, along with supporting documents in respect of the petitioner and another Officer was forwarded to the Ministry of Defence. In fact, the respondent No. 3 has played the role of the disciplinary authority in contravention to the Rule 13 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. He submits that there are also no materials available to even remotely suggest that the respondent No. 3 has been duly authorized the President to initiate such steps. 12. Mr. A.R. Malhotra, the learned counsel further submits that the second ground of challenge to the penalty imposed upon the petitioners is that the memorandum of charge dated 28.12.2015, it is very vague and cryptic. A perusal of the same would go to show that no specific charge or any details of the wrong committed by the petitioner is discernable. Under the circumstances, the petitioner cannot take any proper defence and that he will be only left to his imagination in try to figure out the manner in which a reply has to be made to the charge. He submits that the law in this regard is well settled that the charge should be specific and definite giving the details of the allegations, which form the basis of the charge and that, no inquiry can be sustained on vague charges. In support of his submission, he relies upon the decision of the Apex Court rendered in Anil Gilurker vs. Bilaspur Raipur Kshetriya Gramin Bank and Others, (2011) 14 SCC 379 . 13. Mr. A.R. Malhotra, the learned counsel further submits that the Court of Inquiry as constituted by the respondent no. 4, vide Order dated 04.01.2013 submitted its report, but since the report was not acceptable the respondent No. 4, he again constituted another Court of Inquiry by changing its composition vide Order dated 08.02.2013. He submits that this fact can clearly be seen from the show cause reply given by another Officer, Lt. Col. Alok Singh, who was the Officer Commanding 1077, Field Workshop (P), Setuk at the relevant time. The said Officer ultimately was exonerated from the charged by the respondent No. 3. Referring to his show cause reply, annexed as annexure XVIII to the affidavit-in-opposition of the respondents, he submits that the Officer had clearly indicated that the outcome of the Court of Inquiry constituted vide Order dated 04.01.2013 did not suit the mindset of the then respondent No. 4. As a result, he amended the Court of Inquiry by changing the composition of its members and the Presiding Officer. As a result, he amended the Court of Inquiry by changing the composition of its members and the Presiding Officer. He, therefore, submits that the action of the respondent No. 4 clearly demonstrates the element of biasedness and as such, the departmental proceedings could not have been initiated on the basis of the findings of the Court of Inquiry constituted on 08.02.2013. He further submits that the Lt. Col. Alok Singh, who was also similarly charged was otherwise, exonerated and therefore, even the petitioner should be given a similar benefit. 14. Mr. A.R. Malhotra, the learned counsel referring to the affidavit-in- opposition of the respondents, more particularly, the enclosure to annexure XXIV submits that the policy guidelines dated 08.05.2014 and 15.03.2015 were not in existence while the petitioner was posted as the Officer Commanding 112 RCC (GREF). He submits that the petitioners tenure was only between August 2010 to September, 2013 and therefore, the petitioner could not have been aware of the policy guidelines which were not in existence at the relevant time. 15. Mr. A.R. Malhotra, the learned counsel finally submits that a bare perusal of the impugned order dated 30.08.2016 would go to show that no reason has been assigned by the authority concerned to impose the impugned penalty upon him. The same not being a speaking order is unsustainable in law. In support of his submission, he relies upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Jamuna Gogoi Phukan vs. Gauhati High Court and Others, 2017 (4) GLT 868 and Basab Bijoy Bhattacharjee vs. Gauhati High Court and Others, 2017 (4) GLT 857. 16. Mr. A.R. Malhotra thus submits that under the facts and circumstances, the impugned recommendation dated 12.04.2013, the impugned Order dated 25.12.2014, the Memorandum dated 28.12.2015, the impugned Orders dated 30.08.2016 and 09.01.2018 be set aside and quashed. 17. Ms. Zairemsangpuii, the learned CGC appearing for the respondents submits that the respondent No. 4, upon finding several irregularities in the maintenance of vehicles/ equipments/plants deployed under his jurisdiction constituted a Court of Inquiry vide Order dated 04.01.2013. The same was however reconstituted again vide Order dated 08.02.2013 for administrative reasons and as empowered upon the said authority. 17. Ms. Zairemsangpuii, the learned CGC appearing for the respondents submits that the respondent No. 4, upon finding several irregularities in the maintenance of vehicles/ equipments/plants deployed under his jurisdiction constituted a Court of Inquiry vide Order dated 04.01.2013. The same was however reconstituted again vide Order dated 08.02.2013 for administrative reasons and as empowered upon the said authority. During the inquiry, the petitioner was examined as witness No. 12 and on being asked as to whether, there was any policy/directive by which he was supposed to initiate action for his responsibility of vehicle, he replied that he has not come across the same. The said denial only goes to show the negligence of the petitioner to his duty. 18. Referring to the affidavit-in-opposition of the respondent, more particularly, paragraph No. 10 (c), she submits that the guidelines with regard to maintenance of vehicles/ equipments/plants are being issued by the Headquarters under the DGBR and another higher Headquarters from time to time and are maintained in the policy files in all the Headquarters/Units. All the appointed officers handing their respective fields are expected to read through and abide by the instructions at the time of assuming their responsibilities. The petitioner, therefore, clearly was negligence in not taking up his responsibilities and abide by the guidelines. 19. The learned CGC further submits that the petitioner cannot compare his case with that of Lt. Col. Alok Singh, inasmuch as their assignments, duties and responsibilities were different. The said officer was posted as the Officer Commanding of 1077 Field Workshop, which was primarily responsible to see the repair of plants and machinery whereas the petitioner as the Officer Commanding of 112 RCC (GREF) was responsible in their execution of work and for which purpose, he was to ensure that all the plants, machinery and vehicles were well maintained. She submits that at any rate, the petitioner has only taken the case of Lt. Col. Alok Singh and has failed to mention about the case of other officers against whom similar disciplinary proceedings were drawn. 20. The learned CGC submits that as pointed out earlier, it was only due to the administrative reasons that the first Court of Inquiry vide Order dated 04.01.2013 had to be modified again on 08.02.2013. In fact, the respondent No. 4 has the power and authority to make such modification. 21. 20. The learned CGC submits that as pointed out earlier, it was only due to the administrative reasons that the first Court of Inquiry vide Order dated 04.01.2013 had to be modified again on 08.02.2013. In fact, the respondent No. 4 has the power and authority to make such modification. 21. Referring to paragraph 6 of the affidavit-in-opposition, the learned CGC submits that on finalization of the Court of Inquiry by the DGBR, a draft Memorandum of charge in respect of two GREF Officers, including the petitioner were forwarded to the disciplinary authority, i.e. the President of India, through the Ministry of Defence on 23.07.2015. Subsequently, the disciplinary authority after perusing the case and following due procedure issued the Memorandum of charge under Rule 16 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 vide Memorandum dated 28.12.2015, which was acknowledged by the petitioner on 15.01.2016. This only shows that it was the disciplinary authority, who had in fact approved and initiated the proceedings against the petitioner. She further submits that as the charge leveled against the petitioner was based on material evidence and therefore, no reference of the Court of Inquiry/preliminary inquiry was made in the Memorandum and as such, a copy of the enquiry report was not provided to him. However, on a request made by the petitioner, a set of finalized Court of Inquiry proceedings was provided to him on 08.10.2016 and based on which, he submitted his review petition dated 19.11.2016. Therefore, there is no substance in the contention of the petitioner that the Memorandum was vague and therefore, unsustainable. The minor penalty imposed upon the petitioner under the facts and circumstances is only just and appropriate and therefore, no interference of this Court is called for. 22. Referring to paragraph 15 of the affidavit-in-opposition, the learned CGC submits that as many as three other Officers were either awarded adverse remark or a penalty and therefore, it is not the case that the petitioner alone was singled out in the departmental proceedings that was drawn. 23. I have heard the submissions advanced by the learned counsels for the rival parties and I have perused the materials available on record. 24. From the projection made by the parties, the issue to be considered is as to whether the departmental proceedings was initiated against the petitioner by the disciplinary authority. 23. I have heard the submissions advanced by the learned counsels for the rival parties and I have perused the materials available on record. 24. From the projection made by the parties, the issue to be considered is as to whether the departmental proceedings was initiated against the petitioner by the disciplinary authority. Secondly, whether the Memorandum properly reflected the allegations made against the petitioner. 25. As may be noticed, after the Court of Inquiry was held suggesting drawal of department proceedings against the Officer concerned, including the petitioner, the respondent No. 4, vide his recommendation dated 12.04.2013 (annexure 1), while agreeing with the findings of the Court of Inquiry recommended drawal of administrative/departmental action against three persons, including the petitioner. Thereafter, the respondent No. 3, vide Order dated 25.12.2014 (annexure-2) directed administrative action/disciplinary action against the Officers mentioned therein, including the petitioner. The disciplinary action contemplated/ directed against the petitioner was under Rule 16 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. Rule 16 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 deals with the procedure for imposing minor penalty. Rule 13 of the same Rules provides for the authority to institute proceedings. 26. Rule 13 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 for ready perusal may be abstracted herein below:- "13. Authority to institute proceedings (1) The President or any other authority empowered by him by general or special order may:- (a) institute disciplinary proceedings against any Government servant. (b) direct a Disciplinary Authority to institute disciplinary proceedings against any Government servant on whom that Disciplinary Authority is competent to impose under these rules any of the penalties specified in Rule 11. (2) A Disciplinary Authority competent under these rules to impose any of the penalties specified in Clause (i) to (iv) of Rule 11 may institute disciplinary proceedings against any Government servant for the imposition of any of the penalties specified in Clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 11 notwithstanding that such Disciplinary Authority is not competent under these rules to impose any of the latter penalties." 27. From the above abstract what can be noticed is that the President or any other authority empowered by him by a general or special order may institute disciplinary proceedings against the Government servant. 28. In the present case, it was the respondent No. 3, who directed disciplinary action against the petitioner. From the above abstract what can be noticed is that the President or any other authority empowered by him by a general or special order may institute disciplinary proceedings against the Government servant. 28. In the present case, it was the respondent No. 3, who directed disciplinary action against the petitioner. The petitioner has made a specific averment to this effect at paragraph 19 of the writ petition and against the statement made therein, the respondents in their affidavit-in-opposition have also admitted that the respondent No. 3 directed initiation of administrative/disciplinary action against the erring officials including the petitioner vide his Order dated 25.12.2014. However, all the subsequent actions with regard to disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner was taken up by the disciplinary authority i.e. President of India through the Ministry of Defence by following due procedures laid down by the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. However, there is no mention about the respondent No. 3, having been authorized by the President of India, to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner on his behalf as required under Rule 13 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. 29. The Apex Court in the case of B.V. Gopinath (Supra), while dealing with a similar case and in a proceedings under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 held that under the given facts and circumstances of that case, the approval given by the Finance Minister for initiation of departmental proceedings cannot be also construed to be an approval of the memorandum of charge as well. 30. Paragraphs 49 and 50 of the said Judgment i.e. B.V. Gopinath (Supra) may be quoted hereunder for ready perusal:- "49. We are unable to accept the submission of the learned Additional Solicitor General. Initially, when the file comes to the Finance Minister, it is only to take a decision in principle as to whether departmental proceedings ought to be initiated against the officer. Clause (11) deals with reference to CVC for second stage advice. In case of proposal for major penalties, the decision is to be taken by the Finance Minister. Similarly, under Clause (12) reconsideration of CVCs second stage advice is to be taken by the Finance Minister. Clause (11) deals with reference to CVC for second stage advice. In case of proposal for major penalties, the decision is to be taken by the Finance Minister. Similarly, under Clause (12) reconsideration of CVCs second stage advice is to be taken by the Finance Minister. All further proceedings including approval for referring the case to DoP&T, issuance of show-cause notice in case of disagreement with the enquiry officers report; tentative decision after CVCs second stage advice on imposition of penalty; final decision of penalty and revision/review/memorial have to be taken by the Finance Minister. 50. In our opinion, the Central Administrative Tribunal as well as the High Court has correctly interpreted the provisions of Office Order No. 205 of 2005. Factually also, a perusal of the record would show that the file was put up to the Finance Minister by the Director General of Income Tax (Vigilance) seeking the approval of the Finance Minister for sanctioning prosecution against one officer and for initiation of major penalty proceeding under Rules 3(1)(a) and 3(1)(c) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules against the officers mentioned in the note which included the respondent herein. Ultimately, it appears that the charge memo was not put up for approval by the Finance Minister. Therefore, it would not be possible to accept the submission of Ms. Indira Jaising that the approval granted by the Finance Minister for initiation of departmental proceedings would also amount to approval of the charge memo." 31. It may be noticed that Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 deals with the procedure for imposing major penalty. Applying the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in B.V. Gopinath (Supra), disciplinary proceedings could not have been initiated against the petitioner without the approval or authorization by the disciplinary authority. The Order dated 25.12.2014 (annexure 2) clearly shows that it was the respondent No. 3, who had directed initiation of the departmental proceedings against the petitioner. 32. With regard to the second issue as to whether the memorandum of charge clearly provided that the allegations made out against the petitioner, it may be seen that a brief memorandum was prepared on 28.12.2015 (annexure-3), contemplating action against the petitioner under Rule 16 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. Alongwith the Memorandum, a statement of imputation of misconduct or misbehavior on which action was proposed to be taken was also enclosed. Alongwith the Memorandum, a statement of imputation of misconduct or misbehavior on which action was proposed to be taken was also enclosed. A statement of imputation amongst others mentioned that the petitioner failed to ensure that the costly vehicles/ equipments/ plants deployed under his area of responsibility were fitted with functional odometers and did not exercise any check to ascertain the condition of odometers. Further, a large number of vehicles/ equipments/ plants in his sector were functioning either with defective odometers or without odometers. Such action/inaction on his part established that he failed to discharge his duties in violation of the charter of his duties, procedures and policies/instructions leading to rampant misuse of costly vehicles/equipments/plants by the personnel under his command according to their wish, having significant impact on fuel consumption and likely fuel pilferage. 33. In this connection, it may be gainful to refer to the Apex Court decision in Anil Gilurker (Supra). Facts involved in that case was that the disciplinary authority placed the appellant under suspension and issued charge sheet for misconduct punishable under the Staff Service Regulation of the Bank. In the charge sheet, it was alleged that the appellant sanctioned and distributed loan to a large number of brick manufacturers unit in a very short period of time but had not in fact disbursed the entire loan amount to the borrowers and part of the loan amount was misappropriated by him. The appeal of the employee was allowed by the Apex Court. Operative portion of the said Judgment may be abstracted hereunder:- "11. A plain reading of the charges and the statement of imputations reproduced above would show that only vague allegations were made against the appellant that he had sanctioned loans to a large number of brick manufacturing units by committing irregularities, but did not disburse the entire loan amount to the borrowers and while a portion of the loan amount was deposited in the account of the borrowers, the balance was misappropriated by him and others. The details of the loan accounts or the names of the borrowers have not been mentioned in the charges. The amounts of loan which were sanctioned and the amounts which were actually disbursed to the borrowers and the amounts alleged to have been misappropriated by the appellant have not been mentioned. 12. The details of the loan accounts or the names of the borrowers have not been mentioned in the charges. The amounts of loan which were sanctioned and the amounts which were actually disbursed to the borrowers and the amounts alleged to have been misappropriated by the appellant have not been mentioned. 12. We also find that along with the charge-sheet dated 31-1-1989 no statement of imputations giving the particulars of the loan accounts or the names of the borrowers, the amounts of loans sanctioned, disbursed and misappropriated were furnished to the appellant, and yet the disciplinary authority has called upon the appellant to submit his written defence statement in reply to the charges. We fail to appreciate how the appellant could have submitted his written statement in defence in respect of the charges and how a fair enquiry could be held unless he was furnished with the particulars of the loan accounts or the names of the borrowers, the amounts of loan sanctioned, the amounts actually disbursed and the amounts misappropriated were also furnished in the charge-sheet. 13. As has been held by this Court in Surath Chandra Chakrabarty vs. State of West Bengal (SCC p. 553, para 5) "5. The grounds on which it is proposed to take action have to be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges which have to be communicated to the person charged together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and any other circumstance which is proposed to be taken into consideration in passing orders has also to be stated. This rule embodies a principle which is one of the basic contents of a reasonable or adequate opportunity for defending oneself. If a person is not told clearly and definitely what the allegations are on which the charges preferred against him are founded he cannot possibly, by projecting his own imagination, discover all the facts and circumstances that may be in the contemplation of the authorities to be established against him." 14. If a person is not told clearly and definitely what the allegations are on which the charges preferred against him are founded he cannot possibly, by projecting his own imagination, discover all the facts and circumstances that may be in the contemplation of the authorities to be established against him." 14. This position of law has been reiterated in the recent case of Union of India vs. Gyan Chand Chatter and in para 35 of the judgment as reported in SCC, this Court has observed that the law can be summarised that an enquiry is to be conducted against any person giving strict adherence to the statutory provisions and principles of natural justice and the charges should be specific, definite and giving details of the incident which formed the basis of charges and no enquiry can be sustained on vague charges. 15. We, therefore, allow these appeals, set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and restore the order of the learned Single Judge. Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances, we delete the direction of the learned Single Judge to pay Rs. 15 lakhs to the appellant as compensation in lieu of arrears of salary and we are also not inclined to grant any back wages to the appellant. There shall be no order as to costs." 34. From the above abstract, it may be seen that in order to have a fair inquiry, the employer is required to furnish the delinquent employee the details of the allegations in clear and specific terms, so that he or she can have a reasonable opportunity to respond to the specific allegations. In the present case, both the memorandum as well as the statement of imputation of misconduct admittedly does not spell out the details which could be responded to by the petitioner in clear terms. Therefore, even on this ground, it only appears that the petitioner was kept in a disadvantage position. 35. From the above findings, it is thus clear that the departmental proceedings against the petitioner is only vitiated for want of proper authorization and there being no clarity in the charge framed against him. Therefore, the other issues raised by the parties will not require to be gone into as I find that the departmental proceedings conducted against the petitioner is vitiated on the above two grounds. 36. Therefore, the other issues raised by the parties will not require to be gone into as I find that the departmental proceedings conducted against the petitioner is vitiated on the above two grounds. 36. In that view of the matter and in the result, the impugned Orders dated 30.08.2016 (Annexure 5) and 09.01.2018 (Annexure 8) are hereby set aside. Considering the facts and circumstances, I am not inclined to grant liberty to the respondents to proceed with the petitioner afresh. The impugned Orders upon being set aside, the respondents are directed to restore the increment which was withheld without delay. 37. The writ petition thus stands disposed of as allowed. No cost.