JUDGMENT : A. HARIPRASAD, J. 1. This appeal is laid by challenging the order passed by the Tribunal constituted under the Kerala Forest (Vesting and Management of Ecologically Fragile Lands), Act 2003, (in short the E.F.L. Act). The Tribunal found the application schedule property, over which the respondent claimed ownership, is not a property vested under Section 3(1) of the E.F.L. Act. 2. For disposal of the case, following facts are relevant: Respondent, who is the applicant before the Tribunal and her daughters are owners of the application schedule property. It belonged to the applicant's husband Chilprakash and on his death, it devolved on the applicant/respondent and their daughters. The property was originally acquired by the father of deceased Chilprakash as per a registered document No. 1120/1947 of S.R.O. Parli. According to the respondent, the property is not an ecologically fragile land. It is a garden land. There is no natural vegetation in the property and vegetation occurring in the property is the result of human effort. The property is not lying contiguous to or encircled by any reserved or vested forest. There is no predominant natural vegetation in the property. The land is principally cultivated with seasonal dry crops. There existed a tank on the western extremity of the land, but later the same had been filled up. The applicant was allowed to retain the portion of the property as per proceedings in O.A. No. 8 of 2001 before the Forest Tribunal, Kozhikode, initiated under Section 8 of the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 (in short the Vesting Act). 3. The Divisional Forest Officer, Palakkad filed a written statement disputing the averments in the application. They raised a dispute in respect of 3.81 hectares of land comprised in Survey Nos. 282/1 and 284/2 in Mundur-II Village of Palakkad Taluk and District. The disputed property is a private forest. As per Section 3(1) of the Vesting Act, ownership and possession of all private forests in the State of Kerala stood transferred to and vested in the Government free from all encumbrances with effect from 10-05-1971. The disputed property is a part of Oduvangad Malavaram (VFC item No. 29). During 1992, the applicant and her two children filed O.A. No. 18 of 1992 before the Forest Tribunal, Palakkad seeking exemption of the property from the purview of the Vesting Act. The disputed property is a part of Oduvangad Malavaram (VFC item No. 29). During 1992, the applicant and her two children filed O.A. No. 18 of 1992 before the Forest Tribunal, Palakkad seeking exemption of the property from the purview of the Vesting Act. The Forest Tribunal dismissed the Original application by judgment dated 07-03-1996. Later, the applicants filed O.A. No. 8 of 2001 in respect of the same land. The Forest Tribunal allowed the application, exempting 2.82 acres from the operation of the Vesting Act, vide judgment dated 23-01-2004. In the meantime, the entire area became vested in the Government consequent to the commencement of Kerala Forest (Vesting and Management of Ecologically Fragile Lands) Ordinance, 2000, which was replaced by the E.F.L. Act. The land was notified as ecologically fragile land as per Exts.B1 to B3. This portion of the vested forest is called Koothramkappu Malavaram, which is a part of Oduvangad Malavaram and it lies contiguous to thousands of acres of reserved forest. This forest comprises of various miscellaneous species like teak, chadachi, maruthu, vaka, poola etc. The applicant is laying a claim on a portion of the vested forest in Koothramkappu Malavaram, which is thickly wooded area with luxuriant variety of flora and fauna. The application schedule property is bounded on north, east and west by vested forests. On south, there is a private land. The applicant has suppressed the fact that there are about 9500 teak trees in the area, aged about 16 years, which are planted by the Forest Department. There are thick miscellaneous growth of forest tree species. The applicant and her predecessors had not done any cultivation at any point of time in the disputed area. They had no intention to cultivate. The property was in the possession of forest department from the appointed day viz. 10-05-1971 fixed under the Vesting Act. It remains in the possession of the Forest Department thereafter and it is being protected free from all encumbrances. The application is liable to be dismissed. 4. The applicant testified as PW-1 and the Forest Range Officer deposed as RW-1. Applicant produced no document to substantiate her contention. Exts.B1 to B3 are the documents produced by the Forest Department. Ext.C1 is the Commissioner's report. 5. Heard the learned Special Government Pleader for the appellants and learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 6. 4. The applicant testified as PW-1 and the Forest Range Officer deposed as RW-1. Applicant produced no document to substantiate her contention. Exts.B1 to B3 are the documents produced by the Forest Department. Ext.C1 is the Commissioner's report. 5. Heard the learned Special Government Pleader for the appellants and learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 6. It is an admitted case that the applicant and her children had earlier filed O.A. No. 8 of 2001 before the Forest Tribunal, Kozhikode, established under Section 7 of the Vesting Act, in respect of the properties involved in this case. In other words, the properties involved in O.A. No. 4 of 2008 before the Ecologically Fragile Lands Tribunal (in short E.F.L. Tribunal) is exactly the same as the property in O.A. No. 8 of 2001 before the Forest Tribunal, Kozhikode. The applicant and her children in the previous proceedings raised a contention that the property was not a private forest vested under Section 3(1) of the Vesting Act. In the alternative, they raised a plea that if at all it was a private forest, the property was liable to be exempted under Section 3(2) or 3(3) of the Vesting Act. In that proceedings, the Tribunal found that the entire property is a private forest and the applicant is only entitled to get a declaration in respect of 2.82 acres of land under Section 3(3) of the Vesting Act as her family could have held only 18 acres of land under Section 82 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. It is to be borne in mind that in order to grant exemption under Section 3(3) of the Vesting Act, the Tribunal should find that the property in dispute is a private forest vested under Section 3(1). 7. This fact had been brought to the notice of the E.F.L. Tribunal and the learned Tribunal has considered this aspect in paragraph 14 of its judgment: “14. 7. This fact had been brought to the notice of the E.F.L. Tribunal and the learned Tribunal has considered this aspect in paragraph 14 of its judgment: “14. In the written statement, it is contended by the respondents that Sudhamgada (the applicant herein) and her two children filed O.A. No. 8/2001 in the Forest Tribunal, Palakkad for exemption of the application schedule property from vesting in Government under the provisions of the Act 26/1971, that the Forest Tribunal allowed the said O.A. exempting the property measuring 2.82 acres from vesting in Government by order dated 23-01-2004, and that the property subsequently vested in Government consequent on the promulgation of the Kerala Forest (Vesting and Management of Ecologically Fragile Lands) Ordinance, 2000 which was replaced by the Act and the land was notified as ecologically fragile land.” Despite bringing the above fact to the notice of the E.F.L. Tribunal, it declared the entire property as not ecologically fragile land. Is it a legal mistake? 8. According to the learned Special Government Pleader, this finding of the Tribunal is legally wrong and unsustainable. Even if an extreme view was taken, i.e. excluding 2.82 acres of land, which was exempted by the Forest Tribunal, Kozhikode in O.A. No. 8 of 2001, the E.F.L. Tribunal should have found that the remaining property is ecologically fragile land. It is also contended that the approach by the Tribunal in this regard is thoroughly unsustainable. 9. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent contended that the Commissioner's report in this case would show that the property is surrounded by private lands on two sides. The Government lands falling on north and a portion on western side are teak plantations and therefore they cannot be regarded as vested forest or other forest. 10. Let us examine the definition of “ecologically fragile lands” in Section 2(b) of the E.F.L. Act, which reads as follows: “2(b) “ecologically fragile lands” means:- (i) any Forest land or any portion thereof held by any person and lying contiguous to or encircled by a reserved forest or a vested forest or any other forest land owned by the Government and predominantly supporting natural vegetation. (ii) any land declared to be an ecologically fragile land by the Government by notification in the official Gazette under S.4. 11. (ii) any land declared to be an ecologically fragile land by the Government by notification in the official Gazette under S.4. 11. In order to understand the real intent and purport of the word “forest” in Section 2(b) we have consider its definition in Section 2(c): “2(c) “forest” means any land principally covered with naturally grown trees and undergrowth and includes any forest statutorily recognised and declared as reserved forest, protected forest or otherwise but does not include any land which is used principally for the cultivation of crops of long duration such as tea, coffee, rubber, pepper, cardamom, coconut, arecanut or cashew or any other sites of residential building and surroundings essential for the convenient use of such buildings.” 12. Along with this appeal, M.F.A. No. 34 of 2006 filed by the State Government against O.A. No. 8 of 2001 before the Forest Tribunal, Kozhikode also come up for consideration before us. In M.F.A. No. 34 of 2006, we rendered a judgment today (27-08-2019) finding that the Forest Tribunal under the Vesting Act erred in holding that the applicant and her children are entitled to get exemption in respect of 2.82 acres of land by invoking Section 3(3) of the Vesting Act. After considering the pleadings and evidence in that case, we ruled that the entire 9.43 acres of land claimed by the applicant is a private forest. In that back drop, the question that arises is: What is the impact of the finding that the land in dispute under the E.F.L. Act proceedings is a private forest under the Vesting Act? We shall answer the question in the following manner. 13. As stated above, the entire extent of property claimed by the applicant is found to be a private forest. In this context, the definition in Section 2(c) of the E.F.L. Act assumes importance. On a close scrutiny of the definition of “forest” it can be seen that “forest” means any land principally covered with naturally grown trees and undergrowth. That is one category of land falling within the definition of 'forest'. It further says that “forest” includes any forest statutorily recognised and declared as reserved forest, protected forest or otherwise. This forms the second category. That is one category of land falling within the definition of 'forest'. It further says that “forest” includes any forest statutorily recognised and declared as reserved forest, protected forest or otherwise. This forms the second category. It excludes certain lands from operation of the E.F.L. Act by saying that “forest” does not include any land which is used principally for the cultivation of crops of long duration such as tea, coffee, rubber, pepper, cardamom, coconut, arecanut or cashew or any other sites of residential building etc. 14. It is therefore clear from the definition that any land which is principally covered with naturally grown trees and undergrowth is to be understood as a “forest” within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the E.F.L. Act. Besides, any land which is statutorily recognised as “forest” and declared as reserve forest, protected forest or otherwise also will fall within the definition of forest in Section 2(c) of E.F.L. Act. 15. It is pertinent to note that as per Section 4 of the Vesting Act, all private forests vested in the Government under Section 3(1) shall, so long as they remain vested in the Government, be deemed to be reserved forests constituted under the Kerala Forest Act, 1961. Hence, the contention of the respondent that teak plantations on three sides of the land in dispute cannot be regarded as “forest” becomes totally unacceptable. If it is found to be a private forest vested in the Government under Section 3(1) of the Vesting Act, subsequently planting teak trees thereon will not denude it of its character as a private forest. 16. What is the effect of the word "includes" occurring in the first part of Section 2(c) of the E.F.L. Act is to be examined. It is a well settled proposition in law that the legislature has power to define a word even artificially. So, the definition of a word seen in the definition section may either be restrictive of its ordinary meaning or it may be extensive. 17. The Supreme Court in P. Kasilingam vs. P.S.G College of Technology, AIR 1995 SC 1395 , held thus: “A particular expression is often defined by the Legislature by using the word means or the word includes. Sometimes the words means and includes are used. 17. The Supreme Court in P. Kasilingam vs. P.S.G College of Technology, AIR 1995 SC 1395 , held thus: “A particular expression is often defined by the Legislature by using the word means or the word includes. Sometimes the words means and includes are used. The use of the word means indicates that "definition is a hard-and-fast definition, and no other meaning can be assigned to the expression than is put down in definition." (Gough vs. Gough, Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court) The word includes when used, enlarges the meaning of the expression defined so as to comprehend not only such things as they signify according to their natural import but also those things which the clause declares that they shall include. The words "means and includes" on the other hand, indicate "an exhaustive explanation of the meaning which, for the purposes of the Act, must invariably be attached to these words or expressions." 18. In Bharat Co-operative Bank (Mumbai) Ltd. vs. Employees Union, AIR 2007 SC 2320 , the Supreme Court again considered the difference between the inclusive and exhaustive definitions and observed as follows: “When in the definition clause given in any statute the word means is used, what follows is intended to speak exhaustively. When the word means is used in the definition it is a "hard-and-fast" definition and no meaning other than that which is put in the definition can be assigned to the same. On the other hand, when the word includes is used in the definition, the legislature does not intend to restrict the definition: it makes the definition enumerative but not exhaustive. That is to say, the term defined will retain its ordinary meaning but its scope would be extended to bring within it matters, which in its ordinary meaning may or may not comprise.” 19. Again in N.D.P. Namboodripad vs. Union of India, AIR 2007 SC 1782 , it is observed thus: “The word "includes" has different meanings in different contexts. Standard dictionaries assign more than one meaning to the word include. Webster's Dictionary defines the word "include" as synonymous with "comprise" or "contain." Illustrated Oxford Dictionary defines the word "include" as: (i) comprise or reckon in as a part of a whole; (ii) treat or regard as so included. Standard dictionaries assign more than one meaning to the word include. Webster's Dictionary defines the word "include" as synonymous with "comprise" or "contain." Illustrated Oxford Dictionary defines the word "include" as: (i) comprise or reckon in as a part of a whole; (ii) treat or regard as so included. Collins Dictionary of English Language defines the word "includes" as: (i) to have as contents or part of the contents; be made up of or contain; (ii) to add as part of something else; put in as part of a set, group or a category; (iii) to contain as a secondary or minor ingredient or element. It is no doubt true that generally when the word "include" is used in a definition clause, it is used as a word of enlargement, that is to make the definition extensive and not restrictive. But the word "includes" is also used to connote a specific meaning, that is, as "means and includes" or "comprises" or "consists of." In Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories vs. Dy. Labour Commissioner, (2007) 5 SCC 281 : AIR 2008 SC 968 , it was held as under:- When an interpretation clause uses the word "includes" it is prima-facie extensive. When it uses the word "means and includes" it will afford an exhaustive explanation to the meaning which for the purposes of the Act must invariably be attached to the word or expression.” 20. From the above statements of law, it will be clear that the expression “includes” occurring in Section 2(c) of the E.F.L. Act is employed by the legislature with a clear intention to expand the definition of “forest” by including the lands principally covered with naturally grown trees and undergrowth and also any forest statutorily recognised and declared as reserved forest, protected forest or otherwise within the fold of the definition “forest” under the E.F.L. Act. To our mind, it is certain that the legislature thoughtfully used the word “includes” in the definition of forest in Section 2(c) of E.F.L. Act so as to comprehend not only lands principally covered with naturally grown trees and under growth, but any forest statutorily recognised and declared as reserved forest, protected forest or otherwise. This sweeping definition appears to be in consonance with the object of the E.F.L. Act. This sweeping definition appears to be in consonance with the object of the E.F.L. Act. Emerging legal effect is that once a property is validly declared to be a “private forest” under the Vesting Act, by the expansive definition of “forest” in Section 2(c) of the E.F.L. Act, it automatically becomes an ecologically fragile land. 21. The above reasoning leads us to an irresistible conclusion that the land in dispute in this case squarely falls within the definition of “forest” in Section 2(c) of the E.F.L. Act. Our finding in M.F.A No. 34 of 2006 that the land in dispute is a private forest vested under Section 3(1) of the Vesting Act will decide the fate of this case because in both proceedings the same land is involved and the aforementioned legal principles apply to this case. The land belonged to the applicant/respondent had already vested under Section 3(1) of the Vesting Act as on 10-05-1971 and it continues to remain a vested forest by operation of Section 4 of the Vesting Act. And therefore it squarely falls within the definition of “forest” in Section 2(c) of the E.F.L. Act. For the same reason, we can only find that the land in dispute is an ecologically fragile land falling within Section 2(b) of the E.F.L. Act. Notwithstanding the fact that the Tribunal was put to notice of the earlier proceedings under the Vesting Act in respect of the same land, the Tribunal failed to attach importance to the legal issues arising in this case and wrongly declared the entire land to be not an ecologically fragile land. We find no reason to approve the view taken by the Tribunal and therefore we set aside the finding of the Tribunal. 22. In the result, the appeal is allowed. 23. The impugned order passed by the Tribunal of the Kerala Forest (Vesting and Management of Ecologically Fragile Lands), Palakkad in Original Application No. 4 of 2008 is hereby set aside. The application is dismissed. 24. All pending interlocutory application will stand closed.