JUDGMENT : MIR ALFAZ ALI, J. 1. This revision is directed against the judgment and order dated 19-09-2009, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Cachar, Silchar, in Sessions Case No. 21/2008 acquitting the respondents no. 1 to 5. 2. We have heard learned Amicus Curiae, Mr. B.M. Choudhury for the informant/revision petitioner, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, Mr. H. Sarma for the State/respondent No. 6 and learned counsel, Mr. S.C. Biswas for the respondents No. 1 to 5. 3. As per prosecution case, on 13-08-1995 at about 8 am, the accused persons named in the FIR mounted assault on the informant/revision petitioner and her two sons, Nikhil Das and Sunil Das and brother Bhupen Das, causing severe injuries. The revision petitioner herein, lodged the FIR (Ext.-5), on the basis of which, police registered Silchar P.S. Case No.886/1995 under Sections 147/448/325/327/326/427/149 IPC and commenced investigation. During the course of investigation, the victim Sunil Das succumbed to the injuries and accordingly Section 302 of the IPC was added. In course of investigation, police recorded the statement of the witnesses, sent the body of the victim for post mortem examination, prepared the inquest report and on the conclusion of investigation submitted charge-sheet against eleven accused persons including the respondents No. 1 to 5. Some of the charge sheeted accused absconded and eventually the trial proceeded against the respondents No. 1 to 5. 4. In course of trial, learned Sessions Judge framed charges against the accused persons under Sections 302/323/427/148 read with Section 149 I.P.C., to which, they pleaded not guilty. Sixteen witnesses were examined by the prosecution to establish the charges. On appreciation of evidence, learned Sessions Judge acquitted the respondents No. 1 to 5. During pendency of this revision petition, the respondent No. 5, Rama Kanta Sarkar died on 30.05.2015. 5. Mr. B.M. Choudhury, learned amicus curiae submits that the prosecution witnesses, PW-1, PW-2, PW-5 and PW-7 consistently deposed implicating the accused Mantu and Rama Chandra. However, learned Sessions Judge acquitted all the accused persons without properly appreciating the prosecution evidence and as such, the impugned judgment is required to be interfered. Learned counsel Mr. 5. Mr. B.M. Choudhury, learned amicus curiae submits that the prosecution witnesses, PW-1, PW-2, PW-5 and PW-7 consistently deposed implicating the accused Mantu and Rama Chandra. However, learned Sessions Judge acquitted all the accused persons without properly appreciating the prosecution evidence and as such, the impugned judgment is required to be interfered. Learned counsel Mr. Biswas for respondents No. 1 to 4, supporting the impugned judgment submits, that learned trial court rightly acquitted the respondents, having meticulously appreciated the evidence on record, and as such, the impugned judgment did not suffer from any illegality or impropriety requiring interference by this Court in the exercise of revisional power. 6. Before adverting to the submission of the learned counsel and the evidence on record, we feel obliged to remind ourselves the scope and contour of the revisional jurisdiction to interfere with an order of acquittal. 7. The Apex Court in Kaptan Singh -Vs- State (1997) 6 SCC 185 observed that such power should not be exercised unless there exists a manifest illegality in the judgment or order of acquittal or there is a grave mis-carriage of justice. 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in M. Sainuddin -Vs- Food Inspector (2001) 9 SCC 216 held, that where two views are reasonably possible and the court has taken the view in favour of the accused, the High Court should be slow in interfering with the order of acquittal in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. 9. In Bindeshwari Prasad Singh -Vs- State of Bihar (2002) 6 SCC 650 , the Apex Court held that the High Court should not interfere with an order of acquittal merely because the trial court has taken a wrong view of law or has erred in appreciation of evidence. In absence of manifest illegality resulting in grave mis-carriage of justice, exercise of revisonal jurisdiction in such case is not warranted. 10. In State -Vs- Suraj (2008) 9 SCC 475 , the Apex Court observed that High Court’s power of revision is of exceptional nature and therefore, it is to be exercised sparingly, keeping in mind that this power is limited. A revisional court cannot convert itself into a regular court of appeal, while exercising revisional power in an application for reversal of the order of acquittal. 11. A revisional court cannot convert itself into a regular court of appeal, while exercising revisional power in an application for reversal of the order of acquittal. 11. The scope and ambit of the revisonal court to exercise the power of appellate court by virtue of Section 401 (1) of the Cr.P.C. have been dealt by the Apex Court in State of Maharashtra -Vs- Jogmohan Singh Kuldip Singh Anand reported in (2004) 7 SCC 659 held as under :- “The revisional court is empowered to exercise all the powers conferred on the appellate court by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 401 Cr.P.C. Section 401 CrPC is a provision enabling the High Court to exercise all powers of an appellate court, if necessary, in aid of power of superintendence or supervision as a part of power of revision conferred on the High court or the Sessions Court, Section 397 CrPC confers power on the High Court or Sessions Court, as the case may be, for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. It is for the above purpose, if necessary, the High Court or the Sessions Court can exercise all appellate powers. Section 401 CrPC conferring powers of an appellate court on the revisional court is with the above limited purpose. The provisions contained in Section 395 to Section 401 CrPC, read together, do not indicate the revisional power of the High Court can be exercise as a second appellate power.” 12. In Venkateshan -Vs- Ravi reported in (2013) 14 SCC 207 , the Apex Court observed that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court while examining an order of acquittal is extremely narrow and ought to be exercised only in cases where the trial court had committed a manifest error of law or procedure or had overlooked and ignored relevant and material evidence, thereby causing miscarriage of justice. Re-appreciation of evidence is an exercise that the High Court must refrain from while examining an order of acquittal in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under this Code. 13. Re-appreciation of evidence is an exercise that the High Court must refrain from while examining an order of acquittal in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under this Code. 13. The Apex Court in Sanjay Singh Ramrao Chavan -Vs- Duttaray Gulabrao Phalke (2015) 3 SCC 123 observed that the revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 Cr.P.C. is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised is shown to be perverse, or untenable in law, or is grossly erroneous, or glaringly unreasonable, or where the decision is based on no material, or where the material facts are wholly ignored, or where judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the court may not interfere with the decision in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. 14. What therefore follows from the above authorities is that revisional power, in respect of an order of acquittal is extremely and circumscribed. Although by virtue of Section 401 Cr.P.C. the revisional court, in its discretion, can exercise any of the powers conferred on the court of appeal by section 386 Cr.P.C., the power of the revisional court under Sections 397/401 Cr.P.C. cannot be equated with the power of the appellate court. Thus, the view consistently taken by the Apex Court, with regard to the power of revisional court in interfering with the order of acquittal is that unless, the judgment and order, sought to be revised is found to be perverse or grossly erroneous or against the established tenets of criminal jurisprudence, or miscarriage of justice is caused due to overlooking or ignoring the relevant and material evidence, the revisional court should not interfere with the order of acquittal. Even if two views are possible, the revisional court cannot replace the view of the trial court by its view. Even if the order of acquittal is erroneous, unless such error pertaining to lack of jurisdiction of the court, whose order is sought to be revised, revisional court is not supposed to interfere with an order of acquittal. 15. Keeping in view the above guidelines, now let us scrutinize the evidence and materials brought on record. 16. Even if the order of acquittal is erroneous, unless such error pertaining to lack of jurisdiction of the court, whose order is sought to be revised, revisional court is not supposed to interfere with an order of acquittal. 15. Keeping in view the above guidelines, now let us scrutinize the evidence and materials brought on record. 16. It transpires from the impugned judgment that learned trial court having appreciated the evidence and materials on record came to a definite finding, that there was no evidence to invoke the provisions of Section 149 I.P.C. for attributing constructive liability, and the accused persons would be liable for their individual act. The trial court observed as follows :- “It is found that prosecution failed to make out a case u/S. 149 I.P.C., and as such, prosecution is to prove who actually caused the injury upon the deceased and other witnesses. It has already been found that evidence of PW-6 and PW-8 contradicted the evidence of PW-1, PW-2, PW-5 & PW-7 on material particularly and, therefore, Montu cannot safely be held responsible for the injuries caused upon the deceased. The evidence that accused Ramchandra dragged out the deceased does not itself establish that he intended to kill the deceased.” 17. PW-1, Smt. Jamuna Das, mother of the deceased, deposed that accused Ram Chandra caught hold of the deceased and dragged him to the place of occurrence. The accused Montu hit him with a “shavol” on his head. She further stated, that when other accused persons assaulted the deceased, she (PW-1) raised alarm and in the meantime, the passenger of a public bus, which was parked there, intervened, and the accused persons left the place. PW-1 also deposed that accused Ram Chandra, Montu Sarkar, Shyama Sarkar, Subul Sarkar, Rabindra, Dilip, Monindra, Birendra, Radha and Mintu came to dig a well on their land, which was resisted by her son, Sunil (deceased). During cross-examination, it was elicited that there were various civil and criminal litigations between them. 18. PW-2, Rupen Das, deposed that he went to cultivate the land of PW-1 in the morning, but the accused Monindra prevented him and did not allow him to plough the land and accordingly, he left the field. He further deposed that thereafter victim Sunil Das was dragged from his house by the accused Ram Chandra and accused Montu assaulted him with “shavol” and spade. He further deposed that thereafter victim Sunil Das was dragged from his house by the accused Ram Chandra and accused Montu assaulted him with “shavol” and spade. PW-2 further deposed that Shubal, Monindra, Shayama, Rama, Radha and Dilip were also armed with weapon and assaulted him. This witness also stated that when the accused persons started digging well on the land of PW-1, deceased Sunil resisted the accused persons, whereupon they assaulted Sunil. 19. PW-5 Sankar Das deposed that the accused persons started to dig a well on their land adjacent to their homestead, to which the victim raised objection. He further stated that the accused persons dragged Sunil from the courtyard and Monty assaulted him with the blunt side of the “shavol”. 20. PW-6, Roket Roy, deposed that he did not see who inflicted injury to the victim Sunil. However, he stated to have seen Dilip, Monindra, Girindra, Rabindra and Radha at the place of occurrence. The PW-6 was declared hostile by the prosecution. According to PW-7, Nikhil Das (brother of the deceased), accused Ram Chandra dragged Sunil to their field and Montu assaulted him with the blunt side of the dao and accused Subal caught hold of him. According to him, the accused Ram Chandra, Monindra and Dilip also assaulted the deceased. This witness admitted during his cross-examination, that there was land dispute between the parties. 21. PW-8, Sudhir Sarkar, who happened to be an independent witness, stated that hearing “hulla”, he came to the place of occurrence and found accused Subal, Roma, Shyama, Rabindra, Dilip and Monindra were digging a well on the land of PW-1 adjacent to her house and when he tried to stop the marpit, the accused Monindra assaulted the deceased Sunil with a “shavol” on his head and accused Dilip assaulted him (PW-7). However, he (PW-8) and one Kali Das disarmed the accused persons. At that point of time, a bus parked there and seeing the passengers alighting from it, the accused persons fled away from the place of occurrence. The PW-6, who was also an independent witness, supported the PW-8. The PW- 6, of course, was declared hostile by the prosecution. It is the trite law that testimony of the hostile witness does not get washed off the record only because of such witness being disowned by the prosecution. The PW-6, who was also an independent witness, supported the PW-8. The PW- 6, of course, was declared hostile by the prosecution. It is the trite law that testimony of the hostile witness does not get washed off the record only because of such witness being disowned by the prosecution. The testimony of the hostile witness to the extent supporting other witness can very well be relied upon. 22. A dispassionate scrutiny of the prosecution evidence would show that all the prosecution witness including PWs 1, 2, 5 & 7 deposed that the accused persons were digging a well near the house of the PW-1. When the deceased resisted the accused party, they assaulted the deceased Sunil and he sustained injuries. Though, the testimony of the prosecution witnesses was not consistent as regard participation of all the accused persons, the admitted position was that when the victim prevented the accused party from digging well, occurrence started and the victim was assaulted. Therefore, the prosecution version as deposed by PWs 1, 2, 5 & 7, that the victim was dragged by accused Ramchandra from the house or courtyard was hardly convincing. The above prosecution evidence also made it amply clear, that accused persons did not form unlawful assembly with the object of killing or causing injury to the victim Sunil, nor he was killed in prosecution of such object of the unlawful assembly. Evidently occurrence took place suddenly at the spur of the moment, when the victim Sunil prevented the accused party from digging well and there was also no evidence to prove that the accused persons formed an unlawful assembly with the requisite object and knowledge as laid down in Section 141 IPC and therefore, the finding of the learned trial court that there was no material to attract the provision of Section 149 IPC cannot be faulted. 23. Evidently PWs 1, 2, 5 & 7 were closely related to the victim and belonged to the same family. Admittedly there was enmity between the parties due to various litigations and land dispute. Whereas, PW-6 and PW-8 were the independent witnesses. Dispassionate scrutiny of the evidence would show that PW-8 did not implicate any of the respondents, who were standing trial, inasmuch as, according to PW-8, accused Munindra (absconder) and Dilip (absconder) assaulted the victim. Admittedly there was enmity between the parties due to various litigations and land dispute. Whereas, PW-6 and PW-8 were the independent witnesses. Dispassionate scrutiny of the evidence would show that PW-8 did not implicate any of the respondents, who were standing trial, inasmuch as, according to PW-8, accused Munindra (absconder) and Dilip (absconder) assaulted the victim. PW-6 though did not see the actual occurrence, he also stated about the presence of the Dilip and Ranchandra at the place of occurrence. According to PW-6 when he arrived at the place of occurrence he found the victim Sunil lying there with injuries and accused Gunindra, Rabindra, Dilip and Radha (all of whom absconded) were present there. According to PW- 6, upon his raising alarm, Mantu, Ramachandra, Shyama and others came to the place of occurrence. Therefore, none of the PW-8 and PW-6 implicated any of the respondents Nos. 1 to 4, who were standing trial, though they implicated the absconding accused persons. The prosecution version as deposed by PWs 1, 2, 5 & 7, that Ramachandra dragged the victim and assaulted him was found to be unworthy of credence as indicated above. 24. Thus, what the oral testimony of the prosecution witnesses crystallizes is that prosecution had put forward two different versions through two sets of witnesses. One set comprised of PW-6 & PW-8, who were apparently independent witnesses, and did not implicate the respondents Montu and Ram Chandra or any of the respondent who stood trial. The other set of witnesses comprised of PW-1, PW-2, PW-5 and PW-7, who are all closely related to the victim and belonged to the same family, sought to implicate the respondents Ramchandra and Mantu. When prosecution comes out with two sets of evidence, one favouring the accused and the other against the accused, the court has either to reject both the versions or should accept the version which favours the accused as per the established tenets of criminal jurisprudence. When prosecution comes out with two sets of evidence, one favouring the accused and the other against the accused, the court has either to reject both the versions or should accept the version which favours the accused as per the established tenets of criminal jurisprudence. When the prosecution witnesses stood contradicted on material facts as regard involvement of the respondents and there were two versions, one favouring the respondents and the other against the respondents and the witnesses, viz., PWs 1, 2, 5 & 7, who implicated the respondent accused, who were apparently inimical to the respondents, the prosecution, in our considered view, could by no stretch of imagination be held to have proved the guilt of the present respondent beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore the findings of the learned trial court that the prosecution failed to establish the charges against the respondents and acquittal of the respondents herein, on the basis of such finding appears to be quite reasonable, and as such, we find no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment dated 19-09-2009 of the learned Sessions Judge, Cachar, Silchar, in Sessions Case No. 21/2008 acquitting the respondents herein. 25. This revision petition stands dismissed accordingly. 26. Appreciating the assistance rendered by the learned Amicus Curiae, Mr. B.M. Choudhury, we hereby provide that he is entitled to Rs, 7,500/- as professional fees to be paid by the District Legal Services Authority. However, Mr. B.M. Choudhury, learned Amicus Curiae, out of his generosity offers his professional fees to the dependent/dependents of the victim. We therefore, further provide that the District Legal Services Authority, Silchar shall make an enquiry whether there is any dependent of the victim and in case there is any dependent of the victim, the District Legal Services Authority shall provide compensation to such dependent/dependents in terms of the State of Assam Victim’s Compensation Scheme along with Rs. 7,500/-, as indicated above, being the professional fees of the learned Amicus Curiae. 27. Send down the LCR along with a copy of this judgment. Learned trial court shall send a copy of this judgment to the Chairman, DLSA for necessary action.