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2019 DIGILAW 701 (KER)

Catholic Diocese, Muvattupuzha, Rep. By Bishop v. Muthaiah P. , S/o. Pachamuthu

2019-08-27

P.B.SURESH KUMAR

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JUDGMENT : The claimants in a proceedings for compensation before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal have come up in this appeal challenging the decision of the Tribunal. 2. A Catholic diocesan priest died in a motor accident took place on 21.1.2009. He was aged 51 years at the time of accident. The Catholic diocese under which the deceased priest was working and the siblings of the deceased priest, together preferred the application for compensation. Rs.15,00,000/-was the claim made in the proceedings. The Tribunal, placing reliance on the decision of this court in Varghese v. Krishnan Nair, 2004 (2) KLT 783 found that the siblings of the deceased priest are not entitled to compensation. Consequently, the claim petition was disposed of permitting the Catholic diocese to realise a sum of Rs.3,85,116/-from the insurer of the offending vehicle. The claimants are aggrieved by the said decision of the Tribunal. 3. Heard the learned counsel on either side as also Sri.Jawahar Jose, the learned amicus curiae appointed in the matter. 4. The learned counsel for the appellants, placing reliance on Section 166(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Rule 2(k) of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules 1989, contended that claimants 2 to 5 who are entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased priest are entitled to claim compensation, and the finding to the contrary rendered by the Tribunal is incorrect and unsustainable. The learned counsel also contended that the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal is meagre and would not satisfy the statutory requirement of just compensation in a case of this nature. 5. The learned amicus curiae submitted that although the expression "legal representative" defined in the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 has to be construed liberally in the context of Indian family backgrounds, having regard to the object of the legislation, viz, to provide compensation to victims of motor accidents, it cannot be stretched that far to include Catholic diocese within its sweep in a case involving death of a Catholic diocesan priest. It was pointed out by the learned amicus curiae that the proposition reiterated by this court in Varghese that when a person enters a religious order after renouncing the worldly pleasures, he is deemed to be dead to the world and his heirs at once inherit from him the assets he had, is no longer good law as clarified by this Court in Msgr. Xavier Chullickal v. Raphael ( 2017 (2) KLT 1072 ). It was pointed out by the learned amicus curiae that, among Catholics, there are two categories of priests namely diocesan priests and religious priests. Although all the priests are ordained to preach gospel and serve the people of the God in the person of Jesus Christ, they are distinguished by contrasting the vows made by the religious priests and the promises made by the diocesan priests. It was pointed out that a diocesan priest does not make a promise of poverty and in contrast, a religious priest takes three solemn vows before he is ordained, including the vow of poverty. Religious priest thus owns nothing, and shares things in common with others in his community. According to the learned amicus curiae, even in the case of religious priest, the religious order cannot be regarded as legal representative. It was pointed out that the priest involved in the case being a diocesan priest, only his heirs, in terms of the Indian Succession Act, are entitled to compensation. The learned amicus curiae has taken me through various decisions of the Apex Court as also this court, on the basis of which he has formulated the aforesaid opinion. 6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel on either side as also the learned amicus curiae. 7. In Varghese, in the context of a motor accident claim raised in respect of the death of a Christian priest, placing reliance on the proposition that a person would be deemed to be dead to the world, when he enters a religious order after renouncing the worldly pleasures, a bench of this court held that his heirs are not entitled to stake a claim for compensation. Later, in Msgr. Xavier Chullickal, following the decisions of the Apex Court in Molly Joseph v. George Sebastian, (1996) 6 SCC 337 and Mary Roy v. State of Kerala, (1986) 2 SCC 209 , another bench of this court held that after the introduction of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, the proposition laid down in Varghese is no longer good law and inheritance and succession thereafter in the case of all Christians shall only be in terms of the said Act. A perusal of the judgment in Msgr. A perusal of the judgment in Msgr. Xavier Chullickal, and the judgments of the Apex Court referred to therein would indicate that the view taken in all the cases is that the provisions of Part V of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 are of universal application and the same would prevail and override all personal laws, usage or custom prevailing before the coming into force of the Act. In Msgr. Xavier Chullickal, this court has clarified, therefore, that the decision in Varghese is no longer good law and binding. In the light of the decision in Msgr. Xavier Chullickal and the binding decisions of the Apex Court referred to therein, it can be concluded that the concept that a person would be deemed to be dead to the world when he enters a religious order, is no longer good law. In other words, as rightly pointed out by the learned amicus curiae, the Catholic diocese is not entitled to claim compensation for the death of the deceased priest. 8. In the matter of coming to the aforesaid conclusion, it is necessary to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in Montford Bros. of St. Gabriel v. United India Insurance, (2014) 3 SCC 394 , where the Apex Court has upheld the claim of a religious order for compensation in respect of the death of one of their members in a motor accident. It is seen that Montford Bros. was a case where though the locus standi of the claimant to institute the claim petition was initially disputed, the said contention was not pressed into service during the trial and the parties have proceeded as if the claimant is entitled to raise the claim. The said judgment, in the circumstances, would not preclude this court from taking the view aforesaid. 9. In the light of the discussions contained in the foregoing paragraphs, there cannot be any doubt to the fact that the siblings of the deceased priest alone can be regarded as his legal representatives for raising the claim for compensation. The siblings of the deceased priest have no case that they were financially dependent on the deceased. They are, therefore, not entitled to claim compensation for loss of dependency. The siblings of the deceased priest have no case that they were financially dependent on the deceased. They are, therefore, not entitled to claim compensation for loss of dependency. Of course, they are entitled to compensation under the pecuniary heads like, transportation expenses, damage to clothing and articles, funeral expenses, and under the non-pecuniary heads like loss of estate, pain and suffering, and loss of love and affection. It is seen that the Tribunal has granted compensation under all the aforesaid pecuniary heads and under the non-pecuniary heads of loss of estate and pain and suffering to the Catholic diocese. Having regard to the fact that the accident is one that took place in the year 2009, it cannot be said that the siblings of the deceased priest would have been entitled to altogether more compensation than what was granted under those heads to the Catholic diocese. The only head under which compensation was not granted by the Tribunal to the Catholic diocese is "loss of love and affection". The siblings of the deceased being persons aged 62, 55, 47, and 42, I do not think that they are entitled to compensation under that head, for, compensation for loss of love and affection is normally granted to the tender aged children and siblings of the deceased. In other words, the compensation that should have been granted to the siblings of the deceased priest having granted by the Tribunal to the Catholic diocese, should this court grant compensation to the siblings of the deceased again on the heads mentioned above, is the question remaining to be considered. According to me, in so far as there is no conflict of interest between the Catholic diocese and the siblings of the deceased, and compensation has been granted in a joint petition preferred by the Catholic diocese along with the siblings, compensation under the aforesaid heads need not be given again to the siblings of the deceased. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, there is no merit in the appeal, and the same is, accordingly, dismissed. Before parting with this judgment, I record my deep felt gratitude for the assistance rendered by Sri.Jawahar Jose, the learned amicus curiae.