ORDER 1. The challenge in this petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution is to the order dated 25.5.2019 dismissing the second appeal of the petitioners as time barred by about two months. The aforesaid order was passed by Additional Commissioner Bhopal Division Bhopal while adjudicating the order of the SDO, Sironj, District Vidisha dated 28.8.2018. 2. The SDO dismissed the appeal of the petitioners/appellants on merits preferred against the foundational order of Naib Tahsildar, Mandal-2, Tahsil Sironj, district Vidisha dated 28.8.2018 by which the application of the petitioners/appellants for partition of the agricultural land filed under Section178 of Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 was dismissed. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner/appellants primarily submits that the delay in filing the second appeal was only of 60 days which ought to have been condoned especially when reason assigned in the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act was that of petitioner-Devisingh being seriously unwell due to typhoid from 20.10.2018 to 7.12.2018. 4. It is seen from the record that that the second appellate Court has dismissed the second appeal on the ground that no documents in support of the petitioner being unwell were filed. 5. The apex Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others, reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649 while discussing the scope of section 5 of Limitation Act and explaining the expression "reasonable cause" has laid down that every litigation deserves to be heard and decided on merits and not dismissed on technical grounds. True it is that law of limitation has its own importance yet this law is procedural in nature which ought not to be allowed to come in way of dispensation of justice provided the explanation for delay is not so absurd that as to become unacceptable to the conscience of a man of ordinary prudence. The relevant extracts of the said judgment of the apex Court on the said point are reproduced below for ready reference and convenience : 21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: 21.1 (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non- pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the Courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: 21.1 (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non- pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the Courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2 (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation. 21.3 (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4 (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5 (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6 (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the Courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice 21.7 (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8 (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9 (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the Courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10 (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the Courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.10 (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the Courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11 (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12 (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13 (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: 22.1 (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the Courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2 (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3 (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4 (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a nonserious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters. 6. Taking que from the aforesaid principles laid down and testing the factual matrix attending herein on the same, it is seen that the delay herein is only about 60 days and the reason assigned by the petitioners/appellants was of ill health for which though no documents vouching for the illness were filed, but the second appellate Court could have granted time to the appellants to produce documents to demonstrate the factum of illness which does not seem to have been afforded. This is all the more necessary when a second appeal under Section44 of MLR Code is heard on facts and not only on law. 7. This is all the more necessary when a second appeal under Section44 of MLR Code is heard on facts and not only on law. 7. Consequently, this Court is of the considered view that the matter on the issue of section 5 application deserves to be reconsidered by the second appellate authority (Additional Commissioner, Revenue Division, Bhopal). 8. Accordingly, this petition stands allowed to the following extent: (1) The impugned order of the second appellate Court dated 25.5.2019 (Annexure P-1) passed in Case No.189/Appeal/2018-19 by Additional commissioner Bhopal, Division Bhopal is set aside. (2) The petitioners are directed to furnish documents in support of the cause shown in application under section 5 of Limitation Act for delay, for which a reasonable opportunity be afforded to the petitioners/appellant. Thereafter, the said application be reconsidered on the question of condonation of delay and fresh decision be taken on the same as expeditiously as possible and thereafter proceed to decide the second appeal on merits if the delay is condoned. (3) Since the petitioners have compelled the respondents to contest this petition, the respondents deserve to be compensated. It is thus directed that the aforesaid (1) and (2) directions are subject to the petitioners' paying cost of Rs. 3,000/- each to respondents No. 1, 2 and 3 (total cost of Rs. 9,000/-) within a period of one month from today failing which this order shall be rendered otios. 9. With the aforesaid directions the present petition stands disposed of.