JUDGMENT : SAUMITRA DAYAL SINGH, J. 1. Heard Shri Vivek Saran, learned counsel for the appellants and Shri Ghan Shyam Maurya, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. Present intra-Court appeal has been filed by the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the 'corporation'). It arises from the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 23.01.2019 in Writ-A No. 16403 of 2017, by which the learned Single Judge has set aside the orders dated 10.03.2015 and 25.03.2017 passed by the authorities of the 'corporation' and has further directed the latter to get the respondent Suresh Singh (hereinafter referred to as the 'petitioner-employee') medically examined and, if found unfit to drive a bus, to provide him an alternate employment. 3. Admittedly, the 'petitioner-employee' was engaged by the 'corporation' under a contract dated 16.06.2005, as a Bus Driver for a period of two years. The payment for the work done by the 'petitioner-employee' was also determined under the aforesaid contract. The contract itself was made renewable for one year. It is further an admitted case between the parties that the 'petitioner-employee' remained engaged till 2014. On 12.02.2014, while driving a bus of the 'corporation', he met with an accident wherein he suffered serious injuries to his leg and to his internal organs as well. On 24.07.2015, a medical certificate was issued by the Chief Medical Officer, District Banda, certifying 40 percent permanent disability suffered by the 'petitioner-employee'. 4. In view of such permanent disability, the 'petitioner-employee' sought lighter work/duty to be assigned by the 'corporation'. It is his case, upon such duty being not assigned to him, he approached this Court in Writ-A No. 8189 of 2017 which was disposed by order dated 28.02.2017. The Court noted the stand taken by the 'corporation' of having rejected the claim made by the 'petitioner-employee', by an order dated 10.03.2015. However, the writ Court, at that stage itself, disposed of the writ petition with a direction to the proper authority of the 'corporation' to pass an order on his claim to continue in service. 5. It is in compliance of that order, the Regional Manager of the 'corporation' passed another order dated 25.03.2017 and thus rejected the representation made by the 'petitioner-employee'. The said order became the subject matter of challenge in Writ-A No. 16403 of 2017. That writ petition first came to be dismissed by order dated 19.4.2017. 5. It is in compliance of that order, the Regional Manager of the 'corporation' passed another order dated 25.03.2017 and thus rejected the representation made by the 'petitioner-employee'. The said order became the subject matter of challenge in Writ-A No. 16403 of 2017. That writ petition first came to be dismissed by order dated 19.4.2017. Against that order, the 'petitioner-employee' filed Special Appeal (Defective) No. 356 of 2017 which was allowed by order dated 03.07.2017 with the following observations: "Although the learned counsel for the respondent-Corporation would insist that the provisions of the Act, 1995 would be applicable to permanent employee/employee appointed on substantive basis but having regard to the purpose for which the beneficial legislation has been incorporated i.e. for providing protection to an employee who suffers disability during the course of the employment, it has to be examined whether the benefits of the Act be extended/are applicable to contractual employees or not. Since the aforesaid aspect of the matter has not been considered by the learned Single Judge under the impugned judgment and it may require exchange of pleadings between the parties on the said issues, we deem it fit and proper to set aside the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 19th April, 2017 and to restore the writ petition to its original number. It is ordered accordingly. Let the writ petition be heard and decided afresh in light of the observations made herein above. The present intra-court appeal is allowed subject to the observations made above.” 6. Upon that direction of remand, the order impugned in this appeal has been passed by the learned Single Judge. In view of the observation of the Division Bench noted above, it had to be examined whether the benefit of the Persons With Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Old Act') could be extended to contractual employees or not. 7. The learned Single Judge has reasoned, considering the purpose and object of the legislation being welfare legislation with social objective, the 'corporation' as a model employer should allow that benefit to contractual employees as the 'Old Act' does not distinguish between permanent and contractual employees. 8. 7. The learned Single Judge has reasoned, considering the purpose and object of the legislation being welfare legislation with social objective, the 'corporation' as a model employer should allow that benefit to contractual employees as the 'Old Act' does not distinguish between permanent and contractual employees. 8. Assailing the aforesaid findings and reasoning of the learned Single Judge, learned counsel for the 'corporation' first submits, the 'Old Act' had been repealed by Section 102 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as the 'New Act'). In view of that repealing clause, the learned Single Judge has completely erred in enforcing the obligation on the 'corporation', under the 'Old Act'. 9. Alternatively, it has been submitted, even if Section 20 of the New Act is read pari materia to Section 47 of the 'Old Act' still, the status of the 'petitioner-employee' being that of a contractual employee, the relief as granted by the learned Single Judge, could never be made available to him as neither the 'Old Act' nor the 'New Act', for the reason of that status of the 'petitioner-employee'. The law under both the Acts exists only for the benefit of permanent employees. In this regard, reliance has been placed on two decisions of the Delhi High Court in Adarsh Kumar Khanna Vs. Union of India & Ors. W.P.(C) No. 16309 of 2006, decided on 15.02.2011 and Mohit Mahajan Vs. Foundation for Innovation and Technology Transfer (FITT) & Ors., L.P.A. No. 663 of 2016, decided on 27.11.2018. In the latter judgment, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court confirmed the decision of a learned Single Judge of that Court which decision, in turn, had followed the decision in Adarsh Kumar Khanna Vs. Union of India & Ors. (supra). 10. Relying on those judgments, it has been submitted, the obligation on the employer is not, in all cases, to continue the services of a person who may have suffered disability though he may otherwise be entitled to terminate the services of that employee. To do so, in the opinion of the Delhi High Court, would be to re-write the contract between the parties which, obviously, may not be done or permitted to be done. To do so, in the opinion of the Delhi High Court, would be to re-write the contract between the parties which, obviously, may not be done or permitted to be done. Therefore, it has been submitted, even if the Acts (both the 'Old Act' and the 'New Act'), were to be held applicable to a contract employee, then also, the relief sought may not be granted, as that would amount to re-writing the contract. 11. Learned counsel for the 'petitioner-employee', on the other hand, submits, merely because the learned Single Judge had referred to the provisions of the 'Old Act', may not result in any error in the judgment inasmuch the provisions of Section 20 of the new Act are pari materia to provisions of Section 47 of the Old Act. 12. Then, it has been submitted, even if the rights of a contract-employee were to be tested on the anvil of Section 20 of the 'New Act', the same conclusions would necessarily follow. That provision is a nondiscrimination clause which provides, no government establishment shall dispense or reduce in rank the employee who acquires a disability during his service. Inasmuch as it is undisputed that the 'petitioner-employee' acquired 40% permanent physical disability while he was engaged as a bus driver by the 'corporation', it was not open to the latter to have dispensed with his services. By not allowing the 'petitioner-employee' to join or work on any post, the 'corporation' has, in effect, illegally dispensed with his services, thus violating the law. 13. As to the decisions of the Delhi High Court, relied upon by learned counsel for the 'corporation', it has been submitted, the same have not been decided on the correct principle of law. 14. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having gone through the record, in the first place, earlier, the Division Bench had remitted the matter to examine whether the benefit of the 'Old Act' would be available to the 'petitioner-employee', he being a contract employee. While that order had been passed on 03.07.2017, the 'New Act' had already come into force on 27.12.2016. However, whether the case of the 'petitioner-employee' is examined under the 'Old Act' or the 'New Act', the issue would survive and remain substantially the same, in view of the pari materia provision under the two Acts. While that order had been passed on 03.07.2017, the 'New Act' had already come into force on 27.12.2016. However, whether the case of the 'petitioner-employee' is examined under the 'Old Act' or the 'New Act', the issue would survive and remain substantially the same, in view of the pari materia provision under the two Acts. In this regard, it would be fruitful to take note of the statutory provisions of Section 47 of the Old Act in comparison to that of Section 20 of the New Act: Old Act New Act 47. Non-discrimination in Government employment - (1) No establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service: Provided that, if an employee, after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits: Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier. (2) No promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of his disability: Provided that the appropriate Government may, having regard to the type of work carried on in any establishment, by notification and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in such notification, exempt any establishment from the provisions of this section. 20. Non-discrimination in employment - (1) No Government establishment shall discriminate against any person with disability in any matter relating to employment: Provided that the appropriate Government may, having regard to the type of work carried on in any establishment, by notification and subject to such conditions, if any, exempt any establishment from the provisions of this section. (2) Every Government establishment shall provide reasonable accommodation and appropriate barrier free and conducive environment to employees with disability. (3) No promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of disability. (2) Every Government establishment shall provide reasonable accommodation and appropriate barrier free and conducive environment to employees with disability. (3) No promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of disability. (4) No Government establishment shall dispense with or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his or her service: Provided that, if an employee after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, shall be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits: Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier. (5) The appropriate Government may frame policies for posting and transfer of employees with disabilities. 15. Clearly, except for addition of the word “Government” in Section 20 (4) of the New Act, what was provided by Section 47 (1) of the Old Act, is now provided by Section 20 (4) of the New Act. Therefore, that being the state of the statutory law, the question on which the matter was earlier remitted, survived in entirety. Then, the term 'employee' is not defined either under the 'Old Act' or the 'New Act'. The term 'establishment' to which notice has been made by the learned Single Judge is defined under Section 2 (i) of the New Act and a similar definition existed under Section 2(k) of the Old Act. However, in our opinion, the definition of the term 'establishment' may not be decisive of the controversy involved in the present appeal, since the 'corporation' admits to itself that status. 16. The right being claimed by the 'petitioner-employee' is that his services could not have been dispensed with owing to the 40% permanent disability acquired by him during his service rendered to the 'corporation' as its employee. The term 'employee' was considered by the Supreme Court in Union Public Service Commission Vs. Dr. Jamuna Kurup and Ors., (2008) 11 SCC 10 , wherein a three judge bench of the Supreme Court held as below: “The term “employee” is not defined in the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, nor is it defined in the advertisement of UPSC. The ordinary meaning of “employee” is any person employed on salary or wage by an employer. Dr. Jamuna Kurup and Ors., (2008) 11 SCC 10 , wherein a three judge bench of the Supreme Court held as below: “The term “employee” is not defined in the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, nor is it defined in the advertisement of UPSC. The ordinary meaning of “employee” is any person employed on salary or wage by an employer. When there is a contract of employment, the person employed is the employee and the person employing is the employer. In the absence of any restrictive definition, the word “employee” would include both permanent or temporary, regular or short term, contractual or ad hoc. Therefore, all persons employed by MCD, whether permanent or contractual will be “employees of MCD”. (emphasis supplied) 17. In absence of any contrary legislative intent expressed, either under the 'Old Act' or the 'New Act' to exclude all non-permanent employees or any category of non-permanent employees or temporary employees or daily wage employees or contract employees etc., there is absolutely no reason to exclude the applicability of either of those Acts, to any class of employees of the 'corporation'. Clearly, the 'Old Act' as also the 'New Act' are social welfare legislations enacted in consonance and conformity with the Convention on the Rights of Persons With Disability, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. India is a signatory to that Convention and has also ratified the same. Then Section 20(4) of the 'New Act' and Section 47(1) of the 'Old Act' prohibit discrimination in employment to the disadvantage of a person with disability. That being the sole purpose of the enactment, which is clearly a piece of social welfare legislation, there is no warrant to artificially restrict or limit the full expanse of the word 'employee' used therein. 18. Looked from that perspective, the definition of the word 'employee' as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Union Public Service Commission Vs. Dr. Jamuna Kurup and Ors. (supra) is wholly applicable to the 'Old Act' as also the 'New Act'. 18. Looked from that perspective, the definition of the word 'employee' as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Union Public Service Commission Vs. Dr. Jamuna Kurup and Ors. (supra) is wholly applicable to the 'Old Act' as also the 'New Act'. When, in the general sense, the terms 'employee' has been held to be wide enough to include permanent, temporary, regular, short contract or ad-hoc employees, then, more so in the context of social-welfare legislation, brought specifically to prohibit discrimination (in employment), to the prejudice of a person with disability vis-a-vis a person without disability, the objection raised by the learned counsel for the 'corporation' cannot be sustained. 19. Moreover, the Supreme Court in the case of Dalco Engineering Private Limited Vs. Satish Prabhakar Padhye and Ors., (2010) 4 SCC 378 , in the context of the old Act, observed as under: “We agree that the socio-economic legislations should be interpreted liberally. It is also true that courts should adopt different yardsticks and measures for interpreting socio-economic statutes, as compared to penal statutes and taxing statutes. But a caveat. The courts cannot obviously expand the application of a provision in a socio-economic legislation by judicial interpretation, to levels unintended by the legislature, or in a manner which militates against the provisions of the statute itself or against any constitutional limitations. In this case, there is a clear indication in the statute that the benefit is intended to be restricted to a particular class of employees, that is employees of enumerated establishments (which fall within the scope of “State” under Article 12). Express limitations placed by the socioeconomic statute cannot be ignored, so as to include in its application, those who are clearly excluded by such statute itself. 20. Thus, the real question required to be examined is the limit or the extent to which the protections have been granted under the 'Old Act' and the 'New Act' and not whether such protections exist in favour of the 'petitioner-employee' in his capacity as a contract employee. If a clear indication is to be found that the benefit was intended to be restricted in any way, the same may not be ignored and the limits of operation of the legislation may not be expanded or overlooked, to do good generally. 21. In the context of service jurisprudence, discrimination, as a ground of attack, is not new. If a clear indication is to be found that the benefit was intended to be restricted in any way, the same may not be ignored and the limits of operation of the legislation may not be expanded or overlooked, to do good generally. 21. In the context of service jurisprudence, discrimination, as a ground of attack, is not new. In different fact situations, that ground has been often pleaded in the past and it has been authoritatively dealt with. The provision of Section 47(4) of the 'Old Act' and that of Section 20(1) of the 'New Act' being non-discrimination provisions, it may be examined whether the petitioner-employee being a contract employee could claim same benefits as a permanent employee. Therefore, it has to be examined, to which class of employees does the 'petitioner-employee' belong and what equal rights he may claim, within that class. 22. In this context, first, in the case of The General Manager, South Central Railway, Secunderabad and Anr. Vs. A.V.R. Siddhanth and Ors., (1974) 4 SCC 335 , the Supreme Court had the occasion to consider whether government servants recruited through different methods and who had been earlier absorbed into a single integrated class could be treated differently with reference to their original source of engagement, upon dissolution of the integrated department. In that fact situation, the Supreme Court held as below: “The fundamental right of equality means that persons in like situation, under like circumstances are entitled to be treated alike. The constitutional code of equality and equal opportunity”, observed this Court in State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosla [ (1974) 1 SCC 19 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 49] “is a charter for equals”. So long as employees similarly circumstanced in the same class of service are treated alike, — the question of hostile discrimination does not arise. The equality of opportunity for purposes of seniority, promotion and like matters of employment is available only for persons who fall substantially, within the same class or unit of service. The guarantee of equality is not applicable as between members of distinct and different classes of the service. The Constitution does not command that in all matters of employment absolute symmetry be maintained. The guarantee of equality is not applicable as between members of distinct and different classes of the service. The Constitution does not command that in all matters of employment absolute symmetry be maintained. A wooden equality as between all classes of employees regardless of qualifications, kind of jobs, nature of responsibility and performance of the employees is not intended, nor is it practicable if the administration is to run. Indeed, the maintenance of such a “classless” and undiscerning “equality” where, in reality, glaring inequalities and intelligible differentia exist, will deprive the guarantee of its practical content. Broad classification based on reason, executive pragmatism and experience having a direct relation with the achievement of efficiency in administration, is permissible. That is to say, reasonable classification according to some principle, to recognise intelligible inequalities or to avoid or correct inequalities is allowed, but not mini-classification which creates inequality among the similarly circumstanced members of the same class or group.” (emphasis supplied) 23. Then, the Supreme Court in the case of Jaswant Singh and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors., (1979) 4 SCC 440 , had the occasion to consider whether the retrenchment of certain staff recruited by the Beas Control Board or Beas Construction Board, purely on temporary basis amounted to discrimination vis-a-vis deputationist who had also worked with that employer to perform for the same work. Dealing with the plea of equality thus raised, the Supreme Court clearly held as below: “We see no substance in the grievance of the petitioners that the proposed orders of retrenchment involve violation of the guarantee of equality in the matter of their employment. It is of the essence of the right of equality that equals must be treated alike. In other words, some amongst equals cannot be subjected to hostile discrimination by giving favoured treatment to others who are similarly situated. The difficulty in accepting the petitioners' contention in regard to discrimination is that they and the Deputationists are not equals, not being similarly situated in the matter of the right to continue in employment. The petitioners were appointed on a purely temporary basis for the construction and completion of the works of the Beas Project. The offers of appointment made to them are on the record and they show that each of them was offered a “Temporary post” and the appointment was to be “governed by the rules applicable to Temporary Establishments”. The petitioners were appointed on a purely temporary basis for the construction and completion of the works of the Beas Project. The offers of appointment made to them are on the record and they show that each of them was offered a “Temporary post” and the appointment was to be “governed by the rules applicable to Temporary Establishments”. Two of the six conditions on which they were appointed are these: “(1) Persons engaged temporarily will be on the footing of monthly servants and their employment carries with it absolutely no claim to pensions or any other absentee allowance beyond those conditionally given to temporary employees...; and (2) The services of such employees may be dispensed with at any time without notice in cases of misconduct of any description on their part or of unsatisfactory work and otherwise by one month's notice, or payment of one month's salary in lieu of notice. Also with or without notice, their engagement will cease absolutely on completion of work in connection with which their appointments may have been sanctioned.” The petitioners accepted the offers of appointments by subscribing to a declaration that they had understood and accepted the conditions of their employment. The petitioners are being retrenched in accordance with the conditions subject to which they were appointed. Project is in the final stage of completion and the petitioners will be rendered surplus, insofar as that Project is concerned.” (emphasis supplied) 24. Thus, the Supreme Court clearly held that the persons employed on temporary basis formed a different class from that of deputationist and, therefore, the disengagement of the temporary employees while retaining the deputationist did not amount to discrimination. 25. Then, in the case of Air India Vs. Nergesh Meerza and Ors., (1981) 4 SCC 335 , a three judge bench of the Supreme Court had the occasion to consider whether Air Hostesses and Assistant Flight Pursers in the Indian Airlines formed a separate class as to allow them to be treated differently or whether they formed a single class as may not allow for any different treatment for them. Paragraph no. Paragraph no. 39 of the said report reads as below: “39.Thus, from a detailed analysis and close examination of the cases of this Court starting from 1952 till today, the following propositions emerge: “(1) In considering the fundamental right of equality of opportunity a technical, pedantic or doctrinaire approach should not be made and the doctrine should not be invoked even if different scales of pay, service terms, leave, etc. are introduced in different or dissimilar posts. Thus, where the class or categories of service are essentially different in purport and spirit. Article 14 cannot be attracted. (2) Article 14 forbids hostile discrimination but not reasonable classification. Thus, where persons belonging to a particular class in view of their special attributes, qualities, mode of recruitment and the like, are differently treated in public interest to advance and boost members belonging to backward classes, sucha classification would not amount to discrimination having a close nexus with the objects sought to be achieved so that in such cases Article 14 will be completely out of the way. (3) Article 14 certainly applies where equals are treated differently without any reasonable basis. (4) Where equals and unequals are treated differently, Article 14 would have no application. (5) Even if there be one class of service having several categories with different attributes and incidents, such a category becomes a separate class by itself and no difference or discrimination between such category and the general members of the other class would amount to any discrimination or to denial of equality of opportunity. (6) In order to judge whether a separate category has been carved out of a class of service, the following circumstances have generally to be examined: (a) the nature, the mode and the manner of recruitment of a particular category from the very start, (b) the classifications of the particular category, (c) the terms and conditions of service of the members of the category, (d) the nature and character of the posts and promotional avenues, (e) the special attributes that the particular category possess which are not to be found in other classes, and the like.” (emphasis supplied) 26. Applying the aforesaid test and considering the various circumstances, instances, service conditions, promotional avenues of Assistant Flight Pursers and Air Hostesses, Air Hostesses, though members of the cabin crew were held to form an entirely separate class. Applying the aforesaid test and considering the various circumstances, instances, service conditions, promotional avenues of Assistant Flight Pursers and Air Hostesses, Air Hostesses, though members of the cabin crew were held to form an entirely separate class. The plea of hostile discrimination was repelled upon valid class legislation being established. The rule of equality was found not violated. 27. In this regard, the ratio of the Supreme Court in Dalco Engineering Private Limited Vs. Satish Prabhakar Padhye and Ors. (supra) is pertinent. Though undeniably, the 'Old Act' and the 'New Act' are valuable pieces of social welfare legislation that must, therefore, be given full application, yet, there exist well recognised and pre-existing channels in which the waters of social welfare must flow so as to deliver the fruits of change it carries with it, for the benefit of the society, in a harmonious manner. In view of the law noted above, one such well acknowledged limitation or channel is -equality may be pleaded and enforced only within the same class of employees. 28. The notion of equality, though noble and much cherished as it reflects the innate goodness of human thought that constantly impels human action to improve the present, it cannot be allowed to flow unbounded. The stream of social welfare that the 'Old Act' and the 'New Act' represent, though spring from the purest sense of righteousness, must stay limited and measured in its movement to identify and remove discrimination within the same class or category of employees. It cannot run over or not recognize the class boundaries of employees that are pre-existing and which distinguish one class of employees from another and which the legislature plainly does not intend to ignore or disturb. To allow that would be to allow the channel of law to be breached and the flood waters of social welfare to drown the subject matter of improvement, itself. 29. Thus, in light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, the nondiscrimination clause has to be applied to prevent and prohibit discrimination between two persons, one with disability and other without, when both are found belonging to the same class of employees. 29. Thus, in light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, the nondiscrimination clause has to be applied to prevent and prohibit discrimination between two persons, one with disability and other without, when both are found belonging to the same class of employees. In the fact situation of the present case, it being admitted to the 'petitioner-employee', he was a contract employee and not a permanent employee and his term of engagement was initially for a period of two years only, renewable for one year and further, it not being his case, either that the nature, mode and manner of his recruitment as a bus driver was the same as that of a permanent bus driver of the 'corporation' or that his terms of service were the same or that he had ever been regularized in services or absorbed as a permanent employee, the 'petitioner-employee' may never claim discrimination qua a permanent employee who clearly belongs to a distinct and different class and who enjoys a status. As such the 'petitioner-employee' being a contract employee must seek equality within that class of employees only. Stated positively, the 'petitioner-employee' may not be discriminated against another contract employee. No other or further declaration could be made in his favour. 30. As for the view taken by the Delhi High Court in the cases of Adarsh Kumar Khanna Vs. Union of India & Ors. and Mohit Mahajan Vs. Foundation for Innovation and Technology Transfer (FITT) & Ors., we are unable to agree to that in the first place, the learned single judge of the Delhi High Court in Adarsh Kumar Khanna Vs. Union of India & Ors. (supra), had reasoned that the Courts may not rewrite the contracts. In so far as the employer (in that case) could otherwise terminate the contract of service by issuing a three months notice and that procedure had been adopted, the contract employee was held to be not entitled to claim protection under section 47(1) of the 'Old Act'. That precedent was applied by another learned single judge of that Court in Mohit Mahajan Vs. Foundation for Innovation and Technology Transfer (FITT) & Ors. In the intra-court appeal in that case, the division bench of the Delhi High Court, left this specific issue open to be decided in an appropriate case. It dismissed that appeal on other grounds. 31. That precedent was applied by another learned single judge of that Court in Mohit Mahajan Vs. Foundation for Innovation and Technology Transfer (FITT) & Ors. In the intra-court appeal in that case, the division bench of the Delhi High Court, left this specific issue open to be decided in an appropriate case. It dismissed that appeal on other grounds. 31. Then in Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. Union of India, (2015) 12 SCC 1 , it has been held: "54. .....................................It is a well-settled principle of law that where there is a conflict between obligations flowing from a contract and those flowing from the law, the obligations flowing from the contract must necessarily yield to obligations flowing from the Constitution and laws.................................." 32. Therefore, according to us, all contracts entered into between the parties, including the present contract, are, in the first place, law governing the rights and obligations between them. However, that law is always subject to any modification or alteration that may be made by the statutory law. Thus, once the legislature stepped in and provided certain protections to all employees of 'establishment', that too on fundamental and cherished Constitutional principle of equality irrespective of their status as permanent or temporary employees or contract employees etc., the private contract between the parties stood modified to that extent, by operation of law. No plea/objection as to re-writing of the contract may be sustained as may result in defeating that statutory law. For that reason, we respectfully disagree with the view taken by the Delhi High Court in the above noted decisions. 33. Thus, for reasons given above, the 'Old Act' and the 'New Act' apply to the benefit of all classes of employees in an 'establishment'. However, while giving effect to the provisions of those enactments, the equality may be enforced and established between two employees -one with physical disability and another without, both belonging to same 'class of service'. The equality sought may never transcend the otherwise pre-existing valid 'class categorization' or 'status' of the employee concerned, neither to his benefit not to his prejudice. 34. The equality sought may never transcend the otherwise pre-existing valid 'class categorization' or 'status' of the employee concerned, neither to his benefit not to his prejudice. 34. Thus, in the case of the 'petitioner-employee' having suffered physical disability during his engagement by the 'corporation', the non-discrimination clause introduced and enforced, first by 'Old Act' and now by the 'New Act', modified the contractual obligation of the 'corporation' under the contract pre-existing between the parties so as to oblige the latter to continue to engage the 'petitioner-employee' and to not dispense with his services as a contract employee for the surviving contract period. In other words, even as a contract employee, the 'petitioner-employee' continued to be an employee of the 'corporation' and the benefit of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 and The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, enured to him keeping intact his status as a contract employee. 35. Consequently, the present appeal is partly allowed with an observation that the 'corporation' shall pass a fresh order, in accordance with the directions issued by the learned Single Judge, within a period of one month from today treating the petitioner-employee Suresh Singh to be an existing contract employee. He may accordingly be assigned such other job on contract basis, for such period, as may be available with the 'corporation' in view of his 40% permanent physical disability. The 'corporation' would pass a reasoned and speaking order in that regard, within a period of two months from today. 36. Appeal allowed in part.