ORDER : Petitioners who have been working as Casual Labourers under the 1st Respondent-The Department of Archeological Survey of India since a quarter century or so and who having been accorded Temporary Status have knocked at the doors of this Court invoking its writ jurisdiction calling in question the Endorsement/Order all dated 12.08.2018 copies whereof are at Annexures-F, F1 to F113 to the writ petitions, whereby they are held to be disentitled for the grant of payment of wages at the rate of 1/30th of the applicable pay-scale plus D.A.. They have also sought for a direction to the Respondents for implementing, in effect, the recommendations contained in the report dated 17 & 22 August, 2012 submitted by the Superintending Archeologist to the 1st Respondent herein, which are aimed at securing better service conditions. 2. After service of notice, the Respondents have entered appearance through the learned Senior Central Government Counsel Sri. M.B.Kanavi, who opposes the writ petition. 3. Learned counsel Smt. Sunita Kalasoor appearing for the Petitioners argues that, all these poor casual labourers have been working in the Department of Archeological Survey of India since more than 25 years or so with spotless records; all they have put in a service of not less than 240 days in every completed year; a Muster Roll is maintained containing all the material service particulars of the Petitioners; in the earlier round of litigation in W.P.Nos.101771-101880/2017 & other connected matters, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court had directed the Respondents to implement the offer made in the letter dated 21.08.2014 and to pay them the wages at the rate of 1/30th of the salary plus D.A. and other benefits; that being so the impugned orders that deny the same to the Petitioners are unsustainable. 4. Per contra, learned Senior CGC Mr. 4. Per contra, learned Senior CGC Mr. Kanavi refuting the contention of the Petitioners submits that: all the Petitioners are working as casual labourers since last more than 25 years is true, but that itself would not entitle them to the grant of wages at the rate of 1/30th of salary and other benefits merely on the basis of the offer letter dated 21.08.2014; this Court in the earlier round of litigation virtually had directed consideration of Petitioners’ claim which having been considered is now rejected; the impugned orders cannot be faultered on the grounds urged by the Petitioners; the interpretation placed by the Petitioners on the text of the judgment is incorrect. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the Petitioners and the learned Senior CGC for the Respondents. I have perused the bulky petition papers which include a Judgment dated 12.03.2018 rendered by a Co-ordinate Judge of this Court in the earlier round of litigation. I have also perused the decision cited at the Bar. 6. In the earlier round of litigation this Court has recorded a finding at paragraph 2 relevant part whereof reads as under: “Admittedly, Petitioners were working as casual labourers on daily wage basis from 07.06.1988. The Central Government by Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievance and Pension…. has formulated a policy that the status of casual labourer when it was given to a workmen, the workmen would be entitle to 1/30th of the pay at the minimum of relevant pay scale plus D.a allowance for the work of eight hours a day……On 20-08-2014 an offer letter was given pertaining to 1/30th minimum wages to the casual labourers which was sent to all the Petitioners (which is not in dispute) with their posting to the work place, asking the workmen to submit the required documents within a period of 15 days if the workmen is ready to accept the offer of 1/30th of the minimum wages and to continue under Respondent No.1. As per Annexure-G to G114, the offer letters have been accepted by the Petitioners and they have also furnished all the documents which are required as per the directions of respondent No.2 and respondent No.3…..The respondent counsel has not virtually denied the above said offer letter and as well as the acceptance letters given by the petitioners herein….. As per Annexure-G to G114, the offer letters have been accepted by the Petitioners and they have also furnished all the documents which are required as per the directions of respondent No.2 and respondent No.3…..The respondent counsel has not virtually denied the above said offer letter and as well as the acceptance letters given by the petitioners herein….. Therefore, it is the bound and duty of the respondents to extend the said benefit unless they find that any one of the petitioners is not eligible for the said benefit…..” 7. It is also relevant to reproduce the relevant direction contained in the operative portion of the aforesaid Judgment, which reads as under: “ii. Respondent No.1 and respondents No.2 to 3 are hereby directed to implement the payment of wages as per the offer letter dated 21.08.2014 vide Annexure-G to G114 and give benefit of 1/30th salary in addition to DA and other benefits as per acceptance letter given by the petitioners in accordance with law and they have to pass appropriate orders to each and every petitioner in accordance with law, if for any reason the respondent is not willing to extend the said benefit it should be by means of legal reasons they can pass appropriate orders.” 8. True it is, that some liberty was conceded to the answering Respondent to consider the claim of the Petitioners herein for implementation of the offer contained in the letter dated 21.08.2014 which admittedly was accepted by the Petitioners herein as is forthcoming from the findings recorded by the Coordinate Judge in the earlier round of litigation. It is a general principle of Law of Contract that an offer when accepted by the Offeree certain obligations arise from the agreement resulting therefrom. At least in such circumstances, the Respondents who answer the description of “State” Under Article 12 of the Constitution of India is extensively interpreted by the Apex Court in the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vs. The International Airport Authority of India and others reported in AIR 1979 SC 1628 , suffer the doctrine of promissory estoppel, that obtains in the public law domain. Lord Denning in Robertson’s Case (1949) 1KB 227 at page 231 has observed as under: “The Crown cannot escape by saying that estoppels do not bind the Crown, for that doctrine has long been exploded. Lord Denning in Robertson’s Case (1949) 1KB 227 at page 231 has observed as under: “The Crown cannot escape by saying that estoppels do not bind the Crown, for that doctrine has long been exploded. Nor can the Crown escape by praying in aid the doctrine of executive necessity, that is, the doctrine that the Crown cannot bind itself so as to fetter its future executive action.” This statement of law enunciated by a great Judge of England more than half a century ago has been accepted by the Apex Court as the law on Indian soil too vide Union of India Vs. Indo Afghan Agencies (1968) 2 SCR 366 . 9. There is one more reason as to why the impugned orders are liable to be set at naught. The Directive Principle of State Policy enshrined in Article 42 of the Constitution of India although unjusticeable injuncts the State to make provision for securing just and humane conditions of work. Article 43 mandates that the State shall endeavor to secure inter alia to all workers reasonable conditions of work. The Apex Court time and again has animated service and labour jurisprudence by banking upon these Directive Principles. An assurance given by the 1st Respondent to the labourers who have been admittedly working in the Department of Archeological Survey of India with effect from 07.06.1998, (as held by this Court in earlier round of litigation) cannot be treated as a word given by an ordinary employer in the market place. It does not just generate only a legitimate expectation, that can otherwise be defeated justifiably. The assurance of the State made to the Citizen stands on a very high footing. The reasons given in the impugned orders are neither germane to the issue nor constitute a sufficient ground for going back from the assurance that has already been accepted by the Petitioners. 10. In the above circumstances, these writ petitions succeed in part; a writ of certiorari issues quashing all the impugned orders dated 12.08.2018 at Annexures – F1, F1 to F113 ; the matter is remitted back to the 1st Respondent for consideration afresh within a period of three months in accordance with law and after affording an opportunity of hearing to the Petitioners, keeping in view the observations made herein above. 11. 11. It is needless to mention that, the 1st Respondent shall ensure the payment of wages to such of the Petitioners who have not been paid as yet, at the earliest. In the guise of re-considering the matter, no action prejudicial to the Petitioners’ conditions of service, in any way, shall be taken. No costs.