JUDGMENT : SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR, J. 1. The appellant-Central Coalfields Limited has challenged the order dated 06.01.2017 passed in W.P.(S) No.4773 of 2014 by which the respondents were directed to consider the claim of the respondent-writ petitioner (hereinafter referred to as respondent) for his compassionate appointment, within six weeks. 2. By an order dated 09.07.2018 passed in I.A. No.8636 of 2017, operation of the direction issued by the learned Single Judge has been stayed by the Division Bench of this Court. 3. Two-fold submissions have been made on behalf of the appellant-M/s C.C.L; (i) in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India date of birth of a claimant which is seriously disputed by the employer cannot be decided, and (ii) compassionate appointment is not a vested right in the dependant of the deceased employee and while so, it cannot be claimed as a matter of course. 4. Briefly stated, father of the respondent was employed under M/s C.C.L as Dumper Operator at Piparwar Project. He died in harness on 05.03.2011. After his death, an application was submitted on 23.12.2011 claiming compassionate appointment for the respondent; the respondent is the elder son of the ex-employee. In the service excerpts of his father, the respondent’s age is recorded as 20 years as on 01.04.1987. In Form-F Nomination age of the respondent is given as 19 years as on 25.10.1988 and in the L.L.T.C. Form-A his age is reflected as 37 years as on 21.06.2004. Age of the respondent recorded in the service records of his father is roughly around the same period. However, in the matriculation certificate issued by Bihar Sanskrit Shiksha Board, Patna, his date of birth is recorded as 02.10.1986. As on the date of application for compassionate appointment, age of the respondent as reflected in the various service records of the father of the respondent and the certificate issued by the Project Officer and B.D.O is between 42 to 44 years, whereas in the matriculation certificate and the certificate issued by the Circle Officer it comes to around 25 years. 5. In view of the aforesaid discrepancy in the age of the respondent, the appellant-M/s C.C.L asked him to produce his matriculation certificate for verification, which on verification has been found genuine. 6. 5. In view of the aforesaid discrepancy in the age of the respondent, the appellant-M/s C.C.L asked him to produce his matriculation certificate for verification, which on verification has been found genuine. 6. Before the writ Court, a contention was raised on behalf of the respondent that in view of the Full Bench judgment in “Kamta Pandey vs. B.C.C.L” reported in 2007 (3) JLJR 733 , the date of birth recorded in the matriculation certificate is a conclusive proof and no other record including the date of birth of a claimant recorded in the service record would have precedence over the matriculation certificate. 7. The learned Single Judge has dealt with this issue as follows: “Be that as it may, having gone through the rival submissions of the parties, this Court is of the considered view that when the matter regarding the birth certificate was disputed, it was the respondents-authorities who had asked for the production of the matriculation certificate and on production of the same they had sent it for verification before the Bihar School Examination Board which was found to be genuine. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held in catena of decisions that the matriculation certificate is the only conclusive proof of age. The High Court in the case of Kamta Pandey Vs. BCCL in full bench judgment reported in 2007 (3) JLJR 733 in para 29 which reads as under” “29. --------The date of birth recorded in the Matriculation Certificate duly authenticated by the Education Board is a conclusive proof of age and no other records, including service records as both the parties are governed by Implementation Instruction No.76 of National Coal Wage Agreement-III.” When the respondent-authorities have themselves demanded the matriculation certificate for verification of date of birth and when the same was verified by the Bihar School Examination Board, there was no occasion to turn down the matriculation certificate without any valid reason. There may be several grounds for creating doubts over the genuineness of the date of birth by the respondent-authorities but once when a decision has been taken it should come to a logical end. There may be several grounds for creating doubts over the genuineness of the date of birth by the respondent-authorities but once when a decision has been taken it should come to a logical end. It is the respondent-authorities who had taken a decision for treating the date of birth genuine only on verification of the matriculation certificate and as such after verification when it was found to be genuine, the said certificate ought to have been considered by the respondent-authorities regarding the date of birth of the petitioner. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid observations, rules and guidelines, the respondent-authorities are directed to consider the case of the petitioner for appointment on compassionate ground taking into consideration the age mentioned in the matriculation certificate issued by the Bihar School Examination Board and if the petitioner is found fit for appointment, on consideration of the same, the appointment letter should be issued within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. With the aforesaid observations, the writ petition stands allowed.” 8. In the first place it needs to be recorded that the decision in “Kamta Pandey” has been rendered in the peculiar facts of the case. About half a century ago in “British Railways Board vs. Herrington” reported in (1972) 1 All ER 749, Lord Morris has held, “There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or a judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case”. 9. By now it is well-accepted that a little change in the facts of the case may materially affect a decision in a case. The facts which have been brought on record disclose difference of about 20 years in the age of the respondent. In the normal course, such huge difference in the age of a person as recorded in the matriculation certificate and the service records of his father cannot be accepted. Primarily, it was for the respondent to establish why such huge difference in his age is reflected in different records. It is really not the providence of the writ Court exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to embark upon a roving enquiry to find out what precisely is the age of a claimant. Primarily, it was for the respondent to establish why such huge difference in his age is reflected in different records. It is really not the providence of the writ Court exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to embark upon a roving enquiry to find out what precisely is the age of a claimant. If for nothing else, the writ petition, in view of serious dispute on the date of birth of the respondent, was liable to be dismissed. The death certificate on death of the respondent’s mother records date of the death on 01.04.1986 and the date of birth of the respondent, as claimed by him, is 02.10.1986. 10. No doubt the matriculation certificate of the respondent has been found genuine, but then genuineness of the matriculation certificate is not a conclusive proof that the date of birth recorded in the matriculation certificate is correct. It only would indicate that the claimant has appeared in the examination and he has been declared successful or failed. No procedure has been evolved to find out genuineness of the date of birth of a candidate as recorded in his matriculation certificate. Dispute on date of birth of a claimant cannot be decided in a writ proceeding. 11. The direction issued by the learned writ Court to the appellant-M/s C.C.L to consider the claim of the respondent, in the above facts, cannot be countenanced in law. In “Umesh Kumar Nagpal Vs. State of Haryana and Others”- (1994) 4 SCC 138 : 1995(1) PLJR (SC) 102, the Supreme Court has observed that compassionate appointment cannot be claimed as a matter of course. It is not a mode of appointment rather, it is an exception to the constitutional mandate under Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. All that the claimant can insist is a fair treatment and observance of the rules framed for compassionate appointment. It is not a claim made by the respondent that he has been treated unfairly or his claim has been rejected contrary to the provisions of the National Coal Wage Agreement. 12. Having scrutinized the materials on record and considered the rival contentions, we are of the opinion that the impugned order dated 06.01.2017 passed in W.P.(S) No.4773 of 2014 is unsustainable and, accordingly, it is set-aside. 13. In the result, L.P.A. No. 493 of 2017 is allowed.