JUDGMENT : V.G. Arun, J. The State of Kerala and its officers have filed this Original Petition, being aggrieved by the order of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal in O.A.No.2180 of 2016, whereby the Tribunal had directed reinstatement of the first respondent in service with consequential benefits. The Tribunal also directed that the first respondent should be treated as continuing in service without break and that the period he was out of service should be counted for all service benefits, except pay and allowances. 2. The first respondent had filed the Original Application seeking to quash Annexures A4, A5, A6 & A9. The proceedings/orders aforementioned arose under the following circumstances: The first respondent, while working as Police Constable at the Mannar Police Station, unauthorisedly absented from duty from 26.1.2006 onwards, without submitting the requisite applications and medical passport. On that allegation and also on the allegation that while continuing in unauthorised absence, the petitioner had worked as an agent of a multilevel marketing company registered at Chennai, an enquiry was conducted and report submitted before the District Superintendent of Police. Based on the report a departmental enquiry was ordered. As part of the enquiry, memo of charges and statement of allegations were issued to the first respondent. But the first respondent did not submit any written statement of defence, nor did he produce any evidence. In the departmental enquiry, an officer from the Mannar Police Station was examined, who on the basis of the entry in the General Diary regarding Over Sanction of Leave (OSL) of the first respondent, proved the fact that from 26.1.2006 onwards the first respondent was unauthorisedly absent from duty. 3. The seven days medical passport and consecutive medical certificates issued by an Ayurveda Doctor, submitted by the first respondent covering the period from 25.1.2006 to 28.2.2007 were also marked as Exhibits. The prosecution witness was not cross-examined by the first respondent. On completion of enquiry, Annexure-A4 report was filed, finding the first respondent guilty of the charges of unauthorised absence from duty and engaging in private business, while continuing on unauthorised absence. The enquiry officer found that the actions of the first respondent amounted to grave indiscipline and misconduct. 4. On the basis of Annexure-A4 report, Annexure-A5 show cause notice was issued to the first respondent, to which also he did not submit any reply. The enquiry officer found that the actions of the first respondent amounted to grave indiscipline and misconduct. 4. On the basis of Annexure-A4 report, Annexure-A5 show cause notice was issued to the first respondent, to which also he did not submit any reply. Thereupon, Annexure-A6 order was passed by the third appellant terminating the petitioner from service, with effect from the date from which the first respondent was on unauthorised leave. Even though a remedy by way of appeal under Section 23 or review under Section 36 of the Kerala Police Departmental Inquiries, Punishment and Appeal Rules, 1958 was available to the first respondent against Annexure-A6 order, he did not file either an appeal or revision. While so, one among the police constables against whom disciplinary action had been taken on similar charges as against the first respondent, challenged the punishment by filing O.A.No.260 of 2013 before the Kerala Administrative Tribunal and obtained a favourable order (Annexure-A10). Thereupon, for the first time, the petitioner raised a challenge against the punishment imposed on him, by filing a review under Section 36A of the Kerala Police Departmental Enquiries, Punishment and Appeal Rules, 1958. 5. On receipt of Annexure-A8 Review Petition, the Government considered the contentions of the first respondent and initially decided to reduce the punishment imposed on the first respondent to withholding of annual increments with cumulative effect for a period of three years. The decision to modify the punishment was submitted before the Public Service Commission, for the purpose of consultation, as mandated under Rule 36A(1) of the Kerala Police Departmental Enquiries, Punishment and Appeal Rules, 1958. The Public Service Commission objected to the proposed reduction of punishment on the ground that the punishment imposed after following the requisite procedure shall not be modified on the basis of a review petition filed after nine years. In the light of the objection raised by the Public Service Commission the Government reconsidered its decision and rejected the review petition filed by the first respondent. Thereupon, the first respondent approached the Kerala Administrative Tribunal. 6. The Tribunal took note of the fact that two other similarly situated persons had filed O.A.No.250 of 2013 and O.A No.2098 which were allowed by Annexure-A10 and Annexure-A11 orders. The Tribunal found that the orders in the aforementioned Original Applications will support the plea of the first respondent, since the situation in those cases were also identical. 6. The Tribunal took note of the fact that two other similarly situated persons had filed O.A.No.250 of 2013 and O.A No.2098 which were allowed by Annexure-A10 and Annexure-A11 orders. The Tribunal found that the orders in the aforementioned Original Applications will support the plea of the first respondent, since the situation in those cases were also identical. On that basis, the contention of the first respondent that it is a case of no evidence was accepted and resultantly Annexure-A6 and Annexure-A9 were set aside and consequential directions issued. 7. In this Original Petition, the petitioners contended that the finding of the Tribunal that the case of the first respondent is also identical to that of the applicants in Annexure-A10 and Annexure-A11, is erroneous. That the applicant had failed to submit his written statement of defence, after receipt of the memo of charges and statement of allegations. The first respondent had not cared to cross-examine the prosecution witness examined in the departmental enquiry or to produce any evidence, either oral or documentary, in support of his case. That the first respondent had not even submitted an explanation to the show cause notice, under which circumstances the disciplinary authority was fully justified in imposing punishment, based on the findings in the departmental enquiry. The petitioners further contended that the first respondent had failed to file any appeal or review against Annexure-A6 order, within the stipulated time. That Annexure-A8 Review Petition was filed only after some other similarly situated persons, had diligently moved the Tribunal and obtained favourable orders. Finally it is contended that under no circumstance could the Tribunal have arrived at the conclusion that it was a case of no evidence. 8. We heard the learned Government Pleader for the appellants and the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent. 9. As rightly contended by the learned Government Pleader, the facts of the case in O.A.Nos.250 of 2013 and 2098 of 2014 are not identical to the facts pleaded by the first respondent in his Original Application. The applicants in the aforementioned Original Applications are persons who had answered the memo of charges issued to them, had participated in the departmental enquiry, and had availed the appellate/review remedy against the order imposing punishment. It was after exhausting all other available remedies, that the applicants in O.A.No.250 of 2013 and O.A No.2098 of 2014 had approached the Tribunal. The applicants in the aforementioned Original Applications are persons who had answered the memo of charges issued to them, had participated in the departmental enquiry, and had availed the appellate/review remedy against the order imposing punishment. It was after exhausting all other available remedies, that the applicants in O.A.No.250 of 2013 and O.A No.2098 of 2014 had approached the Tribunal. On the other hand, without raising any objection during the course of the departmental enquiry, in spite of being provided with opportunity and without even raising any objection against findings in the enquiry report or challenging the order imposing punishment, the first respondent had deemed it appropriate to raise a challenge only after some other persons had obtained favourable orders. The action of the first respondent can only be termed as fence sitting. Therefore, the inordinate delay and laches on the part of the first respondent, would deprive him of the benefit of Annexures-A10 & A11 orders, even if his case was identical to that of the applicants therein. 10. The legal position has been succinctly laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a plethora of decisions, including the decisions in Durga Prasad v Chief Controller of Imports & Exports (1969) 1 SCC 185 & State of U.P and others v Aravind Kumar Srivastava and others (2015) 1 SCC 347 . In the aforementioned cases, the parties were guilty of delay and laches. Therefore, in Durga Prasad's case, in spite of identically situated persons having been granted relief, the Apex refused to grant the same relief, for the reason that the relief under Article 226 being discretionary, such discretion cannot be exercised in favour of persons who are guilty of deliberate and wilful delay and laches. In Aravind Kumar Srivastava's case it was held that though the normal rule is that when a particular set of employees are given relief by court, all other identically situated persons should be treated alike, by extending the same benefit, this normal rule is subject to the well recognized exception in the form of laches, delays and acquiescence which would be valid grounds to dismiss the claim. It was also held that the said exception would not apply to those cases where the judgment pronounced by the court was judgment in rem, rendered with intention to benefit all similarly situated persons whether they had approached the court or not. It was also held that the said exception would not apply to those cases where the judgment pronounced by the court was judgment in rem, rendered with intention to benefit all similarly situated persons whether they had approached the court or not. In such cases, obligation is cast upon the authorities themselves to extend the benefit to all similarly situated persons. But, where the judgment was in personam, those who intend to get the benefit of the said judgment must satisfy the court that their petition does not suffer from either laches, delay or acquiescence. Applying the principles enunciated by the Apex Court, we have no hesitation to hold that being guilty of delay and laches, the first respondent is not entitled for the benefit of Annexures A10 & A11 orders, which are orders in personam. 11. Having held that the first respondent is not entitled for the relief granted to the applicants in Annexures A10 & A11 orders, it has to be examined as to whether, the evidence adduced in the departmental enquiry, amounted to no evidence at all, as has been held by the Tribunal. The charges against the first respondent are twofold. (i) that the first respondent was unauthorisedly absent from duty from 25.1.2006. (ii) That, while the first respondent was unauthorisedly absent from duty, he had worked as an agent of a multilevel marketing company based at Chennai. As far as the first charge is concerned, we have the uncontroverted evidence of the officer from the Mannar Police Station, supported by the relevant extract from the General Diary maintained at the Mannar Police Station, which goes to show that the first respondent had unauthorisedly absented from duty with effect from 25.1.2006. Though, Annexure-A1(a) medical certificate is produced, that covers only a period of seven days from 26.1.2006. Obviously, the other medical certificates marked in the departmental enquiry are only self serving documents. Moreover, mere production of medical certificates, without leave applications in the prescribed format, will not entitle the first respondent to be continuously absent from duty. Therefore, as far as the first charge is concerned there is clear, cogent and unchallenged evidence to the effect that the first respondent was on unauthorised absence, at least from 3.7.2006. 12. Moreover, mere production of medical certificates, without leave applications in the prescribed format, will not entitle the first respondent to be continuously absent from duty. Therefore, as far as the first charge is concerned there is clear, cogent and unchallenged evidence to the effect that the first respondent was on unauthorised absence, at least from 3.7.2006. 12. With regard to the second charge, the Tribunal was justified in coming to the conclusion that there was no evidence that the first respondent had worked as an agent of a multilevel marketing company while he was unauthorisedly absent from duty. Even then, the first charge was sufficient for taking disciplinary action against the first respondent. 13. The learned counsel for the first respondent contended that the Government having decided to reduce the punishment to barring of increments with cumulative effect for a period of three years, committed a mistake in consulting the Public Service Commission and retracting from the earlier decision, based on the objection raised by the Commission. In support of the contention, the learned counsel for the first respondent had placed reliance on the decisions in Abdul Khader v Director, Civil Supplies Department, ( 1998 (2) KLT 211 ) and Deputy Director General, NCC v K.V. Gopinath (ILR 2006 (2) Kerala 617). 14. The first respondent had filed Annexure-A8 revision under Rule 36A of the Kerala Police Departmental Inquiries, Punishment and Appeal Rules, 1958. Therefore, it would be apposite to extract the relevant portion of Rule 36A, which weights as follows :- “36A. State Government's power to review-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, the Government may, on their own motion or otherwise after calling for the records of the case, review any order passed by a subordinate authority which is made or is appealable under these rules, after consultation with the Public Service Commission where such consultation is necessary:- a. confirm, modify or set aside the order; b. impose any penalty or set aside, reduce, confirm or enhance the penalty imposed by the order; c. remit the case to the authority which made the order or to any other authority directing such further action or inquiry as they consider proper in the circumstances of the case;” 15. From a reading of Annexure-A9 order it is clear that the initial proposal of the Government was to reduce the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. From a reading of Annexure-A9 order it is clear that the initial proposal of the Government was to reduce the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. The penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority was removal from service of the State Government, which is a penalty that is described in Clause (l) of Rule 15(4) of the Kerala Police Departmental Inquiries, Punishment and Appeal Rules, 1958. The procedure for imposing certain penalties is prescribed under Rule 17. Rule 17(i)(b) prescribes the procedure to be followed in cases where it is proposed to impose any of the penalties mentioned in clauses (ja), (k), (l) and (m) of Sub Rule 1 of Rule 15. Along with other procedure, the Rule also mandates consultation with the Public Service Commission, before imposing penalty, if the competent authority is the Government. In Abdul Khader's case, one of the grounds of challenge placed by the petitioners therein was that O.P.(CAT) No.110 of 2018 14 the order imposing punishment was passed without consulting the Government. In that case, the order imposing punishment was issued by the Board of Revenue, under Rule 11 of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules 1960. Placing reliance on Rule 15A of the CCA Rules it was contended that the order imposing penalty is bad for non-consultation with the Public Service Commission. The contention was rejected by the learned Single Judge, after referring to Regulation 6(1) of the Kerala Public Service Commission (Consultation) Regulations 1957, which mandated consultation before imposing punishment, only in cases where the Government proposes to pass an original order. In Gopinathan's case also, the contention based on Rule 15 of the CCA Rules was rejected for the reason that it was not the Government that had issued the original order imposing penalty. The case at hand is entirely different. When, under Rule 17 of the Kerala Police Departmental Inquiries, Punishment & Appeal Rules, the order imposing penalty could be passed by the Government, only after consultation with the Public Service Commission, necessarily, the order reducing penalty could also have been passed only after consulting the Public Service Commission, in accordance with the stipulation in Rule 36A. In such circumstances the fact that the original order was not passed by the Government is of no consequence. In such circumstances the fact that the original order was not passed by the Government is of no consequence. Therefore, the contention based on the decisions in Abdul Khader & Gopinathan, that before passing Annexure-A9 order, the Government should not have consulted the PSC, is legally unsustainable. 16. The only question that remains for consideration is regarding the proportionality of the punishment imposed on the first respondent. While considering this question, it has to be borne in mind that the first respondent was the member of a disciplined force. It would also be pertinent to refer to Section 91(2) of the Kerala Police Act, which stipulate that a police officer who is absent from duty after lawfully entering on leave and fails without reasonable cause to report back for duty on the expiry of such leave, shall be deemed, within the meaning of the Section, to have withdrawn himself from the duties of this office. Therefore, the essential question is whether, the first respondent, who had chosen to withdraw from his duties, is entitled for any leniency, that too, after having chosen to keep away from the departmental proceedings and not to challenge the order imposing penalty for a long period. Based on the facts and circumstances, we are of the definite opinion that, by his own actions, the first respondent has rendered himself ineligible for any leniency. For the reasons stated above, we are constrained to set aside the impugned order. Accordingly, the Original Petition is allowed setting aside the order dated 30.8.2017 of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal in O.A.No.2180 of 2016.