JUDGMENT : RAMESH RANGANATHAN, J. 1. The delay in preferring these appeals is not opposed and is, therefore, condoned. 2. These appeals are preferred against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (S/S) No.1152 of 2016 and batch dated 27.03.2017. 3. In Writ Petition (S/S) No.1152 of 2016 and batch dated 28.03.2017, the learned Single Judge had relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court, in “D.K. Yadav vs. J.M.A. Industries Ltd., (1993) 3 SCC 259 ”, to hold that, before taking any action putting an end to the tenure of the employee/workman, fair play required that a reasonable opportunity, to put forth his case, is given; and a domestic enquiry is conducted in compliance with principles of natural justice. The writ petitions were allowed and the termination orders dated 26.12.2015 were quashed. The State was directed to reinstate the petitioners with all consequential benefits within a period of six weeks from the date of the order. However, liberty was reserved to the State to proceed with the matter in accordance with law. 4. In the present case, the petitioners were initially appointed as Assistant Teachers in the Primary School on 14.02.1997 on the basis of a Basic Training Certificates (in short “BTC”) produced by them as proof of their possessing the prescribed qualifications to be considered for appointment as Assistant Teachers. The petitioners were placed under suspension on 25.08.2015 on the ground that the Basic Training Certificates submitted by them, at the time of their appointment, were fake; a verification was made by the Secretary Examination Regulatory Authority, U.P., and, by his letter dated 27.07.2015, he informed the District Education Officer that no such certificates of training, bearing Roll Nos.971 and 1303 respectively, had been issued. 5. The petitioners questioned the order of suspension by filing Writ Petition (S/S) Nos.2058 of 2015 and 2055 of 2015 respectively which, learned counsel of either side agree, were disposed of directing early completion of the departmental inquiry. 6. Charge-sheets were issued to the petitioners thereafter on 07.09.2015. The petitioners submitted their reply thereto stating that they had already submitted their reply to the High Court, and no further explanation was necessary. As the charges levelled in the charge-sheet were not specifically denied, an inquiry was conducted and, on receipt of the inquiry report dated 08.12.2015, the impugned order dated 26.12.2015 was passed dismissing the petitioners from service. 7. As the charges levelled in the charge-sheet were not specifically denied, an inquiry was conducted and, on receipt of the inquiry report dated 08.12.2015, the impugned order dated 26.12.2015 was passed dismissing the petitioners from service. 7. Before us Mr. C.S. Rawat, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing for the State/appellants, would submit that, since the petitioners in their reply to the charge-sheet did not deny the allegations and instead stated that they had already submitted their reply to the High Court, the respondent-authorities had, perforce, to conduct the departmental inquiry and, on the basis of inquiry report, to take action against the petitioners. On the other hand, Mr. Pradeep Chamyal, learned counsel for the respondents-writ petitioners, would submit that, even if the appellants are held justified in holding an inquiry, they were nonetheless obligated in law to furnish a copy of the inquiry report to the petitioners, call for their objections, and thereafter impose punishment on them; and their failure to do so would necessitate the impugned order of punishment being set-aside, leaving it to them to make available a copy of the inquiry report, and give the petitioners an opportunity to submit their objections thereto. 8. A copy of the inquiry report was filed, alongwith the counter affidavit, in the Writ Petition. The only question which necessitates examination is whether, failure on the part of the appellants to provide an opportunity to the respondents-writ petitioners to submit their objections to the inquiry report, would automatically result in the impugned order of punishment being set-aside. 9. This question is no longer res integra. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in “Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad & others vs. B. Karunakar & others, (1993) 4 SCC 727 ” considered this question, and observed:- “……Hence, in all cases where the Inquiry Officer's report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the Courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the Court/Tribunal, and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, The Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment the Courts/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short-cuts. Since it is the Court/Tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal appellate of revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Court/Tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. Where after following the above procedure, the Court/Tribunal sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/management to proceed with the inquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back-wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered, should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and to what benefits, if any and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report, should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law……..” (emphasis supplied) 10. That will also be the correct position in law……..” (emphasis supplied) 10. In terms of the law declared by the Supreme Court, in B. Karunakar, this Court is required to permit the petitioners to show how they were prejudiced because of non-supply of the report; it is only if the Court comes to the conclusion that non-supply of the report has caused prejudice to the delinquent employee, would interfere be justified; if, on the other hand, the Court is satisfied that non-supply of the inquiry report would not have made any difference to the ultimate findings, and the punishment order given, the Court should not interfere with the order of punishment. 11. In the order under appeal, the learned Single Judge has not examined this aspect nor has he recorded any finding that failure on the part of the appellants to furnish the inquiry report to the respondents-writ petitioners has caused them substantial prejudice; or, if the copy of the inquiry report had been furnished, it would have resulted in the ultimate finding, and the order of punishment, being set-aside. 12. We consider it appropriate, in such circumstances, to set-aside the order under appeal, and to restore the writ petitions to file. The learned Single Judge shall examine whether failure, to furnish a copy of the inquiry report to the delinquent employee, has caused them prejudice, and whether it would result in the finding recorded by the Disciplinary Authority, and the punishment imposed on the delinquent employee, being set-aside. 13. The special appeals stand disposed of accordingly. No costs.