ORDER 1. Petitioner seeks review of order dated 15.11.2017 passed in Writ Petition No. 4724/2017. 2. There is a delay of 558 days in filing the petition, condonation whereof is being sought vide I.A. No. 2557/2019. 3. It is urged that after the decision wherein the Sub-Divisional Officer, Lashkar was found having no jurisdiction to act as a Competent Authority in absence of notification under section 3 or section 17 of Madhya Pradesh Lok Parisar (Bedakhali) Adhniyam, 1974 (for brevity "Adhiniyam 1974"), the Commandant, Second Battalion, came to know about the notification issued by Collector, Gwalior in exercise of his powers under section 17 of Adhiniyam 1974 on 13.4.2012, notifying Sub-Divisional Officer, Lashkar a Competent Authority. It is contended that information was accordingly sought from Collector, Gwalior on 22.11.2017. Thereafter reminder was sent on 30.11.2017, 26.12.2017, 1.1.2018, 25.1.2018, 2.2.2018. The information was received on 18.5.2018. Thereafter legal opinion was sought on 23.1.2019. That the legal opinion was given on 16.5.2019 which was received in the office of petitioner No. 2 on 13.6.2019. Thereafter the Officer-in-charge contacted in the office of Additional Advocate General. The review petition was filed on 26.6.2019. On the basis of these facts, it is urged that there is no deliberate delay in pursuing the matter at various levels, as a result whereof, some delay has occurred. It is urged that looking into the importance of issue having far reaching effect, the delay be condoned. 4. The respondent though have chosen not to file reply to I.A. No. 2557/2019; however, the condonation of delay is vehemently opposed. It is urged that after the passing of order under review, the respondent having taken recourse to fresh proceedings, it does not lie with the petitioner that there is no deliberate delay. 5. Considered rival contentions. 6. Sufficiency of cause for delay being the prime consideration while dwelling on the application for condonation, it is to be seen as to whether the petitioner discharges the sufficiency criteria. 7. Evidently, in the institutional matter it is not an individual who has to take a decision whether a particular order is to be questioned in higher forum or the action to be taken where the institution is involved, the process has to be as per institutional culture, which leads a matter to pass through various stages of decision making. 7. Evidently, in the institutional matter it is not an individual who has to take a decision whether a particular order is to be questioned in higher forum or the action to be taken where the institution is involved, the process has to be as per institutional culture, which leads a matter to pass through various stages of decision making. Present being a case where very jurisdiction of the Authority concerned being at stake, it is a natural phenomena for the personnel in the hierarchy to have carefully scrutinized the matter which having been done in the present case resulted in delay; which being sufficiently explained deserves to be condoned. Consequently, delay condoned. 8. I.A. No. 2557/2019 stands disposed of. 9. In the Writ Petition No. 4724/2017 which was directed against the order of eviction passed by the Competent Authority under Adhiniyam 1974, the question raised was whether in absence of the notification under section 3 or section 17 of the Adhiniyam 1974, it was within the competence of the Authority concerned to have acted as a Competent Authority. The issue was answered against the Authority concerned on the findings that he was discharging as a Competent Authority under the work distribution order issued by the Collector. Accordingly, it was held: "Evident it is from the stipulations contained in section 3 of the Act of 1974 that it is the State who by notification in the official gazette appoints such person being an officer not below the rank of Assistant Collector or Deputy Collector as Competent Authority for the purposes of the Act of 1974. Learned Government Advocate appearing for the State submits that the State Government, in exercise of its powers conferred under section 17 of the Act of 1974 vide Notification No. F-13-1-75-II-A(3), dated 5th February, 1975, published in M.P. Rajpatra, Part I, dated 16.4.1976 (page 694) has delegated its powers to the Collector and since the Collector by Order No. Øekad@02jhcVkŒ@folcy@XokŒ@DokŒekŒ@,e@5106@16 dated 29.10.16 has appointed the SDO to act as a Competent Authority under section 3 of the Act of 1974, as would warrant any interference. Section 17 of the Act of 1974 authorizes the State Government to delegate the powers. The powers having been delegated by the State Government to the Collector, it does not, however, absolve the Collector from not notifying the Competent Authority as enumerated under section 3 of the Act of 1974." 10. Section 17 of the Act of 1974 authorizes the State Government to delegate the powers. The powers having been delegated by the State Government to the Collector, it does not, however, absolve the Collector from not notifying the Competent Authority as enumerated under section 3 of the Act of 1974." 10. Thus it was the absence of notification under section 17 of Adhiniyam 1974 which led us to hold that the Sub-Divisional Officer, Lashkar was not competent under the Adhiniyam 1974 to have discharged as Competent Authority. 11. The petitioner now have come up with with a notification under section 17 of Adhiniyam 1974 issued by Collector, Gwalior published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette dated 13.4.2012, which is reproduced for ready reference. ^^2- vr% e/; Áns'k 'kklu] x`g foHkkx] Hkksiky ds Kki Øekad ,Q&1&40&87@2&, ¼3½ fnukad 10 tqykbZ] 1987 }kjk ÁnRr 'kfDr;ksa ds Ádk'k esa fuEukuqlkj dkWye uEcj&2 esa nf'kZr vuqfoHkkxh; vf/kdkjh ¼insu½ ¼lgk;d dysDVj@la;qDr dysDVj@fMIVh dysDVj½ dks e/; Áns'k yksd ifjlj vf/kfu;e] 1974 dh /kkjk&3 ds vUrxZr l{ke Ákf/kdkjh ,rn~ }kjk fu;qDr fd;k x;k gS%& Øekad vuqfoHkkxh; vf/kdkjh dk;Z{ks= 1- vuqfoHkkxh; vf/kdkjh] Mcjk vuqfoHkkx Mcjk 2- vuqfoHkkxh; vfèkdkjh] Xokfy;j ¼'kgjh½ 'kgjh o`Rr dqySFk] iqjkuh Nkouh] cgksM+kiqj 3- vuqfoHkkxh; vf/kdkjh] Xokfy;j ¼xzkeh.k½ o`Rr & fljlkSn] lqikoyh] mVhyk] csgV] gfLrukiqj 4- vuqfoHkkxh; vf/kdkjh] >kalh jksM o`Rr & egyxkao] esgjk 5- vuqfoHkkxh; vf/kdkjh] y'dj o`Rr & y'dj] fxjokbZ 6- vuqfoHkkxh; vf/kdkjh] ?kkVhxkao o`Rr & ?kkVhxkao] jsagV] eksguk] cjbZ 7- vuqfoHkkxh; vf/kdkjh] eqjkj o`Rr & eqjkj ,oa cM+kxkao 8- vuqfoHkkxh; vf/kdkjh] fHkrjokj vuqfoHkkx] fHkrjokj 3- mDr vkns'k rRdky ÁHkko'khy gksxkA ihŒ ujgfj] dysDVjA** 12. Section 17 of the Adhiniyam 1974 envisages that: "17. Delegation of powers.- The State Government, may be notification in the Official Gazette, direct that any power exercisable by it under this Act shall subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the notification be exercisable also by an officer of the State Government." 13. Though a cavil is raised on behalf of the respondent that the notification dated 13.4.2012 cannot be said to be in consonance with the stipulations contained under section 3(1)(a) of Adhiniyam 1974 which contemplates notification in the name of person; whereas the notification is by designation. The contentions are taken note of and negatived at the outset. Though a cavil is raised on behalf of the respondent that the notification dated 13.4.2012 cannot be said to be in consonance with the stipulations contained under section 3(1)(a) of Adhiniyam 1974 which contemplates notification in the name of person; whereas the notification is by designation. The contentions are taken note of and negatived at the outset. section 15 of Madhya Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1957 envisages that "Where, by any enactment, a power to appoint any person, to fill any office or execute any function is conferred, then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any such appointment may be made either by name or by virtue of office." 14. A Division Bench of our High Court in New India Insurance Co. Ltd. Mahatma Gandhi Road Bombay v. Molia Devi and others [ 1969 JLJ 238 ] while dwelling on the issue as to whether the appointment of the Additional District Judge as a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal by official designation is invalid and therefore the Court below had no jurisdiction to try the case, hold : "4. Section 15 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, empowers the appointing authority to appoint a functionary either by name or by virtue of office. So far as Tribunals under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 are concerned, they were previously appointed by name. For Rewa Region the then Additional District and Sessions Judge, Shri N. L. Shrivastava, was appointed as one member Tribunal. However, subsequently it was realised that on account of transfers of Judges, fresh Notifications would be required to be issued every time, if the appointment was by name. Therefore, in the year 1965 there was a suggestion that appointments of Tribunals might be made by office. In pursuance of that suggestion the Notification referred to above was issued. 5. Coming to the first question whether the Notification is in contravention of section 110 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Therefore, in the year 1965 there was a suggestion that appointments of Tribunals might be made by office. In pursuance of that suggestion the Notification referred to above was issued. 5. Coming to the first question whether the Notification is in contravention of section 110 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Section 110 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, prescribes the qualifications of a member to preside over the Accident Claims Tribunal, which are as under:-- "A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a member of a Claims Tribunal unless he - (a) is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court, or (b) is, or has been, a District Judge, or (c) is qualified for appointment as a Judge of the High Court." If an appointment is made by name, it is likely that an unqualified person might not come to be appointed. But, if an appointment is made by official designation, there may be a remote probability of a person holding the office of the Additional District Judge Rewa, who is not qualified to be appointed a Judge of the High Court, as per Article 217(2) of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the question is whether the appointment by official designation renders the appointment altogether invalid. Although, it may be valid in about 99 per cent cases, while it might be rendered invalid in a stray case where a person not qualified to be appointed a Judge of a High Court comes to hold the office of the Additional District Judge. We feel that our learned brother, Naik J. has taken an extreme view in holding that an appointment by official designation would be rendered invalid in all types of cases, even though the Additional District Judge concerned may be a person qualified to be appointed a Judge of the High Court. section 15 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 permits appointment either by name or by office and if the view propounded by our learned brother were to be accepted, it would imply that there can be no appointment by official designation where certain qualifications are prescribed for such appointments. In that event section 15 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, would be otiose and could never be resorted to. But, we might mention that appointments by official designation have been upheld under different enactments by the High Courts. 6. In that event section 15 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, would be otiose and could never be resorted to. But, we might mention that appointments by official designation have been upheld under different enactments by the High Courts. 6. It is true that as indicated by our learned brother Naik J., the person presiding over the Accident Claims Tribunal functions as a persona designata and not as a Court. We might advert to the observations of Mehar Singh J. (as he then was) in Harbans Singh v. Gurmeet Kaur, ILR (1966) 2 Punj. 212, wherein the learned Judge expressed the opinion that a Tribunal appointed under section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, would be a persona designata and not a Court, although it may be invested with certain powers of a civil Court for limited purposes. 7. In Malabati Tea Estate v. Sm. Budhni Munda, AIR 1959 Tripura 16, the learned Judicial Commissioner had to consider whether an authority under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, could be appointed by office and whether such an appointment would be rendered invalid. Under the said Act the authority to be appointed should be 'other officer with experience as a Judge of a civil Court'. The learned Judicial Commissioner interpreted the phrase to mean that the authority either be working or should have worked as a Presiding Judge of a civil Court and if the appointment be of a Presiding Officer of a civil Court of official designation, the appointment would not be rendered invalid on that account alone. We may further observe that appointments of Sanitary Inspectors as Food Inspectors under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, by official designation were upheld by Jagan Mohan Reddy J. in Public Prosecutor v. Narkidimili Sriambhadrayya, AIR 1960 AP 282 and by a Division Bench of the Mysore High Court in The State of Mysore v. Danjaya, AIR 1963 Mysore 157. Similarly, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in In re Palanisamy Chettiar AIR 1957 Mad 351 , upheld the appointment of a District Magistrate as an Assistant Sessions Judge under the Code of Criminal Procedure. 8. It is true that in Aurangabad Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court, AIR 1952 Hyd. Similarly, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in In re Palanisamy Chettiar AIR 1957 Mad 351 , upheld the appointment of a District Magistrate as an Assistant Sessions Judge under the Code of Criminal Procedure. 8. It is true that in Aurangabad Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court, AIR 1952 Hyd. 144 where the question was about the appointment of an Industrial Tribunal, the Division Bench thought that an appointment by official designation would be invalid and in its opinion, the appointment should be by name. Merely because an appointment is by official designation, it cannot be asserted that the necessary qualifications for appointment have not been considered by the appointing authority. 9. The precise question came to be considered by Khanna J. in M/s. New Asiatic Transport (P) Co. Ltd., v. Manohar Lal, ILR (1965) 2 Punj. 751. In that case the Notification under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, appointing the Judge of the Small Cause Court, Delhi as a Tribunal under the Act came for consideration. Khanna J. expressed the opinion that such a Notification by official designation could not be said to be invalid merely because the order appointing the Tribunal did not indicate whether the appointing authority had considered the qualifications of the person proposed to be appointed as a Tribunal. We may observe that it is common knowledge that only senior Additional District Judges are appointed as First or Second Additional District Judges at important centres in the State and ordinarily a person who is not qualified would rarely have the chance of being appointed as Second Additional District Judge, Raipur, or for the matter of that the Additional District Judge, Rewa. We can conceive of a situation where a person directly recruited as an Additional District Judge, for which the qualification may be 7 years practice at the Bar, comes to hold the post of an Additional District Judge, Rewa. Of course in that event he cannot claim to function as a Tribunal by virtue of the Notification referred to above, as he would not be qualified to be appointed as a Judge of a High Court. But, we feel that in every case it would be necessary to examine whether the person functioning as a Tribunal is qualified or not. It is for a party to raise the question of jurisdiction, if a person not qualified comes to hold the post. But, we feel that in every case it would be necessary to examine whether the person functioning as a Tribunal is qualified or not. It is for a party to raise the question of jurisdiction, if a person not qualified comes to hold the post. To that extent we might agree that the Notification might be rendered invalid. Otherwise the Notification does not suffer from any infirmities and it cannot be said to be in contravention of section 110 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. 10. We may deal with another facet of the question. We fully agree with our learned brother Naik J., that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal would be functioning as a persona designata and not as a Court. But, there is no bar to the appointment of a persona designata by official designation, as per section 15 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. For the matter of that some of the Corporations Acts or the Municipalities Acts provide for appointment of a Tribunal for election purposes by official designation, such as a District Judge. Similarly, some of the Panchayats Acts in different Stales provide for a re visional authority against the decisions of the Panchayats and appointments by official designation are made, such as civil Judge Class I of a particular place. The appointment itself is not rendered invalid merely because it is by official designation. But the question in each case to be decided on facts and circumstances would be whether the appointment by official designation has actually resulted in the appointment of an unqualified person for a particular office or Tribunal. If it results that way, the appointment would certainly be invalid. But if it does not, we would like to propound that the Notification, would be perfectly valid and the same cannot be challenged on the ground that in a remote case it might result in the appointment of a person who is not qualified. Therefore, we feel that it is necessary to modify the observations made by our learned brother, Naik J. to this extent by stating that the appointment by official designation would be invalid only if it results in appointment of a person not qualified to hold the post. But, in all other cases appointment by official designation would be perfectly valid. Therefore, we feel that it is necessary to modify the observations made by our learned brother, Naik J. to this extent by stating that the appointment by official designation would be invalid only if it results in appointment of a person not qualified to hold the post. But, in all other cases appointment by official designation would be perfectly valid. For this reason, we are unable to agree with the observations of our learned brother, Naik, J. in M/s. Lucky Bharat Garage (Private) Ltd., Raipur v. Smt. Shanti Devi and others (supra)." 15. The notification dated 13.4.2012 thus cannot be faulted with merely because the appointment of Competent Authority is by official designation. Yet another objection is raised on behalf of the respondent that after the decision in Writ Petition No. 4724/2017 on 15.11.2017, the Competent Authority initiated fresh proceedings by issuing notice under section 4(1) of Adhiniyam 1974 in furtherance to the liberty granted. It is urged that now being in seisin with the proceedings, the Review Petition is not tenable. Reliance is placed on the decision in State of Nagaland and another v. Toulvi Kibami and another [ (2003) 8 SCC 671 ]; wherein, it is held:- "2. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that in view of the subsequent events that had taken place consequent upon the judgment of the Division Bench, the review petition filed by respondent No. 1 was not maintainable. In fact the judgment of Letters Patent Bench was acted upon and it stood exhausted and the review petition was futile. Under such circumstances, the review petition ought not to have been entertained and decided on merits." 16. However, when the facts as adverted by their Lordships in paragraph 1 i.e. "In the State of Nagaland, the promotion of Superintending Engineer to the post of Additional Chief Engineer in the Department of Public Health and Engineering is governed by the service rules known as Nagaland Engineering Services Rules, 1977 (Class I and II) (hereinafter referred to as "the rules"). The Respondent No. 2 in C.A. No. 2533/1998 (and appellant in C.A. No. 2536/1998) is a diploma-holder and at the relevant time was working as officiating Superintending Engineer. On 26.3.1991, the Government of Nagaland promoted respondent No. 2 as Additional Chief Engineer. The Respondent No. 2 in C.A. No. 2533/1998 (and appellant in C.A. No. 2536/1998) is a diploma-holder and at the relevant time was working as officiating Superintending Engineer. On 26.3.1991, the Government of Nagaland promoted respondent No. 2 as Additional Chief Engineer. This promotion was challenged by respondent No. 1 who is a degreeholder by means of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground that respondent No. 2 was not eligible for being promoted to the post of Additional Chief Engineer as the said post is to be filled up 100 per cent from amongst the degree-holders. This contention of respondent No. 1 was accepted by the learned Single Judge of the High Court. Consequently, the promotion of respondent No. 2 was set aside. Aggrieved, the State of Nagaland preferred a letters patent appeal which was allowed and order and judgment of the learned Single Judge was set aside. The Division Bench while allowing the appeal directed the State Government to decide whether the diplomaholders could also be promoted to the post of Additional Chief Engineer under the relevant Rules on the basis of they having rendered meritorious service. It is not disputed that consequent upon the direction of the High Court, the Government took a decision in the year 1997 whereby the Government appropriately amended the relevant Rules on the basis of they having rendered meritorious service. It is not disputed that consequent upon the direction of the High Court, the Government took a decision in the year 1997 whereby the Government appropriately amended the relevant rules and brought in the line with the original approved Rules so as to include the reference to eligibility of cases of exceptionally meritorious person who are diploma-holders for promotion to the post of Additional Chief Engineer with retrospective effect i.e. from 12.9.1996. In the view of the matter, respondent No. 2 was promoted to the post of Additional Chief Engineer. In between time, respondent No. 1 filed an application before the Division Bench for review of the order and judgment dated 4.9.1995. The Division Bench allowed the review petition and dismissed the appeal. It is against the said judgment and order of the High Court dated 8.1.1998, the appellants are in appeal before us." We are of the considered opinion that the facts situation in the case at hand are different. 17. The Division Bench allowed the review petition and dismissed the appeal. It is against the said judgment and order of the High Court dated 8.1.1998, the appellants are in appeal before us." We are of the considered opinion that the facts situation in the case at hand are different. 17. In the present case, a notification under section 17 of Adhiniyam 1974 notifying Sub-Divisional Officer, Lashkar did exist since 13.4.2012; which inadvertently was not referred to when the petition was heard, resulting in an error apparent on the fact of record as would prevent us from correcting the said error. Thus while negativing the objection by respondent as to maintainability of the petition, we recall the order dated 15.11.2017 passed in Writ Petition No. 4724/2017 and uphold the eviction order dated 29.6.2017 being passed by the Authority having competence under Adhiniyam 1974. Consequently, the Writ Petition No. 4724/2017 filed by respondent is dismissed. 18. The Review Petition is disposed of finally in above terms. No costs.