ORDER : 1. The prayer in the above petition styled as a bail application, filed under Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C. is as follows: “...... to release the petitioner on bail in S.C.No. 654/2018 on the files of the Sessions Court, Kasargod, arising out of Crime No. 38/2018 of Beckal Police Station, in the interest of justice.” 2. The petitioner herein has been implicated as accused No.4 in Crime No.23/2018 of Bekkal Police Station, which has been registered for offences punishable Secs.449, 302, 397 read with Sec. 34 of the I.P.C. The Police, after investigation, has filed final report/charge sheet in the abovesaid crime and after effecting committal proceedings, the case is now pending before the Sessions Court, Kasaragod, as Sessions Cases, S.C.No. 654/2018. Altogether there are 4 accused in the above case. 3. The brief of the prosecution case is that the accused persons, with their common intention to commit robbery and murder of the deceased Subaida, had trespassed into her house and have committed robbery and have murdered the deceased Subaida, while A-3 along with the petitioner herein (A-4) was waiting outside the house of the deceased. Further that the petitioner has been made an approver in the abovesaid case. That the petitioner has been arrested on 1.12.018 and has been under custody since then. That while the petitioner was undergoing detention, after his arrest and remand, the prosecution has filed Crl.M.P.No. 936/2018 of the Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court, Kasargod, seeking permission of the said court to declare the petitioner (A-4) to be approver to the case with tendering pardon for the abovesaid offences. That after compliance with the requisite provisions under Sec.306 of the Cr.P.C., the statement of the petitioner (A-4) was recorded as approver and final report has also been filed. Anx. A-1 is the copy of the order dated 7.4.2018 rendered by the Chief Judicial Magistrate's Court, Kasargod, on Crl.MP. No.936/2018. After considering the matter, the learned Magistrate has ordered in Anx. A-1 order that, in exercise powers under Sec.306 of the Cr.P.C., petitioner, who has been arrayed as A-4 in Crime No. 38/ 2018 of Bekkal Police Station, is granted pardon, subject to the following conditions: “He will make a true and full disclosure of the whole of circumstances within his knowledge relating to the offence and every other person concerned, where as principal or abettor in the commission of said offence.” 4. Thereafter, the petitioner has filed regular bail application as Crl.M.P.No.3667/2019 before the Sessions Court, Kasaragod. The said regular bail application was dismissed by the Sessions Court, Kasargod, as per Anx. A-2 order dated 8.11.2018 holding that the petitioner has been made an approver by the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate and that it is proposed by the Sessions Court to keep the petitioner in custody pending trial in the case. Further it was pointed out therein that the allegation in the case is that a woman living alone was murdered after robbing her gold ornaments and that the release of the petitioner is therefore at that stage is not feasible. 5. Sec. 306 of the Cr.P.C. deals with tender of pardon. Clause (b) of sub section (4) of Sec. 306 of the Cr.P.C. stipulates that every person accepting a tender of pardon made under Sec. 306(1), shall, unless he is already on bail, be detained in custody until the termination of the trial. The petitioner would contend that though it is so stipulated in clause (b) in sub section (4) of Sec.306 of the Cr.P.C. that the approver shall, unless he is already on bail, be detained in custody until the termination of the trial, it has been held in various decisions of this Court as in Saidevan Thampi & Anr. v. State of Kerala & Ors. reported in 2013 KHC 694 = ILR 2013 (4) Ker. 496 = 2013 (4) KLJ 611 , that the prescription in Sec. 306 (4) (b) of the Cr.P.C. cannot be taken as an absolute prohibition or fetter and that in appropriate cases a vestige of discretion is available to be exercised by virtue of the enabling inherent powers conferred on this Court under Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C. so that in appropriate cases, the approver could be ordered to be released from detention on such conditions as the High Court may deem fit. It is also pointed out that the position in this regard has also been so held in the decision Shanmi Feroz v. National Investigation Agency [ 2010 (4) KLT 409 ] that, since an approver is not a person accused of an offence, Secs.437 and 439 of the Cr.P.C. for grant of bail cannot be pressed into service by an approver for his enlargement on bail, but that the High Court, may in a given case, could release the approver on bail by invoking its inherent powers under Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C., notwithstanding the bar under Sec. 306(4)(b) of the Cr.P.C. That it is in the light of the above well settled legal position that the petitioner has filed the instant application styled as a bail application, but filed under Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C. 6. The investigating officer has filed a statement dated 26.6.2019 in this application. In the said statement it is stated the prosecution allegation in relation to this crime is that between 17.1.2018 at 6 p.m. and 19.1.2018 at 12.20 a.m. one Subaida, aged 60 years, was found inside her house murdered and she was residing alone in the said house and that knowing the same, accused 1 to 4, had gone there in a Hyundai i-20 car bearing registration No.KL 60K 1111 on 16.1.2018 at about 2.45 p.m. on the pretext of taking a house on rent, and observed the premises and left the house. The accused persons had again gone back on 17.1.2018 at about 1.30 p.m. and accused 1 & 2 trespassed into the house of Subaida, and smothered her with a handkerchief having some chemical in it and committed dacoity of gold ornaments worth 5 1/2 sovereigns and thereafter they tied Subaida's feet and face, using a cloth and locked the house from outside and threw the key in a river on their way back and the gold ornaments were sold by the accused at a jewellery at Pallam road for amount of Rs.1,18,000/-, which the accused shared among themselves. That the investigation revealed that A-1 and A-2 had trespassed into the house of deceased lady and A-3 & the petitioner (A-4) waited outside in the car for A-1 and A-2 to accomplish their mission and to come back. That the investigation revealed that A-1 and A-2 had trespassed into the house of deceased lady and A-3 & the petitioner (A-4) waited outside in the car for A-1 and A-2 to accomplish their mission and to come back. That A-2 and A-3 were well aware of the entire incidents and it was at the design of A-1 and A-2 together to commit murder of Subaida and commit dacoity of gold ornaments and the offence is a murder for gain. A-1 and A-4 were arrested on 1.2.2018 and A-2 was arrested on 14.2.2018 and A-3 had surrendered before the court on 12.2.2018. After completion of the investigation the investigating agency has filed Anx. R-1(b) final report/charge sheet on 27.4.2018 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court-II, Hosdurg, and committal proceedings were initiated as C.P.No. 34/2018 and after completing the necessary proceedings, the case was committed to the Sessions Court, Kasaragod, where it is now pending as Sessions Case, S.C.No. 654/2018. It is further stated that A-1 and the petitioner (A-4) continue to be in custody and A-3 was granted regular bail by this Court as per Anx. A-4 order dated 26.3.2019 in B.A.No. 1097/2019. That A-2 had escaped from the Police custody on 14.9.2018 while he was taken to Sullia in Karnataka to be produced before a court there. In relation to the said escape of A-2 from custody, a case as Crime No.103/2018 of Sullia Police Station, Karnataka has been registered for offences punishable under Secs. 353 and 244 of the I.P.C. It is also pointed out that A-2 is a notorious criminal from the State of Karnataka and that he has involved himself in several crimes, such as Crime No. 15 of 2012 of Kadava Police Station, registered for offences punishable under Sec. 302 of the I.P.C., Crime No. 82/2017 of Sullia Police Station for offences under Sec. 379 I.P.C., Crime No. 103/2018 of Sullia Police Station for offences under Secs. 224 & 353 of the I.P.C., Crime No. 209/2019 of Bellara Police Station, for offences punishable under Sec. 457 & 380 I.P.C. and Crime No. 96/2006 of Bellara Police Station has been registered for offences punishable under Secs. 489 and 379 of the I.P.C. and that the criminal courts concerned have issued warrants against him. 224 & 353 of the I.P.C., Crime No. 209/2019 of Bellara Police Station, for offences punishable under Sec. 457 & 380 I.P.C. and Crime No. 96/2006 of Bellara Police Station has been registered for offences punishable under Secs. 489 and 379 of the I.P.C. and that the criminal courts concerned have issued warrants against him. Further that the petitioner (A-4) has provided substantial information against A-2, which has led to his arrest on 14.2.2018 and for these reasons, A-2 is having vengeance against the petitioner (A-4). 7. Further it is stated in the abovesaid statement filed by the I.O. that the petitioner (A-4) was granted pardon by the Chief Judicial Magistrate's Court, Kasargod, as per Anx.A-1/Anx.R-1 (a) order dated 7.4.2018 rendered by the Chief Judicial Magistrate's Court, Kasargod on Crl.M.P.No.936/2018. It is also stated that the stolen gold ornaments have been recovered from MS Jewellery, Pallam, on 2.2.2.2018 in the presence of the accused and the statement of CW-27 (Jewellery owner) would also show that the accused had pledged the gold ornaments belonging to the deceased Subaida in the jewellery and the ornaments of the deceased Subaida were identified by Nabeesa and Fariza, who are CW-4 and CW-5 respectively. More particularly it is contended in the abovesaid statement that the petitioner herein is not entitled for the benefit of release on bail due to the specific statutory bar engrafted in Sec. 306(4)(b) of the Cr.P.C. 8. Heard Sri.E.A.Haris, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri.Suman Chakravarthy, learned Prosecutor appearing for the respondent State of Kerala. 9. Sri.E.A.Haris, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner accused has sincerely co-operated with the investigation process and has been accorded as an approver as per Anx. A-1/ Anx. R-1 (a) order dated 7.4.2018 rendered by the Chief Judicial Magistrate's Court, Kasargod, in accordance with the procedure contained in Sec. 306 of the Cr.P.C. The learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that a reading of the prosecution material as well as the Anx. A-4 order would make it clear that the allegations raised as against the petitioner (A-4) and as against A-3, are broadly of the same nature inasmuch as A-3 and A-4 had allegedly waited in the car outside in the scene of occurrence and accused Nos.1 & 2 had entered into the house of the deceased and committed murder, etc. A-4 order would make it clear that the allegations raised as against the petitioner (A-4) and as against A-3, are broadly of the same nature inasmuch as A-3 and A-4 had allegedly waited in the car outside in the scene of occurrence and accused Nos.1 & 2 had entered into the house of the deceased and committed murder, etc. Further that this Court has held in a series of rulings as in Saidevan Thampi v. State of Kerala & Ors. [2013 KHC 694 = ILR 2013(4) Ker.496], Shammi Firoz v. National Investigation Agency [ 2010 (4) KLT 409 ], Ismail @ Francis Ismail v. State of Kerala [ 2016 (4) KHC 26 = 2016 (3) KLT 445 ], etc. that though there is a general bar engrafted in Sec.306 (4)(b) of the Cr.P.C., every person granted a tender pardon under Sec. 306(1), unless he is already on bail, shall be detained in custody until the termination of the trial, etc. a vestige of discretion is available as per the extraordinary inherent powers conferred on the High Court as per Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C., to consider the plea of an approver for release on bail, taking into account the facts and circumstances of the case and that such power is to be exercised only in rare and exceptional cases. That it has been held by this Court that the provisions contained in Sec.306(4)(b) of the Cr.P.C. cannot be taken as an absolute prohibition or fetter on the inherent powers conferred on the High Court under Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C. and that in appropriate cases, the High Court could, in exercise of the said extraordinary discretionary power, could consider the plea to release the approver from detention on such conditions as the court deems fit and proper depending on the facts of the case. That a similar contention raised by the State prosecution agency in the case in Saidevan Thampi's case supra [2013 KHC 694 = ILR 2013(4) Ker.496] has been considered and overruled by this Court and that the said contention raised by the prosecution agency that the provision contained in Sec. 306 (4)(b) of the Cr.P.C. will amount to a total prohibition and absolute fetter on the superior courts like the High Court to consider the plea for releasing the approver cannot stand judicial scrutiny. Further that the provisions contained in Sec. 306(4)(b) of the Cr.P.C. have to be read in the light of the constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights and liberty more so particularly conferred as per Art.21 of the Constitution of India. Further that with the advent of the new constitutional law perspectives on precious right to dignified life conferred under Art.21 of the Constitution of India, the provisions in Sec. 306(4)(b) of the Cr.P.C. should also be read and understood so that the said statutory provision is in consonance with the fundamental right guaranteed under Art.21. Further that the provision contained in Sec.306(4)(b) of the Cr.P.C. is an enabling provision, which empowers the authorities to detain a person, who has been granted pardon and that the said provision cannot amount to a total fetter on the powers of the superior courts like the High Court conferred as per Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C., etc. so as to save Sec.306(4)(b) from the vice of constitutional attack. 10. Per contra, Sri.Suman Chakravarthy, learned Prosecutor appearing for the respondent State would submit that the provision contained in Sec. 306(4)(b) of the Cr.P.C. is a total prohibition in releasing an approver on bail, if he was under custody at the time when he was granted pardon and that in view of the abovesaid specific statutory prohibition contained in Sec.306(4)(b) of the Cr.P.C., resort to the inherent powers conferred under Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C. is not right and proper. In this regard, the learned Prosecutor would place reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar [AIR 1994 SCC 2420] para No.34, the judgment of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Aameer Abaas Dev v. State [2014 (1) JCC 319] and certain other decisions of other High Courts like the Madras High Court referred to in the said judgment, etc. It is accordingly contended by Sri.Suman Chakravarthy, learned Prosecutor that the dominant object of requiring an approver to be detained in custody until the conclusion of the trial is not for the purpose of punishing the approver for having graciously come forward to give evidence in support of the prosecution, but as a matter of fact it is to protect him from all possible indignation, rage and resentment of his associates in the crime to whom he has chosen to expose and also with a view to preventing him from going through his temptation of saving his one time friends and companions after he is granted pardon and release from custody and it is with such wholesome objective that the legislature has framed the abovesaid provision contained in Sec. 306(4)(b) of the Cr.P.C. and that in view of the said provision, resort to the inherent powers is improper and wrong. Further on facts, the learned Prosecutor would point out earlier accused No.2 has escaped from custody while he was taken to the Police Station in Karnataka State, on 14.9.2018 in connection with a crime committed in that State and accused No.2 in this case is a notorious criminal, who hails from the State of Karnataka and who has involved in various crimes as mentioned herein above and that since the petitioner (A-4) has provided substantial information against A-2, which led to the arrest of A-2 on 14.2.2018, absconding accused No.2 is having vengeance against the petitioner (A-4) and that it may not be safe to release the petitioner on bail, in view of the abovesaid serious threat posed by A-4, who is a notorious criminal, who has shown the daring of even to escape from Police custody. That therefore it will be detrimental to the interests of the prosecution, if the petitioner is released on bail. 11. That therefore it will be detrimental to the interests of the prosecution, if the petitioner is released on bail. 11. It will be pertinent to refer to the provisions contained in Sec. 306 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which reads as follows: “Sec.306: Tender of pardon to accomplish.-(1) With a view to obtaining the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in or privy to an offence to which this section applies, the Chief Judicial Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate at any stage of the investigation or inquiry into, or the trial of, the offence, and the Magistrate of the first class inquiring into or trying the offence, at any, stage of the inquiry or trial, may tender a pardon to such person on condition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relative to the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof. (2) This section applies to-- (a) any offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session or by the Court of a Special Judge appointed under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (46 of 1952). (b) any offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years or with a more severe sentence. (3) Every Magistrate who tenders a pardon under sub-section (1) shall record-- (a) his reasons for so doing; (b) whether the tender was or was not accepted by the person to whom it was made, and shall, on application made by the accused, furnish him with a copy of such record free of cost. (4) Every person accepting a tender of pardon made under subsection (1)-- (a) shall be examined as a witness in the Court of the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence and in the subsequent trial, if any; (b) shall, unless he is already on bail, be detained in custody until the termination of the trial. (4) Every person accepting a tender of pardon made under subsection (1)-- (a) shall be examined as a witness in the Court of the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence and in the subsequent trial, if any; (b) shall, unless he is already on bail, be detained in custody until the termination of the trial. (5) Where a person has accepted a tender of pardon made under sub-section (1) and has been examined under sub-section (4), the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence shall, without making any further inquiry in the case.-- (a) commit it for trial-- (i) to the Court of Session if the offence is triable exclusively by that Court or if the Magistrate taking cognizance is the Chief Judicial Magistrate; (ii) to a Court of Special Judge appointed under the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1952 (46 of 1952), if the offence is triable exclusively by that Court; (b) in any other case, make over the case to the Chief Judicial Magistrate who shall try the case himself.” 12. A perusal of the provision contained in clause (b) of sub section (4) of Sec.306 would indicate that, a person who is granted pardon under Sec. 306 (1) of the Cr.P.C., shall be detained in custody until the termination of the trial unless he is already on bail. So the abovesaid provisions would clearly indicate that unless the accused is on bail prior to the grant of pardon and conferment of the status of the approver, he/she shall be detained in custody until the termination of the trial. The Apex Court has dealt with the objectives contained in Sec. 306(4) and has held as follows in para 34 of the judgment in Suresh Chanda Bahri's case supra [ AIR 1994 SC 2466 , p.2435] “34. ........ It is no doubt true that clause (b) of Section 306(4) directs that the approver shall not be set at liberty till the termination of the trial against the accused persons and the detention of the approver in custody must end with the trial. ........ It is no doubt true that clause (b) of Section 306(4) directs that the approver shall not be set at liberty till the termination of the trial against the accused persons and the detention of the approver in custody must end with the trial. The dominant object of requiring an approver to be detained in custody until the termination of the trial is not intended to punish the approver for having come forward to give evidence in support of the prosecution but to protect him from the possible indignation, rage and resentment of his associates in a crime whom he has chosen to expose as well as with a view to prevent him from the temptation of saving his one time friends and companions after he is granted pardon and released from custody. It is for these reasons that clause (b) of Section 306(4) casts a duty on the court to keep the approver under detention till the termination of the trial and thus the provisions are based on statutory principles of public policy and public interest, violation of which could not be tolerated. But one thing is clear that the release of an approver on bail may be illegal which can be set aside by a superior court, but such a release would not have any affect on the validity of the pardon once validly granted to an approver. In these circumstances even though the approver was not granted any bail by the committal Magistrate or by the trial Judge yet his release by the High Court would not in any way affect the validity of the pardon granted to the approver Ram Sagar.” 13. A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case in Aameer Abaas Dev v. State [2014(1) JCC 319] has held as follows: “There is, therefore, little doubt that so far as the plain reading of Section 306(4) (b) Cr. P.C., the same leaves no manner of doubt that a person accepting a tender of pardon has to be kept in custody till the trial is over unless he was on bail at the time of the grant of pardon. This has been almost the uniform view of judicial decisions, and the use of the word "shall" has been interpreted to leave no flexibility in this regard. This has been almost the uniform view of judicial decisions, and the use of the word "shall" has been interpreted to leave no flexibility in this regard. The general power of grant of bail available to the Courts under the Code is thus circumscribed by the special provisions.” 14. The learned Prosecutor has submitted that the abovesaid decisions of this Court cited by the petitioner in the cases as in Saidevan Thampi's case supra [2013 KHC 694 = ILR 2013(3) Ker.496], Ismail @ Francis Ismail's case supra [ 2016(4) KHC 26 ], Firoz's case supra [ 2010(4) KLT 409 ], etc. have been decided by this Court without considering the abovesaid decision of the Apex Court in Suresh Chandra Bahri's case supra, para 34 and that therefore the abovesaid decisions of this Court require reconsideration as it do not reflect the correct legal position. 15. While considering the above issue, Madras High Court has held as follows in the decision in Jayakodi v. State Thro S.I. Of Police [Doid # IndiaLawLib/186700]; “4. The question as to whether approvers can be enlarged on bail during the pendency of the trial before the Sessions Court, came up for consideration before Paul, J., in Palanisami v. Gundu Palani 1979 L.W. Cri. 20, and the learned Judge, after discussing the earlier authorities including the one in Karuppa Servai v. Kundara 1952 M.W.N. Cri 58, opined that it is not within the competence of the Court to admit an approver to bail when the law declared in unambiguous language that an approver shall not be released on bail until the decision of the case and that the provisions contained in Sub-s. (3) of S 337, Crl. P.C. (V of 1898) (presently S. 306(4)(b), Crl. P.C. 1973) must be read as an exception to the general provisions. In fact, Mr. T.S. Arunachalam, learned counsel for the petitioner, places reliance on the two decisions referred to and considered by Paul, J. in the above decision, and I have no reason to take a different view from that expressed by Paul, J. In the said decision. 5. P.C. 1973) must be read as an exception to the general provisions. In fact, Mr. T.S. Arunachalam, learned counsel for the petitioner, places reliance on the two decisions referred to and considered by Paul, J. in the above decision, and I have no reason to take a different view from that expressed by Paul, J. In the said decision. 5. I am also clear in my mind that the inherent jurisdiction of this Court cannot be resorted to and exercised if there is a specific provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure which has dealt with the scope of powers of Court and from which it is possible to spell out a bar, express or implied, with reference to the exercise of such Inherent jurisdiction. This principle has found recognition in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1978 SC 47 . 6. Above all, there is a reason as to why an approver has to he detained in custody until the termination of the trial unless he is already on bail even at the time when pardon is tendered to him. There is every chance that both the prosecution and the accused would be anxious to get at him and make him resale from the statement which he has already given and the assurance that he will stick on to the statement and speak out the truth, to a very great extent, will become nebulous. That is the reason why the provisions of the Code contemplate that an approver cannot be equated to an accused and he cannot be let on bail until the termination of the trial unless he is already on bail having been admitted to bail on or before the tendering of pardon to him. 7. If these principles are kept in mind, I am not able to persuade myself to countenance the case of the petitioner for the grant of the bail. It is pointed out that the investigation is yet to be completed even though the occurrence is stated to have taken place on 15th December 1978. Mr. Karpagavinanayagam, for the State assures that there will be expeditious completion of investigation by the officials concerned and this is recorded. In the result, this Criminal Miscellaneous Petition is dismissed.” 16. It is pointed out that the investigation is yet to be completed even though the occurrence is stated to have taken place on 15th December 1978. Mr. Karpagavinanayagam, for the State assures that there will be expeditious completion of investigation by the officials concerned and this is recorded. In the result, this Criminal Miscellaneous Petition is dismissed.” 16. The learned Prosecutor has also pointed out that this Court has also held in the decision rendered on 10.10.2012 in Smithlal v. State of Kerala [ 2012(4) KLT 807 ] that in view of the interdiction and prohibition contained in Sec. 306(4)(b) of the Cr.P.C. it is not possible to entertain the contention that approver could be granted bail by resort to the inherent powers conferred on the High Court under Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C. and further that in a case covered by Sec. 306 Cr.P.C., where pardon is tendered by the competent criminal court concerned, the interdiction under Sec. 306(4) would clearly apply and that the court is precluded from releasing the accused from custody, etc. 17. The issue as to the correctness or otherwise of the view taken by a learned Single Judge in the case in Saidevan Thampi's case supra (ILR 2013(4) Ker.496] has been dealt with by this Court in a subsequent judgment in Ismail @ Francis Ismail v. State of Kerala [ 2016 (4) KHC 26 = 2016 (3) KLT 445 ]. 18. As has been held by the Apex Court in Suresh Chandra Bahri's case supra and in various decisions of this Court as in Shammi Firoz's case supra, the object of requiring an approver, who is not on bail to continue to remain in custody until the conclusion of the trial is not in any manner to punish the approver for having graciously agreed to give evidence for the State, but to protect him from the wrath and anger of his associates in the crime, whom he has chosen to expose and also to prevent him from going through the temptation of saving his earlier friends and companions in that crime by turning hostile to the prosecution, and also to secure his presence to await the final verdict of the criminal court. The very purpose and object of the abovesaid provision for granting pardon to an accomplice is to enable the prosecution agency to secure evidence in cases involving very grave offences alleged to have committed by various accused persons under circumstances, wherein it might turn out to be very difficult to get crucial evidence otherwise and it is with the wholesome objective that culprits behind such heinous and grave crimes do not to unpunished that the provision has been made to tender pardon to the accomplice in order to enable him to come clean and to give evidence to expose the culprits in the crime. The condition in granting the pardon is that the approver should make a full and true disclosure of the entire circumstances within his knowledge regarding the crime and concerning every other person involved in the offence and the offer that he will be exonerated from the criminal culpability is dependent on his fulfilling his obligation to make a full and true disclosure about the incidents in the crime. In a case where the beneficiary of the pardon goes back on his word and breached his promise to give full and true disclosure, then the agreement made by the State with the accused also stands broken and the prosecution agency then becomes legally entitled to prosecute such a person, who has resiled from his agreement by taking recourse to Sec. 308 of the Cr.P.C. Going by the prescription contained in Sec. 306(4) certainly there is a general bar in releasing such an accomplice on bail, until the conclusion of the trial, if he was not released on bail prior to his securing the pardon and the said provision has been made to achieve the abovesaid wholesome objectives. 19. As held by this Court in Saidevan Thampi's case supra, in a case where the accused concerned has already been released on bail and is tendered pardon and granted approver status thereafter, then the provision contained in Sec. 306(4)(b) of the Cr.P.C. will not apply to such a person and there is no question of cancellation of bail already granted to him and he could be accorded approver status and yet could enjoy the freedom granted by bail order, subject to faithful compliance of all the bail conditions. It is only in a case where the accused could not secure the benefit of the bail order and had continued to be in custody at the time of his grant of pardon under Sec. 306 that the abovesaid provision under clause (b) of sub section (4) of Sec. 306 would apply and in such a case, it is stipulated that such an accused who has become an approver, shall be detained in custody until the termination of the trial. Therefore, there appears to be clear differentiation as between the class of accused persons, who could already enjoy the grant of a bail order at the time of their securing pardon and the accused persons who could not secure bail at the time of grant of pardon. In both scenarios, the objective in the grant of pardon is the same and it has to be ensured by the prosecution that such person who becomes an approver should make true and full disclosure of the incidents in the crime. Therefore, this Court is inclined to take the view more so particularly in the light of the abovesaid dictum laid down by the Apex Court in S.C.Bahri's case supra, para 34, that there certainly is a general bar in releasing an approver, until termination of the trial, unless he is already on bail. The objectives of such a provision have been dealt with in detail in the aforecited judgments. 20. It will be pertinent to refer to paragraphs 75, 76 and 91 of the judgment of this Court in Saidevan Thampi's case supra (see ILR report), which read as follows: “75. As rightly pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, once pardon is tendered to an accused, or a person contemplated under Section 306 or Section 307 CrPC, then he loses his character as an accused and adorns the status of a witness. Except for the prohibition under Section 306(4)(b) CrPC, it may not be possible to detain that person under the Code. Shri. O. V. Radhakrishnan, learned Senior Counsel, seems to be justified in his submission that but for the bar under Section 306(4)(b) CrPC, the person concerned could not have been detained in custody. Except for the prohibition under Section 306(4)(b) CrPC, it may not be possible to detain that person under the Code. Shri. O. V. Radhakrishnan, learned Senior Counsel, seems to be justified in his submission that but for the bar under Section 306(4)(b) CrPC, the person concerned could not have been detained in custody. The further contention that it is not intended to curtail the liberty of the person, but intended to provide protection in deserving cases and also to ensure that the accused person do not take undue advantage of the position appears to be quite sound and reasonable. The submission of the learned Senior Counsel Shri. O. V. Radhakrishnan that it is not always necessary in all cases that when a person is tendered pardon under Section 306 CrPC, he should be detained without anything more is not the intention of the Legislature also seems to be correct. Only in cases where the situation demands or the Court feels that it is necessary to detain the person for justifiable reasons, the provision can be invoked. That seems to be the proper way to understand the provision. It must be remembered that as far as the reasons for detaining a person under Section 306(4)(b) CrPC are concerned, it is equally applicable to a person to whom pardon is tendered under Section 307 CrPC also. So also, the same conditions apply to a person to whom pardon is tendered under Section 306 CrPC and who is already on bail. The Legislature must be credited with the knowledge of these facts and in that context and under such circumstances the provision, namely, Section 306(4)(b) CrPC will have to be understood. If a person who is already on bail could continue on bail when pardon is tendered to him under Section 306 or 307 CrPC, then it defies one’s logic why a restriction as in the nature of Section 306(4)(b) CrPC should be imposed in the case of a person who is unfortunate to be not on bail when pardon is tendered to him. An anomalous situation may arise if one is to simply accept the proposition that a person in custody should continue to be in custody till the end of the trial adopting a strict interpretation of the provision. For example, in a case there may be distinct incidents. An anomalous situation may arise if one is to simply accept the proposition that a person in custody should continue to be in custody till the end of the trial adopting a strict interpretation of the provision. For example, in a case there may be distinct incidents. It may so happen when some of the accused might have been granted bail and some might not have been granted bail. It may also happen that even though an accused is granted bail, he is not able to execute the bond and therefore he has to remain in custody. If in such a case, for one portion of the incident, a person is granted pardon and if he is already on bail, he can continue to be on bail, if for another incident forming part of the same transaction, a person who is in custody is granted pardon, to say that he should languish in custody till the end of the trial seems to be unjustified, unreasonable and arbitrary and against the notions of justice. 76. The provision, namely, Section 306(4)(b) CrPC cannot be taken as one curtailing the liberty and freedom of a person, but should be treated as an enabling and empowering provision which the Courts concerned can take aid of in a case where circumstances warrant a situation to detain a person who has been granted pardon in further custody if he is not already on bail. It is difficult to comprehend that without anything more, the mere fact that the person who is tendered pardon who is not on bail should continue in custody for no justifiable reason. XXXX XXX XXX 91. Following the principle laid down in the above decisions and the scope and ambit of the power available under Section 462 CrPC it cannot be said that the so-called prohibition under Section 306(4)(b) CrPC is a fetter on the power of the Court under Section 482 CrPC to render justice to the parties and to do such acts as are necessary to secure the ends of justice. The said provision is sufficient, in appropriate cases, for the Courts to grant such relief as the situation warrants. The said provision is sufficient, in appropriate cases, for the Courts to grant such relief as the situation warrants. If that be so, when it is found by the superior Court that the continued detention of a person who has been tendered pardon by virtue of Section 306(4)(b) CrPC is unnecessary, nothing fetters the Court from releasing such a person from detention or custody as the case may be to ensure that his personal liberty is not affected nor is he being detained unnecessarily and unjustifiably.” 21. This Court has also pertinently referred to the view of the Law Commission in their 48th Law Commission Report given on para 24.21 on page 238 thereof, which reads as follows: “24.21. Under sub section (3), an approver, unless he is already on bail, has to be detained in custody until the termination of the trial. The trying Magistrate or Sessions Court has no power to release the approver on bail. Though this may seem harsh particularly when the trial is prolonged, we do not think the provision should be changed. In extraordinary cases of hardshsip, the approver can approach the High Court whose powers as to bail are very wide.” 22. This Court in para 93 (of the ILR report) of Saidevan Thampi's case supra has held that the abovesaid passage from the 48th Law Commission Report would clearly give insight into the scope and powers of Sec. 482 and that therefore the contention of the State that the provision contained in Sec. 306(4)(b) of the Cr.P.C. would be a total bar in the exercise of the inherent powers under Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C. by the High Court, etc. cannot stand judicial scrutiny and that in appropriate cases, resort to the inherent powers concerned under Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C. could be invoked by the High Court, and a contra interpretation that there is a total prohibition in exercising the discretion under Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C. would lead to the situation of the constitutional vice of arbitrary and unreasonable curtailment of liberty guaranteed as per Art.21 of the Constitution of India. Further this Court in paragraph 94 (ILR report) in Saidevan's case supra has summarised the legal position on the abovesaid aspects, which read as follows: “(i) Section 306(4)(b) CrPC is an enabling provision which empowers the authorities concerned to detain a person who has been tendered pardon. Further this Court in paragraph 94 (ILR report) in Saidevan's case supra has summarised the legal position on the abovesaid aspects, which read as follows: “(i) Section 306(4)(b) CrPC is an enabling provision which empowers the authorities concerned to detain a person who has been tendered pardon. (ii) The authorities mentioned in Section 306 CrPC are precluded from releasing the person who has been tendered pardon from custody. (iii) The embargo under Section 306(4)(b) CrPC cannot be imported into Section 307 CrPC. (iv) In view of the fact that a person tendered pardon stands discharged and occupies the status of a witness, Sections 437 and 439 CrPC are not available to release him from custody. (v) Section 306(4)(b) CrPC cannot be taken as an absolute prohibition or fetter on the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of CrPC in appropriate cases to release the approver from detention on such conditions as the Court deems fit. (vi) In view of the above position, challenge to the constitutionality of Section 306(4)(b) CrPC need not be considered.” 23. The correctness or otherwise of the views rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Saidevan Thanpi's case supra has been dealt with by this Court in a subsequent decision rendered in Ismail @ Francis Ismail's case [ 2016 (4) KHC 26 = 2016 (3) KLT 445 ]. This Court in Ismail's case supra, after referring to the decision of this Court in Saidevan Thampi's case supra, has held that Sec. 306(4) of the Cr.P.C. provides that if an accused is already released on bail, has subsequently accepted tender of pardon, then he cannot be detained in custody by resort to the said provision and that the said provision can apply only in a case where the accused has been in judicial custody at the time when he has been granted pardon. Further that the purport of the said provision is mainly that accused persons in judicial custody shall not be mechanically released by resort to the provisions contained in Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C., on the ground that he has seized to be an accused and has gained the status of a witness. Further that the purport of the said provision is mainly that accused persons in judicial custody shall not be mechanically released by resort to the provisions contained in Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C., on the ground that he has seized to be an accused and has gained the status of a witness. But this Court in Ismail's case supra has again reiterated that the provisions contained in Sec. 306(4)(b) of the Cr.P.C. cannot be understood as having a total prohibition and absolute fetter in releasing a person, who has accepted tender of pardon while in judicial custody and that the said prohibition contained in Sec. 306 (4)(b) of the Cr.P.C. cannot be said to be discriminatory and that the benefit of bail availed by the other accused could be given to the remand prisoner on acceptance of tender of pardon and he could be released on bail by the High Court in exercise of the power under Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C., in appropriate and justifiable cases. It has been reiterated therein that there is no question of releasing such a person by resort to the provision contained in Sec. 439 of the Cr.P.C. for the simple reason that after being granted pardon, he loses the status of an accused. This Court has also held in Ismail's case supra that the objective of Sec. 306 (4) of the Cr.P.C. is firstly to ensure that the approver does not cross over to the other side due to pressure or influence or threat and the second objective is to protect the approver from all possible threat to his person and life from his previous companions in the crime and that the law must be very anxious to protect such a person, who has come forward to help the prosecution so that he could divulge truth before the court. However, this Court has rightly cautioned in Ismail's case supra that the High Court in exercise of the extraordinary inherent powers conferred under Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C., has to consider the plea with all caution and circumspection and the court should seriously consider the possible suspicion regarding the reliability of the approver due to his antecedents and there could be other possibility of the approver being influenced or won over by the defence and thirdly, there could be possible threat to his personal life and fourthly, there is a possibility of the approver fleeing from the process of law and the process of law and process of trial to rescue himself from the unpleasant situation of implicating his own crime partners. That the abovesaid four factors should be the main parameters under which the High Court will have to consider the plea to release an approver on bail, who is otherwise covered by the provision contained in Sec. 306 (4) of the Cr.P.C. It will be profitable to refer to paragraphs 8 and 10 of the judgment of this Court in Ismail's case supra [ 2016(4) KHC 26 , p.5-6.] which read as follows: 8. When an application from an approver comes under Section 482 Cr.P.C on acceptance of tender of pardon, to release him on bail, the High Court will have to consider so many aspects. One is the possible suspicion regarding the reliability of the approver, due to his antecedents, the other is the possibility of the approver being influenced or won over by the defence, the third one is the possible threat to his person and life, and the fourth one is the possibility of the approver fleeing from the process of law and the process of trial to rescue himself from the unpleasant situation of implicating his own crime partner. The above four factors are the main factors and circumstances which the High Court will have to consider when the High Court is called upon to exercise the discretion in favour of an approver, under Section 482 Cr.P.C 10. The circumstances where the discretion of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C cannot be exercised in favour of an approver, are the following. The circumstances where the discretion of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C cannot be exercised in favour of an approver, are the following. a. Some elements of doubt lingering in the mind of the court regarding the reliability of the person who accepted tender of pardon, in view of his antecedents including involvement in crimes or in illegal or immoral activities. b. The possibility of the approver crossing over to the other side due to pressures or influences. c. Possible threats to his person and life, from the other accused who will definitely have grudge against the crime partner who crossed over to other side to help the prosecution. d. The possibility of the approver fleeing from the process of law without making himself available for trial, with the object of rescuing himself from an unpleasant situation of implicating his crime partner.” 24. In that regard, it will be pertinent to refer to para 82 of the ILR report in Saidevan's case supra in which this Court has noted that there could be some doubt regarding the actual character of the person who is tendered pardon and though on grant of pardon, he transforms into the position of a witness, it is rather difficult to say that he altogether sheds the character of an accused and it will be appropriate to understand that the status of an accused, who is tendered pardon, his position as a accused remains under an eclipse as long as he adorns the character of a witness and satisfies the conditions of pardon and once he fails to do so under Sec. 306 of the Cr.P.C., his status as an accused revives and subsequent events follow. While dealing with the facts of the case in Ismail's case supra this Court has observed in paras 9 and 12 thereof that the petitioner therein is a previous convict and he has more than two convictions to his credit and A-2 therein is also a previous convict with whom, the petitioner developed an acquaintance while undergoing sentence in jail. While dealing with the facts of the case in Ismail's case supra this Court has observed in paras 9 and 12 thereof that the petitioner therein is a previous convict and he has more than two convictions to his credit and A-2 therein is also a previous convict with whom, the petitioner developed an acquaintance while undergoing sentence in jail. That the way in which the other accused persons had hatched the conspiracy with in junction with the petitioner therein shows unerringly that there could always be a possibility of the others trying to influence or win over the petitioner for fear, if he reveals the truth, the could be put in trouble and they may have to face prison sentence and that when such possibility is there, the possibility of the petitioner therein crossing over to the other side, to help the crime partners cannot be ruled out and that there could be also possibility that the other accused who hatched the design to kill the victim, may even make an attempt on the life of the approver. This Court therein observed it is concern of the law to protect the life and person of the approver in the abovesaid circumstances and in such circumstances, there could be embarrassment and delicacy in view of influences or threats from the other side and his own predicament and possible confusion in his mind, as to he should turn against his crime partners, etc. Taking note of such factual aspects, this Court held in Ismail's case supra that plea of the petitioner therein for release on bail is not to be acceded to by the exercise of the discretion conferred under Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C. and accordingly, the said petition filed under Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C. had been dismissed by this Court. 25. An indepth examination of the various issues has been comprehensively considered by this Court in Saidevan Thampi's case supra rendered on 8.10.2013 and a perusal of the judgment of this Court Smithlal's case supra [ 2012 (4) KLT 807 ] rendered on 10.10.2012 would show that the abovesaid aspects considered in Saidevan Thampi's case supra have not been considered and dealt with in detail in the Smithlal's case supra. 26. 26. There could be quite a few cases, wherein the curtailment of liberty and freedom of the approver would amount to a very perilous situation and may amount to infringement of the right to dignified life conferred under Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. For instance, in this case itself, accused No.3 has been granted regular bail by this Court as per Anx. A-4 order dated 26.3.2019, which is after Anx. A-1 order granting pardon to the petitioner (A-4) as per Anx. A-1 /anx R-1 (a) order 7.4.2018. One of the other accused in this case (A-2) has escaped from custody while he was taken to Sullia in Karnataka State on 14.9.2018. Accused No.2 is a notorious criminal from Karnataka and is involved in quite a few crimes as averred in the statement filed by the investigating officer. Therefore, the apprehension raised by the prosecution that there could be a serious element of threat to the life and person of the petitioner herein (A-4), if he is let out on bail, due to the danger posed by accused No.4, appears to be quite real and substantial and at any rate, cannot be brushed aside by this Court. Therefore, such a crucial aspect should restrain this Court in exercising its discretionary powers under Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C. in the facts and circumstances of this case. But it has to be borne in mind that if an absconding accused like A-2 is not apprehended within reasonable time and even if the trial is split up as against the other available accused persons, then only the trial in respect of such split up cases involving such available accused persons alone could be finalised and the split up case involving the absconding accused No.2, will have to await till he is apprehended. Therefore, if a literal approach is taken to read and understand the provisions contained in Sec. 306(4)(b) of the Cr.P.C., then it would lead to the extreme and inevitable consequence of the petitioner having to be detained in prison until such time as the absconding accused is apprehended and the split up trial as against him is thereafter finalised. There could be cases, where such an absconding accused who could be a very notorious criminal will have the wherewithal to escape apprehension by the Police authorities for quite a long time. There could be cases, where such an absconding accused who could be a very notorious criminal will have the wherewithal to escape apprehension by the Police authorities for quite a long time. Moreover, in the instant case, the said absconding A-2, has escaped from custody of the Karnataka Police, and it is the Police authorities of the Karnataka State who will have to take necessary steps to strenuously endeavour to trace out the whereabouts of the absconding accused and then to apprehend him and then to enforce his personal attendance in the trial in the instant case. If the said process of apprehending such a notorious criminal, who is absconding accused, is to take long time, then certainly curtailment of the liberty and freedom of the approver could be quite serious and grave, if a literal approach in reading the provision contained in Sec. 306(4) of the Cr.P.C. is undertaken. Even in such rare and exceptional cases, if it is held that a superior court like the High Court does not have the jurisdiction even to exercise the extraordinary inherent discretionary powers conferred under Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C. to consider the plea of the approver to be released on bail, notwithstanding the provisions contained in Sec. 306(4)(b) of the Cr.P.C., etc. is adopted, then it could amount to flagrant violation of the precious right to liberty and dignified life guaranteed under Art.21 of the Constitution of India depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case concerned. Moreover, if such a strict and literal construction is adopted so as to hold that there is a total prohibition and absolute fetter even in exercising the powers under Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C. to release the approver on bail is taken, then it might also lead to other consequences which may not be in the best interest of the prosecution agency. If such an approach is taken, the accused person, who is approached by the investigating agency to become an approver then the accused person would be advised that as he is then in custody, he could consider the offer of pardon, only after he secures regular bail and such consequences may not be in the better interest of the prosecution. If such an approach is taken, the accused person, who is approached by the investigating agency to become an approver then the accused person would be advised that as he is then in custody, he could consider the offer of pardon, only after he secures regular bail and such consequences may not be in the better interest of the prosecution. After all it has to be borne in mind that the basic objective in engrafting provisions as in Sec. 306 and 307 of the Cr.P.C. for tendering a pardon to an accomplice is to enable the prosecution agency to adduce evidence before the criminal court concerned in cases involving grave offences, which are committed by several persons, where otherwise it is quite difficult to get evidence, etc. Therefore, while holding that there is a general bar in release of an approver on bail till the conclusion unless he is already on bail, there could be rare and exceptional cases, wherein the discretion under the extraordinary powers under Sec. 482 Cr.P.C. could be exercised by the High Court. However, if extremely strict approach is taken as contended by the prosecution that there is total prohibition and absolute fetter in releasing the accused on bail is adopted, then it would lead to situations of extreme and disproportionate curtailment of liberty as well as certain other consequence which may not be in the best interest of the prosecution, as stated herein above. 27. Therefore, this Court is of the considered opinion that a balanced and harmonious approach should be taken so that extremes from both sides are avoided. To hold that Sec. 306(4) would amount to a total prohibition and absolute fetter to release the approver on bail, is one extreme. On the other hand, to take the view that once an accused is granted pardon, he loses his status of an accused and become a witness and that therefore ordinarily the inherent powers under Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C. could be exercised to release him on bail, is the other extreme. A realistic and golden middle ground has to be struck and it may not be possible to envisage a strait-jacket formula as to in what manner discretion is to be exercised by the High Court under Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C. in cases of this nature. No straight jacket formula can be put forward. A realistic and golden middle ground has to be struck and it may not be possible to envisage a strait-jacket formula as to in what manner discretion is to be exercised by the High Court under Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C. in cases of this nature. No straight jacket formula can be put forward. The basic approach should be that the provisions contained in Sec. 306(4)(b) of the Cr.P.C. would amount to a general bar but that in rare and exceptional cases, the said provision will not amount to total prohibition and absolute fetter on the High Court in exercising the inherent powers conferred under Sec.482 of the Cr.P.C. to consider the plea of an approver to be released on bail, after weighing in various relevant aspects of the matter. 28. In the light of abovesaid aspects, this Court is of the considered opinion that the provisions contained in Sec. 306 (4) of the Cr.P.C. should be construed as a general bar in releasing the approver on bail, until the conclusion of the trial, if he is not already on bail, but at the same time, a vestige of discretion is available as per the inherent powers conferred on the High Courts as per Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C. to consider the plea of the approver to be released on bail in rare and exceptional cases, after careful weighing of all relevant and crucial aspects of the case. So, this Court is of the view that the legal position laid down by this Court in Saidevan's Thampis' case supra, Ismail's Case supra [ 2016(4) KHC 26 ], Shammi Firoz's case supra do not require any serous reconsideration. 29. Coming to the facts of this case, it is seen that accused No.2 is a notorious criminal who is a native of State of Karnataka and he has escaped from Police custody on 14.9.2018 while he was taken to Sullai in Karnakaka State to be produced before the court there and the said absconding accused No.2 has not been apprehended so far. Still further accused No.2 is a notorious criminal who has got involved in various crims mentioned herein above. Still further accused No.2 is a notorious criminal who has got involved in various crims mentioned herein above. The investigating officer has clearly stated that the petitioner (A-4) has provided substantial information against A-2 which led to his arrest on 14.10.2018 and that the said absconding A-2 is having vengeance against the petitioner (A-4) and that there could be serous threat to the life and person of the petitioner (A-4). Taking into account these relevant aspects, this Court is constrained to take the view that the abovesaid stand of the prosecution agency in opposing the release of the petitioner on bail, cannot be said to be unjustified or unreasonable. On the other hand, the threat to the life and person of the petitioner appears to be quite real and substantial. So releasing the petitioner on bail at this stage may not be inconsonance with the very objective in engrafting the provision as in Sec. 306(4) of the Cr.P.C. which is to protect the approver from possible indignation of his crime associates, etc. In view of the abovesaid crucial aspects, this Court is not entering into an assessment of the various other factual canvassed by either side. The abovesaid factual aspects would clearly justify the stand of the prosecution in opposing the release of the petitioner on bail. Hence now the plea of the petitioner to be released on bail cannot be acceded to by this Court, at this stage. 30. However, this need not be the end of the road to the petitioner. If all the accused persons were available for trial, then in a case like this, this Court could have directed the court and the prosecution agency to ensure timely completion of the trial within a reasonable time limit so that the interest of the prosecution, other accused persons and that of the petitioner could be duly protected. However, in the facts of this case, since A-2 is absconding, even if cases as against the other available accused persons are split up and proceeded, the petitioner may have to wait till the apprehension of the absconding accused No.2 and the conclusion of his trial thereafter. Since it is the admitted case of the prosecution agency that A-2 is a notorious criminal from Karnataka and that he has escaped from custody, while he was taken to the Police Station in Karnataka. Since it is the admitted case of the prosecution agency that A-2 is a notorious criminal from Karnataka and that he has escaped from custody, while he was taken to the Police Station in Karnataka. and that the said accused has involved in various other crimes and further he has escaped from custody of the Karnataka Police, it is for the Police authorities of the said State to take efficacious steps to ensure his apprehension without any further delay. If that be so, it may not fully be within the control of the Police authorities of the State of Kerala to take effective steps in that regard. But if any unreasonable delay in apprehending the absconding accused either on account of the lack of diligence of the Police authorities concerned or on account of the extreme agility of the absconding accused, or due to a combination of various such factors, then the approver may be put in a very perilous situation, whereby he will have to await his release until the absconding accused A-2 and the conclusion of the trial thereafter. Such a long delay, which may have serious bearing on the liberty of the approver may not be justifiable. Therefore, the Police agency concerned is duty bound to ensure that all sincere steps are taken for the early apprehension of such an absconding accused without any further delay so that the trial could also be completed within a reasonable time limit. 31. In the light of the abovesaid aspects, further orders and directions are issued: (i) The plea of the petitioner that he should be released on bail by exercise of the powers under Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C. cannot now be granted in view of the abovesaid reasons. (ii) The competent authorities concerned are legally obliged to ensure that the efficacious steps are taken for the expeditious apprehension of the absconding accused No.2 so that the matter could be taken to its logical conclusion and the trial could be completed without further delay (iii) In that regard it is ordered that the State Police chief, Kerala, will take steps to co-ordinate effective action with the Police authorities in the State of Karnataka, so that the latter could take expeditious steps to apprehend the absconding A-2. In that regard the State Police Chief, Kerala, may consider to entrust the abovesaid responsibility to an officer from his headquarters so as to co-ordinate necessary action with the Police authorities of the State of Karnataka. The State Police Chief, Kerala will immediately take steps to request the State Police chief, Karnataka to take immediate and expeditious steps to apprehend accused No.2 preferably within a period of 3 or 4 months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The State Police Chief, Kerala, while issuing communication to the State Police Chief, Karnataka, as aforested will also forward a copy of this order to the latter for necessary information and further immediate action thereof. In this regard, the abovesaid Police officer nominated by the State Police Chief, Kerala, will co-ordinate necessary steps on a regular basis with his counter parts in the Karnataka Police as well as with the officials concerned of the State Police Chief, Karnataka. (iv) Further it is also ordered that liberty is accorded to the petitioner to work out his remedies in relation to his grievances if there is any unreasonable delay in conclusion of the trial on account of non apprehension of the absconding accused or due to any other accused. 32. It is hoped and expected that the competent Police officers of the State of Karnataka more particularly the State Police chief Karnataka will take efficacious and timely steps to ensure the early apprehension of the absconding accused No.2. With these observations and directions, the above Bail Application stands finally disposed of.