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2019 DIGILAW 713 (GUJ)

NAGINDAS NAROTTAMDAS SHAH v. STATE OF GUJARAT

2019-07-05

BELA M.TRIVEDI

body2019
JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioners claiming to be the legal heirs and representatives of the deceased Nagindas Narottamdas Shah have filed the present petition challenging the order dated 15.06.2015 passed by Additional Secretary, Revenue (Appeals), Ahmedabad (hereinafter referred to as 'the S.S.R.D.') in Revision Application No. 5 of 2007, whereby the S.S.R.D. has confirmed the order dated 03.10.2006 passed by District Collector, Ahmedabad in Appeal No. 9 of 2006 and the order dated 01.10.1964 passed by the Deputy Collector, Ahmedabad in respect of the Survey No. 1202/1 and 1221 of Village Ognaj, Taluka Daskroi (hereinafter referred to as 'the said lands'). 2. As per the case of the petitioners, their forefathers were holding lands in question as Inami land as reflected in the entry No. 175 dated 29.10.1956. The Deputy Collector vide the order dated 24.08.1964 recorded that the lands in question having been found to be cultivated by forefathers of the private respondents herein, there was a breach of condition. Thereafter, the said lands were forfeited in favour of the State Government. The petitioners thereafter being aggrieved by the said order, had preferred an Appeal being No. 9 of 2006 before the District Collector under Section 203 of the Gujarat Land Revenue Code ((hereinafter referred to as 'the said Code'), however, the said appeal was dismissed vide the order dated 03.10.2006, against which the Revision Application was preferred before the S.S.R.D., however, the Revision Application also came to be dismissed vide the order dated 15.06.2015 on the ground that the petitioners had preferred the Appeal before the District Collector after a gross delay of about 42 years. 3. The learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala appearing for the petitioners placing heavy reliance on various decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another versus Mst. Katiji and others reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 , and in the case of M.K. Prasad versus P. Arumugam reported in (2001) 6 SCC 176 , submitted that the respondent – S.S.R.D. should have adopted liberal approach in condoning the delay occurred in filing the Appeal before the Collector and should not have dismissed the Revision Application of the petitioners only on the ground that the said Appeal was filed after a gross delay of about 42 years, without examining the merits of the case. He also submitted that this Court in order to do substantial justice to the petitioners, could mould the relief prayed for by the petitioner in the present petition in exercise of the powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In this regard, Mr. Sanjanwala has relied upon the decision of Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar and Others versus Kameshwar Prasad Singh and another reported in (2000) 9 SCC 94 . Mr. Sanjanwala replying upon the decision of this Court in the case of Chhotabhai Dahyabhai Thakore versus State of Gujarat and Others reported in 1997 (3) GLR 2016 , also submitted that mere mentioning of the words “new tenure” in the revenue records is not sufficient proof of inalienability and impartibility and there must be additional and reliable proof to show that the lands in question were of new tenure. According to him, forefathers of the private respondents were the watchmen looking after the lands in question, and therefore, it could not be said that there was any breach of condition as held by the Deputy Collector in his order dated 24.08.1964. 4. The Court does not find any substance in any of the submissions made by the learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala. At the outset, it may be stated that the petition lacks basic facts and material particulars as to how the lands in question were old tenure lands and since when they were treated as new tenure lands. The petition is also silent as to when their grandfather Nagindas expired and as to why he, during his lifetime had not raised any objection against the order dated 24.08.1964 passed by the Deputy Collector. The petition is also silent as to when the petitioners themselves came to know about the said order passed by the Deputy Collector and as to why the said order passed in 1964 was not challenged by them or their father, who were sons of the said Nagindas Narottamdas Shah during their lifetime. Hence, the petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of non-mentioning of important material facts and particulars. 5. It is pertinent to note that as transpiring from the impugned order dated 04.07.2015 passed by the respondent – S.S.R.D., the petitioners had taken up the contention before him that the lands in question were owned by their forefather one Mr. Hence, the petition deserves to be dismissed on the ground of non-mentioning of important material facts and particulars. 5. It is pertinent to note that as transpiring from the impugned order dated 04.07.2015 passed by the respondent – S.S.R.D., the petitioners had taken up the contention before him that the lands in question were owned by their forefather one Mr. Maganlal Laxmichand, and after his death their deceased grandfather Nagindas Narottamdas had inherited the same. There is nothing on record to suggest as to how the lands owned by Maganlal Laxmichand were inherited by Nagindas Narottamdas. It further appears that the proceedings of breach of condition were initiated by the Deputy Collector against the said deceased Nagindas Narottamdas, in which his statement was recorded as transpiring from the order dated 24.08.1964 and he had stated that the forefather of the private respondents herein were the Watchmen taking care of the said lands. Thus, from the said order dated 24.08.1964 passed by the City Deputy Collector, it clearly transpires that the said Nagindas Narottamdas, the forefather of the petitioners was given opportunity of hearing, and was aware about the proceedings initiated for the breach of the conditions. The said order of 1964 came to be challenged by the petitioners in the year 2006 i.e. after a period of 42 years by filing Appeal before the District Collector. As transpiring from the record, the said lands had already been forfeited in favour of the State Government by virtue of the said order passed in 1964 and since then the name of the State Government was appearing in the revenue record. There was no explanation furnished as to why the petitioners or their father had not challenged the said order for about 42 years and filed the Appeal in the year 2006. Hence, the District Collector and the S.S.R.D. have rightly rejected the Appeal and the Revision respectively preferred by the petitioners by holding that there was unexplained gross delay of 42 years on the part of the petitioners in preferring Appeal before the Collector against the order of Deputy Collector. 6. The decisions relied upon by the learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala have no application to the facts of the present case. In the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another versus Mst. 6. The decisions relied upon by the learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sanjanwala have no application to the facts of the present case. In the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another versus Mst. Katiji and others (supra), the Supreme Court was dealing with the issue of delay occurred on the part of the State machinery in preferring the Appeal against the decision substantially enhancing the compensation in land acquisition matters and the Supreme Court held inter alia that on account of an impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the notemaking, file pushing and passing of the buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. Such is not the position in the instant case. The petitioners have failed to explain the delay of 42 years much less satisfactorily, and therefore, the Court does not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order passed by the S.S.R.D. warranting interference of this Court exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is needless to say that “sufficient cause” as contemplated under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has to be established for condonation of delay occurred in preferring the statutory Appeal before the District Collector against the order of Deputy Collector. 7. Though Mr. Sanjanwala has relied upon the Entry No. 175 (Annexure 'C') to show that the forefather of the petitioners - Nagindas Narottamdas was the occupier of the lands in question in the year 1953-54, it is pertinent to note that the name of the forefather of the private respondents - Chandu Jaisangji was shown as the cultivators of the lands during the period 1953-54 to 1963-64 in the revenue records, and therefore, the proceedings for breach of condition were initiated by the Deputy Collector, the lands being of new tenure and could not have been transferred without permission of the Collector. The reliance placed on the decision in the case of Chhotabhai Dahyabhai Thakore versus State of Gujarat and Others (supra), is also not helpful to the petitioners. The reliance placed on the decision in the case of Chhotabhai Dahyabhai Thakore versus State of Gujarat and Others (supra), is also not helpful to the petitioners. As stated earlier, the petition lacks basic facts and material particulars, as also the documents as to how the lands were old tenure and not new tenure and as to since when they were treated as the new tenure land, and as to why their fathers and forefathers had not raised any dispute in this regard. Be that as it may, since the order passed by the Deputy Collector in the year 1964, forfeiting lands in favour of the Government and the entries in that regard in the revenue record remained unchallenged for more than 42 years, at the instance of the forefather of the petitioners, it is difficult to hold at this juncture that the lands were of old tenure. The Court does not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order passed by the S.S.R.D. in not entertaining the Revision Application against the order passed by the Collector in the Appeal preferred by the petitioners which was grossly time barred. 8. In that view of the matter, the petition being devoid of merits, is dismissed. Notice is discharged. Interim relief, if any existing, stands vacated forthwith.