JUDGMENT 1. By this second appeal under section 100 of the CPC, the plaintiff in the suit has challenged the judgment of the First Appellate Court dated 3.4.1998 whereby the appeal has been dismissed on the ground of delay. 2. The appellant had filed the suit for declaration and possession, which was dismissed by the trial Court vide judgment dated 6.5.1995, against which the First Appeal No. 48-A/1995 was filed by the appellant. Since there S A No. 490/98 was a delay of 28 days in filing of the appeal, therefore, an application for condonation of delay was filed. The First Appellate Court vide judgment in the appeal has held that the delay has not been sufficiently explained, therefore, has dismissed the application for condonation of delay. Accordingly, the first appeal has also been dismissed. 3. This Court vide order dated 22.6.1998, while admitting the appeal, had formulated the following substantial questions of law: "1. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within prescribed period? 2. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the delay ought to have been condoned under section 5 of the Limitation Act? 4. Since both these questions are inter-related, therefore, they are being decided together. 5. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant and on perusal of the record it is noticed that the judgment was passed by the trial Court on 6.5.1995. The appellant had moved an application for certified copy of the judgment on 16.5.1995 and the certified copy was received on 27.5.1995. The appellant had filed the appeal on 4.7.1995. Since there was a delay of 28 days in filing the appeal, therefore, the appellant had filed an application for condonation of delay. 6. A perusal of the application for condonation of delay reveals that the delay was explained by the appellant by taking the plea that since 14.6.1995 the appellant was unwell and was unable to move and was taking S A No. 490/98 medical treatment. Along with the application the medical certificate was enclosed whereby the Medical Officer had certified that the appellant was under treatment from 14.6.1995 and he was advised three weeks' complete bed rest. The OPD registration number was also disclosed in the medical certificate. Hence, there was no reason to disbelieve the said explanation as also the medical certificate. 7. Along with the application the medical certificate was enclosed whereby the Medical Officer had certified that the appellant was under treatment from 14.6.1995 and he was advised three weeks' complete bed rest. The OPD registration number was also disclosed in the medical certificate. Hence, there was no reason to disbelieve the said explanation as also the medical certificate. 7. A perusal of the impugned judgment reveals that the First Appellate Court has adopted a highly technical approach in rejecting the application. The application has been rejected merely by noting certain typographical error in respect of the discrepancy in the age of the appellant and not disclosing the date of starting of Court holidays though the same was not relevant. The trial Court has also committed the error in taking the view that the delay between the period 6.5.1995 to 16.5.1995 was not explained whereas, the said period falls within the period of limitation, therefore, in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Shrimant Jadhavrao Anandrao Pawar and others v. Dilip Balvantrao Pawar and another, reported in (JT) 2001 (10) SC 265, the said period was not required to be explained as it was within the period of limitation and the appellant was required to explain only the period of delay in filing the appeal after expiry of limitation period. In this regard, the Supreme Court in the matter of Shrimant Jadhavrao (supra) has held as under: "5. We have perused the order of the learned additional district judge dismissing the appeal on the ground of limitation as also the impugned order of the High Court. We are of the opinion that the approach of both the Courts in the matter of condonation of delay has been erroneous. The impugned order of the High Court shows that the Court was influenced by S A No. 490/98 the fact that the period from 7.12.1998 to 1.1.1999 had not been explained by the appellants. The High Court is on record to say that even if the period from 1.1.1999 to 13.1.1999 is treated to have been properly explained, the first appellate Court committed no error in rejecting the appeal on the ground of delay because of the non-explanation of the delay between 7.12.1998 and 1.1.1999. The period between 7.12.1998 to 1.1.1999 fell well within the period of limitation prescribed for filing the appeal. The period between 7.12.1998 to 1.1.1999 fell well within the period of limitation prescribed for filing the appeal. The question of explaining that period did not arise. It is only the period of those 14 days before the filing of the appeal which was required to be explained and proper explanation for that period has been given, which was supported by medical certificate, which in the facts and circumstances of this case, we see no reason to disbelieve. The learned additional district judge was, therefore, in error in rejecting the application for condonation of delay for the period 7.12.1998 to 1.1.1999, vide order dated 15th November, 1999 and the High Court also fell in error in dismissing the revision petition." 8. That apart, in the present case, the delay was only of 28 days and while deciding the application for condonation of delay the First Appellate Court ought to have kept in mind the fact that the dismissal of appeal on the ground of delay by adopting such a highly technical approach will defeat the substantial right of the appellant. It is not a case of gross unexplained delay. The Supreme Court in the matter of Poonam and others v. Harish Kumar and another, reported in 2012 SAR (civil) 8 = (2012) 12 SCC 527 , in this regard, has held as under:- "15. In the facts of this case it is clear that of all the three ladies, who were the appellants, one of them was pursuing the case and she fell sick. Therefore, she was not in a position to pursue the legal remedy with due diligence as a result of which the appeal was filed with a delay of 63 days. The delay of 63 days is not a delay for a long period and there has been some explanation for the delay. The High Court should have, before passing the impugned judgment, considered the explanation for the delay along with the facts of the case, the position of the parties, the nature of the litigation and the period of delay. The High Court should also have S.A. No. 490/98 considered that it has been settled by a catena of cases that, unless the delay is gross, an explanation for the same should be liberally construed. The High Court should also have S.A. No. 490/98 considered that it has been settled by a catena of cases that, unless the delay is gross, an explanation for the same should be liberally construed. It appears that the High Court has not been able to consider all these relevant facts in their correct perspective before passing the impugned order." 9. The tendency of the Court to find fault with the cause and to reject such application by slipshod order has been deprecated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. While deciding with such application the First Appellate Court was required to adopt a liberal approach. The Supreme Court in the matter of Ram Nath Sao alias Ram Nath Sahu and others v. Gobardhan Sao and others, reported in AIR 2002 SC 1201 , in this regard, has held as under : "10. In the case of N. Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 Supreme Court Cases 123, there was a delay of 883 days in filing application for setting aside ex parte decree for which application for condonation of delay was filed. The trial Court having found that sufficient cause was made out for condonation of delay, condoned the delay but when the matter was taken to the High Court of Judicature at Madras in a revision application under section 115 of the Code, it was observed that the delay of 883 days in filing the application was not properly explained and it was held that the trial Court was not justified in condoning the delay resulting into reversal of its order whereupon this Court was successfully moved which was of the view that the High Court was not justified in interfering with order passed by trial Court whereby delay in filing the application for setting aside ex parte decree was condoned and accordingly order of the High Court was set aside. K.T.Thomas, J., speaking for the Court succinctly laid down the law observing thus in paras 8, 9 and 10: "8. The appellant's conduct does not on the whole warrant to castigate him as an irresponsible litigant. What he did in defending the suit was not very much far from what a litigant would broadly do. Of course, it may be said that he should have been more vigilant by visiting his advocate at short intervals to check up the progress of the litigation. What he did in defending the suit was not very much far from what a litigant would broadly do. Of course, it may be said that he should have been more vigilant by visiting his advocate at short intervals to check up the progress of the litigation. But during these days when everybody is fully occupied with his own avocation of life an omission to adopt such extra vigilance need not be used as a ground to depict him S A No. 490/98 as a litigant not aware of his responsibilities, and to visit him with drastic consequences. 9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the Court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior Court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first Court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior Court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior Court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower Court. 10. ……. ……. ……. The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause." [Emphasis added] The Court further observed in paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 which run thus:- "11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the Courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. S A No. 490/98 12. A Court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the Court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause" under section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari (1969) 1 SCR 1006 and State of W.B. v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality (1972) 1 SCC 366 . 13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the Court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. " [Emphasis added] 11. Thus it becomes plain that the expression "sufficient cause" within the meaning of section 5 of the Act or Order 22 rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute "sufficient cause" or not will be dependant upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the Courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal an exception more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the Courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hyper technical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the S.A. No. 490/98 decision on merit. While considering the matter, Courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way. 12. In view of the foregoing discussions, we are clearly of the opinion that on the facts of present case, Division Bench of the High Court was not justified in upholding order passed by the learned Single Judge whereby prayers for condonation of delay and setting aside abatement were refused and accordingly the delay in filing the petition for setting aside abatement is condoned, abatement is set aside and prayer for substitution is granted." 10. Having regard to the aforesaid factual and legal position, I am of the opinion that the First Appellate Court has committed an error in rejecting the appellant's application for condonation of delay. The delay has been sufficiently explained. Hence, the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act filed by the appellant before the Court below deserves to be and accordingly allowed. The impugned judgment of the First Appellate Court is set aside. The questions of law are answered in favour of the appellant and the matter is remanded back to the First Appellate Court to decide the appeal on merit in accordance with law. 11. The present appeal is accordingly allowed to the extent indicated above.