JUDGMENT : J.B. PARDIWALA, J. 1. As the issues raised in both the captioned writ applications are the same, those were heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. 2. The Special Criminal Application No.895 of 2010 is treated as the lead matter. 3. By this writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the writ applicant has prayed for the following reliefs; “(a) To issue a writ of mandamus or any other writ or appropriate order and/or direction, quashing and setting aside the FIR being M. Case No.1 of 2008, the charge sheet filed in the case and the further proceedings thereunder, pending before the Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhuj qua the petitioner. (b) Pending admission, final hearing and disposal of this petition, to stay further proceedings arising from FIR being M. Case No.1 of 2008, the charge sheet filed in the case and the further proceedings thereunder, pending before the Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate Bhuj qua the petitioner and pass all other incidental and consequential orders. (c) To dispense with filing of affidavit as the petitioner is in jail. (d) To pass any such other and further order as may be deemed fit and proper.” 4. The case put up by the writ applicant, in his own words, as pleaded in the writ application, is as under; “3.1 That with a view to settle traders who were adversely affected in the earthquake, the State Government, Department of Revenue, vide Resolution dated 03/09/2002 decided to allot land admeasuring about 17 Acre in Bhuj @ Rs.800/per Sq.Mtr. or at a higher rate if such rate is fixed by the District Valuation Committee. The said land was decided to be allotted by the State Government to one Nav Nirman Charitable Trust, Bhuj, which was run and administered by the Grains and Seeds Wholesale Merchants Association for the purpose of fielding the wholesale market. The said resolution also mentions that the price of Rs.800/ is the market price and that the same is allotted subject to 9 conditions mentioned in the resolution dated 03/09/ 2002. A copy of the said Resolution dated 03/09/2002 is annexed hereto and marked as “Annexure-B”. The said resolution also mentions that the price of Rs.800/ is the market price and that the same is allotted subject to 9 conditions mentioned in the resolution dated 03/09/ 2002. A copy of the said Resolution dated 03/09/2002 is annexed hereto and marked as “Annexure-B”. 3.2 The petitioner submits that the petitioner was appointed as Collector, Bhuj after passing of the said Resolution i.e. the petitioner joined as Collector, Bhuj on 28/05/2003 and was transferred on 03/06/2006, during which period the petitioner held the post of Collector, Bhuj. The petitioner submits that thereafter, by another Resolution dated 18/08 2003, the State Government, Revenue Department, decided to allot the said land to the Bhuj Bazar Nav Nirman Charitable Trust @ Rs. 890/- per Sq.Mtr., which was the market price, to be paid in 5 yearly installments of 20% each, without interest. The said resolution also provided that upon payment of 20% i.e. the first installment, the possession was to be handed over to the Trust by the Collector by passing a formal order. It was also stated in the said resolution that if the installments of land are not paid, then the State Government shall be entitled to re-enter the land and take over possession of the land and the super structure. A copy of said Resolution dated 18/08/2003 is annexed hereto and marked as “Annexure-C”. 3.3 The petitioner submits that pursuant to the resolutions at Annexures-B & C, the petitioner passed two formal and conditional orders dated 04/12/2003 & 06/10/2005, when the petitioner was holding the post of Collector, Bhuj. The Nav Nirman Charitable Trust was directed vide condition No.2 to allot the land only to those merchants who are certified by the Collector to be affected by the earthquake and condition No.8 lays down that the Collector was to give a certificate after scrutinizing the material given by the traders. One of the conditions stipulated by the petitioner also states that if there is any violation of any of the conditions, then the approval granted would be cancelled and the land along with any superstructure would be recovered by the Government without any compensation. Copies of the orders passed by the petitioner dated 04/12/2003 85 06/10/2005 are annexed hereto and marked as “Annexure-D”colly. Copies of the orders passed by the petitioner dated 04/12/2003 85 06/10/2005 are annexed hereto and marked as “Annexure-D”colly. 3.4 The petitioner submits that since some representations were received against the list submitted by the Traders’ Association, the Deputy Collector was asked to inquire and scrutinize the application and submit his report. The petitioner submits that the Deputy Collector submitted his report on 10/10/2006 i.e. after the petitioner was transferred on 03/06/2006. 3.5 The petitioner states that in the meanwhile, some persons approached this Hon’ble Court by way of filing a PIL being SCA No. 14703 of 2006 making various prayers including a prayer directing to institute a high level inquiry into the entire matter of allotment of land to the Respondent No.6 i.e. Bhuj Bazar Nav Nirman Charitable Trust (hereinafter referred to as “the Trust”) and consequent allotment of the constructed premises by the said respondent No.6 in the name of earthquake affected persons. The said PIL was not pressed as the Collector issued a show cause notice and the collector was directed to conduct his inquiry within a period of 6 months. It is pertinent to note that after conducting the inquiry as directed by this Hon’ble Court, the Collector found 317 allotments in consonance with the state policy and some allotments were found to be irregular. The collector therefore, ordered the cancellation of the said allotments. However, the affected persons/parties approached the Special Secretary and obtained status quo order. Copies of both these orders are annexed hereto and marked as Annexure-E” 3.6 The petitioner submits that on 01/08/2007 the Respondent No.2 filed a private complaint in the Chief Judicial Magistrate Court at Bhuj, being Criminal Inquiry Case No.36/ 07, in which the petitioner was not named as an accused, but it was vaguely stated that the Collector at the time of incident is Accused No.4. The said complaint is filed under sections 200, 203, 217, 465, 466, 467, 468, 471, 472, 474, 475, 484 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. On the said complaint, on 05/11/2007, the Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate passed an order directing investigation under section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. to be conducted by CID (Crimes), Rajkot Zone. The said complaint is filed under sections 200, 203, 217, 465, 466, 467, 468, 471, 472, 474, 475, 484 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. On the said complaint, on 05/11/2007, the Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate passed an order directing investigation under section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. to be conducted by CID (Crimes), Rajkot Zone. 3.7 The petitioner submits that immediately after the said directions were issued, the State Government filed a Revision Application being Criminal Revision Application No.24 of 2008 in the court of Learned Sessions Judge, Bhuj praying for setting aside of the order dated 05/11/2007 directing police investigation by C.I.D. (Crime), or in the alternative, prayed that some other local agency be directed to carry out the investigation. This revision application later on came to be mysteriously withdrawn by the State when the Learned Prosecutor made an endorsement that he does not press the said Revision Application and accordingly the said application was disposed off vide order dated 20/06/2009. 3.8 It is submitted that the complaint did not name the petitioner at all and it only made allegations against all collectors during the relevant point of time. However, due to malaflde intentions on the part of the state, the petitioner only was arrested on 06/01/2010, even though the allegations in the complaint were made against all the collectors’. 3.9 The petitioner submits that vide report dated 19/02/2010, the investigating authorities added sections 7, 11 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 to the aforesaid FIR and thereafter, as the investigating authorities realized that they would not be able to file charge sheet for the offences of corruption without obtaining sanction, the said sections were deleted by the investigating authorities by filing another report dated 01/04/2010. This shows the malafide intention of the prosecution towards the petitioner. And with an intention of further harassing the petitioner, the prosecution has filed a separate complaint against the petitioner for offences under sections 7, 11 & 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 3.10 Thereafter, the investigating agency has completed its investigation and filed charge sheet against the petitioner and others. The petitioner has thereafter moved an application for regular bail in the matter and the same has been rejected. The petitioner has thereafter approached this Hon’ble Court for obtaining regular bail by filing Misc. 3.10 Thereafter, the investigating agency has completed its investigation and filed charge sheet against the petitioner and others. The petitioner has thereafter moved an application for regular bail in the matter and the same has been rejected. The petitioner has thereafter approached this Hon’ble Court for obtaining regular bail by filing Misc. Criminal Application No. 4604 of 2010 and the same is pending.” 5. Thus, it appears from the materials on record that the respondent No.2 (original complainant) lodged a private complaint against the writ applicant herein and others in the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhuj-Kutch for the offences punishable under sections 200, 203, 217, 465, 466, 467, 468, 471, 472, 474, 475, 484 read with 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. 6. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhuj-Kutch passed the following order dated 5th November, 2007. “The application has been looked into, the complaint has been looked into, the CID Crime, Bhuj Branch is directed to carry out the investigation under section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C and file an appropriate report within 30 days before this Court.” 7. Pursuant to the order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate of police investigation under section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., the first information report came to be registered at the Rajkot Zone CID Crime Police Station, Rajkot as the M. Case No.1 of 2008. The CID Crime carried out the investigation, and at the end of the same, filed charge-sheet against the writ applicant herein and other co-accused. The filing of the charge-sheet culminated in the Criminal Case No.1188 of 2010. The criminal case is pending as on date for recording of the evidence. 8. The CID Crime carried out the investigation, and at the end of the same, filed charge-sheet against the writ applicant herein and other co-accused. The filing of the charge-sheet culminated in the Criminal Case No.1188 of 2010. The criminal case is pending as on date for recording of the evidence. 8. Although, manifold grounds of challenge to the institution of the criminal proceedings against the writ applicant have been raised in the memo of the writ application, yet, the learned counsel appearing for the writ applicant restricted his submissions only with regard to the jurisdiction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate in directing the CID Crime to conduct the investigation under section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. To put it in other words, the argument has been confined only with respect to the power of the Chief Judicial Magistrate in ordering the CID Crime to carry out the investigation of the complaint under section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. The argument proceeds on the footing that as the Chief Judicial Magistrate could not have directed the CID Crime to carry out the investigation under section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., the entire investigation could be said to be without jurisdiction, and the filing of the chargesheet also could be said to be without jurisdiction. 9. Submissions on behalf of the writ applicant ; 9.1 Mr. I.H. Syed, the learned counsel appearing for the writ applicant vehemently submitted that the provisions of law comprised under the Code of Criminal Procedure nowhere empowered the Magistrate to direct the investigation to the police officer other than one attached to the police station situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court of such a Magistrate. Mr. Syed would submit that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate could not have referred the complaint lodged by the respondent No.2 herein under section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C to the State CID for the purpose of investigation. Mr. Syed, in support of this submission, has placed reliance on few decisions. The decisions relied upon are as under; “(i) The State of Maharashtra vs. Ibrahim Adamwall Patel, Criminal Writ Petition No.1781 of 2004; (ii) State of Gujarat vs. Parshottam Narsibhai Chauhan & Anr., Criminal Revision Application No.332 of 1993; (iii) Central Bureau of Investigation, Through S.P. Jaipur vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr., (2001) 3 SCC 333 ; 9.2 In view of the above, Mr. Syed, the learned counsel prays that as the initial order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate under section 156(3) of the Code for investigation was without jurisdiction, the entire investigation conducted by the CID could be said to be a nullity, and in such circumstances, the charge-sheet filed against the writ applicant herein could also be said to be without any authority of law and, therefore, should be quashed. 10. Submissions on behalf of the State 10.1 Mr. Mitesh Amin, the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State has vehemently opposed this writ application. Mr. Amin invited the attention of this Court to the fact that vide notification No.G.G./29/POS-1077-214-V issued by the Government of Gujarat, the CID Crime is designated as a police station under section 2(s) of the Cr.P.C, 1973. Mr. Amin pointed out to this Court that by virtue of such notification, the District of Kutch-Bhuj falls within the jurisdiction of the office of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, CID Crime, Rajkot Unit, Rajkot. In such circumstances, according to Mr. Amin, no error could be said to have been committed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kutch-Bhuj in directing the police inspector of the CID Crime, Bhuj Branch to carry out the investigation under section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. 10.2 According to Mr. Amin, the notification issued by the State Government makes all the difference, and in such circumstances, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CBI, Jaipur (supra) on which strong reliance has been placed on behalf of the writ applicant is of no avail to the applicant-accused. 10.3 Mr. Amin would submit that the investigation conducted by the police inspector of the CID Crime, Bhuj Branch resulted in filing of the charge-sheet and the filing of the charge-sheet has culminated in the criminal case. The criminal case is pending before the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kutch-Bhuj and is now ripe for recording of the evidence. Mr. Amin would submit that assuming for the moment that the initial order of investigation under section 156(3) of the Code passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate was without jurisdiction, the same would not render the investigation carried out by the concerned police officer illegal and the consequent filing of the charge-sheet. Mr. Amin would submit that in such circumstances, section 156(2) of the Cr.P.C would come into play. Mr. Amin would submit that in such circumstances, section 156(2) of the Cr.P.C would come into play. Section 156(2) of the Cr.P.C provides that no proceeding of a police officer shall, at any stage, be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under section 156 to investigate. Mr. Amin also invited the attention of this Court to the provisions of section 460 of the Cr.:P.C. Mr. Amin by placing reliance on section 460 of the Cr.P.C submitted that if any Magistrate not empowered by law takes cognizance of an offence under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 190, then such an irregularity would not vitiate the proceedings. 10.4 Mr. Amin also placed reliance on section 36 of the Code which is with regard to the powers of the superior officers of police. Mr. Amin by placing reliance on section 36 of the Code submitted that the police officers superior in rank to an officer in-charge of the police station is also empowered to exercise the same powers through out the local area to which they are appointed, as may be exercised by such officer within the limits of his police station. Mr. Amin submitted that for the purpose of investigation of particular crimes on the direction of the Court or the State Government or the superior competent police officer, the notification issued by the State Government, referred to above, makes the position of CID to be a “police station” within the meaning of section 2(s) of the Code and every police officer attached to this organization of the rank of sub-inspector and above is a “police officer in-charge of a police station” within the meaning of section 156 (1), Cr.P.C. Therefore, according to Mr. Amin, there is no flaw in the competence of the police inspector in-charge of a police station within the meaning of sections 2(s) and 156 of the Code, and in the investigation carried out by him resulting in submission of the charge-sheet under section 173 of the Cr.P.C. In such circumstances, referred to above, Mr. Amin submitted that there being no merit in the solitary contention raised on behalf of the writ applicant, such contention may be rejected and consequently the writ application may also be rejected. 11. Submissions on behalf of the respondent No.2- original complainant; 11.1 Mr. Amin submitted that there being no merit in the solitary contention raised on behalf of the writ applicant, such contention may be rejected and consequently the writ application may also be rejected. 11. Submissions on behalf of the respondent No.2- original complainant; 11.1 Mr. B.B. Naik, the learned senior counsel appearing for the original complainant has, by and large, adopted the submissions canvassed by Mr. Amin, the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State. Mr. Naik would also submit that as the CID Crime, Bhuj Branch has been designated as a police station under section 2(s) of the Code, the Chief Judicial Magistrate was competent to direct the police inspector of the said police station to carry out the investigation. Mr. Naik submitted that to say that the Magistrate under section 156(3) of the Code is not competent to refer a private complaint to any police officer other than the one who is the officer incharge of the particular police station may lead to, in a given case, gross injustice or may lead to travesty of justice. According to Mr. Naik, if such a narrow construction of section 156(3) of the Code is accepted as a binding law on the Magistrates then it may lead to frustration of justice in certain situations where the investigation of a crime by the officer incharge of a police station would not at all be warranted. Mr. Naik gave an instance of a private complaint before a Magistrate under section 200 of the Cr.P.C against the very police officer in charge of a police station. Mr. Naik submitted that if such police officer has vested interest in the alleged crime, or for that matter, if any allegation of his being hand in glove with the accused is made, then in such circumstances, the dictate of justice warrants that such a complaint must be investigated by the police officer other than one who is in actual charge of the police station. Mr. Naik submitted that to meet such exigencies, the legislature has provided the solution in section 36 of the Cr.P.C. 11.2 Mr. Naik submitted that the allegations levelled against the writ applicant are very serious. The writ applicant is alleged to have indulged in a huge fraud. Therefore, serious allegations of embezzlement and offences like forgery etc. in his capacity as the former District Magistrate and Collector of the region of Kutch-Bhuj. Naik submitted that the allegations levelled against the writ applicant are very serious. The writ applicant is alleged to have indulged in a huge fraud. Therefore, serious allegations of embezzlement and offences like forgery etc. in his capacity as the former District Magistrate and Collector of the region of Kutch-Bhuj. The trial is now ripe for recording of the evidence and at such a stage, it will be too much to say that the criminal proceedings be quashed because the CID Crime had no jurisdiction to carry out the investigation and file the charge-sheet. 11.3 Mr. Naik, in support of his submissions, has placed reliance on few decisions of the Supreme Court. Those are as under; “(i) Shivjee Singh vs. Nagendra Tiwary & Ors., (2010) 7 SCC 578 ; (ii) State of Bihar & Anr. vs. J.A.C Saldana & Ors., AIR 1980 SC 326 ; (iii) R.P. Kapur & Ors. vs. Sardar Pratap Singh Kairon & Ors., AIR 1961 SC 1117 ; (iv) State of Bihar & Ors. vs. Anil Kumar & Ors., (2017) 14 SCC 304 ; (v) Rasiklal Dalpatram Thakkar vs. State of Gujarat & Ors., (2010) 1 SCC 1 ; (vi) Central Bureau of Investigation, Thr. S..P. Jaipur vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr., (2001) 3 SCC 333 ; (vii) Rasiklal Dalpatram Thakkar vs. State of Gujarat & Ors., 2007 (2) GLH 619 ; (viii) H.N. Rishbut & Anr. vs. State of Delhi, AIR 1955 SC 196 ; (xi) State of Bihar & Anr. vs. Lalu Singh, (2014) 1 SCC 663 ; 11.4 In such circumstances, referred to above, Mr. Naik prays that there being no merit in this writ application, the same be rejected. ANALYSIS 12. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for my consideration is whether the criminal proceedings against the writ applicant should be quashed?. 13. Before adverting to the rival submissions canvassed on either side, I must look into few provisions of the Cr. P.C., 1973. 14. Section 2(o) defines the phrase “officer in charge of a police station”. 13. Before adverting to the rival submissions canvassed on either side, I must look into few provisions of the Cr. P.C., 1973. 14. Section 2(o) defines the phrase “officer in charge of a police station”. It reads as under; “2(o)”officer in charge of a police station” includes, when the officer in charge of the police station is absent from the station-house or unable from illness or other cause to perform his duties, the police officer present at the station-house who is next in rank to such officer and is above the rank of constable or, when the State Government so directs, any other police officer so present; 15. Section 2(s) defines the term “police station”. It reads as under; “(s) “police station” means any post or place declared generally or specially by the State Government, to be a police station, and includes any local area specified by the State Government in this behalf;” 16. Section 36 of the Code reads as under; “36.Powers of superior officers of police.- Police officers superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station may exercise the same powers, throughout the local area to which they are appointed, as may be exercised by such officer within the limits of his station.” 17. Section 156 of the Code reads as under; “156. Police officer’ s power to investigate cognizable case. (1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. (2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate. (3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such an investigation as above-mentioned.” 18. (2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate. (3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such an investigation as above-mentioned.” 18. Section 190 of the Code reads as under; “190.Cognizance of offences by Magistrates.- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered in this behalf under subsection (2), may take cognizance of any offence - (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; (b) upon a police report of such facts; (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed. (2) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any Magistrate of the second class to take cognizance under sub-section (1) of such offences as are within his competence to inquire into or try.” 19. Section 460 (e) reads as under; “460. Irregularities which do not vitiate proceedings. If any Magistrate not empowered by law to do any of the following things, namely:- (e) to take cognizance of an offence under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub- section (1) of section 190;” 20. I should now look into the notification issued by the State Government dated 18th February, 1980 on which strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Amin, the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State. The notification reads as under: “NOTIFICATION Home Department Sachivalaya, Gandhinagar Dated, the 18th Feb. 1980 No.G.G./29/POS-1077-214-V in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (s) of section 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) , in its application to the State of Gujarat and in super session of the Government Notification, Home Department No. G.G./24/POS-1077-214-C dated the 12th February, 1979 , the Government of Gujarat hereby declares the places specified in column 2 of the Schedule appended hereto to be a police station and directs that each of such police station shall include the areas specified against them in column 3 of the said Schedule. SCHEDULE Serial Number [1] Name of the place. [2] Areas [3] 1 Office of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.I.D, Crime, Gandhinagar Unit, Ahmedabad. SCHEDULE Serial Number [1] Name of the place. [2] Areas [3] 1 Office of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.I.D, Crime, Gandhinagar Unit, Ahmedabad. Ahmedabad Gandhinagar, Sabarkantha jurisdiction of City, Ahmedabad Rural and Mehsana, Banaskantha, and Kheda Districts and Western Railway in Gujarat State. 2 Office of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.I.D, Crime, Baroda Unit, Baroda. Baroda City, Baroda Rural, Surat City, Suratl Rural, Bharuch, Valsad, Dangs and Panchmahals Districts. 3 Office of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.I.D, Crime, Rajkot Unit, Rajkot. Rajkot City, Rajkot Rural, Bhavnagar, Surendranagar, Amreli, Junagadh, Jamnagar and Kutch-Bhuj Districts. By order and in the name of the Governor of Gujarat. A.G. Buch Under Secretary to Government. No.POS-1077-214-V, Home Department, Sachivalaya, Gandhinagar, Dt. 18.2.1980.” 21. Thus, the plain reading of the notification, referred to above, would indicate that the office of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.I.D. Crime, Rajkot Unit, Rajkot is designated as a police station within the meaning of section 2(s) of the Code and the Districts of Rajkot City, Rajkot Rural, Bhavnagar, Surendranagar, Amreli, Junagadh, Jamnagar and Kutch-Bhuj fall within the territorial limits of the said police station. In such circumstances, there is no flaw in the competence of the Police Inspector of the C.I.D. Crime, Bhuj Branch to act as a police officer in charge of a police station within the meaning of sections 2(s) and 156 of the Code, and in the investigation carried out by him resulting in the submission of the charge-sheet under section 173 Cr.P.C. 22. In the aforesaid context, let me go straight to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of J.A.C. Saldana (supra). I may quote the relevant observations; “‘7. Investigation’ is defined in s. 2(h) of the Code to include all the proceedings under the Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any person (other than a Magistrate) who is authorized by a Magistrate in this behalf. ‘Police report’ is defined in s. 2(r) to mean a report forwarded by a police officer to a Magistrate under sub-s. (2) of s. 173. Chapter XII deals with investigation of a cognizable case. ‘Police report’ is defined in s. 2(r) to mean a report forwarded by a police officer to a Magistrate under sub-s. (2) of s. 173. Chapter XII deals with investigation of a cognizable case. Section 156(1) and (2) are relevant and may be extracted: “156(1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. (2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate”. 8. Section 36 confers power of an officer in charge of a police station on all police officers superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station. It reads as under: “36. Police officers superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station may exercise the same powers, throughout the local area to which they are appointed, as may be exercised by such officer within the limits of his station”. 9. Section 173 provides for submission of a report by an officer in charge of a police station on completion of the investigation to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence. Sub-s. (8) of s. 173 is material. It reads as under: “173(8) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence after a report under sub-section (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate and, whereupon such investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed; and the provisions of sub-sections (2) to (6) shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub- section (2)”. 10. The first question is whether the State Government was precluded from directing further investigation in the case in which one investigating officer had submitted a report under s. 173(2) of the Code but on which the Court had not passed any order ? 11. 10. The first question is whether the State Government was precluded from directing further investigation in the case in which one investigating officer had submitted a report under s. 173(2) of the Code but on which the Court had not passed any order ? 11. Section 156 enables the officer in charge of a police station to investigate without the order of a Magistrate into a cognizable case committed within the area of the police station. The officer directed by the State Government to carry on the investigation is Inspector-General, Vigilance. He is undoubtedly an officer superior in rank, if not in department-wise administrative hierarchy, to an officer in charge of a police station. Inter se departmental division such as Inspector-General of Police or Inspector-General, Vigilance, or Additional Inspector-General, C.I.D. may be merely a division of work for administrative efficiency, but the Inspector-General of Police could not by any stretch of imagination be said not to be an officer superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station. While interpreting s. 551 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1908 (‘1908 Code’ for short), which was in pari materia with s. 36 of the Code, this Court in R. P. Kapoor & Ors. vs. Sardar Partap Singh Kairon & Ors., observed that the Addl. Inspector- General of Police was, without doubt, a police officer superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station. Rule 7(a) of the Bihar Police Manual provides that the police force of the entire State is under the overall charge of Inspector-General of Police and for the help of Inspector General and for the convenience of carrying out the work connected with the different branches of police administration, Deputy Inspector General and Assistant Inspectors-General of the rank of Superintendent are posted at headquarters. The use of the word ‘rank’ in s. 36 29 of the Code comprehends the hierarchy of police officers. It is equally clear that Inspector-General of Police will have jurisdiction over the whole of the State. The use of the word ‘rank’ in s. 36 29 of the Code comprehends the hierarchy of police officers. It is equally clear that Inspector-General of Police will have jurisdiction over the whole of the State. Division of work, but not demarcating any local area indicates that Inspector- General, Vigilance, will have jurisdiction extending over the whole of the State and this equally becomes clear from the Notification dated June 6, 1973, issued by the State Government in exercise of the power under clause (s) of sub- s. (1) of s. 4 of the 1908 Code declaring that in respect of certain offences the Vigilance Department shall be deemed to be a police station having its jurisdiction throughout the whole State of Bihar. Even apart from this, Inspector- General appointed by the State Government has jurisdiction over the whole of the State unless the contrary is indicated. If he is thus an officer superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station he could in view of s. 36 exercise the powers of an officer in charge of a police station throughout the local area to which he was appointed meaning thereby the whole of Bihar State as might be exercised by an officer in charge of a police station within the limits of his police station. It was to him that the investigation of the case was ordered to be handed over by the State Government.” 23. Therefore, under the scheme of the Code, the power to submit report in terms of section 173(2) of the Code is with the officer in charge of the police station. However, in view of section 36 of the Code, the police officers superior in rank to an officer in charge of the police station throughout the local area have been conferred with the authority to exercise the same power as that of an officer in charge of the police station. I may also refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in R.P. Kapur (supra), wherein a complaint was addressed and sent to the Chief Minister of the State. The Chief Minister forwarded the said complaint to the Addl. Inspector General of Police. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.I.D carried out the investigation. I may also refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in R.P. Kapur (supra), wherein a complaint was addressed and sent to the Chief Minister of the State. The Chief Minister forwarded the said complaint to the Addl. Inspector General of Police. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.I.D carried out the investigation. Such a procedure was questioned by the petitioners before the Supreme Court on the ground that the procedure adopted as regards the investigation by the CID was something unknown to law and was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In this regard, the following observations are important; “The short question before us is-does this amount to adopting a procedure unknown to law or even to unequal treatment so as to attract Art. 14 of the Constitution ? Learned Counsel for the petitioners has taken us through the relevant provisions in Part V, Chapter XIV, of the Code of Criminal Procedure and has submitted that under s. 154 of the Code every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence should be given to an officer in charge of a police station and under s. 156 any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XV relating to the place of inquiry or trial. He has also referred to s. 157 under which the officer in charge of a police station, shall forthwith send a report of the first information to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence and shall proceed in person, or shall depute one of his subordinate officers not being below such rank as the State Government may, by general or special order, prescribe in this behalf, to proceed to the spot to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case, and if necessary to take measures for the discovery and arrest of the offender. It is contended that the provisions of ss. 154, 156 and 157 of the Code have been violated in the case against the petitioners; and thus the petitioners have been subjected to a special procedure unknown to law or, at any rate, to unequal treatment, treatment different from that of other persons against whom informations of a cognizable offence ape made. 10. 154, 156 and 157 of the Code have been violated in the case against the petitioners; and thus the petitioners have been subjected to a special procedure unknown to law or, at any rate, to unequal treatment, treatment different from that of other persons against whom informations of a cognizable offence ape made. 10. We are unable to accept these contentions as 153 correct. First of all, s. 154, Code of Criminal Procedure, does not say that an information of a cognizable offence can only be made to an officer in charge of a police station. That section merely lays down, inter alia, that every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant; and every such information shall be signed by the person giving it and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in that behalf. Section 156 gives power to an officer in charge of a police station to investigate without the order of a Magistrate any cognizable case which a Court, having jurisdiction in the local area etc. would have power to inquire into or try; sub-s. (2) of s. 156 lays down that no proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate. There has been some argument before us as to the meaning of the expression “ any such case “ occurring in sub-s. (2) of s. 156. As we are not resting our decision on sub-s. (2) of s. 156, Code of Criminal Procedure, we consider it unnecessary to embark upon a discussion as to the true scope and effect of sub-s. (2) of s. 156. Section 157 of the Criminal Procedure Code lays down the procedure which an officer in charge of a police station must follow where information of a cognizable offence is made. Now, there is another important provision in the Code which is of great relevance in this case and must be read. Section 157 of the Criminal Procedure Code lays down the procedure which an officer in charge of a police station must follow where information of a cognizable offence is made. Now, there is another important provision in the Code which is of great relevance in this case and must be read. That provision is contained in s. 551 which is in these terms : “S. 551. Police officers superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station may exercise the same powers, throughout the local area to which they are appointed, as may be exercised by such officer within the limits of his station.” The Additional Inspector General of Police to whom 20 154 Sethi’s complaint was sent was, without doubt, a police officer superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station. Sardar Hardayal Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.I.D., Amritsar, was also an officer superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station. Both these officers could, therefore, exercise the powers, throughout the local area to which they were appointed, as might be exercised by an officer in charge of a police station within the limits of his police station. It is not disputed that the jurisdictional area of the Additional Inspector General of Police was the whole of the State. As to the jurisdictional area of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.I.D., the contention on behalf of the respondent State is that though he was posted at Amritsar, his jurisdictional area extended over the whole State. The learned Advocate-General for the respondent State has drawn our attention to Police Rule 21.28 in the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, Vol. III, issued by and with the authority of the State Government under ss. 7 and 12 of the Police Act (V of 1861). That rule lays down that the Criminal Investigation Department has no separate jurisdiction and the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Criminal Investigation Department, may decide to take over the control of any particular investigation himself or depute one or more of his officers to work directly under the control of the Superintendent of Police of the district. Police Rule 21.32 enumerates some of the cases in which the assistance of the Criminal Investigation Department may be sought. Police Rule 21.32 enumerates some of the cases in which the assistance of the Criminal Investigation Department may be sought. Police Rule 25.14 says that the Criminal Investigation Department is able to obtain expert technical assistance, and in cases where such assistance is required the assistance of the Criminal Investigation Department may be obtained. In the affidavit made by Sardar Hardayal Singh, he has stated that he was entrusted with the investigation of Sethi’s case because of its technical nature and also because his sphere of duty as a Gazetted Officer attached to the Criminal Investigation Department was the whole of the State in view of the memorandum no. 9581-H-51/7912 dated October 155 26, 1951. That memorandum shows that the Deputy Inspector General, C.I.D. and all gazetted officers of the Criminal Investigation Department have jurisdiction extending over the whole of the Punjab State. This is also supported by the affidavit made by Shamshere Singh, Additional Inspector General of Police. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has pointed out that Sethi’s case involved no technical questions and the ground stated in the affidavits of Shamshere Singh and Sardar Hardayal Singh is not, therefore, correct. The question before us is not whether the reason for which the investigation was made over to Sardar Hardayal Singh is correct or not. The question before us is, whether in making over the investigation to Sardar Hardayal Singh a special procedure unknown to law was adopted or the law as to the investigation of cases was administered with an evil eye or unequal hand. If the police officer concerned thought that the case should be investigated by the C. 1. D. even though for a reason which does not appeal to us-it cannot be said that the procedure adopted was illegal. We are unable to agree with learned Counsel for the petitioners that any of these two contentions has been made out in the present case. We are satisfied that the Inspector General of Police, C.I.D. had power to deal with Sethi’s complaint and had further power to direct investigation of the same by Sardar Hardayal Singh who as a police officer superior in rank to an officer incharge of a police station could exercise powers of an officer in charge of a police station in respect of the same. It cannot, therefore, be said that the procedure adopted was unknown to law. It cannot, therefore, be said that the procedure adopted was unknown to law. Nor are we satisfied that the procedure adopted was motivated by any evil purpose, though we are not quite impressed by the reason given by Shamshere Singh or Sardar Hardayal Singh that Sethi’s case was of a technical nature and, therefore, required the assistance of the C.I.D. Even if it was not of a technical nature, it was open to the Additional Inspector General of Police to make over the investigation to a Deputy Superintendent of Police in view of the status of the petitioners. In paragraph 31 of his affidavit 156 A. N. Kashyap, Home Secretary, has said that the Inspector General of Police on receiving the complaint from Sethi ordered on his own the registration of the case without any order or direction from the Chief Minister. The correctness of this statement has been very seriously commented on. In the absence of any affidavit from the Chief Minister and of the original complaint, we have preferred to proceed in this case on the footing that the Additional Inspector General of Police got the complaint from the Chief Minister and then passed necessary orders thereon. Even on that footing we are unable to hold that there has been any violation of legal procedure or that an unfair discrimination has been made against the petitioners.” 24. In the case of C.B.I. through S.P., Jaipur vs. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 2001 SC 668 : 2001 Cri LJ 968), the Supreme Court was seized of the scope of Section 156 (3) of Cr. P.C. and the extent of power of the Magistrate thereunder, while considering the following question before it; “has a Magistrate power to direct the Central Bureau of Investigation to conduct investigation into any offence?”. The scope of sub-section (3) of Section 156 was examined by their Lordships with reference to Section 36 of Cr. P.C. At paragraph-9 of their judgment, their Lordships observed : “9. In this context a reference has to be made to Section 36 of the Code which says that “police officers superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station may exercise the same powers, throughout the local area to which they are appointed, as may be exercised by such officer within the limit of his station”. 25. Then, their Lordships proceeded to hold: “10. 25. Then, their Lordships proceeded to hold: “10. This means any other police officer, who is superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station, can exercise the same powers of the officer in charge of a police station and when he so exercises the power he would do it in his capacity as officer-in-charge of the police station. But when a Magistrate orders investigation under Section 156(3), he can only direct an officer in charge of a police station to conduct such investigation and not a superior police officer, though such officer can exercise such powers by virtue of Section 36 of the Code. .............. Section 36 of the Code is not meant to substitute the magisterial power envisaged in Section 156(3), though it could supplement the powers of an officer in charge of a police station. It is permissible for any superior officer of police to take over the investigation from such officer in charge of the police station either suo motu or on the direction of the superior officer or even that of the Government.” 26. The ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CBI Jaipur (supra), referred to above, in my opinion, is not applicable in the present case in view of the notification of the State Government, referred to above. The notification makes all the difference. Besides the same, the Supreme Court in the said case was dealing with the CBI constituted under the provisions of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. Sections 5 and 6 of the said Act do not confer power upon the Magistrate to order the CBI to conduct the investigation under section156(3) of the Code. This also is one of the aspects which needs to be kept in mind for the purpose of understanding the ratio of the said decision. 27. I may also refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rasiklal Dalpatram Thakkar (supra), wherein the Supreme Court has observed as under; “22. The principal question which emerges from the submissions made on behalf of the parties is whether in regard to an order passed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. the police authorities empowered under Sub-Section (1) of Section 156 can unilaterally decide not to conduct an investigation on the ground that they had no territorial jurisdiction to do so. 23. The principal question which emerges from the submissions made on behalf of the parties is whether in regard to an order passed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. the police authorities empowered under Sub-Section (1) of Section 156 can unilaterally decide not to conduct an investigation on the ground that they had no territorial jurisdiction to do so. 23. Section 156 Cr.P.C. which is the focus of consideration in this case, reads as under :- “156. Police officer’s power to investigate cognizable cases. (1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. (2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one, which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate. (3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such an investigation as above mentioned.” 24. From the aforesaid provisions it is quite clear that a police officer in charge of a police station can, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable offence which a Court having jurisdiction over such police station can inquire into or try under Chapter III of the Code. Subsection (2) of Section 156 ensures that once an investigation is commenced under Sub-section (1), the same is not interrupted on the ground that the police officer was not empowered under the Section to investigate. It is in the nature of a “savings clause” in respect of investigations undertaken in respect of cognizable offences. In addition to the powers vested in a Magistrate empowered under Section 190 Cr.P.C. to order an investigation under Sub-section (1) of section 202 Cr.P.C., Sub-section (3) of Section 156 also empowers such Magistrate to order an investigation on a complaint filed before him. 25. As far as the reference made to Sub-section (4) of Section 181 is concerned, the same appears to be misconceived having regard to the contents thereof which read as follows :- “181. Place of trial in case of certain offences. 25. As far as the reference made to Sub-section (4) of Section 181 is concerned, the same appears to be misconceived having regard to the contents thereof which read as follows :- “181. Place of trial in case of certain offences. (1) xxx xxx xxx (2) xxx xxx xxx (3) xxx xxx xxx (4) Any offence of criminal misappropriation or of criminal breach of trust may he inquired into or tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or any part of the property which is the subject of the offence was received or retained, or was required to be returned or accounted for, by the accused person.” Sub-section (4) only indicates that an inquiry or trial of an offence of criminal misappropriation or criminal breach of trust can be conducted by a Court within whose jurisdiction the offence had been committed or any part of the property forming the subject matter of the offence is received or retained or was required to be returned or accounted for by the accused person. The said provisions do not account for a stage contemplated on account of an order made under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. 26. In the instant case, the stage contemplated under Section 181(4) Cr.P.C. has not yet been reached. Prior to taking cognizance on the complaint filed by the Bank, the learned Chief Judicial Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad, had directed an inquiry under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and as it appears, a final report was submitted by the Investigating Agency entrusted with the investigation stating that since the alleged transactions had taken place within the territorial limits of the city of Mumbai, no cause of action had arisen in the State of Gujarat and, therefore, the investigation should be transferred to the police agency in Mumbai. There seems to be little doubt that the Economic Offences Wing, State CID (Crime), which had been entrusted with the investigation, had upon initial inquiries recommended that the investigation be transferred to the police agency of Mumbai. 27. In our view, both the trial Court as well as the Bombay High Court had correctly interpreted the provisions of Section 156 Cr.P.C. to hold that it was not within the jurisdiction of the Investigating Agency to refrain itself from holding a proper and complete investigation merely upon arriving at a conclusion that the offences had been committed beyond its territorial jurisdiction. 28. 28. A glance at the material before the Magistrate would indicate that the major part of the loan transaction had, in fact, taken place in the State of Gujarat and that having regard to the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 156 Cr.P.C., the proceedings of the investigation could not be questioned on the ground of jurisdiction of the officer to conduct such investigation. It was open to the learned Magistrate to direct an investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. without taking cognizance on the complaint and where an investigation is undertaken at the instance of the Magistrate a Police Officer empowered under Sub-section (1) of Section 156 is bound, except in specific and specially exceptional cases, to conduct such an investigation even if he was of the view that he did not have jurisdiction to investigate the matter. 29. Having regard to the law in existence today, we are unable to accept Mr. Syed’s submissions that the High Court had erred in upholding the order of the learned Trial Judge when the entire cause of action in respect of the offence had allegedly arisen outside the State of Gujarat. We are also unable to accept the submission that it was for the Investigating Officer in the course of investigation to decide whether a particular Court had jurisdiction to entertain a complaint or not. 30. It is the settled law that the complaint made in a criminal case follows the place where the cause arises, but the distinguishing feature in the instant case is that the stage of taking cognizance was yet to arrive. The Investigating Agency was required to place the facts elicited during the investigation before the Court in order to enable the Court to come to a conclusion as to whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint or not. Without conducting such an investigation, it was improper on the part of the Investigating Agency to forward its report with the observation that since the entire cause of action for the alleged offence had purportedly arisen in the city of Mumbai within the State of Maharashtra, the investigation should be transferred to the concerned Police Station in Mumbai. 31. Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. contemplates a stage where the learned Magistrate is not convinced as to whether process should issue on the facts disclosed in the complaint. 31. Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. contemplates a stage where the learned Magistrate is not convinced as to whether process should issue on the facts disclosed in the complaint. Once the facts are received, it is for the Magistrate to decide his next course of action. In this case, there are materials to show that the appellant had filed his application for loan with the Head Office of the Bank at Ahmedabad and that the processing and the sanction of the loan was also done in Ahmedabad which clearly indicates that the major part of the cause of action for the complaints arose within the jurisdiction of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad. It was not, therefore, desirable on the part of the Investigating Agency to make an observation that it did not have territorial jurisdiction to proceed with the investigation, which was required to be transferred to the Police Station having jurisdiction to do so. 32. On the materials before him the learned Magistrate was fully justified in rejecting the Final Report submitted by the Economic Offences Wing, State CID (Crime) and to order a fresh investigation into the allegations made on behalf of the Bank. The High Court, therefore, did not commit any error in upholding the views expressed by the Trial Court. As mentioned hereinbefore, Section 181(4) Cr.P.C. deals with the Court’s powers to inquire or try an offence of criminal misappropriation or of a criminal breach of trust if the same has been committed or any part of the property, which is the subject of the offence, is received or retained within the local jurisdiction of the said Court. 33. The various decisions cited by Mr. Syed, and in particular the decision in Satvinder Kaur’s case (supra) provide an insight into the views held by the Supreme Court on the accepted position that the Investigating Officer was entitled to transfer an investigation to a Police Station having jurisdiction to conduct the same. The said question is not in issue before us and as indicated hereinbefore, we are only required to consider whether the Investigating Officer in respect of an investigation undertaken under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. can file a report stating that he had no jurisdiction to investigate into the complaint as the entire cause of action had arisen outside his jurisdiction despite there being material available to the contrary. The answer, in our view, is in the negative and we are of the firm view that the powers vested in the Investigating Authorities, under Sections 156(1) Cr.P.C., did not restrict the jurisdiction of the Investigating Agency to investigate into a complaint even if it did not have territorial jurisdiction to do so. Unlike as in other cases, it was for the Court to decide whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint as and when the entire facts were placed before it. “ 28. The ratio of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court is that the powers vested in the investigating authorities under section 156(1) of the Code does not restrict the jurisdiction of the Investigating Agency to investigate into a complaint even if it did not have the territorial jurisdiction to do so. Besides the same, the Supreme Court has held that having regard to the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 156 Cr.P.C, the proceedings of the investigation cannot be questioned on the ground of jurisdiction of the officer to conduct such investigation. 29. In Shivjee Singh (supra), the Supreme Court observed in para-7 as regards the violation of the procedural provision and its effect. The observations are as under; “7. We have considered the respective submissions. By its very nomenclature, Cr.P.C. is a compendium of law relating to criminal procedure. The provisions contained therein are required to be interpreted keeping in view the well recognized rule of construction that procedural prescriptions are meant for doing substantial justice. If violation of the procedural provision does not result in denial of fair hearing or causes prejudice to the parties, the same has to be treated as directory notwithstanding the use of word ‘shall’.” 30. In Anil Kumar (supra), the Supreme Court dealt with the question with regard to the validity of the investigative process under the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. While considering the said question, the Supreme Court also referred to section 465 of the Cr.P.C.. I may quote the relevant observations; “22. We shall now deal with the challenge raised by the learned senior counsel, representing the State of Bihar. While considering the said question, the Supreme Court also referred to section 465 of the Cr.P.C.. I may quote the relevant observations; “22. We shall now deal with the challenge raised by the learned senior counsel, representing the State of Bihar. As already noticed hereinabove, the second conclusion drawn by the High Court was, that of investigation carried out, by police officers below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police, after 31.03.1995 and prior to 09.08.2008, would stand vitiated. In order to assail the aforesaid conclusion, learned counsel first drew our attention to Section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The same is extracted hereunder: “465. Finding or sentence when reversible by reason of error, omission or irregularity. - (1) Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no finding, sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered by a Court of appeal, confirmation or revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings before or during trial or in any inquiry or other proceedings under this Code, or any error, or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution, unless in the opinion of that Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. (2) In determining whether any error, omission or irregularity in any proceeding under this Code, or any error, or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution has occasioned a failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings.” (emphasis is ours) 25. Based on the aforesaid provision, it was the submitted, that an omission or irregularity with reference to investigation, would not have the effect of negating the prosecution itself, unless it is further shown, that the same had occasioned a failure of justice. In order to support his above contention, learned counsel placed reliance on H.N. Rishbud and Inder Singh vs. The State of Delhi, (1955) 1 SCR 1150 . The questions that arose for consideration in the above judgment, were expressed in the following manner: “On the arguments urged before us two points arise for consideration. In order to support his above contention, learned counsel placed reliance on H.N. Rishbud and Inder Singh vs. The State of Delhi, (1955) 1 SCR 1150 . The questions that arose for consideration in the above judgment, were expressed in the following manner: “On the arguments urged before us two points arise for consideration. (1) Is the provision of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, enacting that the investigation into the offences specified therein shall not be conducted by any police officer of a rank lower than a Deputy Superintendent of Police without the specific order of a Magistrate, directory or mandatory. (2) Is the trial following upon an investigation in contravention of this provision illegal.” 26. In order to invite the Court’s attention to the conclusion(s) drawn in the above judgment (rendered by a three Judge Division Bench), our pointed attention was drawn to the following position, recorded in the above judgment: “The question then requires to be considered whether and to what extent the trial which follows such investigation is vitiated. Now, trial follows cognizance and cognizance is preceded by investigation. This is undoubtedly the basic scheme of the code in respect of cognizable cases. But it does not necessarily follow that an invalid investigation nullifies the cognizance or trial based thereon. Here we are not concerned with the effect of the breach of a mandatory provision regulating the competence or procedure of the Court as regards cognizance or trial. It is only with reference to such a breach that the question as to whether it constitutes an illegality vitiating the proceedings or a mere irregularity arises. A defect or illegality in investigation, however serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or the procedure relating to cognizance or trial. No doubt a police report which results from an investigation is provided in section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as the material on which cognizance is taken. But it cannot be maintained that a valid and legal police report is the foundation of the jurisdiction of the Court to take cognizance. Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is one out of a group of sections under the heading “Conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings. The language of this section is in marked contrast with that of the other sections of the group under the same heading, i.e. sections 193 and 195 to 199. Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is one out of a group of sections under the heading “Conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings. The language of this section is in marked contrast with that of the other sections of the group under the same heading, i.e. sections 193 and 195 to 199. These latter sections regulate the competence of the Court and bar its jurisdiction in certain cases excepting in compliance therewith. But section 190 does not. While no doubt, in one sense, clauses (a), (b) and (c) of section 190(1) are conditions requisite for taking of cognizance, it is not possible to say that cognizance on an invalid police report is prohibited and is therefore a nullity. Such an invalid report may still fall either under clause (a) or (b) of section 190(1), (whether it is the one or the other we need not pause to consider) and in any case cognizance so taken is only in the nature of error in a proceeding antecedent to the trial. To such a situation section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which is in the following terms is attracted: “Subject to the provisions herein before contained, no finding, sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered on appeal or revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, charge, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings before or during trial or in any enquiry or other proceedings under this Code, unless such error, omission or irregularity, has in fact occasioned a failure of justice”. xxx xxx xxx xxx It does not follow, however, that the invalidity of the investigation is to be completely ignored by the Court during trial. When the breach of such a mandatory provision is brought to the knowledge of the Court at a sufficiently early stage, the Court, while not declining cognizance, will have to take the necessary steps to get the illegality cured and the defect rectified, by ordering such reinvestigation as the circumstances of an individual case may call for. Such a course is not altogether outside the contemplation of the scheme of the code as appears from section 202 under which a Magistrate taking cognizance on a complaint can order investigation by the police. Such a course is not altogether outside the contemplation of the scheme of the code as appears from section 202 under which a Magistrate taking cognizance on a complaint can order investigation by the police. Nor can it be said that the adoption of such a course is outside the scope of the inherent powers of the Special Judge, who for purposes of procedure at the trial is virtually in the position of a Magistrate trying a warrant case.” (emphasis supplied) 27. It was also the pointed contention of learned counsel, that the legal position, as has been expressed in the above judgment, has remained unaltered. In this behalf, our attention was drawn to a recent judgment of this Court in Union of India vs. T. Nathamuni (2014) 16 SCC 285 , wherein the factual issue arose for consideration: “13. The question raised by the respondent is well answered by this Court in a number of decisions rendered in a different perspective. The matter of investigation by an officer not authorized by law has been held to be irregular. Indisputably, by the order of the Magistrate investigation was conducted by the Sub- Inspector, CBI who, after completion of investigation, submitted the charge-sheet. It was only during the trial, objection was raised by the respondent that the order passed by the Magistrate permitting the Sub- Inspector, CBI to investigate is without jurisdiction. Consequently, the investigation conducted by the officer is vitiated in law. Curiously enough the respondent has not made out a case that by reason of investigation conducted by the Sub-Inspector a serious prejudice and miscarriage of justice has been caused. It is well settled that invalidity of the investigation does not vitiate the result unless a miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby.” (emphasis supplied) 28. This Court in the above judgment, while placing reliance on M.C. Sulkunte vs. State of Mysore (1970) 3 SCC 513 ; Muni Lal vs. Delhi Admn. (1971) 2 SCC 48 ; State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 and A.C. Sharma vs. Delhi Admn. (1973) 1 SCC 726 , concluded as under: “19. As discussed earlier, the High Court erred in overlooking the gist of the order of the Special Judge permitting the Sub-Inspector to investigate. (1971) 2 SCC 48 ; State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 and A.C. Sharma vs. Delhi Admn. (1973) 1 SCC 726 , concluded as under: “19. As discussed earlier, the High Court erred in overlooking the gist of the order of the Special Judge permitting the Sub-Inspector to investigate. Further, having regard to the fact that no case of prejudice or miscarriage of justice by reason of investigation by the Sub-Inspector of Police is made out, the order of the High Court cannot be sustained in law. For the reasons stated above, these appeals are allowed and the order passed by the High Court is set aside. The concerned Court shall now act with utmost expedition.” (emphasis supplied) 29. Having given a thoughtful consideration, to the contention advanced on behalf of the appellant - State of Bihar, we are of the view, that the legal position as has been declared by this Court, is in complete consonance and conformity with the postulation contained in Section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This being the position, we have no hesitation in holding, that the second determination rendered by the High Court, to the extent that the investigation carried out by a police officer below the rank of a Deputy Superintendent of Police, after 31.03.1995 and prior to the issuance of the notification dated 03.06.2002 (on 09.08.2008), would stand vitiated, has necessarily to be set aside. In our view, the above finding could have been returned only if, the concerned Court expressed its satisfaction, that the investigation carried out, by a subordinate police officer/official, who had no authority to investigate the matter, had caused prejudice to the accused, leading to miscarriage of justice. Since no such finding has been recorded, and since it has also not been established before this Court, that the accused had suffered such prejudice, it is not possible for us, to sustain the above conclusion, of the High Court. The same is accordingly hereby set aside.” 31. The aforenoted decision has been relied upon by Mr. Naik, the learned counsel appearing for the complainant to fortify his submission that omission or irregularity with reference to the investigation will not have the effect of negating the prosecution itself unless the accused is able to establish or indicate that the same led to failure of justice. The aforenoted decision has been relied upon by Mr. Naik, the learned counsel appearing for the complainant to fortify his submission that omission or irregularity with reference to the investigation will not have the effect of negating the prosecution itself unless the accused is able to establish or indicate that the same led to failure of justice. Such is not the case of the writ applicant. 32. Mr. Syed, the learned counsel appearing for the writ applicant placed strong reliance on a Division Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of The State of Maharashtra vs. Ibrahim Adamwall Patel, reported in 2008 Criminal Law Journal, 1496. In the said case, the contention of the petitioner was that the Magistrate, exercising its power under section 156(3) of the Code cannot direct the State CID to conduct the investigation as the powers of the Magistrate are confined to the directions to the police officer attached to the police station situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the concerned Magistrate. Mr. Syed placed reliance on the observations made by the Division Bench in paras-14,15,16 and 17. “14. The provisions of law comprised under the Code of Criminal Procedure nowhere empower the Magistrate to direct the investigation to the police officer other than one attached to the police Station situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court of such a Magistrate. Such powers undoubtedly can be exercised by this Court in writ jurisdiction or even while exercising the powers under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. It is settled law that a Magistrate does not enjoy inherent power. His powers are those specified under the Code and has to function strictly in accordance with the provisions of law made thereunder. The provisions of law comprised under the Cr. P.C. cannot be amended otherwise than the procedure known to law. The issuance of Manual of Instructions cannot be said to cause amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure, as rightly submitted by the learned APP. The provisions comprised under Clause 2, Chapter III of the Manual would not empower a Magistrate to refer the matter for investigation by CID. 15. The issuance of Manual of Instructions cannot be said to cause amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure, as rightly submitted by the learned APP. The provisions comprised under Clause 2, Chapter III of the Manual would not empower a Magistrate to refer the matter for investigation by CID. 15. The learned single Judge of the Karnataka High Court while dealing with the similar issue after taking note of various earlier decisions of Karnataka High Court, as well as the decision of the Supreme Court, held that the learned Magistrate referring the complaint under Section 156(3) of Cr. P.C. was not empowered to direct the State CID or COD to conduct the investigation in the matter before it. 16. The decision of the Apex Court which has been relied upon is in relation to the absence of the powers to the Magistrate to direct CBI to conduct the investigation either in exercise of powers under Section 156(3) or under Section 202(1) Cr. P.C. The decisions is not strictly on the point in issue. It was clearly observed in CBI through S.P. Jaipur (Supra) that the primary responsibility for conducting investigation into offence in cognizable cases vests with such police officer who is in charge of the police station. It was held therein that “Section 156(3) of the Code which empowers a Magistrate to direct such officer-in-charge of the police station to investigate any cognizable case over which such magistrate has jurisdiction. It is clear that a place or post declared by the Government as police station, must have a police officer-in-charge of it and if he, for any reason, is absent in the station house, the officer who is in next junior rank present in the police station, shall perform the function as officer-in-charge of that police station. The primary responsibility for conducting investigation into offence in cognizable cases vest with such police officer. Under Section 156(3) of the Code empowers a Magistrate to direct such officer-in-charge of the police station to investigate any cognizable case over which such magistrate has jurisdiction.” The jurisdiction to direct the investigation to a police officer in terms of the provisions of law is restricted to a police officer of the police station over which the concerned Magistrate has jurisdiction. This would reveal that a Magistrate cannot issue direction for investigation by the police officer of a police station situated beyond the territorial jurisdiction of his Court. This would apply in case of CBI as well as State CID (Crime). 17. For the reasons stated above therefore, the impugned order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge directing the Magistrate to refer the matter to State CID cannot be sustained, and for the same reasons the impugned order directing the State CID to conduct investigation is also not maintainable and both these orders are liable to be quashed and set aside.” 33. The aforesaid Division Bench decision of the Bombay High Court is also of no avail to the writ applicant as in the State of Maharashtra, CID is not designated as the police station under section 2(s) of the Code and is merely a branch of the Maharashtra police department. 34. In the aforesaid context, Mr.Amin brought to my notice one another decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Prataprao @ Mahesh Baban, Criminal Writ Petition No.3233 of 2009. Mr. Amin invited the attention of the Court to few submissions canvassed by the learned Advocate General on behalf of the State. The submissions noted by the Court of the learned Advocate General in para-10 is as under; “10. So far as the second and third questions are concerned, the learned Advocate General, firstly, invited my attention to the power of the Police Officer to investigate the cognizable offence which is provided under section 156 of the Criminal Procedure Code. He submitted that in view of section 156(1) any Officer in charge of a Police Station could investigate any cognizable offence which the Court having jurisdiction over local area within the limits of the said Police Station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII and, secondly, under sub-clause (3) of section 156 the Magistrate could order investigation under section 190. It is submitted that the Magistrate being a creature of the Statute viz Criminal Procedure Code, his power to direct the investigation is circumscribed by the provisions of Cr.P.C and he has no inherent power to give independent directions of investigation. It is submitted that the Magistrate being a creature of the Statute viz Criminal Procedure Code, his power to direct the investigation is circumscribed by the provisions of Cr.P.C and he has no inherent power to give independent directions of investigation. He then invited my attention to the definition of the term “officer in charge of a police station” which is defined under section 2(o) of the Cr.P.C. It is submitted that the said term does not include any one who is not an officer in the said Police Station and only the State Government can direct any other officer to be an officer in charge of a police station. He then invited my attention to the definition of the term “police station” which defines the police station as any post or place declared generally or specially by the State Government. He submitted that, otherwise, Notification has to be issued by the State Government under section 2(s) for declaring any area as a police station. He submitted that the Head Quarters of the CID has not been declared as police station by the State Government. He invited my attention to one such Notification issued by the State of Maharashtra dated 17/11/2004 declaring that the office of the Anti-Terrorist Squad, Maharashtra State, Mumbai situated at Traffic Institute Building, Sir J.J. Road, Byculla, Mumbai shall be the Police Station with effect from the 17th November 2004 for various offences under the Indian Penal Code, Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and the Official Secrets Act, 1923. It is, therefore, submitted that the State CID which is one of the Departments set up by the Police for its own internal administration could not fall under the definition of the term “police station” and, therefore, the State CID could not be said to be the officer in charge of a police station. He then invited my attention to sections 3 and 4 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 and submitted that superintendence and control of organization of police force vests in the State Government. He, therefore, submitted that the State CID being one of the Branches of the Police Force, the State Government alone is competent to transfer the investigation from the police officer in charge of a police station to the State CID Branch. He, therefore, submitted that the State CID being one of the Branches of the Police Force, the State Government alone is competent to transfer the investigation from the police officer in charge of a police station to the State CID Branch. He then invited my attention to section 173(2) of the Cr.P.C. and submitted that only the Officer in charge of a police station could forward the charge-sheet after completion of investigation for the purpose of taking cognizance of the offence. He then invited my attention to section 173(8) and submitted that the said sub-clause was in the nature of clarification that even after submitting a report under sub-clause (2), power of the officer in charge of a police station to obtain further evidence is not taken away and it will continue in spite of the report being filed and he could forward the further report after further investigating the matter. He submitted that, therefore, original source of power to investigate and submit a report or to further investigate after filing of the charge-sheet was vested in the police officer in charge of a police station and the learned Magistrate could not order reinvestigation or further investigation on his own or on the application by the original complainant or direct another agency such as CID or CBI to further investigate the case. He submitted that this power of transferring the investigation from the officer in charge of a police station to the CID or CBI could alone be exercised by the High Court or Supreme Court while exercising its writ jurisdiction. He submitted that this power could not be exercised by the Magistrate and, therefore, there was no question of the Session Court exercising such power after committal of the proceedings by the Magistrate to the Session Court. “ 35. Mr. Amin placed reliance on this decision only to point out that the headquarters of the CID has not been declared as a police station by the State of Maharashtra. 36. In my view, the Division Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Ibrahim Adamwall Patel (supra) does not help the writ applicant in any manner. 37. Amin placed reliance on this decision only to point out that the headquarters of the CID has not been declared as a police station by the State of Maharashtra. 36. In my view, the Division Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Ibrahim Adamwall Patel (supra) does not help the writ applicant in any manner. 37. In the overall view of the matter, I have reached to the conclusion that no error, not to speak of any error of law, could be said to have been committed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate in directing the Police Inspector of the CID Crime, Bhuj Branch to carry out the investigation. As noted above, the investigation has been completed long time back and the charge-sheet has been filed. It is high time that the prosecution now proceeds further with the recording of the evidence in the Criminal Case No. 1188 of 2010 pending in the court of the 2nd Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhuj. 38. It would not be out of place to state at this stage that the writ applicant herein had preferred Writ Petition (Criminal) No.93 of 2011 with Criminal Misc. Petition No.24787 of 2013 with Writ Petition (Cri.) No.171 of 2011 before the Supreme Court with the following prayers; “In view of the submissions made hereinabove, the Petitioner most respectfully prays that this Hon’ble Court may graciously be pleased to; (A) An appropriate writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondents herein allowing the present petition and directing the transfer of the following four cases from the State CID to the CBI; (I) M. Case No.1 of 2008 registered on dated 20.2.2008 with the CID (Crime) Rajkot zone. (II) Case No.3/2010 registered with CID (Crime) Rajkot Zone. (III) Case No.9/2010 registered with CID (Crime) Rajkot Zone. (IV) CID (Crime) Rajkot Zone No.1/2011 Offences registered under section 217, 409, 120(B) ofIPC. (C) Pass any other order as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and appropriate in the facts and circumstances of the present case.” 39. M. Case No.1/2008 registered with the CID (Crime), Rajkot Zone was one of the cases which the writ applicant wanted the Supreme Court to transfer from the CID (Crime) to the CBI for the purpose of investigation. M. Case No.1/2008 registered with the CID (Crime), Rajkot Zone was one of the cases which the writ applicant wanted the Supreme Court to transfer from the CID (Crime) to the CBI for the purpose of investigation. In the said petition before the Supreme Court, the issue raised before this Court was not raised and on the contrary the SLP came to be rejected by the Supreme Court observing as under; “4. We have heard learned senior counsel for the petitioner at great length on the alleged victimization of the petitioner. He has taken us through all the relevant averments made in the said writ petition and the material relied upon by the petitioner in support of his case. We have also heard learned Addl. Solicitor general for the State of Gujarat. We have perused the affidavit in reply filed on behalf of the State of Gujarat and the relevant material relied upon by the State of Gujarat. We have also gone through the judgment of this Court in Sri Jayendra Saraswathy Swamigal (II) T.N. vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. (2005) 8 SCC 771, to which our attention was drawn by learned counsel for the petitioner and judgment of this Court in K.V. Rajendran vs. Superintendent of Police, CBCID, South Zone, Chennai & Ors. (2013) 12 SCC 480 , to which our attention was drawn by learned counsel for the State of Gujarat. 5. We may particularly note paragraph 6 of the affidavit filed by the State of Gujarat to which our attention is drawn by learned Addl. Solicitor General. It reads thus: “6. I state and submit that substantially the petitioner has based his petition upon the allegations referable to his brother and instances of investigation conducted by his brother viz. Kuldip Sharma IPS. I state and submit that while making assertions with respect to the offences investigated by the brother of the petitioner, the petitioner has suppressed the following important and crucial facts. I state and submit that the brother of the petitioner approached the Honourable Central Administrative Tribunal relying upon the very same instances which are mentioned in the present petition and alleging factual mala fides against the Chief Minister and the then Minister of State (Homes). I state and submit that the brother of the petitioner approached the Honourable Central Administrative Tribunal relying upon the very same instances which are mentioned in the present petition and alleging factual mala fides against the Chief Minister and the then Minister of State (Homes). The then Director General of Police filed a detailed affidavit qua each and every instances cited by the brother of the petitioner (which are cited by the petitioner in the present petition). A copy of the said affidavit filed by the then Director General of Police, Gujarat State before the Central Administrative Tribunal dealing with all instances relied upon by the present petitioner is annexed hereto and is marked as ANNEXURE-R6. I respectfully state and submit that it was duty of the petitioner to point out that after filing of the said affidavit giving factual chronology with respect to each of the instances relied upon by his brother (which is being relied upon by the petitioner), the brother of the petitioner himself had given up the allegation of factual mala fides which is recorded in the judicial pronouncement of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi. It is thus clear that when the petitioner’s brother himself has given up the said factual mala fides after having received a detailed affidavit of the then Director General of Police concerning the instances relied upon, firstly, the petitioner ought not to have referred to the same, and secondly, he ought to have brought to the notice of this Honourable court that his brother has already given up the said allegation in his own case before the Central Administrative Tribunal.” 6. The above assertion made on affidavit has not been denied by learned counsel for the petitioner. Since Kuldip Sharma has himself given up factual/personal mala fides, in our opinion, the petitioner cannot rely upon them to substantiate his case of transfer. 7. In view of the above and having considered the prayer of the petitioner for transfer in its proper perspective in the light of relevant pleadings of the parties, we are of the opinion that no case for transfer of cases to the CBI is made out by the petitioner. Allegations of bias are not substantiated. The said prayer, therefore, will have to be rejected and is rejected. 8. Allegations of bias are not substantiated. The said prayer, therefore, will have to be rejected and is rejected. 8. We must note here that during the pendency of the said writ petition, the petitioner filed Criminal Misc. Petition No.24767 of 2013 and prayed for the following reliefs: “(a) Allow the instant application:; (b) Take on record the documents and the transcripts annexed with the instant application and direct the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to register a case and conduct a thorough enquiry/investigation into the violation of the Telegraph Act 1885 and other applicable laws by Shri Narendra Modi, Shri Amit Shah and any other such person; (c) Allow the accompanying instant writ petition and; (d) Pass any other and further order as may deem fit and proper to this Hon’ble Court.” 9. Though no notice was issued on this application, in the interest of justice we have gone through the criminal miscellaneous petition. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and also learned Addl. Solicitor General for the State of Gujarat and perused the affidavit filed by the State of Gujarat. We have also perused the material on which the State of Gujarat has placed reliance and the rejoinder filed by the petitioner. We are of the considered opinion that the criminal miscellaneous petition deserves to be dismissed as being not connected with the prayer made in the said writ petition and being outside its scope. 10. Before parting, we make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the pending cases filed against the petitioner and the courts seized of those cases must deal with them independently and in accordance with law. We have also not discussed the cases registered against the petitioner in detail as that may be interpreted to mean that we have considered the merits of those cases. We have only considered the question whether the petitioner has made out a case for transfer of the cases from State CID to the CBI. 11. In the result, Writ Petition (Crl.) No.93 of 2011 and Criminal Misc. Petition No.24767 of 2013 are dismissed. In view of the dismissal of this writ petition, Writ Petition (Crl.) No.171 of 2011 is also dismissed as it seeks transfer of FIR No.033 of 2011 from the State CID to the CBI on similar grounds.” 40. 11. In the result, Writ Petition (Crl.) No.93 of 2011 and Criminal Misc. Petition No.24767 of 2013 are dismissed. In view of the dismissal of this writ petition, Writ Petition (Crl.) No.171 of 2011 is also dismissed as it seeks transfer of FIR No.033 of 2011 from the State CID to the CBI on similar grounds.” 40. In view of the above, this writ application fails and is hereby rejected. 41. In view of the order passed in the Special Criminal Application No.895 of 2010, the connected writ application filed by the ‘Bhookam Grast Bhuj Bazar Nav Nirman Trust’ also fails. I take notice of the fact that the Special Criminal Application No.510 of 2008 was filed by ‘Bhookam Grast Bhuj Bazar Nav Nirman Trust’ through its President viz. Arvind Hirji Thakkar challenging the very same order passed by the Magistrate directing investigation under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to the CID Crime, however, the said petition was disposed of as withdrawn. Therefore, the remedy as sought for by the petitioners is already addressed and exhausted by them. It is brought to my notice that the President of the Trust, namely, Arvind Hirji has passed away. In such circumstances, the Special Criminal Application No. 1539 of 2010 also stands rejected.