JUDGMENT : Abdullah Gulamahmed Uraizee, J. 1. The appellant in this appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ("M.V. Act" for short) has assailed the judgment and order dated 07.03.2006 passed by the learned MACT (Aux.) 2nd Fast Track Court Sabarkantha at Himatnagar in MACP No. 595 of 1996 whereunder the Claim Petition preferred by the appellant is dismissed. 2. The material facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the appellant was traveling in a rickshaw bearing registration No. GJ-7T-739 as passenger on 2.02.1996 at about 21 hours. While the rickshaw was passing of Prantij-Himatnagar National Highway a truck-tempo bearing registration No. GJ-9T-6045 came at a high and excessive speed and dashed with the rickshaw in which the appellant was traveling as a passenger. The appellant sustained serious bodily injuries. He, therefore, filed MACP No. 595 of 1996 to recover a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- from the driver, owner and insurer of rickshaw as well as driver, owner and insurer of the truck-tempo. While recording a finding that the rickshaw in which the appellant was traveling is met with an accident, dismissed the Claim Petition as the driver of the rickshaw was not traced out, and therefore, according to the Tribunal, the appellant technically fail to establish that he has received injury in a vehicular incident. 3. The appellant, being aggrieved and dissatisfied by with the impugned judgment and order of dismissal of this Claim Petition has assailed the same in this appeal. 4. I have heard Mr. L.M. Chhablani, learned advocate for the appellant and Mr. Palak Thakkar, learned advocate for the respondent No. 6-Insurance Company of the truck-tempo. Rest of the respondents, though served, have not entered their-appearance to contest the appeal. 5. Mr. Chhablani, learned advocate for the appellant vehemently submitted that the Tribunal has adopted hyper technical approach in dismissing the Claim Petition. He submitted that the standard of proof, required in accident claim case, is of preponderance of probabilities and no script prove beyond reasonable doubt as is required in criminal proceedings. He submitted that the complaint in respect of the accident lodged against the driver of the offending truck-tempo wherein it is satisfactorily stated that the appellant was traveling in rickshaw as a passenger. He submitted that the complaint in respect of the accident lodged against the driver of the offending truck-tempo wherein it is satisfactorily stated that the appellant was traveling in rickshaw as a passenger. In support of his submission, he has relied upon decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mangla Ram v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited (2018) 5 SCC 656 . He, therefore, urged that the appeal may be allowed and the Claim Petition may be remanded to the Tribunal for fresh consideration of all counts. 6. Mr. Palak Thakkar, learned advocate for the respondent No. 6-Insurance Company has supported the impugned judgment and order. He vehemently submitted that the name of the rickshaw driver was known to the appellant still he withheld it from the Tribunal. Such conduct on the part of the appellant costs serious doubt about he being the passenger in the offending rickshaw. He further submitted that the perusal of the Panchnama of the place of accident reveals that the rickshaw was found heavily damaged while the truck-tempo had a minor scratch on its body that itself indicate that the rickshaw had not met with an accident with the truck-tempo. In his submission, the learned Tribunal has assigned cogent reasons for doubting the presence of the appellant in the offending rickshaw and has rightly dismissed the Claim Petition which does not warrant interference in this petition. Alternatively, he submitted that in case this Court is inclined to remand the matter to the Tribunal, all defences available to the Insurance Company may be kept open. 7. The perusal of the impugned judgment and order reveals that the Tribunal has adopted a very hyper technical approach. It further emerges from the impugned judgment that the learned Tribunal has proceeded with the Claim Petition, as if, Criminal Proceedings were being conducted. It is trite law that in Claim Petitions under Section 166 of the M.V. Act strict-proof of happening of the accident is not required but the Tribunal is obligated to decide the Claim Petition, the involvement of the vehicles involved in the touchstone and the preponderance of probability as pose to the stand proof thereof beyond reasonable doubt as is required in Criminal Proceedings. The impugned judgment and order reveals that the Tribunal has analyzed the ocular and documentary evidence as if the criminal case was conducted and doubted the presence of the appellant and auto-rickshaw only because the Medical Certificate and the facts stated in Panchnama and FIR are contradictory. 8. The Supreme Court in the case of Mangla Ram (supra) has made some pertinent observations in paragraph Nos. 21 to 26, which reads as under:- "21. The High Court, however, reversed this finding of fact rendered by the Tribunal essentially on two counts; First, that the Tribunal having discarded the oral evidence about the involvement of Jeep No. RST 4701 in the accident in question, allegedly driven by Respondent 2, could not and ought not to have recorded the finding on the relevant issue against Respondents 2 & 3 merely by relying on the documents framing part of the police charge-sheet. Second, the jeep seizure report (Exh. 5) indicated that only a scratch on the mudguard of the left tyre of the vehicle was noticed, which contradicted the claim of the appellant about the involvement of the vehicle. 22. The question is: Whether this approach of the High Court can be sustained in law? While dealing with a similar situation, this Court in Bimla Devi noted the defence of the driver and conductor of the bus which inter alia was to cast a doubt on the police record indicating that the person standing at the rear side of the bus, suffered head injury when the bus was being reversed without blowing any horn. This Court observed that while dealing with the claim petition in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the Tribunal strict to sensu is not bound by the pleadings of the parties, its function is to determine the amount of fair compensation. In paras 11-15, the Court observed thus: (SCC pp. 533-34) "11. This Court observed that while dealing with the claim petition in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the Tribunal strict to sensu is not bound by the pleadings of the parties, its function is to determine the amount of fair compensation. In paras 11-15, the Court observed thus: (SCC pp. 533-34) "11. While dealing with a claim petition in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a tribunal stricto sensu is not bound by the pleadings of the parties; its function being to determine the amount of fair compensation in the event an accident has taken place by reason of negligence of that driver of a motor vehicle, It is true that occurrence of an accident having regard to the provisions contained in Section 166 of the Act is a sine qua non for entertaining a claim petition but that would not mean that despite evidence to the effect that death of the claimant's predecessor had taken place by reason of an accident caused, by a motor vehicle, the same would be ignored only on the basis of a postmortem report vis-a-vis the averments made in a claim petition. 12. The deceased was constable. Death took place near a police station. The post-mortem report clearly suggests that the deceased died of a brain injury. The place of accident is not far from the police station. It is, therefore, difficult to believe the story of the driver of the bus that he slept in the bus and in the morning found a dead body wrapped in a blanket. If the death of the constable had taken place earlier, it is wholly unlikely that his dead body in a small town like Dharampur would remain undetected throughout the night particularly when it was lying at a bus-stand and near a police station. In such an event, the Court can presume that the police officers themselves should have taken possession of the dead body. 13. The learned Tribunal, in our opinion, has rightly proceeded on the basis that apparently there was absolutely no reason to falsely implicate Respondents 2 and 3. The claimant was not at the place of occurrence. In such an event, the Court can presume that the police officers themselves should have taken possession of the dead body. 13. The learned Tribunal, in our opinion, has rightly proceeded on the basis that apparently there was absolutely no reason to falsely implicate Respondents 2 and 3. The claimant was not at the place of occurrence. She, therefore, might not be aware of the details as to how the accident took place but the fact that the first information report had been lodged in relation to an accident could not have been ignored. 14. Some discrepancies in the evidence of the claimant's witnesses might have occurred but the core question before the Tribunal and consequently before the High Court was as to whether the bus in question was involved in the accident or not. For the purpose of determining the said issue, the Court was required to apply the principle underlying the burden of proof in terms of the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 as to whether a dead body wrapped in a blanket had been found at the spot at such an early hour, which was required to be proved by Respondents 2 and 3. 15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchsone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. For the said purpose, the High Court should have taken into consideration the respective stories set forth by both the parties." (emphasis supplied) The Court restated the legal position that the claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be applied by the Tribunal while dealing with the motor accident cases. Even in that case, the view taken by the High Court to reverse similar findings, recorded by the Tribunal was set aside. 23. Even in that case, the view taken by the High Court to reverse similar findings, recorded by the Tribunal was set aside. 23. Following the enunciation in Bimla Devi case, this Court in Parmeshwari v. Amir Chanel noted that when filing of the complaint was not disputed, the decision of the Tribunal ought not to have been reversed by the High Court on the ground that nobody came from the office of the SSP to prove the complaint. The Court appreciated the testimony of the eyewitnesses in Paras 12 & 13 and observed thus: 12. The other ground on which the High Court dismissed the case was by way of disbelieving the testimony of Umed Singh, P.W. 1. Such disbelief of the High Court is totally conjectural. Umed Singh is not related to the appellant but as a good citizen, Umed Singh extended his help to the appellant by helping her to reach the doctor's chamber in order to ensure that an injured woman gets medical treatment. The evidence of Umed Singh cannot be disbelieved just because he did not file a complaint himself. We are constrained to repeat our observation that the total approach of the High Court, unfortunately, was not sensitised enough to appreciate the plight of the victim. 13. The other so-called reason in the High Court's order was that as the claim petition was filed after four months of the accident, the same is "a device to grab money from the insurance company". This finding in the absence of any material is certainly perverse. The High Court appears to be not cognizant of the principle that in a road accident claim, the strict principles of proof in a criminal case are not attracted...." 24. It will be useful to advert to the dictum in N.K.V. Bros. (P) Ltd. v. M. Karumai Ammal, wherein it was contended, by the vehicle owner that die criminal case in relation to the accident had ended, in acquittal and for which reason the claim under the Motor Vehicles Act ought to be rejected. This Court negatived the said argument by observing that the nature of proof required to establish culpable rashness, punishable under IPC, is more stringent than negligence sufficient under the law of tort to create liability. This Court negatived the said argument by observing that the nature of proof required to establish culpable rashness, punishable under IPC, is more stringent than negligence sufficient under the law of tort to create liability. The observation made in para 3 of the judgment would throw some light as to what should be the approach of the Tribunal in motor accident cases. The same reads thus: 3. Road accidents are one of the top killers in our country, specially when truck and bus drivers operate nocturnally. This proverbial recklessness often persuades the courts, as has been observed by us earlier in other cases, to draw an initial presumption in several cases based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Accidents Tribunal must take special care to see that innocent victims do not suffer and drivers and owners do not escape liability merely because of some doubt here or some obscurity there. Save in plain cases, culpability must be inferred from the circumstance's where it is fairly reasonable. The Court should not succumb to niceties, technicalities and mystic, maybes. We are emphasizing this aspect because we are often distressed by transport operators getting away with it thanks to judicial laxity, despite the fact that they do not exercise sufficient disciplinary control over the drivers in the matter of careful driving. The heavy economic impact of culpable driving of public transport - must bring owner and - driver to their responsibility to their neighbour. Indeed, the State must seriously consider no-fault liability by legislation. A second aspect which pains lis is the inadequacy of the compensation or undue parsimony practised by tribunals. We must remember that judicial tribunals are state organs and Article 41 of the Constitution lays the jurisprudential foundation for State relief against accidental disablement of citizens. There is no justification for neggardliness in compensation. A third factor which is harrowing is the enormous delay in disposal of accident cases resulting in compensation, even if awarded, being postponed by several years. The States must appoint sufficient number of tribunals and the High Courts should insist upon quick disposals so that the 'trauma and tragedy already sustained may not be magnified by the injustice of delayed justice Many States are unjustly indifferent in this regard." 25. The States must appoint sufficient number of tribunals and the High Courts should insist upon quick disposals so that the 'trauma and tragedy already sustained may not be magnified by the injustice of delayed justice Many States are unjustly indifferent in this regard." 25. In Dulcina Fernandes, this Court examined similar situation where the evidence of claimant's eyewitness was discarded by the Tribunal and that the respondent in that case was acquitted in the criminal case concerning the accident. This Court, however, opined that it cannot be overlooked that upon investigation of the case registered against the respondent, prima facie, materials showing negligence were found to put him on trial. The Court restated the settled principle that the evidence of the claimants ought to be examined by the Tribunal on the touchstone of preponderance of probability and certainly the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied as noted in Bimla Devi. In paras 8 & 9 of the reported decision, the dictum in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta, has been adverted to as under: 8. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta while considering the nature of a claim petition under, the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 a three Judge Bench of this Court has culled out certain propositions of which propositions (ii), (v) and (vi) would be relevant to the facts of the present case and, therefore, may be extracted here-in-below: '10.(ii) The rules of the pleadings do not strictly apply as the claimant is required to make an application in a form prescribed under the Act. In facts, there is no pleading where the proceedings are suo motu initiated by the Tribunal. (v) Though the Tribunal adjudicates on a claim and determines the compensation, it does not do so as in an adversarial litigation. (vi) The Tribunal is required to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. It may choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of and matters relevant to inquiry, to assist it in holding the enquiry.' 9. The following further observation available in para 10 of the Report would require specific note: (Shila Datta case, SCC p. 519). '10. ... It may choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of and matters relevant to inquiry, to assist it in holding the enquiry.' 9. The following further observation available in para 10 of the Report would require specific note: (Shila Datta case, SCC p. 519). '10. ... We have referred to the aforesaid provisions to show that an award by the Tribunal cannot be seen as an adversarial adjudication between the litigating parties to a dispute, but a statutory determination of compensation on the occurrence of an accident, after due enquiry, in accordance with the statute.'" In para 10 of Dulcina Fernandes, the Court opined that non-examination of witness per se cannot be treated as fatal to the claim set up before the Tribunal. In other words, the approach of the Tribunal should be holistic analysis of the entire pleadings and evidence by applying the principles of preponderance of probability. 26. In the above conspectus, the appellant is justified in contending that the High Court committed manifest error in reversing the holistic view of the Tribunal in reference to the statements of witnesses forming part of the charge-sheet, FIR, jeep seizure report in particular, to hold that Jeep No. RST4701 driven by Respondent 2 was involved in the accident in question. Indeed, the High Court was impressed by the mechanical investigation report (Ext. 5) which stated that only a scratch mark on the mudguard of the left tyre of the vehicle had been noted. On that basis, it proceeded to observe that the same was in contradiction to the claim of the appellant claimant, ruling out the possibility of involvement of the vehicle in the accident. This conclusion' is based on surmises and conjectures and also in disregard of the relevant fact that the vehicle was seized by the police after investigation, only after one month from the date of the accident and the possibility of the same having been repaired in the meantime could not be ruled out. In other words, the reasons which weighed with the High Court for reversing the finding of the fact recorded by the Tribunal upon holistic analysis of the entire evidence, about the involvement of Jeep No. RST4701 in the accident, cannot be countenanced. In other words, the reasons which weighed with the High Court for reversing the finding of the fact recorded by the Tribunal upon holistic analysis of the entire evidence, about the involvement of Jeep No. RST4701 in the accident, cannot be countenanced. For, those reasons do not affect the other overwhelming circumstances and evidence which has come on record and commended to the Tribunal about the involvement of the subject jeep in the accident in question. This being the main edifice, for which the High Court allowed the appeal preferred by Respondents 2 and 3, it must necessarily follow that the finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal on the factum of involvement of Jeep No. RST4701 in the accident in question will have to be restored for reasons noted hitherto." 9. It is thus eminently clear that the Tribunal required to consider the Claim Petition on the touchstone of probabilities of preponderance and the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be applied in Claim Petitions. The appellant has produced an FIR and Panchnama of place of accident on record of the Claim Petition. These two documents show that the offending truck-tempo was involved in the accident. Under the circumstances, the Tribunal ought not to have dismissed the Claim Petition on the basis of the other ocular evidence on the ground that the offending truck-tempo was not involved in the accident. The reasons assigned by the Tribunal are conjectural and cannot be sustained. I am, therefore, of the view that the whole matter needs to be referred to the Tribunal for consideration and fresh decision. It shall be open for the Insurance Company to agitate by producing cogent evidence that the offending truck-tempo was not involved in the accident. It needs to clarified at this stage that acquittal of the driver of the truck-tempo except the clean acquittal would not be a ground for the Tribunal to discard the Claim Petition holding that the truck-tempo was not involved in the accident. 10. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The judgment and order dated 07.03.2006 passed by the learned MACT (Aux.) 2nd Fast Track Court Sabarkantha at Himatnagar in MACP No. 595 of 1996 is hereby quashed and set aside. 10. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The judgment and order dated 07.03.2006 passed by the learned MACT (Aux.) 2nd Fast Track Court Sabarkantha at Himatnagar in MACP No. 595 of 1996 is hereby quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded to the Tribunal for fresh consideration on all counts after affording an opportunity of adducing the evidence, if any, and hearing to the concerned parties. The Tribunal is expected to finally dispose of the Claim Petition as expeditiously as possible as the accident in question is of the year 1996. 11. It is needless to state that this Court has not expressed any opinion on merits. The Tribunal shall decide the matter strictly in accordance with law and the evidence, ocular and documentary which is made available arid adduced by the parties. 12. In the facts of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs. 13. Record and Proceedings be remitted to, the trial Court forthwith.