JUDGMENT : Jyoti Saran, J. The petitioner prays for issuance of appropriate writ for quashing the order bearing Memo No.260 dated 19.04.1994 together with Memo No.2948 dated 06.03.1999, whereby the petitioner has been dismissed from service. The petitioner also prays that he may be provided with the consequential benefit to which he is entitled after setting aside the orders. Copies of the order dated 19.04.1994 and 06.02.1999 are impugned at Annexures 1 and 2 respectively to the writ petition. 2. The writ petition was admitted for hearing vide order passed on 22.06.2000 and was taken up for consideration at its final stage when the parties have been heard. 3. Facts of the case as reflected from the pleadings on record briefly stated is that the petitioner was appointed as a Routine Clerk cum Law Agent in the Bihar State Board of Religious Trust (hereinafter referred to as 'the Board') in 1967 vide order bearing Memo No.873 dated 25.01.1967. The petitioner joined the post on 01.02.1967. It is the case of the petitioner that right since his appointment in 1967 there was no complaint against his working until 1992 and it is for the first time in his career that he received show case on 14.09.1992 as to why he be not proceeded against for misusing his power against the interest of the Board. A copy of such notice is enclosed at Annexure 3 to the writ petition. 4. The petitioner filed his reply to the show cause and also asked for furnishing of the documents relevant for filing a purposeful reply. According to the petitioner, in spite of the request made the papers were not supplied rather an order of suspension followed on 23.10.1992. The petitioner questioned the order of suspension before this Court in CWJC No. 11062 of 1992 which was admitted for hearing on 08.01.1993. According to the petitioner, the entire issue revolves around the registration of Sri Sarva Mangla Devi Trust, Gulzarbagh, Patna City which was a private trust created by late Kishori Lal Choudhary by a will dated 18.06.1927 but has been incorrectly registered as a public trust by the Bihar State Board of Religious Trust in exercise of power vested under section 34 of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') in the year 1953. 5. 5. It is the case of the petitioner that following the unfounded allegation against the petitioner of indulging in acts which were against the interest of 'the Board' and were in abuse of official power that a disciplinary proceeding was initiated by service of a charge memo which was served on the petitioner through letter dated 11.12.1992 of the Administrator, a copy of which is impugned at Annexure 9 to the writ petition. A perusal of the charge memo would confirm that 8 charges all revolving around the acts, in abuse of powers, to benefit Sri Sarva Mangla Devi Trust, Gulzarbagh, Patna City, were set up against the petitioner. The petitioner filed his reply exhaustively dealing and denying, each of the charges, a copy of which is at Annexure 11 to the writ petition. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report upholding the allegations and which resulted in an order of dismissal bearing Memo No.260 dated 19.04.1994 issued under the signature of the Chairman of 'the Board', a copy of which is impugned at Annexure 1 to the writ petition. This order of dismissal was challenged by the petitioner in a writ petition before this Court in CWJC No.4606 of 1994. A plea was taken by the petitioner that the enquiry was held in gross violation of principles of natural justice inasmuch as the petitioner was deprived of the opportunity of cross-examination of the witnesses. 6. The learned Single Judge hearing the writ petition while recording satisfaction on the plea of examination of records and to hold that the proceedings indeed had not been conducted in accordance with law and in compliance with the rules of natural justice, remitted the matter to the Chairman of 'the Board' for appointing any competent person as an Inquiry Officer. The petitioner was afforded liberty to file a further show cause to the charges as also to express his desire to examine any person or examine any documents and the authority concerned was directed to provide adequate opportunity to the petitioner. The Inquiry Officer was directed to conclude the enquiry within four months of the appointment of the Inquiry Officer, failing which the dismissal order dated 19.04.1994 would stand quashed. The Inquiry Officer was directed to conclude the enquiry within four months of the appointment of the Inquiry Officer, failing which the dismissal order dated 19.04.1994 would stand quashed. The writ petition was disposed of vide order passed on 29.10.1998, a copy of which is present at running page 129 of the proceedings and it is in pursuance of the order so passed that the petitioner filed his representation 21.11.1998 requesting the Chairman of 'the Board' to ensure compliance of the order passed by this Court. The request of the petitioner is enclosed at page 128 of the writ proceedings. 7. Following the order passed by this Court that a fresh enquiry ensued, the report of which is enclosed with the letter dated 12.02.1999 of the Chairman of 'the Board' addressed to the petitioner seeking his reply to the findings of the Inquiry Officer who had upheld the charges. The petitioner was directed to file his reply by 03.03.1999 failing which it would be understood that he has nothing to say. The petitioner in response to the second show cause at Annexure 29 again filed an exhaustive reply on 03.03.1999, a copy of which is present at running page 188 of the writ proceedings and was received in the office of 'the Board' on 04.03.1999. 8. It is strange that despite the fact that an exhaustive reply was filed by the petitioner to the second show cause which reached 'the Board' on 04.03.1999 as confirmed from the receiving present thereon yet, the Chairman in a one line expression, held that the reply lacked substance and has mechanically proceeded to reject the same, to uphold the earlier order of dismissal dated 19.04.1994. This order of the Chairman of 'the Board' dated 06.03.1999 is impugned at Annexure 2 to the writ petition and feeling aggrieved the petitioner has returned to this Court. 9. I have heard Mr. A.B. Ojha, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner along with Mr. Bharat Bhushan and Mr. Shekhar Singh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Board and I have perused the records. 10. Since one of the issues raised by Mr. Ojha, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner was that the order of dismissal passed by the Chairman of 'the Board' did not have the approval of 'the Board' and thus has no lawful support, this Court vide order passed on 14.11.2017 directed Mr. 10. Since one of the issues raised by Mr. Ojha, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner was that the order of dismissal passed by the Chairman of 'the Board' did not have the approval of 'the Board' and thus has no lawful support, this Court vide order passed on 14.11.2017 directed Mr. Singh, learned counsel for 'the Board' to clarify the position not only on the issue whether the order of the Chairman had the sanction of 'the Board' but also whether or not the proceedings had been concluded within the stipulated period of four months granted by this Court in the order passed on the previous round of litigation arising from CWJC No.4606 of 1994 present at running page 129 of the writ proceedings. 11. Mr. Singh, learned counsel appearing for 'the Board' taking pains has demonstrated before this Court that not only the order of dismissal had the sanction of 'the Board' in its meeting so held, even the proceedings have been held in obedience of the direction of this Court. An affidavit to such effect was filed in the present proceedings on 11.12.2017 enclosing the Board's resolution taken in its meeting held on 16.03.1999 which at Agenda No.13 endorses the order of the Chairman to dismiss the petitioner. The affidavit also explains that the proceedings were conducted within the stipulated period. Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the affidavit informs that the Inquiry Officer was appointed on 10.11.1998 and who submitted his report on 13.02.1999 well within the period of four months given by this Court. The circumstances so discussed would confirm that the proceedings had been conducted in the manner prescribed with due opportunity of representation to the petitioner and has also been concluded within the stipulated period. 12. Mr. The circumstances so discussed would confirm that the proceedings had been conducted in the manner prescribed with due opportunity of representation to the petitioner and has also been concluded within the stipulated period. 12. Mr. Ojha, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner now adverting to the merits of the contest has taken this Court through the memo of charges which are 8 in number to submit that a cursory glance of each of the charges would confirm that it is the dispute relating to Sri Sarva Mangla Devi Trust, Gulzarbagh, Patna City on its status as a private/public trust which was the foundation of the proceeding and it is in reference thereto that the petitioner has not only be charged of abusing his official position to influence the matter but is also charged with deriving benefits therefrom which, according to 'the Board', was not lawfully permissible. 13. Mr. Ojha has taken this Court through the exhaustive reply given by the petitioner to each of the charges, a copy of which is at Annexure 11 and equally exhaustive report of the Inquiry Officer on remand of the matter by this Court present at Annexure 29 to the writ petition as well as the order passed by the Chairman thereon, the second show cause reply filed by the petitioner at running page 188 to submit that even when the petitioner had clarified each of the allegations to demonstrate that the allegation of misconduct was based on no evidence rather it is on vague charge that the petitioner was being proceeded but neither the Inquiry Officer has bothered to examine the response while rejecting the same and mechanically upholding the stand of 'the Board', even the Disciplinary Authority i.e. the Chairman of 'the Board' has failed in his duty to deal with the defence of the petitioner before he proceeded to reject the same by the order impugned dated 06.03.1999 upholding the dismissal order dated 19.04.1994. 14. Mr. Shekhar Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of 'the Board' did make a rather serious attempt to salvage the situation by referring to the charges which, according to him, were involving serious financial irregularities as well demonstrated a blatant abuse of power by an officer of 'the Board'. Mr. 14. Mr. Shekhar Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of 'the Board' did make a rather serious attempt to salvage the situation by referring to the charges which, according to him, were involving serious financial irregularities as well demonstrated a blatant abuse of power by an officer of 'the Board'. Mr. Singh has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court reported (National Fertilizers Ltd. vs. P.K. Khanna, (2005) 7 SCC 597 ), paragraph 13 to submit that an objection of an incorrect appreciation of the objections taken by a delinquent in the order of the Disciplinary Authority has been held not sufficient enough to warrant a judicial review. 15. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that in the nature of the disposal made by the Chairman to an issue which involves an extreme penalty of dismissal, I would only observe that the discharge is mechanical and does not reflect a minimal application of mind. When this Court remitted the matter for fresh disposal it reminded the Disciplinary Authority that he had not discharged his duty in the manner prescribed. It is unfortunate that despite such reminder to the Chairman yet he has failed in his duty as a Disciplinary Authority to record his conclusion with supportive reasons. 16. It is bearing note of this serious lapse that this Court has not entered into the thickets of the inter-party contest nor has expressed opinion whether or not the evidences were sufficient for upholding the charge because there is no such finding of the Disciplinary Authority to such effect. This Court certainly cannot plug the loop-holes kept wide open by the Chairman while passing his order on the disciplinary proceeding and upholding the order of dismissal which is absolutely silent on reasons. 17. The principles so advocated by Mr. Shekhar Singh on limit of judicial review in such matters cannot be contested but then the judgment relied upon by Mr. Singh to canvass this point in my opinion does not apply to the present case because the present case is not a case of incorrect appreciation by the Disciplinary Authority rather there is no appreciation at all. Shekhar Singh on limit of judicial review in such matters cannot be contested but then the judgment relied upon by Mr. Singh to canvass this point in my opinion does not apply to the present case because the present case is not a case of incorrect appreciation by the Disciplinary Authority rather there is no appreciation at all. The case in hand is a case of non-consideration of the issue raised by the delinquent in his response to the charge memo as well as in the second show cause reply, either by the Inquiry Officer or the Chairman as the Disciplinary Authority while mechanically rejecting the reply. 18. For the purpose of elucidating the manner of discharge expected of a Disciplinary Authority as well as the importance of recording reasons in an order passed in discharge of quasi-judicial functions I am persuaded to make reference to some of the opinion expressed by the Supreme Court: 19. The Supreme Court in a judgment reported in (Chairman & Managing Director, United Commercial Bank vs. P.C. Kakkar, (2003) 4 SCC 364 ) while dealing with the issue has recorded its opinion at paragraphs 15 as under: "15. It needs no emphasis that when a court feels that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, it must record reasons for coming to such a conclusion. Mere expression that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate would not meet the requirement of law. Even in respect of administrative orders Lord Denning, M.R. in Breen v. Amalgamated Engg. Union observed : (All ER p. 1154h) "The giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration." In Alexander Machinery (dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree it was observed: "Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision-taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at." Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the "inscrutable face of the sphinx", it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking out. The "inscrutable face of a sphinx" is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance. But as noted above, the proceedings commenced in 1981. The employee was placed under suspension from 1983 to 1988 and has superannuated in 2002. Acquittal in the criminal case is not determinative of the commission of misconduct or otherwise, and it is open to the authorities to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings, notwithstanding acquittal in the criminal case. It per se would not entitle the employee to claim immunity from the proceedings. At the most the factum of acquittal may be a circumstance to be considered while awarding punishment. It would depend upon the facts of each case and even that cannot have universal application." 20. The Supreme Court in a case reported in (Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank, (2009) 2 SCC 570 ) has observed at paragraph 23 as thus: "23. Furthermore, the order of the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority are not supported by any reason. As the orders passed by them have severe civil consequences, appropriate reasons should have been assigned. If the enquiry officer had relied upon the confession made by the appellant, there was no reason as to why the order of discharge passed by the criminal court on the basis of selfsame evidence should not have been taken into consideration. The materials brought on record pointing out the guilt are required to be proved. A decision must be arrived at on some evidence, which is legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence Act may not be applicable in a departmental proceeding but the principles of natural justice are. As the report of the enquiry officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also surmises and conjectures, the same could not have been sustained. The inferences drawn by the enquiry officer apparently were not supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof." 21. The inferences drawn by the enquiry officer apparently were not supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as is well known, however high may be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof." 21. The Supreme Court in a judgment reported in (Kranti Associates Private Limited vs. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496) while explaining the importance of recording reasons by an authority performing quasi-judicial functions in reference to different judgments at paragraphs 41 to 46 has summarized the discussion at paragraph 47 in the following manner: "47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds: (a) In India the judicial trends has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts. (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or "rubber-stamp reasons" is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor32.) (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions". (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "due process". 22. Again in a judgment reported in (Ravi Yashwant Bhoir vs. District Collector Raigad, (2012) 4 SCC 407 ), the Supreme Court has, after referring to the earlier opinions and while endorsing the settled principles of law that even in administrative matters it is incumbent upon the authorities to pass a speaking and reasoned order in paragraphs 39 to 45 concluded at paragraph 46 as follows: "46.The emphasis on recording reason is that if the decision reveals the "inscrutable face of the sphinx", it can by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system, reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind of the authority before the court. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system, reasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind of the authority before the court. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out the reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking out. The inscrutable face of the sphinx is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance." 23. Having discussed the legal position settled by the Supreme Court on the duty of an authority performing quasijudicial functions specially where it decides inter-party rights whether on its administrative discharge or in a disciplinary proceeding more particularly where it results in an order of dismissal, it is to be seen whether the Chairman acting as the Disciplinary Authority has done a valid discharge of his duty while passing the impugned order. For the purpose I am persuaded to reproduce the relevant extract of the order dated 06.03.1999 impugned at Annexure 2 which is self eloquent and reflective of the fact that the Chairman of the respondent-Board has completely failed in his duty as a Disciplinary Authority to approve the order of dismissal while rejecting the explanation given by the petitioner because the rejection is mechanical, does not accompany reasons and does not reflect even the minimal application of mind. 24. I am conscious of the limited interference by this Court in disciplinary matters but then the Disciplinary Authority cannot be permitted to get away by passing an order which do not satisfy the requisites of even the minimal application of mind to discuss the evidence which connects the petitioner to the alleged charge or accompany reasons which explicitly demonstrates why the objections taken by the delinquent has been rejected. 25. For the reasons so discussed, I am unable to uphold the order dated 06.03.1999 of the Chairman of 'the Board' impugned at Annexure 2 which goes on to approve the order of dismissal dated 19.04.1994 impugned at Annexure 1 to the writ petition. As a consequence the orders dated 19.04.1994 and 06.03.1999 impugned at Annexures 1 and 2 respectively are quashed and set aside. As a consequence the orders dated 19.04.1994 and 06.03.1999 impugned at Annexures 1 and 2 respectively are quashed and set aside. The matter is remitted to the Chairman of 'the Board' to pass an order afresh, in accordance with law bearing in mind the observations of this Court made hereinabove as well as the legal position so settled on the nature of his duty as a Disciplinary Authority. 26. Since it is entirely due to lapse of the Chairman of the respondent-Board that the matter is again being remitted to him for correction of his mistake, this Court would give him three months time to discharge his obligation. Let such order be passed expeditiously and preferably within three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this judgment. 27. The writ petition is allowed with the directions above.