JUDGMENT : Prakash Gupta, J. ekuuh; U;k;kf/kifr xqIrk & ;g flfoy fofo/k vihy varxZr vkns'k fu;e 1¼vkj½ lh-ih-lh- vihykFkhZ@vizkFkhZ }kjk U;k;ky; ftyk U;k;k/kh'k] >qU>quw¼ftls bl vkns'k esa vkxs v/khuLFk U;k;ky; lEcksf/kr fd;k tkosxk½ }kjk nhokuh fofo/k izkFkZuk i= la[;k 113@2013 es ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 18-07-2016 ds fo:) izLrqr dh xbZ gS] ftlds }kjk izR;FkhZx.k@oknhx.k dk izkFkZuk i= vLFkk;h fu"ks/kkKk Lohdkj fd;k x;k FkkA 2- izR;FkhZx.k@oknhx.k@izkFkhZx.k us vihykFkhZ@izfroknh@vizkFkhZ ds fo:) okn ckcr lafonk dh fofufnZ"V vuqikyuk o fu"k/kkKk izLrqr fd;kA ftlds lkFk izkFkZuk i= vLFkk;h fu"ks/kkKk izLrqr fd;k x;kA izR;FkhZx.k@izkFkhZx.k ds vuqlkj okni= ds vuqlkj okni= ds iSjk la[;k 2 esa of.kZr d`f"k Hkwfe dks vihykFkhZ@vizkFkhZ us dqy foØ; izfrQy 1]72]57]500@& :i;s es foØ; djus dk bdjkj djrs gq, foØ; izfrQy es ls 21 yk[k :i;s vfxze izkIr dj ,d bdjkjukek fnukad 03-08-2012 dks izR;FkhZx.k@izkFkhZx.k ds i{k esa fu"ikfnr fd;kA izR;FkhZx.k@izkFkhZx.k }kjk vihykFkhZ@vizkFkhZ dks bl vk'k; dh vLFk;h fu"ks/kkKk ls izfrcaf/kr djus dh izkFkZuk dh xbZ fd og fookfnr Hkwfe dks okn ds fopkjk/khu jgus ds nkSjku fdlh Hkh izdkj ls fdlh r`rh; i{k dks LFkkukUrfjr ugha djsA 3- izkFkZuk i= vLFkk;h fu"ks/kkKk ds tokc es vihykFkhZ@vizkFkhZ us okni= ds iSjk la[;k 2 esa of.kZr Hkwfe dk lkSnk dqy foØ; izfrQy 1]72]57]500@& :i esa gksuk o bl isVs vfxze 21 yk[k :I;s izkIr djuk o bdjkjukek fnukad 03-08-2012 dks fu"ikfnr fd;k tkuk Lohdkj fd;k djrs gq, eq[;r% ;g vkifŸk yh fd fookfnr Hkw[k.M vihykFkhZ@vizkFkhZ ;k mlds firk ds uke vfHkys[k esa ntZ ugh gksus ls bdjkjukek fnukad 03-08-2012 dh ikyuk djk;k tkus ;ksX; ugha gSA izR;FkhZx.k@izkFkhZx.k mDr bdjkjukes dh ikyuk djus gsrq bPNqd o rRij ugha Fks] u gS] bu dkj.kks ls mDr bdjkjuke dh fofufn"V vuqikyuk ugh djk;h tk ldrhA 4- ;ksX; ofj"B vf/koDrk vihykFkhZ@vizkFkhZ Jh ,e-,e-jatu dk rdZ gS fd fookfnr Hkwfe dk lkSnk dqy foØ; izfrQy 1]72]57]500@& :i;s es gqvk Fkk ftlds isVs Lohd`r :i ls izR;FkhZx.k@izkFkhZx.k us dsoy 21 yk[k vnk fd, x, FksA izR;FkhZx.k@izkFkhZx.k 'ks"k foØ; izfrQy jkf'k vnk djus dks bPNqd o RkRij Fks o bPNqd o rRij gS] ;g i=koyh ij miyC/k lkexzh ls izFke n`"V;k izekf.kr ugha gSA blds vykok jktLo vfHkys[k esa fookfnr Hkwfe vihykFkhZ@vizkFkhZ o mlds firk ds uke ntZ ugha gksus ls bdjkjukek fnukad 03-08-2012 dkuwuu izorZuh; ugha gSA 5- bldk fojks/k djrs gq, ;ksX; ofj"B vf/koDrk Jh ts-ih-xks;y dk rdZ gS fd bdjkjukek fnukad 03-08-2012 dk fu"iknu vihykFkhZ@izfroknh }kjk tokc esa Lohdkj fd;k x;k gS lkFk gh mlds }kjk mDr bdjkjukes dh vkaf'kd ikyuk esa 21 yk[k :i;s vfxze izkIr fd;k tkuk Hkh Lohdkj fd;k x;k gSA vihykFkhZ }kjk ;g dguk fd fookfnr Hkwfe mlds o mlds firk ds uke vfHkys[k esa ntZ ugha gS] ;g bl Lrj ij fopkj.kh; ugha gSA mUgksusa bl ckcr U;kf;d n`"Vkar nhukukFk cuke pqUuhyky] vkj-,y-MCY;w 1974 ist 383 dk voyEc fy;kA 6- geus nksuksa i{kks ds vf/koDrkx.k }kjk j[ks x, ijLij fojks/kh rdksZ ij fopkj fd;k o vk{ksfir vkns'k o lkFk gh lkFk miyC/k lEiw.kZ vfHkys[k dk /;kuiwoZd voyksdu o ifj'khyu fd;Ka 7- bl lqLFkkfir U;kf;d fLFkfr ds ckjs esa dksbZ fookn ugha fd;k tk ldrk fd v/khuLFk U;k;ky; }kjk vLFkk;h fu”ks/kkKk ds izkFkZuk i= esa ikfjr foosdh;¼fMLØs'kujh½ vkns'k esa lkekU;r;k vihyh; U;k;ky; dks gLr{ksi ugha djuk pkfg,A ,sls vkns'k esa vihyh; U;k;ky; dk gLr{ksi rHkh okaNuh; gS tc og izdV gksrk gks fd og euekuk ¼vkjcsVªh½] LosPNkpkjh¼dsijhf'k;l½ o izfrdwy ¼izholZ½ gS o i=koyh ij miyC/k lkexzh ij fopkj fd;s fcuk ikfjr fd;k x;k gSA tSlk fd ekuuh; loksZPp U;k;ky; }kjk eksgEen esgrkc [kku oxSjk cuke [kq'kuqek bczkfge [ku oxSjk ¼2013½ 9 ,llhlh 221 fof/kd n`"Vkar esa vfHkfu/kkZfjr fd;k x;k gSA bl lac/k esa bl U;kf;d n`"Vkar dk iSjk 20 fuEu izdkj gS "In a situation where the learned Trial Court on a consideration of the respective cases of the parties and the documents laid before it was of the view that the entitlement of the plaintiffs to an order of interim mandatory injunction was in serious doubt, the Appellate Court could not have interfered with the exercise of discretion by the learned Trial Judge unless such exercise was found to be palpably incorrect or untenable. The reasons that weighed with the learned Trial Judge, as already noticed, according to us, do not indicate that the view taken is not a possible view. The Appellate Court, therefore, should not have substituted its views in the matter merely on the ground that in its opinion the facts of the case call for a different conclusion. Such an exercise is not the correct parameter for exercise of jurisdiction while hearing an appeal against a discretionary order. While we must not be understood to have said that the Appellate Court was wrong in its conclusions what is sought to be emphasized is that as long as the view of the Trial Court was a possible view the Appellate Court should not have interfered with the same following the virtually settled principles of law in this regard as laid down by this Court in Wander Ltd. vs. Antox India (P) Ltd." 8- izfroknh@vihykFkhZ us fookfnr Hkwfe dk cspku oknhx.k@izR;FkhZx.k dks dqy 1]72]57]500@& : es fd;k tkuk] mlds isVs 21 yk[k :i;s vfxze izkIr fd;k tkuk vkSj bl ckcr bdjkjukek fnukad 03-08-2012 dks fu"ikfnr fd;k tkuk Lohdkj fd;k gSA bl Lrj ij izFke n`"V;k ,slh dksbZ lkexzh vfHkys[k ij ugh gS ftlls izFke n`"V~;k ;g izdV gksrk gS fd oknhx.k@izR;FkhZx.k lafonk ds vius Hkkx dh ikyuk djus dks bPNqd o rRij ugha Fkk ;k ugha gSA izdj.k ds rF;ksa o ifjfLFkfr;ksa o i=koyh ij miyC/k lkexzh dks n`f"Vxr j[krs gq, ;g fcUnq Hkh nksuks i{kks dh lk{; fy, fcuk bl Lrj ij r; ugha fd;k tk ldrkA 9- tgka rd fookfnr Hkwfe dk vihykFkhZ@vizkFkhZ o mlds firk ds uke ntZ ugha gksus ls bdjkjukek dkuwuu izorZuh; ugha gksus dk iz'u gS] ;g U;k;ky; bl fuf'pr er dk gS fd ;g iz'u rks bl Lrj ij drbZ fopkj.kh; ugh gSA f}rh; lafonk dh fofufnZ"V vuqikyuk ds okn esa foØsrk }kjk bl vk'k; dh vkifŸk dh csph xbZ laifŸk dk LoRo mlds ikl ugha Fkk ;k LoRo =qfViw.kZ Fkk] fd izfrj{kk xkS.k gSA gekjs bl er dh iqf"V izR;FkhZ ds vf/koDrk }kjk izLrqr U;kf;d n`"Vkar ls gksrh gS ftldk lqlaxr iSjk la-6 fuEu izdkj gS%& 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, and, in my opinion, the enquiry by the trial Court on the question whether the suit land was ancestral m the hands of the defendant or whether the defendant was entitled to sell the suit land was wholly irrelevant in the present case. The plaintiff in his plaint has nowhere asserted that Ex. A/1 though executed by the defendant was also binding on his adult sons and his wife. In the absence of such assertion in the plaint, it was not open to the trial Court to go into the question that the defendant had defective title as the suit land was ancestral and the defendant was owner of one fourth share only. In my opinion, the vendor cannot be permitted to set UD a defence in a suit for specific performance brought by the purchaser that he had no title or had defective title to the property which he had agreed to sell. In support of my view I place reliance on Mir Abdul Hakeem Khan vs. Abdul Mannan Khadri, AIR 1972 Andh Pra 178; Baluswami Aiyar vs. Lakshmana Aiyar, AIR 1921 Mad 172 (FB) and Muni Samapoa vs. Gurunaniappa, AIR 1950 Mad 90 . It was observed by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Baluswami Aiyar's case (supra): "Where a person sues for specific performance of an agreement to convey and simply impleads the party bound to carry out the agreement there is no necessity to determine the question of the vendor's title, and the fact that the title which the purchaser may acquire might be defeasible by a third party is no ground for refusing specific performance if the purchaser is willing to take such title as the vendor has. But where a party seeking specific performance seeks to bind the interests of persons not parties to the contract alleging grounds which under Hindu Law would bind their interests and enable the vendor to give a good title as against them and make them parties, it is difficult to see how the question as to the right of contracting parties to convey any interest except his own can be avoided and a decree passed the effect of which will merely be to create a multiplicity of suits." In the present case, there is no question of the plaintiff's attempting to bind the interests of his two adult son or his wife as there was neither any such allegation made in the plaint nor they were impleaded parties to the suit. The only party to the agreement and the suit being the defendant, it is unnecessary to determine the rights of the persons who are not parties before the Court. In Muni Samappa's case. AIR 1950 Mad 90 (supra) the suit for specific performance was brought by the purchaser against the executants of the agreement to sell a house, It was held that there was no necessity to determine the question of the vendor's title, and the fact that the title which the purchaser may acquire, might be defeasible by sons of defendants was no ground for refusing specific performance if the purchaser was willing to take such title as the vendors had. The same principle was followed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Mir Abdul Hakeem Khan's case, AIR 1972 Andh Pra 178 (supra). 10- bl izdkj v/khuLFk U;k;ky; us ;g ekuus esa fd vLFkk;h fu"ks/kkKk tkjh djus gsrq izR;FkhZx.k@izkFkhZx.k ds i{k esa izFke n`"V;k dsl] lqfo/kk dk larqyu o ifjfer {kfr ds fcUnq izekf.kr gS] fdlh Hkh izdkj dh dksbZ =qfV dkfjr ugha dh gS ,oa v/khuLFk U;k;ky; us bl lac/ka esa i=koyh ij miyC/k lEiw.kZ lkexzh ij fopkj dj foosdh; vkns'k ikfjr fd;k gS tks fdlh Hkh izdkj ls euekuk] LosPNkpkjh¼dSijhf'k;l½ o izfrdwy ugha dgk tk ldrkA mijksDr foospu ls ;g vihy lkjghu gksus ls ,rn}kjk fujLr dh tkrh gSA