JUDGMENT : A. HARIPRASAD, J. 1. Rule 58(7) of the Kerala State Waqf Rules, 2019 (in short, “the Rules”) is the subject matter of challenge alleging that it is beyond the legislative competence of the State Government and it is in excess of the delegated legislative power under Section 109 of the Waqf Act, 1995 (in short, “the Act”). It is also contended that the said rule violates Section 16 of the Act too. Petitioners therefore contended that Rule 58(7) of the Rules is ultra vires of the parent Act and is liable to be struck down. 2. Petitioners are members of the Kerala State Waqf Board (hereinafter referred to as “the Board”). 1st petitioner has been elected from among the mutawallis in the State. He was an elected member in the previous Board also. 2nd petitioner was also elected from among the mutawallis and he had been elected twice previously to the Board. Term of the current Board expires on 20.10.2019. State Government, purportedly drawing power from Section 109(1) of the Act, notified the Rules including Rule 58(7) for providing a bar on re-election of the Board members, who had been members for two consecutive terms. It is alleged that the said rule has been inserted in order to accommodate the sympathisers and supporters of the ruling political party and to oust those who oppose the present political dispensation. It is also contended that the rule is in conflict with Section 16 of the Act which lays down the disqualifications of a person for being appointed or for continuing as a member of the Board. 3. Petitioners contended that the District Collector, Ernakulam used to be the Returning Officer in charge of the elections to the State Waqf Board. According to them, there are more than a thousand mutawallis in Kerala. They are eligible to cast their votes. 1st petitioner was first elected to the Board from among the mutawallis in the year 2008 along with the 2nd petitioner, who then was in his second turn. 2nd petitioner was first elected to the Board from among the mutawallis in the year 2003.The current Board came into office on 20.10.2014 whereby the petitioners were re-elected as members. 1st respondent, vide G.O.(MS) No.8/2019 dated 07.01.2019, in suppression of the Kerala Waqf Rules, 1996, made the present Rules. The State Government made several changes to the previous Rules. 2nd petitioner was first elected to the Board from among the mutawallis in the year 2003.The current Board came into office on 20.10.2014 whereby the petitioners were re-elected as members. 1st respondent, vide G.O.(MS) No.8/2019 dated 07.01.2019, in suppression of the Kerala Waqf Rules, 1996, made the present Rules. The State Government made several changes to the previous Rules. According to them, addition of Rule 58(7) is with a malafide intention. Ext.P1 is the copy of the Rules. With these allegations the petitioners seek the following reliefs: “i. Issue an appropriate writ declaring that Rule 58(7) of the Kerala Waqf Rules, 2019 is beyond the legislative competence of State and in excess of the delegated legislation; ii. Issue a writ, order or direction, declaring that the Rule 58(7) of the Kerala Waqf Rules, 2019, is ultra-vires of the Indian Constitution; iii. Issue a writ, order or direction, declaring that the Rule 58(7) of the Kerala Waqf Rules, 2019, is ultra-vires the Waqf Act, 1995; iv. Issue a writ, order or direction, declaring that the petitioners are eligible to be re-elected or nominated as members of the Kerala State Waqf Board irrespective of the bar sought to be introduced through Rule 58(7) of Kerala Waqf Rules, 2019; v. Grant such other reliefs as this Court deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 4. Respondents 1 and 2 filed a counter statement opposing the petition. They contended that none of the grounds stated for granting the prayers is valid. The rule is well within the legislative competence of the State Government and not violative of any provision of the Constitution of India. It is not in excess of the powers conferred on the State by the Act. Rule 58(7) is within the permissible limits of the rule making power as provided in Section 109 of the Act. A perusal of the relevant provisions in Section 109 of the Act would show that the State Government's rule making power is traceable to Section 109(2)(xxv) of the Act, which is wide enough to take in inter alia the impugned rule too. A perusal of the relevant provisions in Section 109 of the Act would show that the State Government's rule making power is traceable to Section 109(2)(xxv) of the Act, which is wide enough to take in inter alia the impugned rule too. It must also be noted that Sub-section (2) of Section 109 of the Act is of a wide and general amplitude as it employs a language such as “without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing powers” and allows the State Government to frame rules “to carry out purposes of the Act”. In support of the case set up by the respondents, certain authorities are cited, which shall be dealt with hereunder. 5. On behalf of the 3rd respondent, a counter affidavit has been filed. From the tenor of the averments in the counter affidavit, it can be seen that the Board takes a neutral stance and does not seriously challenge the averments in the petition. 6. Heard Sri.George Poonthottam, learned senior counsel for the petitioners, Sri.K.V.Sohan, learned State Attorney for respondents 1 and 2 and Sri.T.P.Sajid, learned Standing Counsel for the Waqf Board. For a full and final adjudication of the case, we allowed the petition filed by two persons, who are said to be mutawallis, as I.A.No.1 of 2019 to get themselves impleaded as additional respondents 5 and 6. Heard Sri.Paul Kuriakose, learned counsel for the additional respondents. The contention of the petitioners that the Rule under challenge is unconstitutional is not pressed at the hearing. 7. Fact that the petitioners are members of the existing Board is not in dispute. Section 14 of the Act speaks about the composition of the Board. It reads as follows: “14. Heard Sri.Paul Kuriakose, learned counsel for the additional respondents. The contention of the petitioners that the Rule under challenge is unconstitutional is not pressed at the hearing. 7. Fact that the petitioners are members of the existing Board is not in dispute. Section 14 of the Act speaks about the composition of the Board. It reads as follows: “14. Composition of Board.-(1) The Board for a State and the National Capital Territory of Delhi shall consist of- (a) a Chair person; (b) one and not more than two members, as the State Government may think fit, to be elected from each of the electoral colleges consisting of - (i) Muslim Members of Parliament from the State or, as the case may be, the National Capital Territory of Delhi, (ii) Muslim Members of the State Legislature, (iii) Muslim members of the Bar Council of the concerned State or Union territory; Provided that in case there is no Muslim member of the Bar Council of a State or a Union territory, the State Government or the Union territory administration, as the case may be, may nominate any senior Muslim advocate from that State or the Union territory, and; (iv) mutawallis of the auqafs having an annual income of rupees one lakh and above. Explanation I.-For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the members from categories mentioned in sub-clauses (i) to (iv), shall be elected from the electoral college constituted for each category. Explanation I.-For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the members from categories mentioned in sub-clauses (i) to (iv), shall be elected from the electoral college constituted for each category. Explanation II.-For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that in case a Muslim member ceases to be a Member of Parliament from the State or National Capital Territory of Delhi as referred to in sub-clause (i) of clause (b) or ceases to be a Member of the State Legislative Assembly as required under sub-clause (ii) of clause (b), such member shall be deemed to have vacated the office of the member of the Board for the State or National Capital Territory of Delhi, as the case may be, from the date from which such member ceased to be a Member of Parliament from the State or National Capital Territory of Delhi, or a Member of the State Legislative Assembly, as the case may be; (c) one person from amongst Muslims, who has professional experience in town planning or business management, social work, finance or revenue, agriculture and development activities, to be nominated by the State Government; (d) one person each from amongst Muslims, to be nominated by the State Government from recognised scholars in Shia and Sunni Islamic Theology; (e) one person from amongst Muslims, to be nominated by the State Government from amongst the officers of the State Government not below the rank of Joint Secretary to the State Government; (1-A) No Minister of the Central Government or, as the case may be, a State Government, shall be elected or nominated as a member of the Board : Provided that in case of a Union territory, the Board shall consist of not less than five and not more than seven members to be appointed by the Central Government from categories specified under sub-clauses (i) to (iv) of clause (b) or clauses(c) to (e) in sub-section (1) : Provided further that at least two Members appointed on the Board shall be women : Provided also that in every case where the system of mutawalli exists, there shall be one mutawalli as the member of the Board. (2) Election of the members specified in clause (b) of subsection (1) shall be held in accordance with the system of proportional representation by means of a single transferable vote, in such manner as may be prescribed : Provided that where the number of Muslim Members of Parliament, the State Legislature or the State Bar Council, as the case may be, is only one, such Muslim Member shall be declared to have been elected on the Board : Provided further that where there are no Muslim Members in any of the categories mentioned in sub-clauses (i) to (iii) of clause (b) of sub-section (1), the ex-Muslim Members of Parliament, the State Legislature or ex-member of the State Bar Council, as the case may be, shall constitute the electoral college. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where the State Government is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded in writing, that it is not reasonably practicable to constitute an electoral college for any of the categories mentioned in sub-clauses (i) to (iii) of clause (b) of sub-section (1), the State Government may nominate such persons as the members of the Board as it deems fit. (4) The number of elected members of the Board shall, at all times, be more than the nominated members of the Board except as provided under sub-section (3) *** (6) In determining the number of Shia members or Sunni members of the Board, the State Government shall have regard to the number and value of Shia auqafs and Sunni auqafs to be administered by the Board and appointment of the members shall be made, so far as may be, in accordance with such determination. *** (8) Whenever the Board is constituted or re-constituted, the members of the Board present at a meeting convened for the purpose shall elect one from amongst themselves as the Chairperson of the Board. (9) The members of the Board shall be appointed by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette.” 8. *** (8) Whenever the Board is constituted or re-constituted, the members of the Board present at a meeting convened for the purpose shall elect one from amongst themselves as the Chairperson of the Board. (9) The members of the Board shall be appointed by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette.” 8. On a careful scrutiny of the above provision, it can be seen that the Board consists of a Chairperson, one and not more than two members, as the State Government may think fit to be elected from each of the electoral colleges, consisting of Muslim members of the Parliament for the State, Muslim members of the State Legislature, Muslim members of the Bar Council of the State and mutawallis of the waqfs having an annual income of `1,00,000/-and above. It can also be seen that one person from amongst Muslims having professional experience in town planning or business management, social work, finance or revenue, agriculture and development activities has to be nominated by the State Government. Besides, from amongst Muslims one person each has to be nominated by the State Government from recognised scholars in Shia and Sunni Islamic theology. Further, one person from amongst Muslims is to be nominated by the State Government from officers of the State Government not below the rank of a Joint Secretary to the Government. Restrictions for Ministers of the Central Government or the State Government for being elected or nominated are also contained in this provision. For this case, we need only consider the aspect that not more than two members from amongst mutawallis of waqfs having an annual income of `1,00,000/-and above are to be elected from the electoral college constituted. 9. It is pointed out by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that term of the present Board is to expire on 20.10.2019. Section 15 of the Act prescribes a term of office for the members of the Board as five years from the date of notification referred to in Section 14 of the Act. 10. Now we shall turn to Section 16 of the Act which deals with disqualifications for being appointed or for continuing as a member of the Board. It reads as follows: “16. 10. Now we shall turn to Section 16 of the Act which deals with disqualifications for being appointed or for continuing as a member of the Board. It reads as follows: “16. Disqualification for being appointed, or for continuing as, a member of the Board.-A person shall be disqualified for being appointed, or for continuing as, a member of the Board if - (a) he is not a Muslim and is less than twenty-one years of age; (b) he is found to be a person of unsound mind; (c) he is an undischarged insolvent; (d) he has been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude and such conviction has not been reversed or he has not been granted full pardon in respect of such offence; (da) he has been held guilty of encroachment on any waqf property; (e) he has been on a previous occasion - (i) removed from his office as a member or as a mutawalli, or (ii) removed by an order of a competent Court or Tribunal from any position of trust either for mismanagement or for corruption.” The petitioners pointedly contended that the State Government has no authority to delete or add or in any manner expand the grounds for disqualifying a person for being appointed or for continuing as a member of the Board. Indisputably, this enactment falls within List III -Concurrent list, specified in Article 246 of the Constitution of India. Sri.George Poonthottam vehementally argued that the provision in Rule 58(7) of the Rules, that no member of the Board shall be eligible for re-nomination or re-election for more than two terms consecutively, will have the effect of adding one more ground of disqualification to Section 16 of the Act, which will be ultra vires of the power derived by the State Government through delegation. 11. Per contra, Sri.K.V.Sohan argued that on a perusal of the other limbs in Rule 58, it will be clear that Sub-rule (7) of Rule 58 goes well with the remaining provisions relating to declaration of election of certain members. 12. Although the challenge is only against Sub-rule (7) of Rule 58 of the Rules, it will be profitable to quote the entire Rule 58 for clarity of expression. “58. 12. Although the challenge is only against Sub-rule (7) of Rule 58 of the Rules, it will be profitable to quote the entire Rule 58 for clarity of expression. “58. Declaration of election of certain members.-(1) Where the number of Muslim Members of Parliament, the State Legislature or the State Bar Council, as the case may be, is less than or equal to the number of members to be elected from each category, such Muslim Member shall be declared to have been elected on the Board. (2) Where the number of Muslim Members of Parliament, the State Legislature or the State Bar Council, as the case may be, is only one, such Muslim Member shall be declared to have been elected on the Board and the remaining vacancy shall be filled in the manner referred to in sub-rule (3). (3) Where the person declared to have been elected under sub-rule (1) or sub-rule (2) is not willing to serve as a member of the Board or such member is only one, the Government may after recording its reasons fill the vacancies by nominating such persons as the members of the Board as it deems fit under subsection (1) of section 14. (4) Where there are no Muslim Members in any of the categories mentioned in sub-clauses (i) to (iv) of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 14, the ex-Muslim Members of Parliament, the State Legislature or ex-member of the State Bar Council, as the case may be, shall constitute the electoral college of the Parliament, the State Legislature, the State Bar Council, as the case may be, (5) Where the number of electors, in each category under sub-rule (4) is less than or equal to the number of members to be elected from each category such Muslim Members shall be declared to have been elected on the Board. (6) Where the person declared to have been elected under sub-rule (5) is not willing to serve as a member of the Board or such member is only one, the Government may after recording its reason fill the vacancies by nominating such persons as the member of the Board under sub-section (3) of section 14. (7) No member of the Board shall be eligible for re nomination or re-election for more than two terms consecutively.” 13. (7) No member of the Board shall be eligible for re nomination or re-election for more than two terms consecutively.” 13. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, we deem it fit to reproduce the relevant part of Section 109 of the Act too: “109. Power to make rules.-(1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules to carry out the purposes of this Act, other than those of Chapter III. (2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing powers, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely : xxxxx (iv) the manner of election of members of the Board by means of a single transferable vote, under sub-section (2) of section 14; xxxxx (xxv) any other matter which is required to be, or may be, prescribed.” 14. In this context, we have to consider the plea raised by the interveners also. According to Sri.Paul Kuriakose, Section 109(2)(iv), which says that the State Government may make rules providing for the manner of election of members of the Board by means of a single transferable vote under Section 14(2) of the Act, gives an elbow room for the State Government to restrict re-election of the past members. According to him, Rule 58(7) of the Rules does not prescribe a disqualification. It works out only as a temporary measure to keep away a member, who had served the Board for more than two terms consecutively, that too for one term only. And, this clause is intended to provide opportunity to all eligible persons from that electoral college to be members of the Board. It is also pointed out that Rule 58(7) of the Rules, if allowed to operate, will be in tune with the valued democratic principles. 15. Let us examine the scope of delegation of legislative power. Section 3(51) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 contains definition of the term “rule” in the following words; rule shall be meant a rule made in exercise of a power conferred by any enactment and shall include a regulation made under any enactment. Consistent with their sovereign character, the legislatures of India posses wide powers of delegation.(see Rajnarain Singh v. Chairman, Patna Administration Committee - AIR 1954 SC 569 ). Consistent with their sovereign character, the legislatures of India posses wide powers of delegation.(see Rajnarain Singh v. Chairman, Patna Administration Committee - AIR 1954 SC 569 ). However, the legislature cannot delegate its function of laying down legislative policy in respect of a measure and its formation as a rule of conduct. The legislature must declare the policy of law and the legal principles which are to control any given case. The essential legislative function consists in the determination or choice of the legislative policy and functions, which consist in determination or choice of the legislative policy and of formally enacting that policy into a binding rule of conduct (see Harishankar Bagla v. The State of Madhya Pradesh - AIR 1954 SC 465 ). 16. What is permitted, therefore, is the delegation of ancillary or subordinate legislative functions or what is fictionally called, a power to fill up the details. The legislature may, after laying down the legislative policy, confer discretion on an administrative agency as to the execution of the policy and leave it to the agency to work out the details within the frame work of the policy (see Khambhalia Municipality v. State of Gujarat AIR 1967 SC 1048 ). 17. Delegated legislation is open to scrutiny of the courts. It may be declared invalid on two grounds -(i) violation of the Constitution and (ii) violation of the enabling Act. Second ground includes within itself not only cases of violation of the substantive provisions of the enabling Act, but also cases of violation of the mandatory procedure prescribed. 18. Power to make subordinate legislation is derived from the enabling Act. It is fundamental that the delegate on whom such a power is conferred has to act within the limits of authority conferred by the enactment. Rules cannot be made to supplant the provisions of the enabling Act, but to supplement it. The delegate cannot override the Act either by exceeding the authority or by making provisions inconsistent with the Act. It is also an important fact that the delegate has to exercise the power of making subordinate legislation in accordance with the procedure prescribed, if any. 19. The delegate cannot override the Act either by exceeding the authority or by making provisions inconsistent with the Act. It is also an important fact that the delegate has to exercise the power of making subordinate legislation in accordance with the procedure prescribed, if any. 19. A subordinate legislation may also be struck down as arbitrary if it fails to take into account every vital fact which either expressly or by necessary implication is required to be taken into consideration by the Statute or the Constitution (see Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India - AIR 1986 SC 515 ). 20. It is settled law that in considering the vires of a subordinate legislation one should start with the presumption that it is intra vires. It means that if a subordinate legislation under consideration is open to two constructions, one of which would make it bad and the other good, the courts must adopt that construction which makes it good (see Morvi Municipality v. State of Gujarat - AIR 1993 SC 1508 ). In appropriate cases the court can read down a general provision to avoid its being declared ultra vires. But when a part of the subordinate legislation is admittedly ultra vires, the question arises whether the remaining part can be severed from the invalid part and upheld as valid. In this case, we find no challenge against any provision in the Rules except Rule 58(7). Now, we shall examine the rival contentions. 21. Sri.George Poonthottam contended that if we read the first proviso to Section 14(2) of the Act, it can be seen that the Parliament, in its wisdom, has thought of a contingency where the number of Muslim members of Parliament or State Legislature or State Bar Council, as the case may be, could be one only. Then, such member shall be declared to have been elected on the Board. According to him, if Rule 58(7) is allowed to remain, it will frustrate the above said statutory intendment in a situation where only one person is available in that category and he had served the Board for more than two times consecutively. In otherwords, if one person alone from the above categories is available and he had been elected on the Board two times earlier in succession, then the statutory mandate that he should be declared to have been elected will be defeated. 22. In otherwords, if one person alone from the above categories is available and he had been elected on the Board two times earlier in succession, then the statutory mandate that he should be declared to have been elected will be defeated. 22. It is also pointed out that the second proviso to Section 14(2) of the Act, which says that where there are no Muslim members in any of the categories mentioned in Sub-clauses (i) to (iii) of Clause (b) of Subsection (1) of Section 14, the ex-Muslim members of Parliament, State Legislature or ex-member of the State Bar Council, as the case may be, shall constitute the electoral college also will be violated at times. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 58 of the Rules is in harmony with this provision. However, according to Sri.George Poonthottam, Rule 58(7) is in direct conflict with both the statutory provision and the aforementioned provision in the Rule. It is the contention that in an eventuality envisaged in the aforementioned provision in the Statute and Rule where only one person is available to be elected on the Board, then by operation of Rule 58(7), he will become ineligible for re-nomination or re-election. 23. Sri.George Poonthottam raises another contention that Rule 58(5), which says that where the number of electors in each category under Sub-rule (4) is less than or equal to the number of members to be elected from each category, such Muslim members shall be declared to have been elected on the Board, will become an impossibility if Sub-rule (7) of Rule 58 is allowed to stand. 24. For the above reasons Sri.George Poonthottam argued that Rule 58(7) of the Rules is not only in excess of the State's delegated power, but also it contradicts its own provisions. 25. On a perusal of Rule 24 relating to decision of the Returning Officer on objections, it can be seen that after notification of the election as provided in Rule 21, presentation of nomination paper, etc. as stated in Rule 22 and scrutiny of nominations as per Rule 23, the Returning Officer shall examine the nomination paper and decide all objections which may be made at the time of any nomination. as stated in Rule 22 and scrutiny of nominations as per Rule 23, the Returning Officer shall examine the nomination paper and decide all objections which may be made at the time of any nomination. Either on any such objections or on his own motion, after such summary enquiry, the Returning Officer may reject any nomination on any of the following grounds, viz., (i) that the candidate is ineligible for election under Section 16 of the Act subject to the exceptions mentioned therein and (ii) that the seconder is a person whose name is not registered in the electoral roll. If Rule 58(7) is allowed to stand, it may add one more reason for the Returning Officer to reject the nomination, which, according to the petitioners, is an unjust expansion of the disqualifications provided under Section 16 of the Act. 26. Per contra, Sri.K.V.Sohan, learned State Attorney and Sri.Paul Kuriakose, learned counsel for the additional respondents contended that even if the Returning Officer detects any violation of Rule 58(7), he cannot reject the nomination since that is not a ground enumerated in Rule 24. Viewing from one angle, this itself is an anomaly in the Rules. 27. It is brought to our notice that Section 64 of the Act deals with the grounds for removal of a mutawalli from his office. Section 16(e)(i) of the Act says that a person shall be disqualified for being appointed or for continuing as a member of the Board, if he has been on a previous occasion removed from his office as a member or as a mutawalli. It is clear from Sections 16 and 64 of the Act that certain enumerated stigma attached to a person render him unsuitable to hold or continue in the post of mutawalli and as such he becomes liable to be removed from the office. Reason mentioned in Rule 58(7) can never be said to be a stigma or mark of disgrace. Therefore, we find merit in the argument raised by the petitioners that it may result in denial of rights to certain eligible persons. 28. Reason mentioned in Rule 58(7) can never be said to be a stigma or mark of disgrace. Therefore, we find merit in the argument raised by the petitioners that it may result in denial of rights to certain eligible persons. 28. Sri.George Poonthottam placing reliance on Sales Tax Officer, Ponkunnam and another v. K.I.Abraham ( AIR 1967 SC 1823 ) contended that Section 109 of the Act does not empower the State Government to make rules so as to trench upon the Statute and add further grounds of disqualification to prevent eligible persons from holding the office as members of the Board. He also placed reliance on Kunj Behari Lal Butail and others v. State of H.P. and others ( (2000) 3 SCC 40 ) to contend that the phraseology in Section 109 of the Act will not show any legislative intent of delegating, expressly or by necessary implication, the power to the State Government to enact a provision like Rule 58(7). 29. Refuting these arguments, Sri.K.V.Sohan contended that if Section 109 of the Act is read in its entirety, it will be clear that the State Government has ample powers to make rules in order to carry out the purposes of the Act. According to him, avoidance of creating vested interests in an institution like Waqf Board and giving opportunity to all eligible members of the electoral college consisting of mutawallis to be members of the Board are the avowed objects of the Act. 30. To reinforce the above contentions, Sri.K.V.Sohan placed reliance on Pratap Chandra Mehta v. State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh and others ( (2011) 9 SCC 573 ). The Supreme Court was dealing with questions as to whether the provisions of Rules 121 and 122A of the Madhya Pradesh State Bar Council Rules, 1962 were ultra vires of Section 15 of the Advocates Act, 1961. The reason pointed out to say so, inter alia, was that there was no nexus between the rule making by the State Bar Council and the powers provided under Section 15 of the Advocates Act. In the course of discussion, Section 15 of the Advocates Act and other cognate provisions along with provisions in the Rules were closely examined. In paragraph 60, the Supreme Court observed thus: “Purposive construction, to a large extent, would help to resolve the controversy raised in the present case. In the course of discussion, Section 15 of the Advocates Act and other cognate provisions along with provisions in the Rules were closely examined. In paragraph 60, the Supreme Court observed thus: “Purposive construction, to a large extent, would help to resolve the controversy raised in the present case. The purpose of the Advocates Act is the democratic and harmonious functioning of the State Bar Councils, to achieve the object and purposes of the Act. We are unable to see how the provisions of Rule 122-A fall foul of the ambit and scope of Section 15 of the Advocates Act and, for that matter, any other provisions of that Act. On the contrary, they are in line with the scheme of the parent Act.” 31. According to Sri.K.V.Sohan, the reasons in the above decision could be squarely applied to this case. We are unable to accept this argument because the interpretation of the rules by the Supreme Court viz-a-viz Section 15 of the Advocates Act would clearly show that they do not militate against the statutory provisions. In paragraphs 46 to 52 of the judgment, the Supreme Court, after examining the various provisions, mentioned that language of the Statute has to be examined before giving a provision an extensive meaning. It is also stated that the courts would be justified in construing a provision purposively to perpetuate the object of the Act, while ensuring that such rules framed are within the field circumscribed by the parent Act. Viewed from the above angle, in this case we find that making rules for keeping away persons belonging to the electoral college of mutawallis, who were members on the Board for two consecutive times, is not an object or purpose of the Act. Therefore the principles in Pratap Chandra Mehta's case may not be applicable to this case. 32. Another decision relied on by Sri.K.V.Sohan is Bhandara District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. and others v. State of Maharashtra and another ((1993) Supp. (3) SCC 259). The Supreme Court interpreting the provisions in Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, especially Sections 72, 73A and 145, held thus: “We have considered the argument and examined the provisions of the Act placed before us by the learned counsel for the parties. (3) SCC 259). The Supreme Court interpreting the provisions in Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, especially Sections 72, 73A and 145, held thus: “We have considered the argument and examined the provisions of the Act placed before us by the learned counsel for the parties. It appears that there is clear basis for selecting the category of persons to be referred to by the expression “designated officer” for the purposes of Sections 73-A, 73-C, 73D and 73-E, and the policy in this regard is perfectly reasonable, having regard to the object of the amendment. The impugned provisions restrict the period for which a person either elected or appointed (under the Act, the rules or the bye-laws), who is entitled to give directions in relation to business of a society, can remain in office. The object of the amendment is clearly discernible as preventing a person or a group of persons from monopolising the affairs of a society by exercising control thereon indefinitely for a long period. A cooperative society is not meant to be run as a close preserve of an individual or a group of persons. “Cooperative” has been understood as a form of organisation where persons voluntarily associate together on a basis of equality for the promotion of their economic interests. The emphasis is on 'cooperation'. It is, therefore, desirable to have the active participation of as many members as may be possible. The Statement of Objects and Reasons for the 1969 Amendment has mentioned that the object of the Act was not being fully achieved as a group of persons were found holding the key positions in several important cooperative institutions simultaneously and for long periods, with a result that new leadership was not being built up to the desired extent. To check this unhealthy tendency and to give a more democratic character to the cooperative institutions, it was found necessary to prescribe the limitations in the statute itself by amendment. When after watching the effect of the earlier amendments, the Gujarat Legislature found that the goal was not fully achieved, and a further amendment was necessary, the impugned provisions were inserted in the Act. All this has been done for realising the objective set out by the Act and is clearly in the public interest.” Facts in the above case are clearly distinguishable from those in this case. All this has been done for realising the objective set out by the Act and is clearly in the public interest.” Facts in the above case are clearly distinguishable from those in this case. Here, on a reading of Section 14 of the Act, it will be clear that the Parliament had contemplated the situations wherein there may not be sufficient number of eligible persons of a particular electoral college to come on to the Board. Remedial measures in an eventuality, wherein dearth of eligible persons was felt, are mentioned in Section 14 itself. Rule 58(7) would create further hurdles in effectively constituting the Board in a situation envisioned under Section 14 of the Act. 33. The decisions relied on by Sri.K.V.Sohan in Shivaji Ramchandra More Kolhapur and others v. State of Maharashtra and another (1988 SCC OnLine Bom. 101) and Sri.Konkadi Padmanabha v. The Union of India, Department of Home Affairs (ILR 2015 Kar. 5699) could also be distinguished on facts. 34. In recapitulation of what we have mentioned above, it can be stated that Rule 58(7) cannot be regarded as one enacted to carry out the purposes of the Act. By no stretch of reasoning it can be said that it falls within the rule making power of the State Government conferred under Section 109 of the Act. Neither Clause (iv) nor Clause (xxv) of Section 109(2) of the Act empowers the State Government to add an additional disqualification to prevent an eligible mutawalli from becoming a member of the Board. According to us, Rule 58(7) suffers from the vice of exceeding the limits of delegated legislative powers. Further, it contradicts the other provisions in the rule itself, making it unworthy of continuance in the body of the Rules. When we regard the contents of Rule 58(7), we find that the matters therein do not go in harmony with the parent Statute and rest of the provisions in the Rules. Therefore, we find that the State Government has exceeded the rule making power conferred by Section 109 of the Act when it enacted Rule 58(7) of the Rules. Hence, the writ petition is allowed to the extent of declaring that Rule 58(7) of the Kerala State Waqf Rules, 2019 is beyond the legislative competence of the State and is in excess of the legislative delegation. Hence, the writ petition is allowed to the extent of declaring that Rule 58(7) of the Kerala State Waqf Rules, 2019 is beyond the legislative competence of the State and is in excess of the legislative delegation. We also declare that Rule 58(7) of the Rules is ultra vires of the Wakf Act, 1995. Hence we strike down the said Sub-rule.