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2019 DIGILAW 739 (CAL)

Ranaghat OBR Brihattara Graduate Teachers Association v. State of West Bengal

2019-07-22

MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA

body2019
JUDGMENT : MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA, J. 1. The first petitioner is an association registered under The West Bengal Societies Registration Act, 1961 and was constituted to address the grievance of its members who are the Post-Graduate teachers in different Government aided and Government sponsored schools in West Bengal. The grievance of the petitioners (the petitioner no.2 being the Secretary of the first petitioner) is the disparity in the pay scale of Post-Graduate teachers in Government aided and Government sponsored schools in the State and the pay scales framed by the Government of India and other States in respect of trained graduate teachers. The prayer of the petitioners is for rectification of the pay scale of the members of the first petitioner on a level commensurate with the pay scales framed by the Government of India for trained graduate teachers. 2. The immediate relief sought is for a direction on the respondent no.10 being the Member Secretary, Sixth Pay Commission, Government of West Bengal to consider a representation of the first petitioner dated 29th January, 2019 for parity in the pay scales of the members of the petitioner no.1 and those who come under the pay scales framed by the Government of India. 3. Having regard to the immediate and only relief sought for by the petitioners as stated above, the point of adjudication before this court is whether a claim for "equal pay for equal work" can entitle a petitioner to seek a Mandamus in the form of a direction on the concerned respondent for considering the grievance of the petitioner. The point for adjudication, as formulated, arises out of a preliminary objection taken by the State whose representing counsel disputes the entitlement of the petitioner in seeking such a direction in the absence of a fundamental right or its breach. It should be clarified that the prayer of the petitioners follows from an order passed by a learned Single Judge of this court on 28th November, 2018, the relevant part of which is set out below; "Mr. Pratik Dhar, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submits that they have submitted a representation for pay parity to the Principal Secretary, Finance Department, Government of West Bengal and other Departmental authorities. Mr. Pratik Dhar, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submits that they have submitted a representation for pay parity to the Principal Secretary, Finance Department, Government of West Bengal and other Departmental authorities. Mr. Joyotosh Majumder, learned Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the State submits that the representation so made by the petitioners has to be considered by the 6th Pay Commission and not by the Finance Department. He submits that the Department of School Education and the Department of Finance shall obviously assist the Pay Commission in clearing all the doubts and anomalies that have been raised by the petitioners in their representation. However, I note that the 6th Pay Commission has not been made a party. Accordingly, the writ petitioners are directed to add the Member Secretary, 6th Pay Commission as a party in course of this day and serve a copy of the writ petition on him. In view of the submission made on behalf of both the parties, I direct the Principal Secretary, 6th Pay Commission to consider the representation being Annexure 'P/11' of the writ petition in accordance with law. The Pay Commission shall, of course, be at liberty to take all the assistance that is required from the Department of Finance and the Department of School Education so that the representation made by the petitioners are properly addressed and considered by the Pay Commission." 4. Learned counsel for the State seeks to make a departure from the position taken by the learned Government Pleader on the day when the above order was passed, as according to counsel, the right to "equal pay for equal work" is not a fundamental right and hence cannot be the subject-matter of a writ petition where a writ of Mandamus is prayed for. Counsel submits that the right to parity of pay is at best a constitutional goal drawing inspiration from the Directive Principles of State Policy under Part IV of the Constitution of India. Counsel relies on State of Haryana Vs. Counsel submits that the right to parity of pay is at best a constitutional goal drawing inspiration from the Directive Principles of State Policy under Part IV of the Constitution of India. Counsel relies on State of Haryana Vs. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Association, 2002 6 SCC 72 for the proposition that a pay structure is ordinarily evolved keeping in mind several factors, including method of recruitment, level at which recruitment is made, the hierarchy of service in a given cadre, minimum educational/technical qualifications, avenues of promotion, the nature of duties and responsibilities, the horizontal and vertical relativities in similar jobs, public dealings, satisfaction level and the employers capacity to pay. In this decision, it was held that the claim of "equal pay for equal work" is a constitutional goal to be achieved by the Government and is a matter which is for the Executive to discharge. The Supreme Court sounded a note of caution against delving in administrative decisions and interfering only where the decision of the Government is patently irrational or unjust to a section of employees. Reliance is placed on State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. C. Mandawar, 1954 AIR(SC) 493, where it was held that a difference in the scale of dearness allowance recommended by the Central Pay Commission and sanctioned by the Government cannot furnish a ground for holding that the scale of dearness allowance recommended by the Department and adopted by the State of Madhya Pradesh is repugnant to Article 14 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court questioned the applicability of Article 14 to a difference in the scale of dearness allowance recommended by the Pay Commission and that adopted by the State of Madhya Pradesh. The next decision relied on is of a learned Single Judge of this court in W.P.28538(W) of 2014 where the point of adjudication was whether a representation of the petitioner being a "Remedial Instructor" could be considered by the School Education Department. The learned Judge was of the view that since the scheme for engagement of 'Remedial Instructor' had been discontinued under The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 and a Government order dated 3rd July, 2012 did not protect the interest of a 'Remedial Instructor', the petitioner did not have a legally protected right which could be judicially enforced. The next decision relied on is of another learned Judge of this court in W.P.2421(W) of 2011, where it was held that an important requirement for issuance of Mandamus is the existence of a statutory duty which can be enforced. In that decision, it was found that the writ petitioner could not establish a legal duty or a legal obligation on the part of the authorities for considering the representation of the petitioner. The last decision relied on is State of H.P. Vs. Pran Nath Anand, 1995 Supp4 SCC 434, where the Supreme Court held that the State Government can have separate pay scales for its employees irrespective of the fact that a different scale of pay exists in another State for a similar post. The Supreme Court was of the view that although there should be uniformity of pay scales, a difference in the economic conditions of different States can lead to different scales of pay and conditions of service and this cannot be held to be impermissible in law. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies on Randhir Singh Vs. Union of India, 1982 1 SCC 618 for the proposition that "equal pay for equal work" is a constitutional goal capable of attainment through constitutional remedies by enforcement of constitutional rights. This court is tempted to dwell on this decision for the sheer eloquence of the manner in which the principle has been enunciated by Justice Chinnappa Reddy. Since attempting to paraphrase the language used would be doing injustice to the brilliance of the passage, an extract of the relevant paragraph is set out below; "It is true that the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' is not expressly declared by our Constitution to be a fundamental right. But it certainly is a constitutional goal. Article 39(d) of the Constitution proclaims "equal pay for equal work for both men and women" as a Directive Principle of State Policy. 'Equal pay for equal work for both men and women' means equal pay for equal work for everyone and as between the sexes. Directive Principles, as has been pointed out in some of the judgements of this Court have to be read into the fundamental rights as a matter of interpretation. 'Equal pay for equal work for both men and women' means equal pay for equal work for everyone and as between the sexes. Directive Principles, as has been pointed out in some of the judgements of this Court have to be read into the fundamental rights as a matter of interpretation. Article 14 of the Constitution enjoins the State not to deny any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws and Article 16 declares that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. These quality clauses of the Constitution must mean something to everyone. To the vast majority of the people the equality clauses of the Constitution would mean nothing if they are unconcerned with the work they do and the pay they get. To them the equality clauses will have some substance if equal work means equal pay. Whether the special procedure prescribed by a statute for trying alleged robber-barons and smuggler kings or for dealing with tax evaders is discriminatory, whether a particular governmental policy in the matter of grant licences or permits confers unfettered discretion on the Executive, whether the take-over of the empires of industrial tycoons is arbitrary and unconstitutional and other questions of like nature, leave the millions of people of this country untouched. Questions concerning wages and the like, mundane they may be, are yet matters of vital concern to them and it is there, if at all that the equality clauses of the Constitution have any significance to them. The Preamble to the Constitution declares the solemn resolution of the people of India to constitute India into a Sovereign Socialist Democratic Republic. Again the word 'Socialist' must mean something. Even if it does not mean 'to each according to his need', it must at least mean 'equal pay for equal work'. .......................Construing Articles 14 and 16 in the light of the Preamble and Article 39(d), we are of the view that the principle 'equal pay for equal work' is deducible from those Articles and may be properly applied to cases of unequal scales of pay based on no classification or irrational classification though those drawing the different scales of pay do identical work under the same employer." 6. The next case relied on by counsel for the petitioner is D.S. Nakara Vs. The next case relied on by counsel for the petitioner is D.S. Nakara Vs. Union of India, 1983 1 SCC 305 , where the Supreme Court relying on Randhir Singh Vs. Union of India, 1982 1 SCC 618 was of the view that State action must be directed towards attaining the goals set out in Part IV of the Constitution (The Directive Principles of State Policy) and where all relevant considerations are the same, persons holding identical posts may not be treated differently in the matter of their pay merely because they belong to different departments. The last case relied upon is State of Punjab Vs. Jagjit Singh, 2017 1 SCC 148 for the principle in support of "equal pay for equal work" and where the Supreme Court was of the view that being compelled to work at a lesser wage strikes at the self-respect and dignity of the individual who does not accept the unequal wage voluntarily. The strong words used by the Supreme Court are reproduced below; "58. ...............Any act of paying less wages as compared to others similarly situate constitutes an act of exploitative enslavement, emerging out of a domineering position. Undoubtedly, the action is oppressive, suppressive and coercive, as it compels involuntary subjugation. 59. ...............the principle of "equal pay for equal work" constitutes a clear and unambiguous right and is vested in every employee-whether engaged on regular or temporary basis." 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner places several documents in support of his contention that there should be parity of pay scales for those with the same qualifications and performing the same duties and responsibilities regardless of whether the comparison is made between rules framed by the State Government or the Central Government. For this purpose, counsel places the Report of the Education Department of 1964-1966 and the National Policy on Education, 1986 published by the Department of Education, Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India in 1998. In the former document, Clause 3.09 enunciates the principle of parity where it has recommended that the remuneration of teachers working in different managements should be the same for all teachers having the same qualifications and the same responsibilities should have the same, or at least similar remuneration and conditions of work and service. In the former document, Clause 3.09 enunciates the principle of parity where it has recommended that the remuneration of teachers working in different managements should be the same for all teachers having the same qualifications and the same responsibilities should have the same, or at least similar remuneration and conditions of work and service. The Report makes a reference to historical reasons for variations of scales of pay of school teachers belonging to the same category but working under different managements in that administrative authorities under the British did not wish to reduce the salaries of Government servants but at the same time were keen to keep salary costs down to a level which the economy could afford. The Report also mentions that the principle of parity has been accepted at all levels of school education in seven States but has not been accepted in five states, including West Bengal. The second document relied upon applies the principle to a pan-India level where the Policy recommends that the pay and service conditions of teachers have to be commensurate with social and professional responsibilities for attracting talent and that efforts will be made to reach the objective of uniform emoluments, service conditions and grievance/remuneration mechanisms for teachers throughout the country. Counsel further relies on notifications of July 2017 and April 2012 for the States of Uttar Pradesh and Haryana respectively which show that the States have adopted pay scales which are at par with the Central Government. 8. I have heard the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner and the State. The issue, as stated above, is whether the petitioners on these facts have a right under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to seek a direction from the Writ Court on the concerned respondent for considering the representation of the petitioner no.1 for "equal pay for equal work". The objection taken by the State is on the ground that the right of "equal pay for equal work" is not a fundamental right and hence the alleged infraction of such right cannot entitle the petitioners to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of a Writ Court. The objection taken by the State is on the ground that the right of "equal pay for equal work" is not a fundamental right and hence the alleged infraction of such right cannot entitle the petitioners to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of a Writ Court. In other words, the question to be answered is whether a Writ Court can invoke its powers for issuing a Mandamus on any of the respondents where the petitioners have not been able to establish a breach of a fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution of India. It should be clarified at the outset that counsel for the petitioners has reiterated several times during the course of submissions that the prayer for the present purposes is limited to a direction on the respondent no.10, namely, the 6th Pay Commission, Government of West Bengal, for considering the representation of the petitioners. Although documents have been shown and cases cited on the principle of parity of pay, this court has not been invited to adjudicate on whether the members of the petitioner no.1 have a right to a pay scale framed by the Central Government or whether the State has deprived the petitioners of such right. At this point, the petitioners merely want a right of audience before the 6th Pay Commission following a similar direction passed on the latter by a Co-ordinate Bench of this court by the order dated 28th November, 2018 where the State, represented by the learned Government Pleader, had conceded to such a direction. With reference to the argument made in this writ petition, this court is of the view that the State cannot speak in two voices. 9. The decisions cited by counsel for both the parties may be classified under two Heads; (a) whether right to "equal pay for equal work" is a fundamental right, (b) whether a direction can be passed on the respondent to consider a representation where a petitioner has not been able to establish a fundamental right. With regard to (a), the Supreme Court termed the right as a "constitutional goal" to be attained for the fulfilment of the objectives enshrined under Constitution of India. With regard to (a), the Supreme Court termed the right as a "constitutional goal" to be attained for the fulfilment of the objectives enshrined under Constitution of India. The objective is crystallized in Article 14 and Article 16 which enjoins the State not to deny to any person equality before the law or equal protection of the laws and equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters of employees of any office under the State. Article 39(d) reinforces this objective by making this principle gender-neutral. Downgrading the principle of "equal pay for equal work" to less than a fundamental right would be constricting the principles guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 which are the equality clauses of the Constitution. If equality is one of the rights in reliance of which a person (Article 14) and a citizen (Article 16) can approach a Writ Court (its infraction thereof) then that equality must also permeate all spheres of life and necessarily include a person's rewards for the work performed. The Preamble to the Constitution of India must also be stated where it is resolved to secure to the citizens equality of status and of opportunity. This resolve must surely transcend nomenclatures given to certain principles and whether such nomenclatures have been found to be constitutional goals and not fundamental rights perse. The comparison therefore cannot be strait-jacketed between different departments within the State or between two States or even between the State and the Centre but equal opportunities and rewards for equal work across territorial boundaries on a nationwide level. A few of the decisions cited and documents shown may therefore not be wholly applicable to what the petitioners seek. Articles 14 and 16 takes into their fold matters of discrimination where inequality of emoluments for persons similarly placed amounts to discrimination against those who are deprived of a higher/equal scale of pay. When the Supreme Court found the principle of equal pay for equal work not to be a fundamental right but a constitutional goal, it did not intend to diminish the status of the right but instead place it on a pedestal of an objective to be fulfilled in consonance with the vision of the Constitution where no one would be placed on an unequal footing in terms of pay compared to another who performs work of a similar nature, volume or sensitivity. Reference in this context may be made of Randhir Singh Vs. Union of India, 1982 1 SCC 618 & D.S. Nakara Vs. Union of India, 1983 1 SCC 305 . The reason for the cautious approach shown by the Supreme Court in some of the cases was the complex nature of Executive decisions and the economic compulsions of individual States. The aforesaid consideration finds expression in State of H.P. Vs. Pran Nath Anand, 1995 Supp4 SCC 434. 10. In relation to differences resulting from economic conditions in different States significantly in this case, this court finds that the Finance Department, State of West Bengal, has fixed the pay band of Assistant Teachers with Post-Graduate degrees following the recommendation of the 6th Central Pay Commission but has failed to do so in fixing the pay band of Assistant Teachers with Graduate degrees. This is also the averment in the writ petition. Therefore, the argument that States are guided by their economic conditions in fixing their respective pay scales fails, at least in this case. 11. In State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. C. Mandawar, 1954 AIR(SC) 493, the Supreme Court made a distinction between claims which are made under a right and those which are matters of grace. In Dulal Chandra Mondal, the scheme for engagement for "Remedial Instructors" had been discontinued under the 2009 Act as well as by a subsequent Government Order of 2012 by reason of which the learned Single Judge found the petitioner not to have a legally protected right which had been infringed. In Bijoy Kumar Singha, the preliminary reason of the court to hold that the petitioner's representation could not be considered was the considerable delay in making such representation which the court found to be an illusory cause of action only for the purpose of invoking the writ jurisdiction of the court. 12. A writ of Mandamus is a command issuing from the High Court directed against the State or any public authority which requires the performance of a duty which has been wrongfully refused. The High Courts have wide powers to issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs where a positive obligation exists on the part of a public authority of the State and to prevent disorder consequent to a failure of justice. The High Courts have wide powers to issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs where a positive obligation exists on the part of a public authority of the State and to prevent disorder consequent to a failure of justice. Mandamus can also be issued where law does not provide a specific remedy but where injustice on the part of a public authority calls for an intervention. The petitioner must of course establish that a legal duty exists on part of the respondent which the respondent has failed to perform. The petitioner must also show a clear legal right to the performance of that duty and that the law does not provide any adequate remedy to secure the enforcement of the right or the performance of the duty which is sought to be enforced. In this case, the petitioners have established not only a right to redress the inequality caused by the refusal on the part of the respondents to put the petitioners on the same plane as their counterparts who are beneficiaries of the rules framed by the Government of India but also a duty on the part of the respondent to rectify the imbalance between the petitioners and their counterparts with a Post-Graduate degree within the State itself. 13. In view of the only and innocuous prayer sought for by the petitioners, this court does not deem it necessary to engage any further with the rights of the petitioner to a parity in pay scales as urged in the writ petition. For the reasons stated above in court is of the view that the petitioners have a right under the constitutional scheme to seek an appropriate direction from the 10th respondent. The respondent no.10 is accordingly directed to grant an audience to the petitioners and/or the members and of the petitioner no.1 consider the representation dated 29th January, 2019 on any day as may be mutually agreed upon by the parties but which may not be later than 16th August, 2019. The Pay Commission shall be at liberty to take the assistance of the Department of Finance, the Department of School Education or any other concerned body, which may be conducive for a proper decision on the cause urged by the writ petitioners. 14. W.P. 6041(W) of 2019 is disposed of in terms of the above. The Pay Commission shall be at liberty to take the assistance of the Department of Finance, the Department of School Education or any other concerned body, which may be conducive for a proper decision on the cause urged by the writ petitioners. 14. W.P. 6041(W) of 2019 is disposed of in terms of the above. This order is subject to payment of court fees being paid by the petitioners. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties on priority basis upon compliance of all requisite formalities.