JUDGMENT : J.B. Pardiwala, J. 1. This tax appeal under section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, is at the instance of an assessee and is directed against the order passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Rajkot Bench, Rajkot, dated December 13, 2017 in I.T.A. No. 362/RJT/2016 for the assessment year 2013-14. 2. The assessee has proposed the following substantial question of law for the consideration of this court: "Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the order passed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is perverse inasmuch as it confirms the penalty of Rs. 30,00,000 under section 271AAB of the Act which was levied without issue of notice under section 274 read with section 271AAB of the Act?" 3. It appears from the materials on record that the search under section 132 of the Act was carried out at the premises of the appellant on August 23, 2012. The case was selected for scrutiny and a notice under section 142(1) of the Act was issued dated May 9, 2013. In response to the notice, the return of income showing the total income of Rs. 3,86,51,830 was filed by the appellant on February 26, 2014. The notice under section 143(2) of the Act was issued dated April 21, 2014. A detailed questionnaire was issued on June 24, 2014 along with the notice under section 142(1) of the Act. The assessment proceedings were completed and a disallowance of Rs. 3,99,492 was made under section 14A of the Act read with rule 8D of the Income-tax Rules, 1962. The Assessing Officer initiated proceedings under section 271AAA of the Act on the premises that the disclosure was made during the course of the search. In the course of the search carried out on August 23, 2012, a stock of 99,779 kgs. belonging to the proprietary concern of the appellant was recovered and the same was declared as income at the rate of Rs. 300 per kg. amounting to Rs. 2,99,33,955 against which the appellant had made a disclosure of Rs. 3,00,00,000. The notice under section 274 read with section 271AAA of the Act was issued on February 13, 2015, calling upon the appellant to show cause why penalty should not be levied under section 271AAA of the Act. 300 per kg. amounting to Rs. 2,99,33,955 against which the appellant had made a disclosure of Rs. 3,00,00,000. The notice under section 274 read with section 271AAA of the Act was issued on February 13, 2015, calling upon the appellant to show cause why penalty should not be levied under section 271AAA of the Act. Later, a corrigendum to the order under section 143(3) of the Act was issued on July 3, 2015, by which the section under which the penalty proceedings were initiated in the order under section 143(3) of the Act was to be read as section 271AAB instead of section 271AAA of the Act. The corrigendum further stated that the penalty notice under section 274 of the Act stood modified to that extent. The Assessing Officer recorded his satisfaction that the case of the appellant fell under section 271AAB(1) of the Act and consequently, levied a penalty of Rs. 30,00,000 at 10 per cent of the undisclosed income. 4. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the Assessing Officer, the appellant preferred an appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). The appeal preferred by the appellant came to be dismissed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), thereby affirming the order passed by the Assessing Officer. 5. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), the appellant preferred an appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal also dismissed the appeal and thereby affirmed the order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). 6. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant is here before this court with the present tax appeal. 7. We take notice of the order passed by a Co-ordinate Bench dated October 15, 2018, which reads as follows: "1. The appellant-assessee has challenged the judgment of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal confirming the penalty imposed by the Assessing Officer under section 271AAB of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Two grounds are raised before us. Firstly, that the Tribunal proceeded on wrong factual assertion that notice under section 271AAB was issued by the Assessing Officer though after the assessment was completed. The counsel for the appellant pointed out that the Assessing Officer had initially issued notice under section 271AAA of the Act along with the order of assessment but, later on, issued a corrigendum providing that reference to the section would be read as 271AAB instead of section 271AAA. The counsel for the appellant pointed out that the Assessing Officer had initially issued notice under section 271AAA of the Act along with the order of assessment but, later on, issued a corrigendum providing that reference to the section would be read as 271AAB instead of section 271AAA. In fact, no separate notice under section 271AAB was ever issued. The second contention of the counsel was that, in any case, sanction, for initiation of penalty proceedings as required under the law, was not obtained. 2. In our opinion, the first contention of the appellant cannot be accepted. Even if the Tribunal has provided on the wrong basis assuming incorrectly that a separate notice under section 271AAB was issued, the petitioner cannot argue, in the facts of the present case, that the entire proceedings were vitiated. This is so for the reason that admittedly the Assessing Officer, after having initially issued notice under section 271AAA, shortly issued corrigendum correcting the reference to the statutory provision as section 271AAB. This was thus a case of pure correction of typographical error. The petitioner cannot argue that no valid notice under the law was issued. Concededly such correction also took place long before the penalty proceedings proceeded further and culminated into the order of penalty imposed by the Assessing Officer after giving full opportunity of defending to the assessee. 3. We are however inclined to examine the assessee's second contention regarding prior sanction. In this respect also, our inquiry would be whether initial notice though erroneously titled as one under section 271AAA of the Act was proceeded by sanction. 4. Notice for final disposal returnable on November 26, 2018." 8. Thus, in the order dated October 15, 2018 referred to above, it has been made explicitly clear that the inquiry was confined only as regards the question, whether the initial notice titled as one under section 271AAA of the Act was proceeded by sanction or not? 9. The grounds of challenge as raised in the memo of this appeal are as under: "(a) The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has factually erred in holding that a show-cause notice dated July 3, 2015 was issued to the appellant under section 274 read with section 271AAB of the Act. No such notice was issued. 9. The grounds of challenge as raised in the memo of this appeal are as under: "(a) The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has factually erred in holding that a show-cause notice dated July 3, 2015 was issued to the appellant under section 274 read with section 271AAB of the Act. No such notice was issued. (b) The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal found from the paper book submitted by the appellant that at least one notice dated July 3, 2015 under section 274 read with section 271AAB was issued. However, in the index of the paper book submitted by the appellant, the one-page document dated July 3, 2015 is titled 'Copy of notice (corrigendum) received on July 3, 2015'. Hence, this is referring to the corrigendum issued under section 143(3) of the Act alone. (c) It is also evident from the corrigendum issued under section 143(3) of the Act itself that the Assessing Officer did not intend to issue a fresh show-cause notice under section 274 of the Act. The corrigendum simply mentions that 'Accordingly, the penalty notice under section 274 dated February 13, 2015 also stands modified'. (d) There is no mention of notice dated July 3, 2015 under section 274 read with section 271AAB of the Act even in the penalty order dated July 16, 2015 or in the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) dated July 21, 2016. If such notice were issued, the penalty order would surely have mentioned it. The very first mention of such a notice is in the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal itself. This further cements the fact that no such notice was issued." 10. The further grounds of challenge are that the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is perverse inasmuch as it: (a) Confirms the levy of penalty under section 271AAB of the Act on a factually erroneous basis, i.e., that a show-cause notice was issued to the appellant under section 274 read with section 271AAB of the Act. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal mentioned at numerous instances in its order that a fresh notice was issued under section 271AAB of the Act which demonstrates that issue of fresh notice was a crucial factor in its decision. (b) Erroneously notes that the essential difference between section 271AAA and section 271AAB of the Act is a paradigm shift in quantification of penalty. (b) Erroneously notes that the essential difference between section 271AAA and section 271AAB of the Act is a paradigm shift in quantification of penalty. In doing so, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal fails to appreciate that both the provisions are materially different, not just with respect to quantification. This is further supported by the fact that section 271AAB of the Act was inserted by an amendment. With such a marked difference between the two provisions, it is inconceivable that penalty be imposed without adequate notice and following due process of law. (c) Holds the reference to an obliterated provision to be a mere technical defect. It is submitted that mentioning the wrong provision in the show-cause notice is a violation of the principles of natural justice as it denies the appellant its right to a hearing and cannot be held to be a mere technical defect. (d) Errs in holding that reference to section 271AAA of the Act instead of section 271AAB of the Act is a curable defect under section 292B of the Act." 11. The Tribunal, in its impugned order, observed as under: "11. As can be seen, both erstwhile section 271AAA as well as the newly inserted section 271AAB concerns the penalty proceedings where search has been initiated on or after the specified date and certain undisclosed income pertains to 'specified previous year' is detected in distinction to normal provisions concerning penalty. Penalties either under section 271AAA or section 271AAB are leviable in respect of undisclosed income pertaining to specified previous year regardless of the fact that the return was filed subsequently which duly included the impugned undisclosed income. We also notice that the circumstances for initiation of penalty proceedings both under section 271AAA and section 271AAB are broadly similar. The circumstances that holds the key to invoke either section 271AAA or section 271AAB is identical, namely, existence of undisclosed income attributable to 'specified previous year'. The essential difference between the two lies in paradigm shift in quantification of penalty. 12. Significantly, the circumstance for imposition of penalty is not in challenge. The circumstance, namely, existence of undisclosed income and pertaining to 'specified previous year' is conceded and also included in the return of income. Thus, the prerequisite for application of both section 271AAA and section 271AAB are equally met. 12. Significantly, the circumstance for imposition of penalty is not in challenge. The circumstance, namely, existence of undisclosed income and pertaining to 'specified previous year' is conceded and also included in the return of income. Thus, the prerequisite for application of both section 271AAA and section 271AAB are equally met. The search in the instant case was initiated on August 23, 2012 when penalty provision under section 271AAA was brought to naught (with effect from July 1, 2012) and replaced by a new section 271AAB. Thus, section 271AAB alone was in vogue at the relevant time of initiation of search. As a corollary, the penalty proceedings could not have been initiated by the Assessing Officer with the aid of a non-existent section 271AAA of the Act at the relevant time. While the applicability of both section 271AAA as well as section 271AAB is founded on identical circumstance, the quantification of penalty could be done only with reference to section 271AAB in force. The Assessing Officer has attempted to correct this bona fide error in making initial reference to a wrong section by suitable 'corrigendum' issued in this regard. The assessee has impugned this action. At this juncture, we also find from the paper book submitted by the assessee that the Assessing Officer has admittedly issued at least one notice dated July 3, 2015 for penalty in contemplation. A proper notice under correct section has thus been eventually served on the assessee albeit after assessment but prior to passing of penalty order. The assessee has duly responded to the original notice under section 271AAA as well as this notice under section 271AAB and has co-operated with the Assessing Officer in continuance of proceedings. The assessee has not questioned the Assessing Officer on jurisdictional aspect but has merely contended on merits as to why the provisions of section 271AAB should not apply to the assessee. As noted earlier, the prerequisites or circumstances for issuance of notice both under erstwhile section 271AAA and current section 271AAB being identical, the mistake in making reference to an obliterated provision is in the realm of mere technical defect. This being so, the basis for assumption of jurisdiction remains intact and is not vitiated. The error in making reference to wrong section in our considered view being purely technical do not impinge upon substratum in any manner and thus a curable defect rectifiable under section 292B. This being so, the basis for assumption of jurisdiction remains intact and is not vitiated. The error in making reference to wrong section in our considered view being purely technical do not impinge upon substratum in any manner and thus a curable defect rectifiable under section 292B. In other words, the mistake committed by the Assessing Officer in making reference to a non est provision is a curable defect in view of the fact that cause existing for invoking both sections are identical. The mistake and defect in penalty notice was corrected to bring it in conformity with the intent and purpose for which the penalty proceedings were initiated originally. The mistake being technical, the assessee is precluded from taking any objection in this regard in terms of section 292B of the Act. 13. We are also called upon to delve upon a pertinent question raised on behalf of the assessee as to whether such modification in the basis of invoking of penalty proceedings qua section 271AAA/271AAB is permissible post assessment. It is outlined on behalf of the assessee that 'requisite satisfaction' drawn by the Assessing Officer in respect of initiation of penalty in the course of assessment proceedings was with reference to section 271AAA of the Act. However, after the completion of the assessment, the 'satisfaction' stands suo motu modified and drawn afresh with reference to section 271AAB which is not permissible. The answer to this question lies in the position of law as the point of time of forming 'satisfaction' for the purposes of section 271AAB. Section 271(1B) of the Act provides a clue in this regard. It inter alia enjoins the requirement of formation of 'satisfaction' towards existence of circumstances for initiation of penalty proceedings in the course of assessment proceedings with reference to penalty provisions of section 271(1)(c) of the Act. In distinction, the penalty proceedings in the present case concerns section 271AAA or section 271AAB. It is critical here to note that no specific bar is provided in law to form 'satisfaction' with reference to these special provisions prior to the completion of the assessment. Thus, requirement of forming 'satisfaction' in this course of assessment proceedings cannot be read for the purposes of section 271AAA/271AAB. It is critical here to note that no specific bar is provided in law to form 'satisfaction' with reference to these special provisions prior to the completion of the assessment. Thus, requirement of forming 'satisfaction' in this course of assessment proceedings cannot be read for the purposes of section 271AAA/271AAB. In other words, the satisfaction towards applicability of section 271AAA or 271AAB can be legally derived at the stage later to completion of assessment in contrast to fetters placed in respect of normal penal provisions under section 271(1)(c) of the Act. Subsequent formation or modification in purported 'satisfaction' after completion of assessment is thus not prohibited under section 271(1B) of the Act in so far as section 271AAA/section 271AAB is concerned. The legislative intent and scope for imposition of penalty under section 271(1)(c) is entirely different from what is envisaged under provisions of section 271AAB applicable to search cases. The penalty under section 271(1)(c) and section 271AAA/271AAB are mutually exclusive in the sense that in view of specific exclusions provided in section 271AAA/271AAB, operation of section 271(1)(c) gets suspended in matters falling in the scope under section 271AAA/271AAB. As a sequel, even if it is presumed that 'satisfaction' was wrongly drawn with reference to section 271AAA at the time of framing the assessment, the Assessing Officer was well within its mandate to form it post-assessment qua section 271AAB. To reiterate, the show-cause notice in the instant case has been initially issued under the sunset provision of section 271AAA of the Act and thereafter revised by issuing fresh notice under section 271AAB of the Act seeking explanation from the asses-see as to why penalty should not be imposed. Having regard to the statutory framework, we do not see any statutory impediment in formation or modification of the basis of 'satisfaction' post-assessment. To reiterate, there is no mandate in law to issue notices under section 271AAA/section 271AAB in the course of assessment proceedings. It is sufficient to issue show-cause notice under section 271AAB before actual imposition of penalty before or after the assessment. The action of the Assessing Officer is therefore not at loggerheads with the framework of statutory procedure in this regard. An opportunity is found to have been given and availed of by the assessee before imposition of penalty. Therefore, no subversion of the principles of natural justice can also be inferred. The action of the Assessing Officer is therefore not at loggerheads with the framework of statutory procedure in this regard. An opportunity is found to have been given and availed of by the assessee before imposition of penalty. Therefore, no subversion of the principles of natural justice can also be inferred. The error committed initially is thus not fatal and do not vitiate the entire proceedings owing to non-application of section 271(1B) of the Act. Such correction of human error to enforce provisions of section 271AAB, in our view, is within the pale of statutory competence of the Assessing Officer in the absence of any specific prohibitions in law. Therefore, we do not see any merit in the plea raised. 14. Undisputedly, the assessee was found to be in possession of unaccounted stock in the course of search conducted under section 132 of the Act which culminated in disclosure of unaccounted income of Rs. 3 crores. The Assessing Officer has fairly and most liberally applied concessional treatment as provided under the penal provisions of section 271AAB of the Act towards such an unaccounted income qua far stiffer penalty applicable under the normal provisions provided under section 271(1)(c) of the Act. The undisputed nature of undisclosed income found and also conceded in the statement recorded under section 132(4) of the Act followed by the return of income does not leave any room for doubt that the remedy for loss of probable revenue detected in the course of search was obtained by following due process of law. 15. Noticeably, the penalty order under section 271AAB was passed with the approval of superior authority, i.e., the Joint Commissioner of Income-tax as provided under section 274(2) of the Act. While facts towards approval of the competent authority (JCIT) for issuance of corrigendum/fresh notice is not placed before us, no statutory requirement in this regard was brought to our notice. Hence, issuance of notice under section 271AAB without approval do not in our view vitiate the penalty proceedings. 16. The assessee has placed few judgments in the paper book which however, were not adverted to in the course of hearing. Having noted that peculiar facts of the case vis-a-vis totally dissimilar facts existing in the case law cited, we do not see any necessity to deal with the same. 16. The assessee has placed few judgments in the paper book which however, were not adverted to in the course of hearing. Having noted that peculiar facts of the case vis-a-vis totally dissimilar facts existing in the case law cited, we do not see any necessity to deal with the same. Whereas in the present case a 'corrigendum' has been issued together with fresh notice to correct the irregularity of technical nature, the assessee has also co-operated with enquiry and not raised any objection nor he could have. Besides, as concluded, notice under section 271AAB can be issued post assessment unlike proceedings under section 271(1)(c) of the Act. No prior approval of superior authority is shown to be needed for mere initiation of penalty proceedings under section 271AAB. Thus, subsequent notice under section 271AAB is not found to be marred with any irregularity of substantive nature. In contrast to these facts, the facts in the case law cited are totally different 'and found to be of no assistance to the assessee." 12. Mr. M.R. Bhatt, the learned senior standing counsel appearing for the Revenue, has vehemently opposed this tax appeal. Mr. Bhatt submitted that the order passed by the Co-ordinate Bench referred to above makes it clear that the only inquiry which the court thought fit to undertake was, whether the initial notice, though erroneously titled as one under section 271AAA of the Act, was proceeded by sanction or not. 13. Mr. Bhatt placed on record for our perusal the submission of draft penalty orders for approval put forward by the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Central Circle-1, Rajkot, before the Joint Commissioner of Income-tax, Central Range, Rajkot. Mr. Bhatt also placed on record for our perusal the approval of the penalty order under section 271AAB of the Act passed by the Joint Commissioner of Income-tax, Central Range, Rajkot. 14. The third paragraph of the order passed by the Co-ordinate Bench dated October 15, 2018 referred to above created some confusion in our mind. The word "sanction" in para-3 created the confusion. Mr. Bhatt, the learned senior standing counsel appearing for the Revenue, clarified that the Co-ordinate Bench wanted to inquire, whether the order of penalty ultimately came to be approved or not. 15. The word "sanction" in para-3 created the confusion. Mr. Bhatt, the learned senior standing counsel appearing for the Revenue, clarified that the Co-ordinate Bench wanted to inquire, whether the order of penalty ultimately came to be approved or not. 15. The two documents which have been placed on record today indicate that the penalty order passed in the case of the appellant herein was approved by the Joint Commissioner of Income-tax. 16. Mr. Hemani in the last pointed out that in para-6 of the assessment order, there is a reference as regards the issue of notice under section 271AAA of the Act. According to Mr. Hemani, when the corrigendum came to be issued stating that section 271AAA should be read as section 271AAB of the Act, at that point of time also, a fresh notice ought to have been issued under section 274 of the Act. 17. According to Mr. Hemani, the penalty notice could not have been corrected by way of corrigendum. In short, it appears that the submission of Mr. Hemani is that the appellant should have been heard even before the issue of the corrigendum. 18. We are not impressed by the aforesaid submission of Mr. Hemani. In fact, there is no substantial difference between section 271AAA and section 271AAB of the Act, except that section 271AAA would apply in cases where search has been initiated under section 132 on or after the first day of June, 2007 but before the first day of July, 2012, whereas section 271AAB would apply in cases where search has been initiated under section 132 on or after the first day of July, 2012. 19. We are of the view that no interference is warranted with the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal could not be said to have committed any error, much less an error of law, in passing the impugned order. 20. In view of the aforesaid, this tax appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.