JUDGMENT : SUDHIR AGARWAL, J. 1. Heard Sri Indra Prasad Yadav, learned counsel for petitioner and Sri P.D. Tripathi, learned counsel for respondents. 2. This writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India has been filed by sole petitioner, Banwari Lal who was a Constable in Central Reserve Police Force (hereinafter referred to as "C.R.P.F."), assailing order dated 13.12.2003 (Annexure-7 to writ petition), whereby punishment of dismissal has been imposed upon him by Commandant 104 Batallian, Rapid Action Force (C.R.P.F.), Aligarh in purported exercise of power under Section 11(1) of Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1949") read with Rule 27 of Central Reserve Police Force Rule, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as "Rule, 1955"). Petitioner has also been denied full salary for the period of suspension and the same has been confined to amount of subsistence allowance already paid. All his medals, decorum etc., earned in service have been forfeited. He has also challenged Appellate Authority's order dated 27.05.2004 passed by Deputy Inspector General, C.R.P.F., New Delhi, dismissing petitioner's appeal and Revisional Order dated 19.09.2005 passed by Inspector General of Police, C.R.P.F., New Delhi dismissing petitioner's revision. 3. All his medals, decorum etc., earned in service have been forfeited. He has also challenged Appellate Authority's order dated 27.05.2004 passed by Deputy Inspector General, C.R.P.F., New Delhi, dismissing petitioner's appeal and Revisional Order dated 19.09.2005 passed by Inspector General of Police, C.R.P.F., New Delhi dismissing petitioner's revision. 3. A charge-sheet dated 12.12.2002 was served upon petitioner containing two charges which read as under :- ^^en ,d&cy la[;k 913227509 flikgh cuokjh yky Mh@ 104 cVkfy;u nzqr dk;Z cy] ds0fj0iq0 cy us lnL; gksus dh gSfl;r ls voKk vopkj ,oa M;wVh dh vis{kk dk O;ogkj djrs gq, fnukad 23-9-02 ls 25-11-02 rd fcuk fdlh le{k vf/kdkjh dh vuqefr@vodk'k Lohd`fr ds M;wVh ls vuqifLFkr jgkA cy la[;k 913227509 flikgh cuokjh yky Mh@104 cVkfy;u nzqr dk;Z cy] ds0fj0iq0cy dks nks fnu vkdfLed vodk'k fnukad 20-9-02 ls 21-9-02 jfookj dh vuqefr Lohd`fr fd;k x;k FkkA mDr dkfeZd dks viuh M;wVh ij 23-9-02 dks fjiksVZ djuk FkkA ijUrq os oSls djus ls vlQy jgk vkSj fnukad 25-11-02 ¼vi0½ dks 64 fnu xSj gkftj jgdj cVkfy;u eq[;ky; esa fjiksVZ fd;kA ;|fi cy la[;k 913227509 flikgh cuokjh yky Mh@104 cVkfy;u nzqr dk;Z cy] ds0fj0iq0 cy vyhx<+ us cy dk lnL; gksus dh gSfl;r ls voKk dk vijk/k fd;k gS ftlesa mlus 64 fnu fcuk fdlh l{ke vf/kdkjh dh vuqefr@vodk'k Lohd`r ds M;qVh ls vuqifLFkr jgk tks fd dsUnzh; fjtoZ iqfyl cy vf/kfu;e 1949 dh /kkjk 11 ¼1½ ds lkFk ifBr dsUnzh; fjtoZ iqfyl cy fu;ekoyh 1955 ds fu;e 27 ds vUrxZr n.Muh; gSAa "Item 1:- Force No 913227509 Cons Banwari Lal, D/104 Battalion- Rapid Action Force, Central Reserve Police Force, remained absent from his duty from 23.9.02 to 25.11.02 without any permission/ sanction of leave by the competent officer, thus showing disobedience, misconduct and negligence towards his duties as a member of the Force. Two days' casual leaves from 20.9.02 to 21.9.02, with permission for Sunday, had been sanctioned to Force No 913227509 Cons Banwari Lal, D/104 Battalion-Rapid Action Force, C.R.P.F. The aforesaid official was to report back for his duty on 23.9.02 but he failed to do so; and after absence of 64 days he reported at the Battalion headquarters on 25.11.02 (A.N). Two days' casual leaves from 20.9.02 to 21.9.02, with permission for Sunday, had been sanctioned to Force No 913227509 Cons Banwari Lal, D/104 Battalion-Rapid Action Force, C.R.P.F. The aforesaid official was to report back for his duty on 23.9.02 but he failed to do so; and after absence of 64 days he reported at the Battalion headquarters on 25.11.02 (A.N). Though Force No 913227509 Cons Banwari Lal, D/104 Battalion- Rapid Action Force, Central Reserve Police Force has as a member of the Force, committed disobedience, wherein he remained absent from duty for 64 days without any permission/ sanction of leave by the competent officer, which is punishable under Section 11 (1) of the Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949 read with Rule 27 of Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955." en&nks&cy la[;k 913227509 flikgh cyokjh yky Mh@ 104 cVkfy;u] nzqrdk;Z cy ds0fj0iq0cy dks nks fnu dk vkdfLed vodk'k fnukad 20-9-02 ls 21-9-02 lkFk esa fnukad 22-9-02 dks vuqefr LOkhd`fr dh xbZ FkhA dkfeZd dks fnukad 23-9-02 dks viuh M~;wVh ij mifLFkr gksuk Fkk ijUrq og fu/kkZfjr le; ij fjiksVZ djus esa vlQy jgk vkSj 64 fnu fnukad 23-9-02 ls 26-11-02 rd fcuk fdlh l{ke vf/kdkjh dh vuqefr vodk'k Lohd`fr ds M;qVh ls vuqifLFkr jgkA dkfeZd dks rqjUr M~;wVh ij fjiksVZ djus ds fy, i= la[;k&,y-ns-2@02 Mh@104 fnukad 28-9-02 ,oa 28-10-02 }kjk vkns'k fn;k x;k] ijUrq dkfeZd us vius mPp vf/kdkfj;ksa }kjk ikfjr vkns'kksa dh vuns[kh djrs gq, fcuk vuqefr ds viuh M~;wVh ls vuqifLFkr jgkA ;|fi cy la[;k 913227509 flikgh cuokjh yky Mh@104 cVkfy;u] nzqr dk;Z cy] ds0fj0 iq0 cy dk lnL; gksus dh gSfl;r ls voKk dk vijk/k fd;k ftlesa mlus vius mPp vf/kdkfj;ksa ds }kjk ikfjr vkns'kksa dk ikyu ugha fd;k tks fd dsUnzh; fjtoZ iqfyl cy vf/kfu;e 1949 dh /kkjk 11 ¼1½ ds lkFk ifBr dsUnzh; fjtoZ iqfyl cy fu;ekoyh 1955 ds fu;e 27 ds vUrxZr nLrkostksa dh lwph ftuds vk/kkj ij Mh@104 cVkfy;u nzqr dk;Z cy] ds0fj0iq0 cy vyhx<+ ds cy la[;k 913227509 flikgh cuokjh yky ds fo:) yxk, x, vkjksiks dks enksa ds fl) fd, tkus dk izLrko gSA** Item-2: Two days' casual leaves from 20.9.02 to 21.9.02 with permission for 22.9.02 had been sanctioned to Force No 913227509 Cons Banwari Lal, D/104 Battalion- Rapid Action Force, C.R.P.F. The official was to report back on 23.9.02, but he failed to report on the specified time and remained absent from duty for 64 days i.e. from 23.9.02 to 26.11.02 without any permission/ sanction of leave by the competent officer. The official was vide letter no L.De. 2/02 D/ 104 dated 28.9.02 and 28.10.02 directed to report back for duty immediately but the official, ignoring orders passed by higher officers, remained absent from his duty without permission. However, Force No 913227509 Cons Banwari Lal, D/104 Battalion- Rapid Action Force, C.R.P.F., as a member of the Force, committed disobedience, wherein he did not comply with the orders passed by his superior officers which is punishable under Section 11 (1) of the Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949 read with Rule 27 of Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955, which contains the list of documents on the basis of which counts of charges levelled against Force No 913227509 Cons Banwari Lal of D/104 Battalion, Rapid Action Force, C.R.P.F., Aligarh are proposed to be proved." (English Translation by Court) 4. In the list of evidences, four documents and four witnesses were relied and referred. Petitioner submitted reply dated 04.10.2002 stating that he had been seriously ill and treatment was going on and after getting fit, would report for duty. 5. Oral enquiry was conducted by Miss Tejinder Kaur, Assistant Commandant who was appointed vide order dated 12.04.2003 as Enquiry Officer. After completion of enquiry, Enquiry Officer submitted report dated 22.10.2003 holding the charges proved. A copy of Enquiry Report was forwarded to petitioner vide office letter dated 31.10.2003. Petitioner submitted reply where after order of punishment was passed by Disciplinary Authority on 13.12.2003. Petitioner's appeal and revision have also been dismissed, as stated above. 6. Learned counsel for petitioner has contended that oral enquiry was conducted illegally, inasmuch as, petitioner was not given any opportunity of cross-examination; witnesses' statements are self-contradictory; petitioner was not absent without any reason but he was ill and, therefore, there was no misconduct and despite the fact that department and witnesses did not prove charges still petitioner has been held guilty. Lastly, it is also submitted that punishment imposed upon petitioner is highly disproportionate considering the gravity of charge and, therefore, arbitrary. 7. Learned counsel appearing for respondents, on the contrary, sought to support orders of punishment by submitting that due opportunity was given to petitioner and there is no violation of procedural requirement, hence, writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 8. 7. Learned counsel appearing for respondents, on the contrary, sought to support orders of punishment by submitting that due opportunity was given to petitioner and there is no violation of procedural requirement, hence, writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 8. Record shows that in the charge-sheet only four witnesses were named but ultimately Department examined seven witnesses as under: S.No. Name of Witnesses Post (i) Sri Shankar Lal Hawaldar (ii) Smt. Vijay Rawat Assistant Commandant (iii) Sri Tej Singh Hawaldar (iv) Sri Sulakhad Singh Hawaldar (v) Sri Ram Jakhad Constable (vi) Sri Chandra Bhan Constable (vii) Sri Wadappa Constable 9. Petitioner was given opportunity of cross-examination and thereafter to lead his defence evidence. Thus, it cannot be said that inquiry has not been held properly or that the petitioner has not been given adequate opportunity to defend himself. 10. With respect to non-performance of duty in the night of 22.02.2003, I find that Smt. Vijay Rawat, Assistant Commandant in her statement clearly said that petitioner did not attend duty and when asked, he said that since enquiry was already going on against him, therefore, he cannot discharge guard's duty and when explained that he was not under suspension, he admitted his guilt and said that in future, he shall perform his duty. Again on 24.02.2003 in the night, he did not attend his bathroom/tent guard's duty and thereby consistently defied order of superior authorities regarding performing of official duty. Statements have also been placed on record and I find that petitioner was also given opportunity to cross-examine witnesses hence, contention that petitioner was not given opportunity of defence to cross-examine witnesses produced by Employer to prove charges, is factually incorrect. 11. In respect of charge-2 also, petitioner has not disputed his absence but he said that he was absent on account of illness. So far as this aspect is concerned, he has not adduced any credible evidence before Enquiry Officer/Authority as well as Disciplinary Authority. Moreso, counsel for petitioner could not explain as to why petitioner did not go to Government Hospital when as a member of C.R.P.F., he was entitled for treatment in Government Hospital. 12. So far as this aspect is concerned, he has not adduced any credible evidence before Enquiry Officer/Authority as well as Disciplinary Authority. Moreso, counsel for petitioner could not explain as to why petitioner did not go to Government Hospital when as a member of C.R.P.F., he was entitled for treatment in Government Hospital. 12. Counsel for petitioner has placed reliance on a Supreme Court Judgment in Bhagwan Lal Arya v. Commissioner of Police, Delhi and another, (2004) AIR SC 2131 and has contended that absence on account of medical reasons cannot be treated to be a "misconduct" or "grave misconduct". 13. Having gone through aforesaid judgment, I do not find that any assistance can be extended to petitioner from aforesaid judgment for the reason that therein absence of Bhagwan Lal was duly supported by medical certificate and in view thereof, Court held that there was no absence without valid reasons, hence, it was not a case of misconduct. However, that is not so in the present case. 14. Counsel for petitioner has also relied on a Supreme Court's decision in Krushnakant B. Parmar v. Union of India and another,2012 1 CRC 427, on the proposition that absence for valid reason is not a misconduct. As proposition of law, there is no dispute but in the present case, absence of petitioner was deliberate, without any valid reason, therefore, it has rightly been treated to be a misconduct and judgment in reference would not help petitioner at all. 15. Now coming to question of disproportionate punishment in respect whereof, petitioner has placed reliance on a Supreme Court's judgment in Ex. Naik Sardar Singh v. Union of India and Others, (1992) AIR SC 417, which was the judgment rendered in a Criminal Appeal arisen from Court Marshal proceeding under Army Act, 1950, but I find that the said judgment has no application in the present case. On the contrary, in my view, punishment imposed upon petitioner cannot be said to be disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct having been proved against him. 16. When this Court comes to the question of rationality of punishment, looking to the nature of employment of petitioner and paramount importance of maintenance of discipline in Uniformed force, I find it difficult to hold that punishment can be said to be disproportionate to the charges levelled and proved against petitioner. 17. 16. When this Court comes to the question of rationality of punishment, looking to the nature of employment of petitioner and paramount importance of maintenance of discipline in Uniformed force, I find it difficult to hold that punishment can be said to be disproportionate to the charges levelled and proved against petitioner. 17. Moreover, in the matter of award of punishment, the scope of judicial review in exercise of power under Article 226 of Constitution of India is extremely narrow and restricted. Unless it could be shown that punishment imposed upon delinquent employee is such as to shock the conscious of the Court or that no person of ordinary prudence would come to such conclusion that it is ex facia arbitrary, the Court will not interfere. 18. In Ranjit Thakur Vs Union of India and others, (1987) 4 SCC 611 , Court held: "judicial review generally speaking, is not directed against a decision, but is directed against the "decision making process". The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the competent authority. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. If one can say that punishment imposed is wholly irrational and perverse it is a recognised ground of judicial review." (emphasis added) 19. This judgment was explained in Union of India Vs. R.K. Sharma, (2001) 9 SCC 492 , and Court said: "In Ranjit Thakur, the charge was ridiculous, the punishment was harsh and disproportionate and it was on such gross facts that this Court had held that the punishment was so strikingly disproportionate that it called for interference; and the said observations in Ranjit Thakur are not to be taken to mean that a court can, while exercising the power of judicial review, interfere with the punishment merely because it considers the punishment to be disproportionate. It was held that only in extreme cases, which on their face, show perversity or irrationality, there could be judicial review and merely on compassionate grounds, courts should not interfere." (emphasis added) 20. Both the aforesaid judgments have been noticed and reiterated in Union of India and others Vs. Bodupalli Gopalaswami, (2011) 13 SCC 553 . 21. It was held that only in extreme cases, which on their face, show perversity or irrationality, there could be judicial review and merely on compassionate grounds, courts should not interfere." (emphasis added) 20. Both the aforesaid judgments have been noticed and reiterated in Union of India and others Vs. Bodupalli Gopalaswami, (2011) 13 SCC 553 . 21. It is well settled that the Courts in exercise of power of judicial review would not normally interfere with the quantum of punishment and shall be very slow unless it is found to be shocking to its conscience. (State of U.P. Vs. Sheo Shankar Lal Srivastava and others, (2006) 3 SCC 276 ; Hombe Gowda Educational Trust and another Vs. State of Karnataka and others, (2006) 1 SCC 430 . 22. In State of Gujarat Vs. Anand Acharya alias Bharat Kumar Sadhu, (2007) 9 SCC 310 Court has held: "The well settled proposition of law that a court sitting in judicial review against quantum of punishment imposed in the disciplinary proceedings will not normally substitute its own conclusion of penalty is not in dispute. However, in the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the concious of the court, then the court appropriately mould the relief either by directing the disciplinary/appropriate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed or to shorten the litigation it may make exception in rare cases and impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof." 23. In Charanjit Lamba Vs. Commanding Officer, Southern Command and others, (2010) AIR SC 2462, Court held: "... the quantum of punishment in disciplinary matters is something that rests primarily with the disciplinary authority. The jurisdiction of a Writ Court or the Administrative Tribunal for that matter is limited to finding out whether the punishment is so outrageously disproportionate as to be suggestive of lack of good faith. What is clear is that while judicially reviewing an order of punishment imposed upon a delinquent employee the Writ Court would not assume the role of an appellate authority. It would not impose a lesser punishment merely because it considers the same to be more reasonable that what the disciplinary authority has imposed. What is clear is that while judicially reviewing an order of punishment imposed upon a delinquent employee the Writ Court would not assume the role of an appellate authority. It would not impose a lesser punishment merely because it considers the same to be more reasonable that what the disciplinary authority has imposed. It is only in cases where the punishment is so disproportionate to the gravity of charge that no reasonable person placed in the position of the disciplinary authority could have imposed such a punishment that a Writ Court may step in to interfere with the same." 24. Referring to Charanjit Lamba Vs. Commanding Officer, Southern Command and others (supra) in Maharashtra Land Development Corporation and Corporation and others Vs. State of Maharashtra and another, (2011) 15 SCC 616 it was held that constitutional requirement for judging the question of reasonableness and fairness on the part of the statutory authority must be considered having regard to the factual matrix obtaining in each case. It cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. It must be considered keeping in view the doctrine of flexibility. Before an action is struck down, the Court must be satisfied that a case has been made out for exercise of power of judicial review. 25. In Prem Nath Bali Vs Registrar, High Court of Delhi and others, (2016) AIR SC 101, question arose, 'whether punishment of compulsory retirement was excessive, unjust and does not commensurate with the charge proved against delinquent employee. Court said: "Once the charges leveled against the delinquent employee are proved then it is for the appointing authority to decide as to what punishment should be imposed on the delinquent employee as per the Rules. The appointing authority, keeping in view the nature and gravity of the charges, findings of the inquiry officer, entire service record of the delinquent employee and all relevant factors relating to the delinquent, exercised its discretion and then imposed the punishment as provided in the Rules. Once such discretion is exercised by the appointing authority in inflicting the punishment (whether minor or major) then the Courts are slow to interfere in the quantum of punishment and only in rare and appropriate case substitutes the punishment. Once such discretion is exercised by the appointing authority in inflicting the punishment (whether minor or major) then the Courts are slow to interfere in the quantum of punishment and only in rare and appropriate case substitutes the punishment. Such power is exercised when the Court finds that the delinquent employee is able to prove that the punishment inflicted on him is wholly unreasonable, arbitrary and disproportionate to the gravity of the proved charges thereby shocking the conscious of the Court or when it is found to be in contravention of the Rules." (emphasis added) 26. The above observations are reiterated in Commissioner of Police and others Vs. Sat Narayan Kaushik, (2016) AIR SC 1464. In the matter of punishment it is always relevant, to consider the position, delinquent employee was holding, what was nature of his duties, degree of trust, integrity etc. maintained by such person and other relevant factors. 27. In the matter of a member of disciplined force, who left campus without prior permission, proceeded to the market, consumed liquor and quarreled with the civilians, it was held that punishment of dismissal cannot be said to be disproportionate or excessive. In Union of India and others Vs. Diler Singh, (2016) 13 SCC 71 , Court held: "when a member of the disciplined force deviates to such an extent from the discipline and behaves in an untoward manner which is not conceived of, it was difficult to hold that the punishment of dismissal as was imposed was disproportionate and shocking to the judicial conscience." 28. CRPF is a Paramilitary Force where discipline is one of the most important aspect. Petitioner being a member of Paramilitary Force, having shown a reckless attitude of abandoning duty without producing any sufficient and reliable material to justify his absence for valid reasons, is guilty of serious lapse. Authorities' satisfaction for believing evidence being primary, they are well competent to analyze various facts and circumstances. In the instant case, Authorities after analyzing various facts and circumstances have found petitioner's explanation unsatisfactory. I, therefore, do not find any reasons to interfere with the same under Article 226 of the Constitution. 29. No other point has been argued. 30. The writ petition lacks merits. Dismissed.