ORDER : 1. Appellant/plaintiff has filed the present second appeal being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 04.12.2012 passed by Civil Judge, Class-II, Manavar, district Dhar and judgment dated 22.09.2016 passed by Additional District Judge, Manavar, district Dhar whereby the suit for declaration and permanent injunction and the first appeal both have been dismissed respectively. 2. Facts of the case in short are as under: Plaintiff filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction in respect of a piece of land admeasuring 35 x 12 x 8 sq. ft. situated in Ward No. 13, Juni, Manavar, district Dhar (hereinafter referred as ‘the suit land’). According to the plaintiff, the said land came into his share by way of partition as the same was joint family property/vardiloparjit property. He is using the said land since last so many years for storing garbage, wood, animals and their food etc. He is residing in the house situated at Juni Mohalla, Manavar since last 13 years. The suit land is situated 12 ft. away from the south side of the said house. He purchased the west facing house admeasuring 24 x 75 sq. ft. in the year 1996 from Gajanand. He had an agreement to sell with the father of defendant No. 2 and his brother Chaganlal for sale of 30 x 40 sq. ft. house and since then he is in possession in it. He received a notice dated 11.08.2009 from the Court of Tehsil in Case No. 342/08-09 then he came to know that the defendant No. 2 being the owner of the suit land has donated it to defendant No. 1 vide registered gift deed dated 06.06.2008. There was collusion between defendant Nos. 1 and 2. The defendant No. 2 had no right and title over the land to execute the gift deed and on the basis of the gift deed the defendant No. 1 is trying to dispossess him forcibly which gave cause of action to him for filing the civil suit for the relief of declaration and permanent injunction. 3. Defendant No. 1 filed the written statement as well as counter claim for the reliefs of declaration and possession of the suit property. The defendant No. 2 also filed the written statement in favour of defendant No. 1. 3. Defendant No. 1 filed the written statement as well as counter claim for the reliefs of declaration and possession of the suit property. The defendant No. 2 also filed the written statement in favour of defendant No. 1. According to the defendants, Maganlal and his brother Chaganlal both jointly purchased large area of the land vide registered sale-deed dated 26.06.1943 from Jawharlal (minor). Maganlal and Chaganlal both have expired and the defendant No. 2 being the son became the exclusive owner of the suit property. He was in possession over the suit property as well as other lands. The area of the suit land is 35 ft. from north to south, 12 ft. on the north side and 8 ft. on the south side. There is a concrete road on the east side and house of Vijay Barve and Namdev Dharamshala are situated on the west side. The defendant No. 2 has admitted the execution of the gift deed dated 06.06.2008 in favour of defendant No. 1 and denied the title of the plaintiff. The plaintiff purchased the house from the father of defendant No. 2 by way of agreement to sell but since the sale-deed was not executed, therefore, he has no title. The defendants have specifically denied the title of the plaintiff by way of succession and also denied that the suit property is vadiloparjit property. The defendant No. 2 has admitted that he had handed over possession of the suit land to defendant No. 1 on 06.08.2008 and thereafter the plaintiff has forcibly taken possession on 25.07.2009 by erecting fencing. 4. Plaintiff filed the written statement to the counter claim of defendant No. 1. He has also denied that the suit property is not the part of the land purchased by Maganlal and Chaganlal vide registered sale-deed dated 26.06.1943. Neither the father of defendant No. 2 purchased the suit land nor did the defendant No. 2 have the right to execute the gift deed. 5. On the basis of the pleadings in the suit as well as counter claim and written statement, the trial Court framed eight issues for adjudication. In support of his case the plaintiff examined himself as PW-1, Vittal as PW-2, Hira S/o Chithar as PW-3 and got exhibited 13 documents as Ex.P/1 to P/13. In rebuttal, defendant No. 1 examined Manohar, the Manager of Namdev Samaj Dharamshala as DW-1. In support of his case the plaintiff examined himself as PW-1, Vittal as PW-2, Hira S/o Chithar as PW-3 and got exhibited 13 documents as Ex.P/1 to P/13. In rebuttal, defendant No. 1 examined Manohar, the Manager of Namdev Samaj Dharamshala as DW-1. The defendant No. 2 examined himself as DW-2 and Gyarasia as DW-3. The plaintiff in rebuttal to the counter claim examined Hari as PW-4. The defendants have got exhibited six documents as Ex.D/1 to D/6. 6. After appreciating the evidence came on record vide judgment and decree dated 04.12.2012 learned Civil Judge has dismissed the suit and decreed the counter claim of defendant No. 1 and also directed the plaintiff to hand over vacant possession of the suit land to defendant No. 1. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree, plaintiff preferred first appeal No. 3A/13 and vide judgment dated 22.09.2016, learned Additional District Judge, Manavar has dismissed the appeal by upholding the impugned judgment and decree dated 04.12.2012, hence present second appeal before this Court by the plaintiff. 7. Shri D.S. Kale, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff submitted that though the plaintiff has failed to prove his title by way of succession and long possession but the learned Courts below have erred in decreeing the counter claim in favour of the defendant No. 1. The defendant No. 2 has utterly failed to prove his title over the suit land to execute the gift deed in favour of defendant No. 2. The father of defendant No. 2 and his brother had purchased the land on 26.06.1943 but he has failed to prove that the suit land is a part of the said land. The possession of the plaintiff is not in dispute but he cannot be dispossessed by a person who has no title over the land. Learned Courts below on the basis of the probability has found the title of defendant No. 2 over the suit land in order to grant the decree in favour of defendant No. 1. The defendant Nos. 1 and 2 both have failed to prove the sale-deeds by calling the parties to the sale-deed in to the witness box. It is settled law that the registered sale-deed is not a public document but a private document. The defendants have filed the certified copy of the sale-deed in the Court for proving their title. The defendant Nos. 1 and 2 both have failed to prove the sale-deeds by calling the parties to the sale-deed in to the witness box. It is settled law that the registered sale-deed is not a public document but a private document. The defendants have filed the certified copy of the sale-deed in the Court for proving their title. In support of his contention he has placed reliance over the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rekha Wd/o Vijay Singh Rana and Others vs. Smt. Ratnashree W/o Rajendra Kumar Jain, 2006 (1) MPLJ 103 . 8. Shri Kale, learned counsel further submitted that the identity, boundary and the location of the suit property are in dispute. The plaintiff filed an application under Order 26 Rule 9 of the CPC but the trial Court has wrongly rejected the said application. When there is a dispute about the demarcation and identity of the suit property in question, it is the duty of the Court to issue a commission by appointing an employee of the revenue department to get the land in dispute demarcated and for its identification for which even no application from the party is required. In support of his contention he has placed reliance over the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of Shreepat vs. Rajendra Prasad and Others, JT 2000 (7) SC 379 and the judgment of this Court in the case of Jaswant S/o Kashi Ram Yadav vs. Deen Dayal, 2011 (2) MPLJ 576 . 9. Shri Kale further raised an issue of pecuniary jurisdiction of the civil Court to decide the suit. The defendant No. 1 in his counter claim has valued the suit property at Rs. 46,000/- for which the Civil Judge, Class-II had no jurisdiction to try the counter claim because the Civil Judge, Class-II has the jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit of a value of not exceeding Rs. 25,000/-. In support of his all the contentions Shri Kale has proposed the following question of law in this appeal for the purpose of admission: 1. 25,000/-. In support of his all the contentions Shri Kale has proposed the following question of law in this appeal for the purpose of admission: 1. Whether without appointing a local commission under O.26 R.9 CPC the Courts below were justified in holding that suit land is covered by the sale-deed Ex.D/2 which is of the year 1943 and the area and boundaries shown therein has been substantially changed when the suit was filed in the year 2009? 2. Whether Courts below were justified in allowing counter claim filed by the respondent No. 1 on the basis of the Gift deed Ex.D/1 when said Gift deed was not executed by all legal heirs of Chhanganlal and Maganlal and on the date of execution of Gift deed, the respondent No. 2 was not in possession of the suit land? 3. Whether the Courts below were justified in allowing the counter claim when it was not properly valued as per market value shown in the gift deed and it was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial Court? 10. Shri A. Nimgaonkar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents/ defendants argued in support of the impugned judgment and decree. He submitted that both the Courts below have concurrently held that the plaintiff has failed to prove his title over the suit land by way of partition of the joint family property. There was no dispute of identity of the land, therefore, learned trial Court has rightly rejected the application filed under Order 26 Rule 9 of the CPC. The scope of interference by the High Court in a second appeal under section 100 of the CPC in respect of concurrent finding is very limited. There is no perversity in the findings recorded by the Courts below, hence no question of law is liable to be framed in this second appeal. The parties have successfully proved the title over the suit land and the counter claim has rightly been decreed. The civil Court has acquired the jurisdiction to try the present suit after 23.12.2011 through the Madhya Pradesh Civil Court (Amendment) Act, 2011, hence prayed that the present appeal is liable to be dismissed. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records of both the Courts below. 12. The civil Court has acquired the jurisdiction to try the present suit after 23.12.2011 through the Madhya Pradesh Civil Court (Amendment) Act, 2011, hence prayed that the present appeal is liable to be dismissed. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records of both the Courts below. 12. So far the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Civil Judge, Class-II to decide the suit is concerned, the plaintiff filed the suit on 27.10.2009 for the relief of declaration and permanent injunction before the Civil Judge, Class-II, Manavar, district Dhar. The defendant No. 1 filed the counter claim on 22.12.2009 seeking the relief of declaration and possession of the suit property. The defendant No. 1 sought the declaration of title by way of gift deed in which the value of the property is mention as Rs. 46,000/-. Since the gift deed was executed without any consideration, therefore, the defendant No. 1 has only paid the fixed Court fees for the relief of declaration. Though the suit was filed before the Civil Judge, Class-II who had the jurisdiction to decide the suit of the value no exceeding Rs. 25,000/- but during the pendency of the suit by way of amendment dated 23.12.2011 by Act No. 35 of 2011 the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Civil Judge, Class-II has been enhanced from Rs. 25,000/- to Rs. 2,50,000/-. As per the language of section 6 of the Civil Courts Act, 1958 the Civil Judge, Class-II shall have a jurisdiction to hear and determine any suit or proceeding of a value not exceeding Rs. 25,000/- (after the amendment it is Rs. 2,50,000/-). When the civil Court has decided the civil suit it had the jurisdiction to determine the suit of the value not exceeding Rs. 2,50,000/- therefore, the Civil Judge, Class-II has rightly decided the suit, hence I do not find any question of law is involved in this appeal on this point of challenge. 13. So far as the rejection of the application under Order 26 Rule 9 CPC is concerned, it is settled law that when there is a dispute about the demarcation and identity, it is the duty of the Court to appoint an employee of the revenue department as a commission to get the land in dispute demarcated. The same principle applies to a suit in which the identity of the suit land is also in dispute. The same principle applies to a suit in which the identity of the suit land is also in dispute. In the present suit there is no dispute about the location, identity and demarcation of the land. Both the parties have pleaded that the size of the land is 35 x 12 x 8 sq. ft. The boundaries of the land are also not in dispute. The plaintiff filed the suit against the defendants that they are trying to forcibly evict him from the suit land by virtue of the gift deed dated 06.06.2008. The defendant No. 1 claimed the title by virtue of the gift deed of the same land, hence there was no dispute in respect of identity and demarcation of the suit land, therefore, both the Courts below have rightly held that there was no need to appoint the Commissioner under Order 26 Rule 9 of the CPC. Even otherwise the case of the plaintiff is based on the title by way of partition of the joint family property/vadiloparjit property. It is also settled law that Order 26 rule 9 CPC cannot be used to collect the evidence. The burden is on the plaintiff to prove his title over the suit land in a suit of declaration of title. In view of the above, I do not find any question of law involved in this appeal in respect of applicability of provision of Order 26 Rule 9 of the CPC. 14. Plaintiff filed the suit for declaration of title of the suit land. As per the pleadings in the plaint as well as the evidence given by the plaintiff, he claimed the title over the suit land on the ground that the suit land is vadiloparjit property and he received it as his share in it by way of partition. The plaintiff has not filed any documentary evidence to establish that the suit land was the part of joint family property/vadiloparjit property. He has utterly failed to prove the partition in the family also, therefore, both the Courts below have rightly held that the plaintiff has failed to prove his title over the land and there is no perversity in it. Hence, on the question of perversity also no question of law is involved in this second appeal. Accordingly, the findings of both the Courts below are hereby upheld. 15. Hence, on the question of perversity also no question of law is involved in this second appeal. Accordingly, the findings of both the Courts below are hereby upheld. 15. Plaintiff has also filed first appeal as well as second appeal being aggrieved by the decree of title and possession in favour of defendant no. 1. According to the plaintiff the defendant No. 2 had no right and title over the suit land to execute the registered gift deed in favour of defendant No. 1. Since the defendant No. 1 filed the counter claim for the relief of declaration and possession then the burden was on him to prove his title over the suit land. The defendant No. 1 claimed the title by way of registered gift deed. The defendant No. 2 has not disputed the execution of the gift deed in favour of defendant No. 1, then the defendant No. 2 is liable to prove that the suit property was belonging to him being the son of Maganlal. The defendant No. 2 derived the title of the suit land being the son of Maganlal who purchased large area of the land along with his brother by registered sale-deed dated 26.06.1943. According to the plaintiff he purchased the dilapidated house by way of an agreement to sell from the father of defendant No. 2 but thereafter the sale-deed could not be executed, however, the said issue is not involved in this appeal. The dispute is only in respect of the suit land. Both the Courts below after minutely examining Ex.D/2, D/4, D/5 and D/6 came to the conclusion that the suit land was originally owned by the father of defendant No. 2 and his brother Chaganlal. The trial Court has recorded the findings in para-26, 27 and 28 of the judgment in respect of title of defendant No. 2 over the suit land. The trial Court has discussed the boundaries mentioned in Ex.D/2, D/4, D/5 and D/6 and came to the conclusion that the suit property is a part of the land mentioned in Ex.D/2 by which Chaganlal and Maganlal had purchased the land. The trial Court has discussed the boundaries mentioned in Ex.D/2, D/4, D/5 and D/6 and came to the conclusion that the suit property is a part of the land mentioned in Ex.D/2 by which Chaganlal and Maganlal had purchased the land. The findings recorded in para-26, 27 and 28 of the judgment and decree are reproduced below:- ^^26- vc Ádj.k esa ;g Á'u mBrk gS fd D;k fookfnr Hkwfe ÁŒMhŒ 2 ds foØ;&foys[k fd Hkwfe dk gh Hkkx gS\ bls ns[kus ds fy;s ÁŒMhŒ 5 edku c;kukek ¼jftLVMZ fcØh i=½ ftlds ekfyd Nxuyky] exuyky o jruyky us 3 eaftyk cuk dosywuqek dCtk twuh bUnkSj dk edku Lo;a dh ekyfdu ,oa dCts dk fnukad 31-05-1960 dks 'kksHkkxey o lwjtey firk xsankyky dks cspk Fkk ftlds mRrj esa 'kadj firk uanyky tkfr rsyh mecjcu okys dk edku nf{k.k esa j[kcnkl dk edku ,oa iwoZ esa Nxuyky o exuyky dk dksBk o if'pe esa vke jksM gS bl Ádkj Áfroknh Øekad&2 ds firk o mlds HkkbZ us iwoZ&if'pe 70 QhV 10 bap ,oa pkSMkbZ mRrj&nf{k.k 20 QhV 2 bap okyk edku cspus ds mijkar iwoZ esa foØsrkx.k dksBk gksus dk mYys[k gS ftlls Áfroknh euksgj o ikjley ds dFku dh iqf"V gksrh gSA ÁŒMhŒ 5 jftLVMZ foØ; i= 31-5-1960 dk gksdj mls Hkh fdlh us pqukSrh ugha nh gS ,oa bl ckr dk Hkh [k.Mu ugha gqvk gS fd oknh Áfroknh ikjley ds firk ds edku ,oa mlh ls yxk oknh dk 'kksHkkxey ls [kjhnk x;k edku ftlesa oknh jg jgk gS ftls 'kksHkkxey us Áfroknh ikjley ds firk o HkkbZ ls [kjhnk gSA 27- oknh lk{kh fNrj dk Hkh Áfrijh{k.k esa ;gh dguk gS fd oknh dk edku [kjhnk gqvk gS ftls Nxu exu lsB ls [kjhnk gS ,oa exuyky dk iq= Áfroknh Øekad&2 ikjley gS ,oa fookfnr Hkwfe dks ukenso /keZ'kkyk ds ihNs Hkh gksuk Lohdkj fd;k gS 'kksHkkxey ds edku ds nf{k.k esa tokgj lsB dk edku Fkk ftls cæhyky firk ghjkyky ikVhnkj us fnukad 08-03-1990 dks Ø; fd;k tks ÁŒMhŒ 6 gksdj ist uacj 3 ij bl ckr dk mYys[k gS fd fcØh 'kqnk edku ds mRrj dh rjQ tks edku gS mles 'kksHkkxey jgrk gS pawfd nksuksa edku esa os ifjokj ds yksx jgrs Fks vc og edku Nxuyky exuyky us 'kksHkkxey dks mijksDr edku Ø; dj fn;k ftldh pqrqZlhek esa iwoZ esa Nxu exu dk [k.Mgj gksus dk mYys[k gSA 28- bl Ádkj ÁŒMhŒ 2] 4] 5 ,oa 6 ds nLrkostksa ls ;g Áekf.kr gS fd nkfo;k Hkwfe ds ewy ekfyd ÁŒMhŒ2 ds vuqlkj Áfroknh ikjley ds firk o HkkbZ Nxuyky Fks ftudh e`R;q gksus ij ikjley ekfyd gqvk vkSj ikjley us vius ekfydh; dh fookfnr lEifRr dks Áfroknh Øekad&1 dks nku dj fn;k tks jftLVªMZ nku i= ÁŒMhŒ 1 gS ftls QthZ ugha dgk tk ldrk D;ksafd ikjley us LoRo ,oa vkf/kiR;/kkjh dh gSfl;r ls nkfo;k lEifRr Áfroknh Øekad&1 dks jftLVªMZ nku dh gS ftlesa leLr rRoksa dk lekos'k gSA** 16. The first appellate Court did re-appreciate all the aforesaid sale-deeds and came to the conclusion that the suit property was the part of Ex.D/2. The findings are recorded in para-22 and 23 of the first appellate Court's judgment, therefore, both the concurrent findings are not liable to the interfered by this Court under section 100 of the CPC. The first appellate Court did re-appreciate all the aforesaid sale-deeds and came to the conclusion that the suit property was the part of Ex.D/2. The findings are recorded in para-22 and 23 of the first appellate Court's judgment, therefore, both the concurrent findings are not liable to the interfered by this Court under section 100 of the CPC. The findings recorded in para-22 and 23 of the judgment are reproduced below:- ^^22- bl Ádkj nLrkost ÁŒMhŒ 2 ds fu"iknu vkSj vuqÁek.ku Áekf.kr gksrk gSA mDr nLrkost ds lkFk layXu ekufp= esa Ø; 'kqnk Hkwfe ds nf{k.k fn'kk esa edku ukFkqyky 'kadjyky if'pe fn'kk esa dLrqjpan gyokbZ dk iMr edku] mlds ckn 60 QhV pkSMh xyh] mlds ckn ljkch iap dh iMr vjkth] dkyqHkkbZ dk edku] iwoZ fn'kk esa ljdkjh tehu o ysfVu eqUlhiy desVh eukoj] mRrj fn'kk esa ckY;k] uafn;k] fd'ku] taxfy;k] dksnfM;k] ckyk] Hkwfj;k oxSjg dgkj yksx o foBBy dqEgkj] lsuk iVok] /kUukyky /kksch] cYyq dqEgkj oxSjg ds edku nf'kZr gSA mDr prqZlhek dks Áfroknh euksgj ÁŒlkŒ 1 us Áfrijh{k.k ds in Øekad 13 esa Lohdkj fd;k gSA bl Ádkj oknh }kjk fn;s x;s lq>ko ls gh ;g Li"V ÁdV gksrk gS fd oknh foØ; i= ÁŒMhŒ 2 esa okf.kZr Hkwfe prqZlhek dks Lohdkj dj jgk gSA 23- oknh us okn&i= dh df.Mdk 4 esa la'kks/ku ds ek/;e ls ;g vfHkopu lekfgr fd;k gS fd mlus o"kZ 1996 esa xtkuan firk 'kadjyky jkBkSj fuoklh mejcu ls 24 ck; 75 QhV iwoZ&if'pe yEckbZ dk edku ije/kke ekxZ ij x<+h eksgYys esa Ø; dj iSr`d fgLls ds vU; eksgYys ds edku iVsy ekxZ xyh uEcj 4 dks NksM+dj mDr Ø;'kqnk edku esa jgus vk x;kA o"kZ 1996 esa gh oknh us viuh lgwfy;r ns[krs gq, Áfroknh Øekad 2 ikjley ds firk ,oa muds HkzkrkJh Nxuyky us vius bl edku ds ihNs if'pe dk edku 30 ck; 40 QhV mRrj&nf{k.k yEckbZ okyk Ø; fd;kA oknh }kjk fd, x;s mDr vfHkopu ds vkyksd esa oknh lk{kh 'kadj okŒlkŒ 1 ds dFkuksa dk ifj'khyu djus ij mlds Áfrijh{k.k esa ;g LohdkjksfDr vkbZ gS fd fookfnr Hkwfe dh mRrj ls nf{k.k yEckbZ 45 QhV iwoZ ls if'pe mRrj rjQ pkSMkbZ 12 QhV vkSj nf{k.k rjQ pkSMkbZ 8 QhV gS vkxs bl lk{kh us ;g Hkh Lohdkj fd;k gS fd if'pe esa ukenso /keZ/kkyk mRrj esa cæhyky ikVhnkj dk edku nf{k.k esa jkLrk gSA ;g lk{kh bl lq>ko ls vufHkKrk ÁdV djrk gS fd nkfo;ksa Hkwfe ikjley ds firk ,oa muds HkkbZ Nxuyky }kjk o"kZ 1945 esa Ø; dh xbZ FkhA bl Ádkj ;g ÁdV gksrk gS fd oknh us o"kZ 1996 esa Áfroknh Øekad 2 ds firk ls tks Hkw&Hkkx Ø; fd;k Fkk ml Hkw&Hkkx ds ihNs dh rjQ iwoZ fn'kk ls djhc 12 QhV nwj nf{k.k fn'kk esa fookfnr Hkwfe yxh gqbZ FkhA blh Ádkj Áfroknhx.k dh vksj ls ÁLrqr lk{; ls Hkh ;g ÁdV gksrk gS fd oknxzLr Hkwfe Áfroknh Øekad 1 ds edku vkSj fot; cosZ ds edku ds ihNs fLFkfr gS] ,slh fLFkfr esa laHkkoukvksa dh Ácyrk ;gh ÁdV gksrh gS fd fookfnr Hkwfe oknh ds firk exuyky }kjk ÁŒihŒ 2 ds ek/;e ls Ø; dh xbZ Hkwfe dk Hkkx gSA** 17. The plaintiff did not challenge all the execution of Ex.D/2, D/4, D/5 and D/6 and the defendant No. 2 has produced the certified copies of all those documents which were duly got exhibited by him in the Court. After marking them as exhibits the original copies of the deed have been returned by the Court which is evident from the order sheet dated 10.12.2012 of the civil Court. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rekha (supra) has held that the certified copy marked without laying foundation for receiving secondary evidence though admissible for the purpose of proving the contents of the original document, will not be the proof of execution of the original document. The defendant No. 2 has filed the certified copies of those documents (Ex.D/2, D/4, D/5 and D/6) in order to prove that the suit land is a part of the land mentioned in Ex.D/2. The execution of those sale-deeds have not been disputed by the plaintiff, therefore, only for the purpose of contents of it the certified copies can be looked into. Hence, the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below are based on proper appreciation of evidence. 18. In second appeal the High Court can interfere with the judgment and decree passed by the subordinate Courts only on a question of law much less substantial question of law. The findings of fact recorded by the Courts below are not liable to be interfered with unless the same are perverse. 19. The apex Court in the case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam vs. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, (1999) 3 SCC 722 , has held as under: “5. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first appellate court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence. 6. If the question of law termed as a substantial question stands already decided by a larger Bench of the High Court concerned or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or by the Supreme Court, its merely wrong application on the facts of the case would not be termed to be a substantial question of law. Where a point of law has not been pleaded or is found to be arising between the parties in the absence of any factual format, a litigant should not be allowed to raise that question as a substantial question of law in second appeal. The mere appreciation of the facts, the documentary evidence or the meaning of entries and the contents of the document cannot be held to be raising a substantial question of law. But where it is found that the first appellate court has assumed jurisdiction which did not vest in it, the same can be adjudicated in the second appeal, treating it as a substantial question of law. Where the first appellate court is shown to have exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, it cannot be termed to be an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in second appeal. This Court in Reserve Bank of India vs. Ramkrishna Govind Morey, AIR 1976 SC 830 , held that whether the trial court should not have exercised its jurisdiction differently is not a question of law justifying interference.” 20. In case of Laxmidevamma vs. Ranganath, (2015) 4 SCC 264 , again the apex court has held as under: “16. Based on oral and documentary evidence, both the courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact that the plain-tiffs have established their right in A schedule property. In case of Laxmidevamma vs. Ranganath, (2015) 4 SCC 264 , again the apex court has held as under: “16. Based on oral and documentary evidence, both the courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact that the plain-tiffs have established their right in A schedule property. In the light of the concurrent findings of fact, no substantial questions of law arose in the High Court and there was no substantial ground for re-appreciation of evidence. While so, the High Court proceeded to observe that the first plaintiff has earmarked the A schedule property for road and that she could not have full-fledged right and on that premise proceeded to hold that declaration to the plaintiffs’ right cannot be granted. In exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, concurrent findings of fact cannot be upset by the High Court unless the findings so recorded are shown to be perverse. In our considered view, the High Court did not keep in view that the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below, are based on oral and documentary evidence and the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained.” 21. Recently, the Apex Court in case of Adiveppa and Others vs. Bhimappa and Others, (2017) 9 SCC 586 , has held as under: “17. Here is a case where two Courts below, on appreciating the entire evidence, have come to a conclusion that the Plaintiffs failed to prove their case in relation to both the suit properties. The concurrent findings of facts recorded by the two Courts, which do not involve any question of law much less substantial question of law, are binding on this Court. 18. It is more so when these findings are neither against the pleadings nor against the evidence and nor contrary to any provision of law. They are also not perverse to the extent that no such findings could ever be recorded by any judicial person. In other words, unless the findings of facts, though concurrent, are found to be extremely perverse so as to affect the judicial conscious of a judge, they would be binding on the Appellate Court.” 22. In view of the above, this appeal does not involve any question of law much less substantial question of law. Accordingly, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.