JUDGMENT : A.M. SHAFFIQUE, J. 1. This appeal is preferred by the appellant challenging the verdict passed by the Sessions Judge, Kollam in S.C. No. 86 of 2014 by which he was found guilty under Section 376 (2) (f) and (i) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short IPC) and was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life and to pay a fine of Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand only) in default of which to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years. He was also found guilty under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from the Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for brevity POCSO Act) but, the offence under S.376(2)(f) and (i) being of greater degree, no separate sentence is awarded for the same as per Section 42 of POCSO Act. It is also directed that the appellant/accused is not entitled to the benefit of set off under Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short Cr.P.C.). 2. The case of the prosecution is that the appellant/accused herein committed rape on his own daughter who was under the age of 16 years at the time of commission of offence from a period of 2010 to 2013 at their temporary shed situated at Charuvila Puthen Veedu, Punnakkad, Podiyattuvila Muri, Arakkal Village and as a result, the victim was impregnated and delivered a girl child. 3. Prosecution examined PWs. 1 to 11 and marked Exts.P1 to P13. MO1 is identified. During 313 examination, the appellant/accused denied all the incriminating evidence and pleaded that he is innocent. His wife eloped with another man. Thereafter he was not in a proper mental state. He also had undergone treatment for mental illness. He used to return late from work and during that period, his children were in the house of his neighbour Paulose. According to him, he had not done anything to his daughter. No defence evidence was adduced in the case. 4. Evidence adduced by the prosecution in the case, in brief, are as under: PW-1 is the Doctor who examined the victim and issued Ext.P1 certificate. PW-2 is the victim who is the daughter of the appellant/accused. PW-3 is the neighbour staying adjacent to the place of occurrence. PW-4 is the Medical Officer who examined the appellant/accused and issued Ext.P4 certificate. Evidence adduced by the prosecution in the case, in brief, are as under: PW-1 is the Doctor who examined the victim and issued Ext.P1 certificate. PW-2 is the victim who is the daughter of the appellant/accused. PW-3 is the neighbour staying adjacent to the place of occurrence. PW-4 is the Medical Officer who examined the appellant/accused and issued Ext.P4 certificate. PW-5 is the Headmaster through whom Ext.P5 extract of school admission register is marked. PW-6 is the Village Officer through whom Ext.P6 scene plan is brought in evidence. PW-7 recorded the additional statement of PW-2. PW-8 registered Ext.P7 FIR on the basis of Ext.P2 statement of PW-2 which he received along with the letter from Child Welfare Committee, Kollam. PW-9 is the C.I. of Police, Women Cell, who recorded Ext.P2 statement of the victim. PW-10 is the then C.I. of Police, Anchal. He took over the investigation and prepared Ext.P8 scene plan. He seized MO1 dress of the victim and forwarded it to Court through Ext.P9 property list. On 16.06.2013, PW-10 arrested the appellant/accused and Ext.P10 is the arrest memo and Ext.P11 is the inspection memo. Ext.P4 is the certificate obtained after potency test of the appellant/accused. Ext.P12 is the remand report. PW-11 is the successor of PW-10 and he altered the penal provisions included in the FIR through Ext.P13 report. He completed the investigation and filed the charge-sheet. 5. Learned counsel appearing for and on behalf of the appellant Sri. Sony Vincent contended that the case is a fabricated one and the appellant is innocent. He is falsely implicated in the crime. There is absolutely no evidence to connect the appellant with the grave allegation prosecution had raised against him, who is the father of the victim. No DNA test is conducted. Medical examination of the victim was conducted without obtaining the consent of the victim as per the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 and the rules thereunder. Prosecution failed to prove the age of the victim as below 16 years. Ext.P5 is inadmissible in evidence. The period of offence is not deposed to by the victim. Her version is not believable as the entire family was living in a single shed with her two brothers during the alleged period of offence. It is in evidence that she was in the habit of spending time in the house of one Paulose till late night. The period of offence is not deposed to by the victim. Her version is not believable as the entire family was living in a single shed with her two brothers during the alleged period of offence. It is in evidence that she was in the habit of spending time in the house of one Paulose till late night. No investigation is conducted to rule out the involvement and responsibility of other persons for the pregnancy of the victim. Independent witnesses were not examined including those of Ashraya Shelter Home. Head master Mohanan who was a crucial witness is also not examined. There is nothing to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt. Admittedly, the appellant is a mental patient. The Court below erred in arriving at its present conclusion. Based on such wrong reasoning, a harsh and disproportionate punishment is also passed against the appellant. He pleaded for an acquittal extending benefit of doubt to the appellant. 6. On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader for Atrocities against Women and Children, Smt. S. Ambika Devi vehemently argued that the case at hand is so shocking and unheard of in our State. Person by whom she was to be protected became her predator. Place where she would find shelter had been converted by the appellant herein into the place of savagery. The offence is a continuing one. She was totally silenced by the appellant by threats. PW-2's evidence is totally reliable and it is corroborated by medical and other available evidence. Though there are some lapses in conducting the investigation, prosecution succeeded in proving the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and the Court below is justified in convicting the appellant. The punishment is in proportion to the gravity of offence committed by the appellant. He is a depraved man with no bounds. Trial Court is fully justified in imposing the said punishment and hence no interference is called for. She relied on the following decisions of the Apex Court to support her arguments:- (i) State of Karnataka vs. Yarappa Reddy, AIR 2000 SC 185 was cited to point out that criminal justice system does not solely rest on the probity of investigation and criminal trial cannot be allowed to plummet to the level of investigating officers ruling the roost. She relied on the following decisions of the Apex Court to support her arguments:- (i) State of Karnataka vs. Yarappa Reddy, AIR 2000 SC 185 was cited to point out that criminal justice system does not solely rest on the probity of investigation and criminal trial cannot be allowed to plummet to the level of investigating officers ruling the roost. Even if the investigation is illegal or even suspicious, the rest of evidence must be scrutinized independently of the impact of it. (ii) State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Asha Ram, AIR 2006 SC 381 was relied to emphasize that conviction can be founded on the testimony of the prosecutrix alone unless there are compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. 7. PW-3 is a neighbour of the victim. She deposed that the appellant/accused was residing in a shed near to their house during the relevant period and he used to come home late and the three children of the appellant used to come to their home and wait till the appellant come. 8. Ext.P5 is the school admission register of PW-2 proved through PW-5, the Headmistress. Ext.P5 shows that PW-2 was born on 19.04.1998. She also deposed that her name was removed from the rolls as she was absent for a long period. Her evidence shows that the victim was below 16 years during the time she was subjected to sexual assault. 9. Ext.P1 certificate is issued by PW-1 the Doctor after examining the victim at Government Victoria Hospital, Kollam. According to her, at the time of examination, the victim was 18 weeks pregnant. In Ext.P1, PW-1 also recorded the reason for the said pregnancy deposed to by the victim (PW-2). The allegation noted is that she was sexually abused by her own father for more than three years. 10. Ext.P4 is the potency certificate of the appellant/accused, issued by PW-4 the Medical Officer at Taluk Headquarters Hospital at Punalur. His evidence shows that the appellant was capable of performing sexual acts at the time of test. 11. The most important evidence relied on by the prosecution in the case is the oral testimony of the victim (PW-2). PW-2's evidence is as follows: She deposed that a few years back, her mother eloped with a man from Konni leaving herself and her two younger brothers with her father, who is the appellant/accused herein. 11. The most important evidence relied on by the prosecution in the case is the oral testimony of the victim (PW-2). PW-2's evidence is as follows: She deposed that a few years back, her mother eloped with a man from Konni leaving herself and her two younger brothers with her father, who is the appellant/accused herein. Thereafter the appellant along with them shifted their residence to appellant's parents' home. The appellant and his brother did not get along well together and hence the appellant constructed a shed in the property belonging to his father and started residing there with PW-2 and her brothers. PW-2 was studying in the 8th standard. She further deposed that ever since her mother abandoned her father, he used to make her do all household chores such as cooking and looking after her younger brothers. He even insisted her to share his bed. He used to come home in the evening in drunken condition. He used to consume ganja and used to force himself upon her. According to her, she opposed initially the acts of her father. Later she was frightened by her father. Until the abuse became unbearable, she did not inform the matter to anybody, out of fear. She approached one Mohanan who was the Headmaster of the school in which her brothers were studying and informed the matter. With his help, the three children were shifted to a shelter home named Ashraya. She was admitted to Thamarakkudy High School in the 8th standard. While studying there, she had symptoms of nausea and vertigo. She was taken to Vijaya Hospital at Kottarakkara and it was detected that she was five months pregnant. Immediately, the matter was reported to the Child Welfare Committee, Kollam. Her statement was recorded by the Child Welfare Committee and her statement along with a forwarding letter by the Chairman of the Committee was sent to the police. With the help of PW-9, Ext.P3 FIS was recorded. Thereafter she had been sheltered in Mahila Mandiram. She delivered a girl child on 13th November, 2013 through caesarean. She also deposed that she had given statement before Magistrate also. She identified MO1 churidar top as the dress she wore at the time of offence as it was her usual dress at home. In Court, with tears, she identified her father as her violator. 12. She delivered a girl child on 13th November, 2013 through caesarean. She also deposed that she had given statement before Magistrate also. She identified MO1 churidar top as the dress she wore at the time of offence as it was her usual dress at home. In Court, with tears, she identified her father as her violator. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant attacked each and every piece of evidence adduced by the prosecution. He pleaded that no reliance could be placed on the testimony of PW-2 and he also argued that the medical examination was conducted without obtaining the consent of the victim or her guardian. Determination of age of the victim is also done against the established procedures of law. He relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Jarnail Singh vs. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 263 to substantiate his contentions. Paragraphs 22 and 23 being relevant, are extracted below:- “22. On the issue of determination of age of a minor, one only needs to make a reference to Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as “the 2007 Rules”). The aforestated 2007 Rules have been framed under Section 68(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Rule 12 referred to hereinabove reads as under: xxx xxx “23. Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis for determining age, even of a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there is hardly any difference insofar as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of the prosecutrix VW, PW- 6. The manner of determining age conclusively has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained by adopting the first available basis out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). The manner of determining age conclusively has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained by adopting the first available basis out of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest rated option available would conclusively determine the age of a minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3), matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the child concerned is the highest rated option. In case, the said certificate is available, no other evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said certificate, Rule 12(3) envisages consideration of the date of birth entered in the school first attended by the child. In case such an entry of date of birth is available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated as final and conclusive, and no other material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of such entry, Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is available, then no other material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration for determining the age of the child concerned, as the said certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that Rule 12(3) postulates the determination of age of the child concerned, on the basis of medical opinion.” 13. This is a case in which a severe crime which shocks human conscience was reported to the Police from the Child Welfare Committee. Allegation was that a minor girl was raped over a period of time by her own father at her house. The result of the 'meticulous' investigation is that the Court has nothing to rely as evidence except the oral testimony of the victim girl. Investigation was conducted in a shallow manner. This is yet another instance of neglect of the cause of poor and disabled by an investigating agency. Any doubt in the oral evidence of the victim, would end up in an acquittal. But it is not so. Investigation was conducted in a shallow manner. This is yet another instance of neglect of the cause of poor and disabled by an investigating agency. Any doubt in the oral evidence of the victim, would end up in an acquittal. But it is not so. We do not find any compelling reason to seek corroboration as we are convinced of the truthfulness of the sole testimony of PW-2, who is the daughter of the appellant herein. It is now well settled principle of law that conviction can be founded on the testimony of the prosecutrix alone unless there are compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The evidence of a prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured witness. The testimony of the victim of sexual assault is vital unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the Courts should find no difficulty in acting on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. It is also well settled principle of law that corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. The evidence of the prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured witness. Even minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. 14. Learned counsel relied on the following judgments to point out instances where the Apex Court relied on the sole testimony of Prosecutrix to convict the accused:- (i) Madan Gopal Kakkad vs. Naval Dubey, (1992) 3 SCC 204 . In this case, it was pointed out that even in cases wherein there is lack of oral corroboration to that of a prosecutrix, a conviction can be safely recorded, provided the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity and the probabilities factor does not render it unworthy of credence and that as a general rule, corroboration cannot be insisted upon, except from the medical evidence, where, having regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence can be expected to be forthcoming. (ii) State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 . (ii) State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 . In this case, the Apex Court held as under:- “Rape is not merely a physical assault — it is often destructive of the whole personality of the victim. A murderer destroys the physical body of his victim, a rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female. The courts, therefore, shoulder a great responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They must deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations.” 15. In spite of the flaws in investigation, we find that the trial Court was justified in holding that the accused is guilty for rape. 16. Life imprisonment for the remainder of life is the punishment imposed on the accused. 17. In fact, the charge against the accused is for having committed rape u/s 375 of IPC. The punishment is provided u/s 376. S.376 of I.P.C. had been substituted by Act 13/2013 and the new provision came into effect from 3.2.2013. In the case on hand, the allegation of the prosecution was that the accused had committed rape of the victim extending a period of three years from 2010. There is no evidence to indicate that he had committed rape on the victim after the amendment to I.P.C. with reference to S.376 of I.P.C. effective from 3.2.2013. Therefore, the provision which was applicable prior to 3.2.2013 requires to be considered for imposing punishment on the accused. There is no evidence to indicate that he had committed rape on the victim after the amendment to I.P.C. with reference to S.376 of I.P.C. effective from 3.2.2013. Therefore, the provision which was applicable prior to 3.2.2013 requires to be considered for imposing punishment on the accused. Prior to Act 13/2013, the punishment for committing rape was with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than seven years, but which may be for life or for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine. Proviso indicates that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than seven years. Sub-section (2) of S.376 provides a punishment with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than 10 years and it may be for life and shall also be liable to fine in instances where the offence is committed by special category of persons and sub clause (f) amounts to commission of rape on a woman when she is under twelve years of age. In fact, the provision which was applicable after Act 13 of 2013 included S.376(2) (f) and (i), which reads as under:- “376. Punishment for rape (1) Whoever, except in cases provided for in sub-section (2), commits rape, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than seven years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine. (2) Whoever:- (a) xxx (b) xxx (c) xxx (d) xxx (e) xxx (f) being a relative, guardian or teacher of, or a person in a position of trust or authority towards the woman, commits rape on such woman. (g) xxx (h) xxx (i) commits rape on a woman when she is under sixteen years of age.” 18. The evidence in the case would suggest that the victim was being raped since 2010 upto 2013. Age of the victim is proved by Ext.P5, an extract of the admission register produced by PW-5. Ext.P5 would indicate the date of birth of the victim as 19.4.1998. Therefore, only as on 19.4.2010, she would have crossed 12 years. Apparently we do not know whether the rape was committed for the first time after attaining 12 years or before that. Ext.P5 would indicate the date of birth of the victim as 19.4.1998. Therefore, only as on 19.4.2010, she would have crossed 12 years. Apparently we do not know whether the rape was committed for the first time after attaining 12 years or before that. The benefit of doubt has to be given to the accused. Under the POCSO Act, which came into effect from 19.6.2012, child is defined as meaning, any person below the age of 18 years and punishment for penetrative sexual assault is for a description which shall not be less than 7 years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. The punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault coming u/s 6 is rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine. It is relevant to note that the victim had given birth to a child on 13.11.2013. Therefore the actual date on which rape was committed, i.e. whether before Act 13 of 2013 coming into effect or not cannot be discerned. At any rate, even for committing rape, u/s 376(1), imprisonment for life is the maximum punishment that could be provided along with fine which has rightly been granted by the Court below though invoking the amended provision u/s 376(2)(f) and (i) of the I.P.C. But an accused who is punished for imprisonment for life is entitled to seek for remission or commutation of sentence in terms of Sections 432 and 433 of Cr.P.C. r/w S.55 of the I.P.C. Ordinarily, it is not within the power of the Courts to direct that the accused shall not be released from jail unless he had undergone imprisonment for the whole of his life. Granting remission or commutation of sentence is within the domain of the appropriate Government and the Court cannot impose on the Government that they should not exercise their power under Sections 432 and 433 of Cr.P.C. in remitting or commuting sentences. Granting remission or commutation of sentence is within the domain of the appropriate Government and the Court cannot impose on the Government that they should not exercise their power under Sections 432 and 433 of Cr.P.C. in remitting or commuting sentences. There is no doubt about the proposition and as held by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Gopal Vinayak Godse vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, (1961) 3 SCR 440 which has been followed in a long line of judgments and the latest of which is the Constitution Bench judgment in Muthuramalingam vs. State, (2016) 8 SCC 313 that the punishment for imprisonment for life granted by the Court means a sentence of imprisonment for the convict for the rest of his life. But the Apex Court has also held that, in cases where imposition of death sentence would be too harsh and imprisonment for life is too inadequate, the Apex Court has adopted different methods to ensure that the minimum terms of life imprisonment ranges from atleast 20 years to the end of natural life, as held in Swamy Shraddananda vs. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 . However, in instances where the maximum punishment is imprisonment for life, such a method cannot be adopted and even the Constitutional Courts much less the trial Court cannot direct that the Government should not exercise their power under Sections 432 and 433 of Cr.P.C. r/w S.55 of the I.P.C. In fact in State of Rajasthan vs. Jamil Khan, (2013) 10 SCC 721 , the Apex Court had expressed an opinion that introducing one more category of punishment i.e. life imprisonment without commutation or remission was appropriate if a proper amendment is made to S.53 of I.P.C. In view of what is stated above, it is only appropriate that the direction issued by the Court below qualifying the word life imprisonment to the “remainder of life” is patently illegal and to that extent, the sentence requires to be modified. 19. In the result, we confirm the finding of guilt on the accused u/s 376 of I.P.C. r/w S.6 of the POCSO Act and he is convicted to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five thousand only), with default sentence as directed by the trial Court. 19. In the result, we confirm the finding of guilt on the accused u/s 376 of I.P.C. r/w S.6 of the POCSO Act and he is convicted to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five thousand only), with default sentence as directed by the trial Court. The order of the Court below that the conviction of life imprisonment is for the “remainder of his life” shall stand set aside. 20. Appeal is disposed of accordingly.