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2019 DIGILAW 754 (KER)

Kunjumon K. D. S/o Devasya v. State of Kerala Rep. by Public Prosecutor, High Court of Kerala

2019-09-20

MARY JOSEPH

body2019
ORDER : 1. Dated this the 20th day of September 2019. In the petition on hand, the petitioner in C.M.P. No. 231 of 2019 and 1st accused in C.C. No. 219 of 2017 pending on the files of Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-II, Kothamangalam (for short ‘the trial court’) seeks to set aside the order passed by the court on 04.09.2019, declining pardon to him. 2. C.M.P. No. 231 of 2019 is an application filed by the petitioner before the said court under Section 306 Cr.P.C. seeking pardon. The petitioner is the 1st accused in an elephant poaching case. He has filed an application seeking to obtain pardon from the court to act as an approver. The court has observed that the 1st accused is involved in several other elephant poaching cases and forest cases. The court found that the prosecution is devoid of a case that without the testimony of the petitioner, conviction of the rest of the accused could not be secured. Accordingly, his application for grant of pardon was dismissed. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has approached this Court in the petition on hand. 3. Sri. K.K. Dheerendra Krishnan, the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the court below is highly unjustified in passing an order of the nature. According to him, without understanding the true spirit of Section 306 Cr.P.C. the trial court has arrived at a finding that the application filed under Section 306 Cr.P.C. is not sustainable. It is contended by the learned counsel that the rejection of the application was purely mechanical, without going into the merits of the report filed by the investigating officer and also the facts confessed by the petitioner. 4. Uniform law of procedure for the whole of India both in presidency towns and in the moffusil was enacted and it was the Criminal Procedure Code, 1882. It was supplanted by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898). Grant of pardon to an accomplice is dealt with under the aforesaid Code in Section 337 Cr.P.C. Hidayattullah, J. (as his Lordship then was) speaking for a three judge bench had dealt with the issue in Lt. Commander Pascal Fernandes vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, AIR 1968 SC 595 and observed as follows: “The next question is whether the Special Judge acted with due propriety in his jurisdiction. Commander Pascal Fernandes vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, AIR 1968 SC 595 and observed as follows: “The next question is whether the Special Judge acted with due propriety in his jurisdiction. Here the interests of the accused are just as important as those of the prosecution. No procedure or action can be in the interest of justice if it is prejudicial to an accused. There are also matters of public policy to consider. Before the Special Judge acts to tender pardon, he must, of course, know the nature of the evidence the person seeking conditional pardon is likely to give, the nature of his complicity and the degree of his culpability in relation to the offence and in relation to the co-accused......” 5. In Laxmipat Choraria vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 938 the Apex Court while dealing with a similar issue under the provisions of the old Code held: “14......To keep the sword hanging over the head of an accomplice and to examine him as a witness is to encourage perjury. Perhaps it will be possible to enlarge Section 337 to take in certain special laws....where accomplice testimony will always be useful and witnesses will come forward because of the conditional pardon offered to them....” 6. Section 306 Cr.P.C. is verbatim to Section 337 of the old Code. There is no change at all with respect to the power to grant pardon. 7. The learned counsel has cited CBI vs. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal and Another, 2013 KHC 4917 (SC) to support his contention that the court need not have to look into the gravity of the involvement of the petitioner in the offence or the involvement of the petitioner in other crimes, while considering an application seeking tendor of pardon. The learned counsel has relied on Paragraph 20 of the judgment cited supra, which is extracted hereunder:- “20. From the aforesaid discussion on the issue, it is evident that the law laid down by this Court in Lt. Commander Pascal Fernandes (supra) and Laxmipat Choraria (supra) still holds the field. In spite of our repeated query, no case where a different view from the aforesaid two cases has been taken could be brought to our notice. From the aforesaid discussion on the issue, it is evident that the law laid down by this Court in Lt. Commander Pascal Fernandes (supra) and Laxmipat Choraria (supra) still holds the field. In spite of our repeated query, no case where a different view from the aforesaid two cases has been taken could be brought to our notice. In view of the above and considering the judgment of the Privy Council in Bawa Faquir Singh (supra), we are of the view that the grant of pardon by a Court under S.306 Cr.P.C. on being asked by the accused and duly supported by the State is a judicial act and while performing the said act, the Magistrate is bound to consider the consequences of grant of pardon taking into consideration the policy of the State and to certain extent compare the culpability of the person seeking pardon qua the other co-accused.” 8. It is evident from the extracts above, that grant of pardon under Section 306 Cr.P.C. on being asked by the accused and supported by the State is a judicial act and while performing the said act the Magistrate is bound to consider the consequences of granting pardon taking into consideration the policy of the State and to a certain extent in comparison of the culpability of the person seeking pardon qua the other co-accused. 9. Therefore, it is clear that factors to be considered while exercising power under Section 306 Cr.P.C. is settled in Lt. Commander Pascal Fernandes and Laxmipat Choraria (Supra) and it still holds the field. 10. In the case on hand, the Magistrate concerned has cited twin reasons while passing order dismissing the application. The first one was that the accused who applied pardon was involved in other several elephant poaching cases under the forest offences. The second one was that the prosecution has not projected a case while reporting the proposal to tendor pardon to the petitioner that without the testimony of this accused, conviction of the rest of the accused could not be secured. 11. A look at Section 306 Cr.P.C. is warranted by the context to see whether the trial court is justified in declining pardon to the petitioner for the twin reasons, stated above. “ 306. 11. A look at Section 306 Cr.P.C. is warranted by the context to see whether the trial court is justified in declining pardon to the petitioner for the twin reasons, stated above. “ 306. Tender of Pardon to accomplice:- (1) With a view to obtaining the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in or privy to an offence to which this section applies, the Chief Judicial Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate at any stage of the investigation or inquiry into, or the trial or, the offence, and the Magistrate of the first class inquiring into or trying the offence, at any stage of the inquiry or trial, may tender a pardon to such person on condition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relative to the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof. (2) This section applied to:- (a) any offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session or by the Court of a Special Judge appointed under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (46 of 1952). (b) any offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years or with a more severe sentence. (3) Every Magistrate who tenders a pardon under sub-section (1) shall record:- (a) his reasons for so doing. (b) whether the tender was or was not accepted by the person to whom it was made, and shall, on application made by the accused, furnish him with a copy of such record free of cost. (4) Every person accepting a tender of pardon made under sub-section (1):- (a) shall be examined as a witness in the Court of the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence and in the subsequent trial, if any. (b) shall, unless he is already on bail, be detained in custody until the termination of the trial. (5) Where a person has accepted a tender of pardon made under sub-section (1) and has been examined under sub-section (4), the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence shall, without making any further inquiry in the case:- (a) commit it for trial:- (i) to the Court of Session if the offence is triable exclusively by that Court or if the Magistrate taking cognizance is the Chief Judicial Magistrate. (ii) to a Court of Special Judge appointed under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (46 of 1952), if the offence is triable exclusively by that Court. (b) in any other case, make over the case to the Chief Judicial Magistrate who shall try the case himself.” 12. It starts with words “With a view to obtaining the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in or privy to an offence to which this section applies................” Section 306 Cr.P.C. is an enabling provision that empowers a Magistrate to grant pardon to a person supposed to be concerned in or privy to the offence involved in the prosecution and sought to be established by it. The object of the provision is that in cases involving offences of gravity, liable to punished with heavy punishments, the offenders shall not be allowed to escape punishment. 13. Therefore, the Section contemplates that pardon can be tendered to an accomplice who is supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in the commission of the offence or privy to it, on condition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relative to the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof. Therefore concern about the involvement of the co-accused directly or indirectly in the commission of the offence or privy to it, is a material aspect to be looked into before tendering pardon to an accused under Section 306 Cr.P.C. 14. It is pertinent to note that Annexure I application was filed before the trial court by the 1st accused in O.R No. 2/2015 of Edamalayar Forest Station seeking grant of pardon. Annexure II report has been filed by the Range Forest Officer before the court concerned following the filing of Annexure I application. It is revealed therefrom that the petitioner has only involvement of lesser gravity in the commission of the crime compared to his accomplice and his knowledge about the transaction has a major role to play in establishing the accusations against co-accused. It is also stated in Annexure II that evidence if tendered by the applicant as an approver would be helpful in procuring conviction of the co-accused. Annexure III is the statement recorded from the applicant by the trial court. It is also stated in Annexure II that evidence if tendered by the applicant as an approver would be helpful in procuring conviction of the co-accused. Annexure III is the statement recorded from the applicant by the trial court. The statement incorporates the information, the person seeking pardon was having about the commission of the offence and the role played by the co-accused in the commission thereof. 15. When pardon is applied for, by a party, the court has to look into the information liable to be supplied by the party regarding the complicity of himself and the co-accused in the commission of the crime and to see whether those would help the court to procure conviction of accused other than himself involved in the commission of the offence. 16. When viewed in the backdrop and in the light of the dictum in Lt. Commander Pascal and Fernandes Laxmipat Choraria (Supra) which holds the field, the trial court failed to consider the relevant factors, which it was liable to be looked into while exercising jurisdiction to grant pardon under Section 306 Cr.P.C. For the reason, the order passed by the trial court declining pardon, under challenge in the application on hand deserves to be set aside. 17. In the result, Crl. M.C. is allowed and the order impugned is set aside. The order granting or rejecting pardon shall be supported by legal reasons for doing so as inherent in the provision itself. C.M.P. No. 231/2019 filed by the petitioner in C.C. No. 219/2017 in O.R. No. 02/2015 of Edamalayar Forest Station is remanded to the court concerned for consideration afresh in the light of the decision made hereinabove and after duly applying it's mind to Annexures II and III, whether the purpose contemplated by Section 306 Cr.P.C. could be achieved by grant of pardon to the petitioner. Whatever be the result of such a consideration, it must only be supported by reasons shown in Lt. Commander Pascal Fernandes and Laxmipat Choraria (Supra). At any rate, the application shall be considered afresh and disposed of within one month from the date of this order duly considering Annexures II and III in the light of the law on the point in Lt. Commander Pascal Fernandes and Laxmipat Choraria (Supra) holding the field as on date.