JUDGMENT : Bela M. Trivedi, J. 1. Both the petitions, involving similar questions of law and facts, were heard together with the consent of the learned Advocates for the parties and this common order is being passed. 2. The petitioners in both the petitions have prayed for the following main reliefs:- (a) to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, directing the respondent for implementing with Exhibit "B" dated 27th January, 2004, Exhibit "C" dated 9th October, 2013 and Exhibit "E" dated 14.8.2014; (b) to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, directing the respondent that the said lease deed dated 31st August, 1996 is void ab initio and the respondents be restrained by an order of this Hon'ble Court from acting upon the said lease be issued; (c) to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, restraining the respondents from demanding any levy or rent or its arrears from the petitioners; (d) to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, restraining the respondents in any manner disturbing the possession of the petitioners and its members and restraining respondents from in any manner disturbing the cultivation of salt by the petitioner and its members and sale of the salt; (e) without prejudice to the above, respondents be restrained from terminating the lease and directing them to renew the lease in accordance with terms of the lease deed at Exhibit "A" dated 31st August, 1996; (f) to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction restraining the respondents from issuing any commercial tender in respect of the said plots of land in possession of the petitioner and its members." 3. The broad facts as emerging from the petitions are that the petitioners are the registered Cooperative Societies and their members are engaged in the production of salt, who are known as "Agariyas". According to the petitioners, the forefathers of their members were the owners and in possession of their respective salt lands from the time immemorial, and the they having inherited the said lands from their forefathers, they had become the owners of their respective plots. According to the petitioners, the forefathers of their members were the owners and in possession of their respective salt lands from the time immemorial, and the they having inherited the said lands from their forefathers, they had become the owners of their respective plots. However, taking undue advantage of their illiteracy and ignorance of law, the then Salt Commissioner pressurized the members of the petitioners Societies to execute the lease deeds with the Central Government for manufacturing the salt. They were threatened that they would not be allowed to manufacture salt if they did not execute the lease deeds with the Central Government, and therefore, the petitioners entered into the lease deeds in 1974 for a period of 20 years up to 1994. Under the said lease agreements, the Salt Commissioner imposed ground rent and assignment fees on the production of salt. Thus, according to the petitioners, the Government of India, without any authority of law, converted the members of the petitioner Societies from the owners to the lessees in respect of the said lands, and levied illegal assignment fees and ground rent. The petitioners were also forced to execute subsequent lease deeds on 31.8.1996 for the period from 1.10.1994 to 30.9.2014 (Annexure-A), which were illegal and void ab initio. According to them, during the tenure of the said lease deeds, the respondents had unilaterally increased the ground rent and the assignment fees in the year 2004 and 2013 and issued the impugned notices at Annexures-"B", "C" and "E" respectively. Hence, the petitions have been filed. 4. The affidavit-in-reply has been filed on behalf of the respondents, wherein it has been contended inter alia that the lease deeds dated 31.8.1996 were entered into by the petitioners on their own free will and understanding. During the period when the lease deeds were in force and operation, the petitioners did not raise any dispute with regard to their ownership rights, and it was only when the lease period is expiring, such disputes have been raised, which even otherwise are subject to the arbitration clause in the lease deeds. It is contended that by virtue of the Resolution No. 4269 dated 28.10.1859, all lands taken up for making salt works were deleted from the Kumal (village register) and placed at the disposal of Commissioner of Customs, Salt, Opium and Abkari (Annexure-R/1). It is contended that by virtue of the Resolution No. 4269 dated 28.10.1859, all lands taken up for making salt works were deleted from the Kumal (village register) and placed at the disposal of Commissioner of Customs, Salt, Opium and Abkari (Annexure-R/1). Thereafter, the Collector of Central Excise, Bombay vide his letter dated 16.6.1949 had transferred the works in salt factories, buildings, roads, lands and other constructions maintained at the salt works in connection with the manufacture or excavation of salt to the Salt Commissioner's Organization, Bombay (Annexure-R/2). The ownership of the entire land admeasuring 800 acres Dharasana Group Salt Producers & Sale Society Limited was shown as Central Government lands in the Revenue Record as per 7/12 Extracts and Hak Patrak of District Valsad of Gujarat. As per the Government of India Act, 1919, the Provincial Governments were given administrative control over the Crown lands, however, it was stipulated that the lands used for the purposes of Government of India as on 1.4.1921 will continue to remain Crown property and shall not be transferred to the Provincial Government. Since the salt works were owned by Government of India, Salt Department, the ownership of lands in question at Dharasana Salt Works continued to vest with the Government of India. Similar provisions were made in the Government of India Act, 1935 and in the Constitution of India. Accordingly, all the lands in question were shown as of Government of India's ownership in the Revenue and Panchayat Records, as per Annexures-R/3 and R/4. It is further contended that the petitioner Society vide its letter dated 10.10.1973 and again vide the letter dated 19.6.1974 had requested the respondents to cancel the individual licences and issue a single licence to the Society, one for Dharasana pans and one for Chharwada pans, (Annexure-R/6 colly). Thereafter, the land admeasuring about 1511 acres of Central Government was leased out to Dharasana Group Cooperative Salt Producers & Sales Society Limited, having 538 members belonging to two different villages, Dharasana and Chharwada by executing lease deed on 13.7.1981 for the period from 1.10.1974 to 30.9.1994 (Annexure-R/8). Since then, the members belonging to each village were working in separate sections of the salt works covered by the said area. Since then, the members belonging to each village were working in separate sections of the salt works covered by the said area. Thereafter, the members belonging to Chharwada section formed their separate society under the Registration dated 3.1.1991 having 240 Agariyas, and as per their request, the leases in respect of both the Societies were renewed for a period of 20 years from 1.10.1994 to 30.9.2014. The respondents have further contended that the Government has been levying ground rent/royalty on the Central Government land leased/licensed of the production of salt in terms of monetary consideration from the time immemorial. The Salt Committee constituted in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, New Delhi in the year 1958 under the Chairmanship of Shri Manubhai Shah, the then Minister of Industry, had looked into the aspect of levy of ground rent. The recommendations made by the said Committee were accepted with certain modifications by the Government of India, Department of Industrial Development vide their Resolution dated 3.5.1961, wherein it was decided that the period of lease should normal be of 20 years, renewal of lease be considered for a period of 20 years on merits at appropriate time on such terms and conditions as the Government may decide and that the Government agreed for levying the ground rent/assignment fee. Thus, the assignment fee on the basis of productivity was introduced with effect from 7.12.1961 and was in force up to 196.1964. Thereafter on the recommendation of CAB for salt, the Government of India, Ministry of Industry and Supply decided the realization of assignment fee adopting the rates fixed by the Government of Gujarat in respect of the land owned by them and granted on lease for the production of salt, vide the Ministry's letter dated 20.6.1964, according to which the ground rent at Rs. 2/- per acre per annum and assignment fee at the rate of Re. 1/- per ton of salt produced and issued subject to minimum production were fixed for different areas per annum (Annexure-R/11 colly). The respondents have denied that the members of the petitioners' societies or their forefathers were the owners of the leased property. According to them, the petitioners' forefathers were manufacturing salt on the Central Government land under the licences for manufacture of salt issued to them, however, the lands in question were always recorded in the name of Central Government. The respondents have denied that the members of the petitioners' societies or their forefathers were the owners of the leased property. According to them, the petitioners' forefathers were manufacturing salt on the Central Government land under the licences for manufacture of salt issued to them, however, the lands in question were always recorded in the name of Central Government. It was also denied that the Salt Commissioner had forcibly pressurized the petitioner societies and their members to execute the lease deeds with the Central Government for manufacturing salt. It is further stated that the working of the formula of charging ground rent and assignment fee decided vide the letter dated 20.6.1964 was renewed and the Government of India vide the Resolution dated 19.12.1969 clarified the terms of lease and charging of assignment fee and ground rent. As a follow up thereof, the ground rent and the assignment fees were revised to Rs. 5/- per acre, and Rs. 10/- per ton/acre/annum were fixed with effect from 1.1.2004 after following the due procedure. Again the said formula was revised and the decision of the Government to increase the assignment fees and ground rent was conveyed under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, New Delhi vide letter dated 9.10.2013, whereby the rate of minimum assignment fees was revised from Rs. 10/- per ton to Rs. 100/- per ton subject to minimum production fixed per acre in the respective States and the ground rent was revised to Rs. 120/- per acre. According to the respondents, the Government has the right to increase the lease rent in respect of their lands as per the legal position settled by various High Courts. As per the Government Policy revised and notified on 26.10.2013, the Government lands for salt manufacture are to be settled through open tenders and the present petitioners, if they wanted to continue, they may participate in the open tender process, nonetheless no relief as prayed for could be granted. 5. The petitioners have filed the affidavit-in-rejoinder reiterating the contentions raised in the petitions to the effect that their forefathers were cultivating the lands in question since the time immemorial and before 1974 there was no question of lease, and that the Government gave them the licences for manufacture of salt. The respondents now wanted to convert licences into leases. 5. The petitioners have filed the affidavit-in-rejoinder reiterating the contentions raised in the petitions to the effect that their forefathers were cultivating the lands in question since the time immemorial and before 1974 there was no question of lease, and that the Government gave them the licences for manufacture of salt. The respondents now wanted to convert licences into leases. According to the petitioners, even under the pre-British rule, perpetual rights of the Agariyas on the salt lands were recognized, and they were paying the land assignment annually. Since 1859, there was no land assignment and the administration of the salt lands was given to the Salt Commissioner, who regulated the manufacture of salt and recovery of taxes as per the licences from time to time, however, at no point of time the ownership rights of the Agariyas were usurped by the concerned Government. In the present case, the licences have not been revoked, but have been illegally converted into lease, which is illegal and void. 6. Learned Advocate Mr. B.A. Desai appearing with Mr. Satish C. Patel for the petitioners, taking the Court to the history of status of Agariyas since the pre-independence period, vehemently submitted that as a matter of fiscal policy, the collection of land revenue and collection of salt taxes was transferred from the Collector to Customs Department, which would collect the salt taxes and also the land revenue. Such transfer was mere a matter of administrative convenience and did not affect the proprietary rights of the private salt manufacturers, including the petitioners. According to him, the petitioners were the Agariyas on the lands in question, as shown in Zamin Kharda and the Government had given them licences to manufacture salt. There was nothing on record to show that the said lands were Government lands as opposed to private lands shown in the land register (Zamin Kharda). According to the learned Advocate for the petitioners, none of the resolutions or decisions passed or taken by the Central Government with regard to lease of the lands belonging to the petitioners were applicable to them. According to the learned Advocate for the petitioners, none of the resolutions or decisions passed or taken by the Central Government with regard to lease of the lands belonging to the petitioners were applicable to them. The Government Resolution dated 3.5.1961 or 20.6.1964 or 19.12.1969 relied upon by the respondents with regard to the levy of ground rent and assignment fee were violative of Article 265 and Article 300A of the Constitution of India, and that the ownership of the lands in question of the petitioners could not be converted into lease by an executive fiat as reflected in the said resolutions. As regards the letter dated 10.10.1973 written by the petitioner Societies to the Salt Commissioner, Mr. Desai submitted that the said letter was written only to issue the consolidated licence by discontinuing the individual licences of the members of the petitioners, however, the Deputy Salt Commissioner under the pressure and undue influence forced and threatened the members of the petitioner Societies to enter into lease agreement for Dharasana and Chharwada salt pans. Such lease agreements without authority of law were violative of Article 77 of the Constitution of India. He further submitted that such purported lease agreements providing for payment of assignment fee and ground rent, were also illegal and void. The unilateral increase in the assignment fee and ground rent from time to time at exorbitant rates was also violative of the terms of lease deeds and mala fide to confiscate the lands of the petitioners. Mr. Desai earnestly urged that the respondents could not take law in their hands and dispossess the petitioners forcibly under the guise of nonpayment of assignment fee of the ground rent. Relying upon various decisions of the Supreme Court, he submitted that the summary proceedings of eviction could be resorted to by the Government who are illegally occupying the lands of the Government. Such being not the case, in the instant petition, the possession of the petitioners of the lands in question is required to be protected by quashing the impugned notices. 7. Learned Advocate Mr. Such being not the case, in the instant petition, the possession of the petitioners of the lands in question is required to be protected by quashing the impugned notices. 7. Learned Advocate Mr. Viral Shah for the respondents, however, challenging the very maintainability of the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution submitted that the petitions deserve to be dismissed as the petitioners are the defaulters, who have not paid the Government dues i.e. assignment fee and ground rent, and that the lease period mentioned in the lease deeds has already expired. In view of the Government policy of 2013, lease could be renewed only by holding public auctions. According to Mr. Shah, there are highly disputed questions of facts involved in the petitions and the prayers themselves are self-contradictory in nature. He further submitted that after the execution of lease deeds in the year 1976 and 1994 for a period of twenty years up to 2014, in respect of the part of the lands in question it does not lie in the mouth of the petitioners to say that they were the owners and that the lease deeds were forcibly got executed from them. According to him, the dues from the petitioners of Special Civil Application No. 12819 of 2014 towards the assignment fees were about Rs. 43,77,000/- and the dues from the petitioners of Special Civil Application No. 12820 of 2014 were about Rs. 38,72,337/-. Similarly, the petitioners of SCA No. 12819 of 2014 were liable to pay Rs. 1,12,200/- towards ground rent and the petitioners of SCA No. 12820 of 2014 were liable to pay Rs. 85,245/- towards ground rent. Thus, in order to avoid payment of such huge amount, the petitions were filed raising false issues of ownership, which were never raised earlier, at the time of execution of the lease deeds in the year 1974 till 2014. He, therefore, urged to dismiss the petitions with compensatory cost. 8. At the outset, it may be stated that both the petitions not only lack the basic facts and particulars which are required to be stated to substantiate the claims made in the petitions with regard to rights of the petitioners in respect of the lands in question or plots in question, on which they are farming salt, the petitions contain highly disputed questions of facts. The reliefs claimed in the prayer clauses are also of civil nature. The reliefs claimed in the prayer clauses are also of civil nature. It is needless to say that the petition involving highly disputed questions of facts and the petition claiming reliefs which are of civil nature, could not be entertained under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 9. That part, it appears that the petitions also suffer from the vice of gross delay, laches, acquiescence, and estoppel, inasmuch as the legality of the lease deeds executed by the members of the petitioner societies in the year 1974 and subsequently in the year 1996 is sought to be challenged in the present petitions filed in the year 2014 on the ground that the respondents had forcibly and in high-handed manner, got executed such lease deeds in their favour. In this regard it is pertinent to note that admittedly the petitioners themselves had requested the respondent No. 2 - Salt Commissioner for cancellation of the individual licences of their members and to issue the licences in the name of the petitioner societies vide the letter dated 17.6.1974 (Annexure R-6). Thereafter, the lease deed dated 13.7.1981 for twenty years from 1.10.1974 to 30.9.1994 was executed by the petitioner Dharasana Group having 538 members for the land admeasuring 1511 acres, covering two villages - Dharasana and Chharwada. The members of Chharawada Section formed their separate Society with 240 Agariyas, and therefore, the leases in respect of both the Societies were renewed as per their request on 31.8.1996 for the period from 1.10.1994 to 30.9.2014. None of the petitioner Societies or their members raised any dispute with regard to the ownership rights till the subsistence of the said lease period, and such disputes have been raised for the first time in the present petitions, challenging the legality and validity of the lease deeds executed on 31.8.1996. 10. Further, as per the claim made by the petitioners, each member of the petitioner societies was the owner of the plot on which he was cultivating the salt, and therefore, both the petitioner societies were the societies of the plot owners, who were the salt manufacturers. 10. Further, as per the claim made by the petitioners, each member of the petitioner societies was the owner of the plot on which he was cultivating the salt, and therefore, both the petitioner societies were the societies of the plot owners, who were the salt manufacturers. According to the petitioners, the respondent Salt Commissioner in the year 1974 taking undue advantage of the illiteracy and ignorance of the salt manufacturers and owners of the plots forcibly pressurized the members of the petitioner Societies to execute the lease deeds with the Central Government for manufacturing of salts and threatened the members not to allow salt manufacturing, if lease deeds were not executed. It is extremely difficult to accept such allegations made by the petitioners without producing on record any material to substantiate the same. On the contrary, the record shows otherwise. The lease deeds were executed for a period of 20 years from 1974 to 1994 on 13.7.1981 and under the said deeds, the petitioners had agreed to pay the ground rent and the assignment fees on the production of salt as mentioned therein. The said lease deeds were also renewed on 31.8.1996 for a further period of 20 years commencing from 1st October, 1994 to 30th September, 2014. If they were forced to execute the lease deeds in 1974 and again in 1996, there is no reason coming forth on record as to why the petitioner Societies or their members remained silent and did not challenge the alleged action of the respondent Salt Commissioner for so many years till 2014 when they filed the petitions. It is axiomatic that unreasonable delay denies to the petitioners, the discretionary extraordinary remedy of mandamus, certiorari or other relief. Inordinate delay is not merely a factor for the Court to refuse appropriate relief but also a relevant consideration it be so minded not to unsettle settled things, as held by Supreme Court in case of G.C. Gupta and Ors. Vs. N.K. Pandey and Ors., reported in (1988) 1 SCC 316 . 11. The Supreme Court in case of State of M.P. and Ors. Vs. Nandlal Jaiswal and Ors., reported in (1986) 4 SCC 566 observed in paragraph 24 as follows:- "24. Vs. N.K. Pandey and Ors., reported in (1988) 1 SCC 316 . 11. The Supreme Court in case of State of M.P. and Ors. Vs. Nandlal Jaiswal and Ors., reported in (1986) 4 SCC 566 observed in paragraph 24 as follows:- "24. Now, it is well settled that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in the exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The evolution of this rule of laches or delay is premised upon a number of factors." 12. In case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Digambar, reported in AIR 1995 SC 1991 , the Supreme Court observed in paragraph 12 as follows:- "12. How a person who alleges against the State of deprivation of his legal right, can get relief of compensation from the State invoking writ jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution even though, he is guilty of laches or undue delay is difficult to comprehend, when it is well settled by decision of this Court that no person, be he a citizen or otherwise, is entitled to obtain the equitable relief under Article 226 of the Constitution if his conduct is blame-worthy because of laches, undue delay, acquiescence, waiver and the like. Moreover, how a citizen claiming discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution against a State, could be relieved of his obligation to establish his unblameworthy conduct for getting such relief, where the State against which relief is sought is a welfare State, is also difficult to comprehend. Moreover, how a citizen claiming discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution against a State, could be relieved of his obligation to establish his unblameworthy conduct for getting such relief, where the State against which relief is sought is a welfare State, is also difficult to comprehend. Where the relief sought under Article 226 of the Constitution by a person against the welfare State is founded on its alleged illegal or wrongful executive action, the need to explain laches or undue delay on his part to obtain such relief, should, if anything, be more stringent than in other cases, for the reason that the State due to laches or undue delay on the part of the person seeking relief, may not be able to show that the executive action complained of was legal or correct for want of records pertaining to the action or for the officers who were responsible for such action not being available later on. Further, where granting of relief is claimed against the State on alleged unwarranted executive action, is bound to result in loss to the public exchequer of the State or in damage to other public interest, the High Court before granting such relief is required to satisfy itself that the delay or laches on the part of a citizen or any other person in approaching for relief under Article 226 of the Constitution on the alleged violation of his legal right, was wholly justified in the facts and circumstances, instead of ignoring the same or leniently considering it. Thus, in our view, persons seeking relief against the State under Article 226 of the Constitution, be they citizens or otherwise, cannot get discretionary relief obtainable thereunder unless they fully satisfy the High Court that the facts and circumstances of the case clearly justified the laches or undue delay on their part in approaching the Court for grant of such discretionary relief. Therefore, where a High Court grants relief to a citizen or any other person under Article 226 of the Constitution against any person including the State without considering his blameworthy conduct, such as laches or undue delay, acquiescence or waiver, the relief so granted becomes unsustainable even if the relief was granted in respect of alleged deprivation of his legal right by the State." 13. In case of State of M.P. and Anr. Vs. In case of State of M.P. and Anr. Vs. Bhailal Bhai, reported in AIR 1984 SC 1006, the Constitution Bench considered the effect of delay in filing writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and held as under:- "17. At the same time we cannot lose sight of the fact that the special remedy-provided in Art. 226 is not intended to supersede completely the modes of obtaining relief by an action in a civil court or to deny defences legitimately open in such actions. It has been made clear more than once that the power to give relief under Art. 226 is a discretionary power. This is specially true in the case of power to issue writs in the nature of mandamus. Among the several matters which the High Courts rightly take into consideration in the exercise of that discretion is the delay made by the aggrieved party in seeking this special remedy and what excuse there is for it. Another is the nature of controversy of facts and law that may have to be decided as regards the availability of consequential relief. Thus, where, as in these cases, a person comes to the Court for relief under Art. 226 on the allegation that he has been assessed to tax under a void legislation and having paid it under a mistake is entitled to get it back, the court, if it finds that the assessment was void, being made under a void provision of law, and the payment was made by mistake, is still not bound to exercise its discretion directing repayment. Whether repayment should be ordered in the exercise of this discretion will depend in each case on its own facts and circumstances. It is not easy nor is it desirable to lay down any rule for universal application. It may however be stated as a general rule that if there has been unreasonable delay the court ought not ordinarily to lend its aid to a party by this extraordinary remedy of mandamus. Again, where even if there is no such delay the Government or the statutory authority against whom the consequential relief is prayed for raises a prima facie triable issue as regards the availability of such relief on the merits on grounds like limitation, the Court should ordinarily refuse to issue the writ of mandamus for such payment. Again, where even if there is no such delay the Government or the statutory authority against whom the consequential relief is prayed for raises a prima facie triable issue as regards the availability of such relief on the merits on grounds like limitation, the Court should ordinarily refuse to issue the writ of mandamus for such payment. In both these kinds of cases it will be sound use of discretion to leave the party to seek his remedy by the ordinary mode of action in a civil court and to refuse to exercise in his favour the extraordinary remedy under Art. 226 of the Constitution." 14. In the instant case there is unexplained inordinate delay on the part of the petitioners in invoking extraordinary jurisdiction seeking writ of mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and that too, seeking relief of civil nature, which could not be granted. 15. Even on merits, the petitioners have no case. The petitioners have also not produced any documents to show as to how their members had become the owners of the plots in question on which they were manufacturing the salt, and in which Government records their names were recorded as the owners in respect of the lands in question. Merely by making allegations or averments in the petitions that the members of the petitioner Societies were the owners of their respective plots on which they were manufacturing salt, would not entitle them to claim ownership rights over the plots in question, more particularly when the petitioner Societies themselves have executed the lease deeds in favour of the Salt Commissioner for and on behalf of the President of India, in respect of the parcels of lands mentioned therein, further agreeing to pay assignment fee and ground rent, and subject to terms and conditions as mentioned therein. 16. Though the learned Advocate Mr. Desai has heavily relied upon various provisions contained in the Shilotry Act and other Regulations and Resolutions prevailing during the era of British Rule and thereafter, in the opinion of the Court, such reliance is absolutely misplaced and misconceived. There is nothing on record whatsoever to show as to which of the member of the petitioner Societies was the owner of which of the plots in question and since when and how. There is nothing on record whatsoever to show as to which of the member of the petitioner Societies was the owner of which of the plots in question and since when and how. Such highly contested and disputed claims of civil nature could not be entertained in the petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In this regard, it would be apposite to reproduce a very apt observations made by the Supreme Court in a very recent case of Roshina T.Vs. Abdul Azeez K.T. and Ors., reported in (2019) 2 SCC 329 , in which it has been observed as under:- "12. The question as to who is the owner of the flat in question, whether respondent No. 1 was/is in possession of the flat and, if so, from which date, how and in what circumstances, he claimed to be in its possession, whether his possession could be regarded as legal or not qua its real owner etc. were some of the material questions which arose for consideration in the writ petition. 13. These questions, in our view, were pure questions of fact and could be answered one way or the other only by the Civil Court in a properly constituted civil suit and on the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties but not in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution by the High Court. 14. It has been consistently held by this Court that a regular suit is the appropriate remedy for settlement of the disputes relating to property rights between the private persons. The remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution shall not be available except where violation of some statutory duty on the part of statutory authority is alleged. In such cases, the Court has jurisdiction to issue appropriate directions to the authority concerned. It is held that the High Court cannot allow its constitutional jurisdiction to be used for deciding disputes, for which remedies under the general law, civil or criminal are available. This Court has held that it is not intended to replace the ordinary remedies by way of a civil suit or application available to an aggrieved person. The jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution being special and extraordinary, it should not be exercised casually or lightly on mere asking by the litigant. This Court has held that it is not intended to replace the ordinary remedies by way of a civil suit or application available to an aggrieved person. The jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution being special and extraordinary, it should not be exercised casually or lightly on mere asking by the litigant. (See Mohan Pande vs. Usha Rani, 1992 (4) SCC 61 and Dwarka Prasad Agrawal vs. B.D. Agrawal, (2003) 6 SCC 230 ). 15. In our view, the writ petition to claim such relief was not, therefore, legally permissible. It, therefore, deserved dismissal in limine on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy of filing a civil suit by respondent No. 1 (writ petitioner) in the Civil Court." 17. In view of the afore-stated factual and legal position, the Court is of the opinion that the present petitions involving highly disputed questions of facts, seeking prayers of civil nature and suffering from the vice of delay, laches, acquiescence and estoppel could not be entertained under Article 226 of the Constitution. From the conduct of the petitioners, it clearly transpires that the legality and validity of the said lease deeds have been challenged in these petitions along with the communications dated 27.1.2004, 9.10.2013 and 14.8.2004 at Annexures- "B", "C" and "E" respectively in the petitions, only with a view to stall the recovery proceedings initiated against them by the respondents. The petitioners under the guise of challenging the legality and validity of the lease deeds executed by them in the year 1996 have indirectly attempted to thwart the recovery proceedings initiated by the respondents against them by issuing the impugned notices. Hence, also the petitions do not deserve any further consideration. 18. In that view of the matter, the petitions being devoid of merits and untenable at law are dismissed.