JUDGMENT : Sunil B. Shukre, J. Heard. 2. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent. 3. The petitioner, who is presently 22 years of age and was about 21 years of age when preventively detained in prison, has been deprived of his personal liberty by an order of detention passed by the respondent No.2 on 25.6.2018, which was later approved by the Advisory Board on 17.7.2018 sanctioning such preventive detention of the petitioner for a period of one year. Learned counsel for the petitioner has taken us through the impugned order in order to support his argument as to how the order is based upon irrelevant consideration as well as inadequate consideration. This has been disagreed to by the learned A.P.P. who submits that sufficiency of material which weighed with the detaining authority can never be a subject matter of judicial review to be undertaken as a second Court of review. 4. While there can be no doubt about the proposition of law put forward by the learned A.P.P., we must say that the relevancy of the material at least can always be considered while judicially reviewing an administrative action or a quasi judicial order as the impugned order appears to be in the present case. It is well settled law that for reaching a satisfaction regarding the need for preventively detaining a person for a particular period of time, the Authority has to apply it's mind to the material available on record and reach a suitable conclusion. In other words, the subjective satisfaction must be based upon the objective criteria offered by the material vetted by the Authority. Application of mind by the authority to material available on record is a sine quo non for making of the subjective satisfaction. Once it is found that the subjective satisfaction has been reached by considering the material available on record and forming a view regarding its sufficiency, it is no longer open to the Court to interfere with an order passed in this way, as if the Court is sitting in appeal over such an order. But, when it is found that some material though irrelevant has been considered by the authority, the Court would have to consider its overall impact upon the subjective satisfaction reached by the authority. 5. But, when it is found that some material though irrelevant has been considered by the authority, the Court would have to consider its overall impact upon the subjective satisfaction reached by the authority. 5. In the present case, it is seen that several cases involving some serious offences under various provisions of Indian Penal Code are pending against the petitioner. So, involvement of the petitioner in a series of such offences must be considered as one of the relevant factors for reaching the subjective satisfaction by the Authority. We find from the impugned order that it has indeed been seen to be so by the respondent No.2. Therefore, as regards the opinion formed by the Authority in respect of pendency of these cases, we do not think that it would be permissible for us to substitute our opinion for the opinion of respondent No.2. 6. There is, however, one material which according to us ought to have been ignored but has not been by the respondent No.2. The respondent No.2 has found that the petitioner is indulging himself in a consistent manner in sale of liquor containing about 20.60 % of ethyl alcohol, which according to respondent No.2 has been opined to be having hazardous effect on nervous system, liver and other vital parts of the human body. This view has been formed by the respondent No.2 after eliciting answers to the questions put to one Medical Officer in this regard. A perusal of the query made to the Medical Officer would show that it nowhere refers to or mentions the name of the petitioner and there is no material in this query which is suggestive of it having any nexus with the petitioner. Even the impugned order is silent on this aspect of the matter. Therefore, it is doubtful whether the medical opinion so given by the Medical Officer could have been straight away applied to the present case so as to form subjective satisfaction regarding the need for the petitioner to be detained preventively. 7. This factor of selling of liquor containing hazardous chemical, ethyl alcohol, it appears, has had it's significant impact on the satisfaction subjectively reached by the detaining Authority. 7. This factor of selling of liquor containing hazardous chemical, ethyl alcohol, it appears, has had it's significant impact on the satisfaction subjectively reached by the detaining Authority. This factor, if separated from the other factors which have also been considered by the respondent No.2, would considerably reduce the overall impact of the other adverse material relied upon by the Authority in making the decision. When this factor is ignored, the seriousness of the alleged criminal activity of the petitioner is considerably reduced for the reason that at least 4 out of 7 pending offences which have been seen as putting the petitioner in bad light relate to sell, distribution and transportation of the illicit liquor attracting applicable provisions of the Maharashtra Prohibition Act. Therefore, we are of the view that on this ground, the impugned order becomes highly suspect in the eye of law. 8. The doubt that we have expressed regarding correctness of the impugned order gets more deep by one more aspect, which we would discuss now. 9. This compounding aspect is about violation of right of the petitioner under Section 10 of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug-Offenders and Dangerous Persons Act, 1981 (in short, "the Act of 1981") to make a representation and have it decided by the Advisory Board, in accordance with law. While the petitioner made his representation by availing of his right on 12.7.2018, the representation does not appear to have been considered in any manner by the Advisory Board. Although it is the submission of the learned A.P.P. that this representation has been decided on 17.7.2018 and it has been done after giving an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner, we find that no order rejecting this representation by the Advisory Board has been placed on record. The reply of the prosecution also does not specifically say that the representation dated 12.7.2018 was rejected by the Advisory Board on 17.7.2018. The submission made by the learned A.P.P. in this regard is by way of an inference to be drawn by the approval order passed by the Advisory Board on 17.7.2018. But, this order does not in categorical terms and state that the representation dated 12.7.2018 was considered by it and was rejected by it. This would mean that a valuable right available to the petitioner has been taken away from him. But, this order does not in categorical terms and state that the representation dated 12.7.2018 was considered by it and was rejected by it. This would mean that a valuable right available to the petitioner has been taken away from him. After all, right to liberty is a fundamental right enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India and although this right is subject to reasonable restriction and can also be temporarily taken away in accordance with the procedure established by law, needless to say the procedure has to be reasonable and the procedure prescribed for restricting this right has also to be followed in letter and spirit. If that is not done, there would be a deprivation of fundamental right of the petitioner without following the procedure established by law. This is what has happened in the present case and, therefore, in our view, this is a compounding factor to what is seen by us already as an unjustifiable impugned order, making the impugned order as completely vulnerable in law. 10. In the result, we find that the preventive detention of the petitioner ordered by respondent No.2 can no longer be seen as having been done in accordance with law and consequently the petition deserves to be allowed. 11. The petition stands allowed. 12. The impugned order dated 25.6.2018 as well as approval order dated 17.7.2018 both are hereby quashed and set aside. 13. It is directed that the petitioner be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other crime. 14. Rule is made absolute in the above terms.