ORDER : 1. This is an application for judgment upon admission. The basis of the application appears to be a communication made by the defendant no.3 to the plaintiff in respect of the execution of deed of conveyance in favour of the plaintiff. Shorn of all details, the plaintiff has entered into an agreement for sale with the defendants for purchase of a valuable property at AJC Bose Road of which the defendant nos.1 and 2 are the owners and the defendant no.3 who had a prior agreement for sale with the owners was made a confirming party. By the deed of cancellation executed by and between the defendant nos.1 and 2 as vendors and the defendant no.3 as purchaser, the defendant no.3 received a sum of Rs.3.80 crores as damages, compensation, interest etc. as full and final payment and such amount was received to the fullest satisfaction of the said defendant. 2. The case of the plaintiff in the plaint is plain and simple. The plaintiff has stated that on the basis of the agreement for sale, the defendant no.3 had agreed to execute the conveyance as a confirming party. The execution of the agreement for sale is not in dispute. The said agreement is registered and duly signed by all the parties. The agreement records that the confirming party has received all his dues, claims, damages, charges etc. from the vendors, namely, the defendant nos.1 and 2 and has voluntarily and willfully on his own accord cancelled, terminated, surrendered and relinquished its earlier agreement for sale permanently and once for all. The defendant nos.1 and 2 have agreed to execute the deed of conveyance. However, the defendant no.3 has refused to execute the said conveyance on the ground that the defendant nos.1 and 2 have failed to pay the balance sum of Rs.2.30 crores received from the vendors for execution and registration of the deed of conveyance in favour of the plaintiff. 3. In the affidavit in opposition filed in this proceeding, it is contended on behalf of the defendant no.3 that the entire transaction has to be treated as a whole. 3. In the affidavit in opposition filed in this proceeding, it is contended on behalf of the defendant no.3 that the entire transaction has to be treated as a whole. The obligation and/or duty of the defendants to execute the deed of conveyance is dependent upon receiving the agreed consideration of Rs.3.80 crores as damages, compensation and interest in respect of the said property as mutually decided by the defendant nos.1 and 2 on the one hand and the defendant no.3 on the other hand. This amount has not been paid by the defendant nos.1 and 2 to the defendant no.3 and accordingly, the defendant no.3 is not obliged to execute the deed of conveyance as a confirming party. 4. Mr. Banerjee, learned counsel representing defendant no.3 has submitted that judgment upon admission shall proceed on the basis that there is an unequivocal admission on the part of the defendant and even if in the recital of a document there is a stated consideration, it is always open for a defendant, at the time of trial, to contend that the stated consideration is not the real consideration and can avoid a transaction on proving such fact. It is submitted that the letter dated 6th July 2018 would not establish that there is any unequivocal admission on the part of the answering defendant to execute the deed of conveyance. It is true that the defendant had agreed to execute the deed of conveyance upon payment of Rs.2.30 crores, but it does not take away the right of the defendant to put up any defence appropriate to its case in the written statement to deny execution of the conveyance in favour of the plaintiff, particularly having regard to the fact that under the deed of cancellation, the defendant no.3 did not receive a sum of Rs.3.80 crores from the defendant nos.1 and 2. It is submitted that the execution of the deed of conveyance between the plaintiff and the defendants is dependent upon performance of the mutual and reciprocal obligations by the defendants inter se and only upon performance of such obligations under the deed of cancellation, the defendant no.3 might be called upon to execute the conveyance as a confirming party. Mr. It is submitted that the execution of the deed of conveyance between the plaintiff and the defendants is dependent upon performance of the mutual and reciprocal obligations by the defendants inter se and only upon performance of such obligations under the deed of cancellation, the defendant no.3 might be called upon to execute the conveyance as a confirming party. Mr. Banerjee submits that in fact the stated consideration in the deed of cancellation was inadequate having regard to the expenses incurred by the defendant no.3 in relation to the property in question as also the steps taken by him in order to make the said property free from encumbrance. Mr. Banerjee has relied upon a decision of the single Bench of this Hon’ble Court in Srimati Kasturi Bai vs. Ramlal Pandey reported at 66 CWN 9, for the proposition that at the trial it is open for a defendant to contend that the stated consideration is not the only consideration and the defendant is entitled to claim more amount than what is stated in the document. Mr. Banerjee submits that the object of Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure has fallen for consideration in Ghanashyamdas Agarwal vs. Bank of India & Ors. reported at 2007 (1) CHN 862 and Himani Alloys Limited vs. Tata Steel Limited reported at (2011) 15 SCC 273 , where it has been stated that judgment upon admission ought not to be passed unless it is clear, unambiguous and unconditional and in the instant case, having regard to the defence disclosed in the affidavit in opposition, it cannot be contended that there is a clear and unequivocal admission on the part of the defendants to execute the deed of conveyance in favour of the plaintiff. 5. Mr. Ranjan Deb, learned senior counsel on behalf of the plaintiff has submitted that the defendants are bound by the recital in which the defendant no.3 has clearly acknowledged that the claims of the defendant no.3 have been fully satisfied and on such consideration the defendant no.3 has executed the agreement for sale. The inter se dispute between the defendants cannot be a ground for the defendant no.3 to deny execution of the said conveyance. Mr. The inter se dispute between the defendants cannot be a ground for the defendant no.3 to deny execution of the said conveyance. Mr. Deb submits that in a suit for specific performance, once the plaintiff is able to establish that the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform its obligation, the Court being satisfied that the plaintiff has in fact performed its obligation can pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff. Mr. Deb submits that the plaintiff is ready with Rs.9.82 crores and is willing to pay it to the defendants subject to the defendants accepting the same. 6. The object of Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to ensure speedy disposal of matters where the Court on the basis of the pleading or otherwise arrives at a finding that there is an admission and can proceed to pronounce a judgment on the basis of such admission. Under the amended provision of Order 2 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, all that the Court is required to be satisfied is that the admission of a fact is made either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing. The words ‘or otherwise’ clearly mean that the enquiry of the Court is not restricted to the pleadings only. If there are materials on record from which it is possible for the Court to arrive at a conclusion that admission in fact has been made by a party, the Court can pronounce a judgment upon admission. The object of the provision is to resolve the dispute between the parties as expeditiously as possible without waiting for a prolonged trial. 7. Order 12 Rule 6 Code of Civil Procedure empowers the Court to pass a decree for judgment upon admission whenever such admission is sufficient for the grant of relief prayed for. The scope and amplitude of the power of the Court under the amended provision have been elaborately discussed in Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. versus Union of India reported at 2000 (7) SCC 120 . In the said decision a contention was raised on behalf of the bank that admissions under Order 12 Rule 6 should only be those made in the pleadings and the effect of the admissions can only be considered at the trial of the main suit. Ltd. versus Union of India reported at 2000 (7) SCC 120 . In the said decision a contention was raised on behalf of the bank that admissions under Order 12 Rule 6 should only be those made in the pleadings and the effect of the admissions can only be considered at the trial of the main suit. The Hon’ble Supreme Court was considering transactions connected with the construction of dormitories and other buildings for a university in Iraq. In the application for judgment upon admission the plaintiff relied upon the balance sheet of the plaintiff for the year ending 31st March, 1989 with reference to certain schedules; minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directors of the Bank and letter dated 4th June, 1990 communicating the resolution and minutes of the meeting held on 30th May, 1990. The Hon’ble Supreme Court negated the contention that the resolution or minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directors, resolution passed thereon and the letter sending the said resolution to the respondent bank cannot amount to a pleading or come within the scope of the Rule as such statements are not made in the 4 course of the pleadings or otherwise. It is stated in the said decision that when a statement is made to a party and such statement is made before the Court showing admission of liability by an application filed under Order 12 Rule 6 and the other side had sufficient opportunity to explain the said admission and if such explanation is not accepted by the Court, the trial Court is not helpless in refusing to pass a decree. In paragraph 12 and 15 of the said decision the Hon’ble Supreme Court discussed the scope of Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure as well as the expression otherwise which finds place in the said section. It is stated that in the Objects and Reasons set out while amending the said Rule, it is stated that “where a claim is admitted, the court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on admitted claim. The object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled”. The object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled”. The said provision should not be unduly narrowed down as the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment. Where the other party has made a plain admission entitling the former to succeed, it should apply and also wherever there is a clear admission of facts in the face of which it is impossible for the party making such admission to succeed. Even without referring to the expression “otherwise” in Rule 6 of Order 12 CPC, an inference was drawn on the basis of the pleadings raised in the case in the shape of the applications under that Rule and the answering affidavit which clearly reiterates the admission. If that is so, interpretation of the expression “otherwise” becomes unnecessary. The said view was reiterated in Karam Kapahi and Others versus Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust and Another, reported at 2010 (4) SCC 753 . In the said decision 5 it was stated, “The principles behind Order 12 Rule 6 are to give the plaintiff a right to speedy judgment. Under this Rule either party may get rid of so much of the rival claims about “which there is no controversy.” In the 54th Law Commission Report, an amendment was suggested to enable the court to give a judgment not only on the application of a party but on its own motion. The amendment was brought about to further the ends of justice and give these provisions a wider sweep by empowering Judges to use it “ex debito justitiae”. The thrust of the amendment is that in an appropriate case, a party, on the admission of the other party, can press for judgment, as a matter of legal right. However, the court always retains its discretion in the matter of pronouncing judgment. The thrust of the amendment is that in an appropriate case, a party, on the admission of the other party, can press for judgment, as a matter of legal right. However, the court always retains its discretion in the matter of pronouncing judgment. If the provision of Order 12 Rule 1 is compared with Order 12 Rule 6, it becomes clear that the provision of Order 12 Rule 6 is wider inasmuch as the provision of Order 12 Rule 1 is limited to admission by “pleading or otherwise in writing” but in Order 12 Rule 6 the expression “or otherwise” is much wider in view of the words used therein namely “admission of fact . . . either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing”. In the present case where the controversy is between the parties on an admission of nonpayment of rent, judgment can be rendered on admission by the court. The provision under Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code is enabling, discretionary and permissive and is neither mandatory nor is it peremptory since the word “may” has been used. Thus in a given situation, as in the instant case, the said provision can be applied in rendering the judgment.” 8. The admission in the instant case is based on a letter written by the defendant no.3. The defendant no.3 has denied execution of the said document not on the basis that the plaintiff has failed to perform its obligation but in view of a dispute between the answering defendant and the defendant nos.1 and 2. The defendant no.3 did not deny the execution of the agreement for sale in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is not a party to the cancellation agreement. The dispute between the defendant nos.1 and 2 and the defendant no.3 cannot be a ground to deny execution of the conveyance in favour of the plaintiff once the plaintiff has been able to establish that the plaintiff has discharged its obligation and is ready and willing to discharge the remaining obligations. It is settled law that when the parties have entered into a written agreement, the relationship of the parties is to be decided on the basis of the written terms and no amount of parol evidence shall be allowed to vary or modify the written agreed terms entered into by and between the parties. It is settled law that when the parties have entered into a written agreement, the relationship of the parties is to be decided on the basis of the written terms and no amount of parol evidence shall be allowed to vary or modify the written agreed terms entered into by and between the parties. Section 92 of the Evidence Act does not permit such evidence to be led when the parties have reduced their agreement in writing. Both the deed of cancellation and the deed of conveyance executed in February, 2018 in unequivocal terms stated that the answering defendant no.3 has received full consideration and has no claim over the said property. As on date, there is no proceeding in which the defendant no.3 has challenged and/or questioned such documents. The defendant no.3 in its communication did not even question the validity of the agreement for sale entered into by and between the plaintiff and the defendants. In Srimati Kasturi Bai (supra), while interpreting Section 92 of the Evidence Act, the learned Single Judge observed that when there is one consideration stated in the document, evidence of any other consideration not in contradiction to that instrument is admissible and it is not in contradiction to the consideration in the instrument to prove a consideration larger than that which is mentioned. The said judgment cannot be considered in vacuum. In the letter dated 6th July, 2018, it is not the case of the defendant that the stated consideration in the deed of cancellation was inadequate or not covering all the claims of the defendant no.3 in relation to the property in question. This is evident from paragraphs 2 and 3 of the letter, which read: “This is to inform you that by a Cancellation of Agreement of Sale between me and Habibullah Khaleeli and Iran Dokht Khaleeli (your vendors) and as per that Cancellation of Agreement of Sale said Habibullah Khaleeli and Iran Dokht Khaleeli has agreed to pay me as sum of Rs.3,80,00,000/- (Rupees Three Crore Eighty Lakh) as damages, compensation, interest in respect of said property. This is pertinent to mention herein that we have only received Rs.1,50,00,000/- (Rupees One Crore Fifty Lakh) through your client on 23.02.2018 and balance payment of Rs.2,30,00,000/- (Rupees Two Crore Thirty Lakh) is still due and payable by said Habibullah Khaleeli and Iran Dokht Khaleeli till date.” 9. This is pertinent to mention herein that we have only received Rs.1,50,00,000/- (Rupees One Crore Fifty Lakh) through your client on 23.02.2018 and balance payment of Rs.2,30,00,000/- (Rupees Two Crore Thirty Lakh) is still due and payable by said Habibullah Khaleeli and Iran Dokht Khaleeli till date.” 9. This was followed by an unequivocal statement on the part of the defendant no.3 that he is ready and willing to execute the deed of conveyance as a confirming party in favour of the plaintiff upon receiving payment of Rs.2.30 crores as agreed between him and the defendant nos.1 and 2. The question arises whether this objection with regard to the execution of the deed of conveyance can be raised at this stage when the written terms of both the agreements clearly show that the defendant No. 3 has relinquished all its claims in relation to the said property. In view of the recitals in the agreement for sale dated 23rd February, 2018 in which the defendant no.3 as a confirming party has clearly stated that he has received all his dues, claims, damages, charges etc from the vendors, namely, the defendant nos.1 and 2 and has voluntarily and willfully on his own accord cancelled, terminated, surrendered and relinquished the said agreement for sale permanently and once for all and cancelled all form of documents executed among the confirming party and the vendors, it is no more open for the defendant no.3 to deny execution of the said conveyance on a specious plea that unless the defendant no.3 received a sum of Rs.2.30 crores from the defendant nos.1 and 2, the said defendant no.3 as a confirming party is not obliged to execute the conveyance in favour of the plaintiff. This obligation, if any, is not to be discharged by the plaintiff. The payment of Rs.2.30 crores is an obligation that the defendant nos.1 and 2 may have to discharge to the defendant no.3 in relation to the deed of cancellation which again going by the terms of the recital the defendant no.3 seems to have received namely a sum of Rs.3.80 crores and admits, accepts and acknowledges receipt of the said amount from the defendant nos.1 and 2. Mr. Mr. Banerjee although wants to place emphasis on the money receipt to show that the cheque details are left blank, but the fact remains that this deed of cancellation has been duly executed by the defendant nos.1 and 2 and the defendant no.3 with their eyes wide open followed by the execution of the agreement for sale in favour of the plaintiff. 10. There is no contemporaneous evidence to show that the defendant no.3, prior to the plaintiff calling upon the defendant no.3 to execute the deed of conveyance, has enforced its right under the deed of cancellation or has initiated any proceeding for recovery of the said sum of Rs.2.30 crores. However, in this proceeding, it is not necessary for this Court to decide the inter se dispute between the defendant nos.1 and 2 and the defendant no.3. However, on the basis of the letter dated 6th July, 2018, I am of the firm opinion that the defendant no.3 has admitted execution of the agreement for sale and since the plaintiff is not required to pay the said sum of Rs.2.30 crores to the defendant and there is no obligation on the part of the plaintiff to ensure that the defendant no.3 received the said sum of Rs.2.30 crores from the defendant nos.1 and 2, it is not open to the defendant no.3 to deny execution of the said conveyance in favour of the plaintiff on this pretext. 11. This order, however, shall not be construed as deciding finally the inter se dispute between the defendants and the entitlement of the defendant no.3 to receive a sum of Rs.2.30 crores from the defendant nos.1 and 2 as claimed by him in the letter dated 6th July, 2018 is not decided. 12. Under such circumstances, the plaintiff is directed to deposit a sum of Rs.9.82 crores with the Registrar, High Court, Original Side within a period of ten days from date upon intimation to the defendants. The defendants shall execute the deed of conveyance in favour of the plaintiff within two weeks thereafter. In default, the Registrar, Original Side, shall execute the conveyance on behalf of the defendants or on behalf of the unwilling defendants or defendant, as the case may be. It is made clear that I have not decided the claim of the defendant no.3 against the defendant nos.1 and 2. In default, the Registrar, Original Side, shall execute the conveyance on behalf of the defendants or on behalf of the unwilling defendants or defendant, as the case may be. It is made clear that I have not decided the claim of the defendant no.3 against the defendant nos.1 and 2. The Registrar shall keep the said amount in a short term fixed deposit with a nationalized bank yielding highest return for a period of one year, subject to any order that may be passed in a proceeding that may be instituted by the defendant No. 3 against the defendant Nos. 1 and 2. In the event no proceeding is initiated by the defendant no.3 against the defendant nos.1 and 2 by 30th April, 2019, the Registrar shall release the amount in favour of the defendant nos.1 and 2. 13. Since this order virtually disposes of the suit, by consent of the parties, the suit is treated on the day’s list and stands decreed. The department shall draw up the decree as expeditiously as possible.