JUDGMENT : 1. The facts of the matter, in a nutshell, are as follows: 2. The opposite party no.1, an erstwhile Bishop of the proforma opposite party no. 2, filed a suit against the proforma opposite party no. 2 for several declarations and consequential reliefs, primarily challenging the decision of the proforma opposite party no. 2 to discontinue the services of the opposite party no. 1 as the Bishop of the Diocese of Calcutta, on the basis of the decision to decrease the age of superannuation for such post from 68 years to 65 years. 3. In the said suit, the present petitioner made an application for impleading himself, on the ground that the petitioner was the present incumbent in the said post of Bishop of the Diocese of Calcutta, thus having direct interest in the fate of the suit. By the impugned order, the said application under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure was dismissed on contest by the trial court. 4. It is relevant to mention that previously another application had been taken out by the Diocese of Calcutta for getting itself impleaded as a party to the suit, which was rejected by the trial court on February 15, 2019. The trial court, while dismissing the present application, held inter alia that the dismissal of the said prior application for addition of party operated as res judicata against the petitioner. It was further held in the impugned order that the Bishop's function under the Synod of the proforma opposite party no. 2 (the Church of North India) and the legality of the decision of the Synod had been challenged in the suit, which could not be a matter of personal grievance of the petitioner. The decision of the court, it was held, shall bind the plaintiff, the proforma opposite party no. 2 and consequently the Bishop, whoever was in office at the relevant time. 5. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner argues that the petitioner was not only a proper but a necessary party to the suit, since the petitioner was the present incumbent in the post of the Bishop of the Diocese at Calcutta, which was in contention of the suit. In the event the plaintiff/opposite party no. 5. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner argues that the petitioner was not only a proper but a necessary party to the suit, since the petitioner was the present incumbent in the post of the Bishop of the Diocese at Calcutta, which was in contention of the suit. In the event the plaintiff/opposite party no. 1 succeeded in the suit, the petitioner would be the worst affected party, since he would be removed from the said post as a necessary consequence. As such, it is argued that the trial court ought to have added the petitioner as a necessary party to the suit. 6. Learned senior counsel cites a judgment reported at (2007) 10 SCC 82 [Sumtibai and others vs. Paras Finance Co. Regd. Partnership Firm Beawer (Raj.) Through Mankanwar (Smt) W/o Parasmal Chordia (Dead) and others], wherein it was held that if a person can show a fair semblance of title or interest, he can certainly file an application for impleadment. The said case arose from a suit for specific performance. 7. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner then places reliance on a judgment reported at (2017) 9 SCC 700 [Pankajbhai Rameshbhai Zalavadiya vs. Jethbhai Kalabhai Zalavadiya (deceased) Through Legal Representatives and others], which laid down that Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure enables the court to add any person as a party at any stage of the proceedings if the person's presence in court is necessary in order to enable the court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. Avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings was held to be one of the objects of the said provision. It was observed that the said provision empowers the court to substitute a party to the suit if such addition is necessary for the determination of the real matter in controversy in the suit and/or the controversy so raised cannot be effectively and completely settled without impleading such person. Order I Rule 10(2) of the Code, it was held, gives wide discretion to the court to deal with such a situation which may result in prejudicing the interests of the affected party if not impleaded in the suit and where the impleadment of the said party is necessary and vital for the decision of the suit. 8. Learned counsel for the contesting opposite party no. 8. Learned counsel for the contesting opposite party no. 1 argues that the Supreme Court has laid down consistently that the tests for impleading a person under Order I rule 10 of the Code were: i. Whether the plaintiff had any relief against the proposed added party; and ii. Whether any effective decree could be passed against the said added party in the suit. 9. Learned counsel for the opposite party no. 1 cites a judgment reported at (2005) 6 SCC 733 [Kasturi vs. Iyyamperumal and others], wherein it was held that the question of jurisdiction of the court to invoke Order I Rule 10 of the Code to add a party shall not arise unless the party proposed to be added has direct and legal interest in the controversy involved in the suit. A person is legally interested in the answers to the controversies only if he could satisfy the court that it may lead to a result that will affect him legally. Two tests were to be satisfied for determining the question as to who was a necessary party, being: 1. There must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of controversies involved in the proceedings; 2. No effective decree can be passed in the absence of such party. 10. The said decision was rendered in the context of a suit for specific performance. 11. Learned counsel next cites an unreported judgment of the Supreme Court dated July 17, 2019 in Civil Appeal Nos. 5522 and 5523 of 2019 [Gurmit Singh Bhatia vs. Kiran Kant Robinson and others]. It was held in the said decision, considering Kasturi (supra) and applying the principle that the plaintiff is the dominus litis, the question of jurisdiction of the court to invoke Order I Rule 10 of the Code shall not arise unless a party has a direct legal interest in the controversy involved in the suit. The two tests laid down in Kasturi (supra) were reiterated by the Supreme Court. It was further observed and held that a third-party or a stranger cannot be added as a party to a suit for specific performance merely in order to find out who is in possession of the contractual property or to avoid multiplicity of suits. The two tests laid down in Kasturi (supra) were reiterated by the Supreme Court. It was further observed and held that a third-party or a stranger cannot be added as a party to a suit for specific performance merely in order to find out who is in possession of the contractual property or to avoid multiplicity of suits. The Supreme Court held further that a third-party or a stranger to a contract cannot be added so as to convert a suit of one character into a suit of different character. 12. It was also held that the plaintiff cannot be forced to add a party against whom he does not want to fight. If he does so, in that case it would be at the risk of the plaintiffs. 13. In the present case, it is argued by the opposite party no.1, the Bishop was the head of the Diocese-in-question which, in turn, operates under the proforma opposite party no.2. The Bishop was also an ex officio member of the Synod, in charge of affairs for the proforma opposite party no. 2. 14. A Diocese is a zonal division under the proforma opposite party no. 2, with the Bishop at its head. As such, it is argued, in view of the rejection of the previous application for impleadment of the Diocese of Calcutta itself, the present Bishop, as head of the Diocese, is debarred from seeking impleadment by operation of the principle of res judicata. 15. It is further argued on behalf of the opposite party no. 1 that the present petitioner was admittedly transferred to the post of the Bishop of Diocese of Calcutta during the pendency of the suit. The injunction application of the opposite party no. 1 in the suit has been kept pending for an inordinately long period and applications are being filed one after the other for addition of parties for the purpose of stalling the proceedings, thereby depriving the plaintiff/opposite party no. 1 from getting his remedy in the suit or in the injunction application. 16. It is further argued that the 'affected party' theory could not be applied to addition of parties in civil suits, as settled by the Supreme Court time and again. 1 from getting his remedy in the suit or in the injunction application. 16. It is further argued that the 'affected party' theory could not be applied to addition of parties in civil suits, as settled by the Supreme Court time and again. If anybody and everybody who is collaterally affected by the decree were to be impleaded in a suit, there would be no end to litigation and it would be theoretically possible for the Bishop to be changed every day, conferring a new cause of action on the current incumbent to get himself impleaded in the suit, which would snowball into a never-ending litigation. 17. In reply, the petitioner lastly submits that the principles of Service Jurisprudence demand that the present incumbent to a post be impleaded in an action concerning the post as the said person has a direct interest in the result of the litigation. Since the litigation at hand concerns the post of the Bishop at the Diocese of Calcutta and the petitioner is the present incumbent in the said post, the petitioner is a necessary party to the suit and ought to have been added as a party. 18. The application for addition of party, which was rejected by the impugned order, makes it abundantly clear that, subsequent to removal of the plaintiff/opposite party no. 1 from the post of the Bishop of the Diocese of Calcutta, one reverend Dr. Probal Kanto Datta was appointed to the said post with effect from October 9, 2018. The said new incumbent took charge of the said office on October 10, 2018. 19. By a subsequent resolution adopted by the Executive Committee of the Synod of the Church of North India (proforma opposite party no. 2) at its special meeting held on June 10, 2019, the present petitioner was transferred to the Diocese of Calcutta as its Bishop and reverend Dr. Probal Kanto Datta was transferred to the Diocese of Durgapur as its Bishop. The petitioner was installed on June 11, 2019, on which date he took full charge. 20. Thus, it is evident that whatever may be the result of the suit-in-question, the same would not affect the Bishophood of the present petitioner in any manner. What would at best be touched would be the functioning of the petitioner as the Bishop of the Diocese of Calcutta in particular. 20. Thus, it is evident that whatever may be the result of the suit-in-question, the same would not affect the Bishophood of the present petitioner in any manner. What would at best be touched would be the functioning of the petitioner as the Bishop of the Diocese of Calcutta in particular. It is obvious that the Diocese of Calcutta had no priority in the hierarchy of the Episcopate than any other Diocese. In fact, the first new incumbent after the plaintiff was transferred to the Diocese of Durgapur and the present petitioner was brought in his place of Calcutta, also on transfer. Thus, at best the petitioner would be transferred to some other Diocese in the event the opposite party no. 1 succeeded in his suit. Hence, the 'direct interest' pleaded by the petitioner is basically a myth and is not strong enough to let the petitioner intrude into the suit. 21. Applying the tests as laid down in the judgments cited by both sides, the petitioner could not have a right to be impleaded. The first test, being that there must be a right to some relief against the petitioner in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings, does not apply to the petitioner. The controversy in the present suit is entirely regarding the superannuation of the plaintiff/opposite party no. 1 upon reducing the age of superannuation. The allegation of illegality of such removal was for the plaintiff/opposite party no. 1 to prove against the proforma opposite party no. 2, the defendant in the suit. As per the frame of the present suit, there was no scope for the plaintiff to seek a relief against the present petitioner. 22. Even if the plaintiff succeeds in the suit, the status of the petitioner as a member of the Episcopate would not be taken away but the petitioner could at best be transferred to some other Diocese. Thus, the right claimed in the suit does not operate in any manner against the petitioner at all. Rather, in the event the plaintiff succeeded in getting a decree to the effect that the reduction in superannuation age was illegal, it would also ensure to the benefit of the petitioner and other Bishops under the proforma opposite party no. 2, rather than being contrary or adverse to their interest. 23. Rather, in the event the plaintiff succeeded in getting a decree to the effect that the reduction in superannuation age was illegal, it would also ensure to the benefit of the petitioner and other Bishops under the proforma opposite party no. 2, rather than being contrary or adverse to their interest. 23. As far as the second test laid down by the Supreme Court is concerned, an effective decree can very well be passed in the absence of the present petitioner, who has no direct interest in the result of the suit. For the suit to be maintainable in its present form, no decree has to be sought against the petitioner. There was, in fact, no occasion to seek any such decree. 24. The other test of direct and legal interest was an interest in the 'controversy involved in the suit' and not an interest in the result of the suit. Thus, whichever way a person may be affected collaterally by the decree in a suit, could not ipso facto be an indicator of the necessity to add him/her as a party to the suit. The interest of the proposed added party had to be in the controversy involved in the suit, for him to be impleaded. The controversy involved in the present suit, however, revolves around the legality of reduction of superannuation age vis-à-vis the removal of the plaintiff/opposite party no. 1 from the post-in-question. There could not be any direct or even indirect interest of the petitioner in such controversy at all. 25. Moreover, the logic of the opposite party no.1, that adding every present incumbent to a post in a suit of such a nature would prolong litigation indefinitely, cannot be brushed aside. The dispute in the present lis is entirely centered around the removal of the plaintiff/opposite party no. 1 and could not be broadened to incorporate every dispute or consequence, collateral or otherwise, emanating from such dispute. 26. Even if the general norms and principles of Service Jurisprudence are factored in, prospective success of the present suit would not render the petitioner jobless as a Bishop under the Church of North India but would only entail, at the worst, a transfer of the petitioner to some other Diocese, just as he was transferred to the post of Bishop in the Diocese of Calcutta. Thus, such principles do not directly apply to the present case. 27. Thus, such principles do not directly apply to the present case. 27. It may be noted here that the logic advanced by the opposite party no. 1 and accepted by the trial court, that the previous rejection of the application of the Diocese of Calcutta for addition of party operated as res judicata, is not acceptable. It is so because the present petitioner has not come solely in the capacity of the head of the Diocese of Calcutta or as a representative of the said Diocese but in his independent capacity as a Bishop, apparently to protect his appointment. As such, there is a subtle distinction between the causes espoused by the present petitioner in his individual capacity and that done by the Diocese itself. 28. However, in view of the discussions above, the trial court acted well within its jurisdiction in dismissing the prayer of the petitioner for addition of party. 29. Accordingly C.O. No. 1901 of 2019, and consequentially the connected application bearing C.A.N. No. 5682 of 2019, are dismissed, thereby affirming the order impugned in the revisional application. In view of the implicit urgency in the matter, the trial court is directed to dispose of the injunction application pending in connection with Title Suit No. 1119 of 2018 pending before it, without granting any unnecessary adjournment to either side, positively within August 9, 2019. 30. There will be no order as to costs. 31. Urgent certified website copies of this order, if applied for, be made available to the parties upon compliance with the requisite formalities.