JUDGMENT : Anu Sivaraman, J. Heard Sri.George Poonthottam, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners in W.P.(C).No.24840 of 2019, Sri.D.Somasundaram, the learned counsel for the petitioners in W.P.(C).No.24843 of 2019, Sri.M.Sasindran, the learned counsel for the petitioners in W.P.(C).No.25149 of 2019, Sri.R.Lakshmi Narayan, the learned standing counsel for the State Co-operative Election Commission, Sri.N.Reghuraj, the learned counsel for the respondent Society and Sri. Bimal Nath, learned senior Government Pleader. 2. These writ petitions are filed challenging action of the Returning Officer of the Pazhavangadikkara Service Co-operative Bank Limited in rejecting the nomination submitted by the petitioners. 3. It is submitted that the nominations had been rejected on the ground that the petitioners were sureties to the different loans and default had been committed in repayment of the loans. Relying on the provisions of Rule 44 (1) (c) (i) of the Kerala Cooperative Societies Rules [hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules'] and proviso to Rule 44 (2) (c), the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners contend that where the disqualification is in respect of loans to which the concerned member had stood as surety, there has to be notice issued informing the member concerned of the default committed by the principal debtor and it is only after expiry of 30 days from the receipt by the member concerned of the notice from the society demanding him to clear the default that disqualification under Rule 44 (1) (c) (i) would accrue. Reliance is placed on the decision of this Court in Salim Vs. Joint Registrar, (1998) 2 KerLT 665 wherein the issue was pointedly considered. The decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Abdul Rasheed Vs. State of Kerala, (1988) 1 KerLT 190 is also relied on. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the rejection of the nomination was specifically on the ground that the petitioners are disqualified for submitting nomination in terms of Rule 44 (1) (c). It is submitted that the provisions of Rules had been specifically considered by this Court in Salim's case [cited supra] and it has been held that the disqualification under Rule 44 (1) (c) would accrue only after expiry of the period of one month from the date of notice as provided under proviso to Rule 44 (2) (c). It is submitted that the provisions of Rules had been specifically considered by this Court in Salim's case [cited supra] and it has been held that the disqualification under Rule 44 (1) (c) would accrue only after expiry of the period of one month from the date of notice as provided under proviso to Rule 44 (2) (c). It is contended that in the absence of any such notice, the rejection of the nomination of the petitioner is completely invalid. 5. A statement has been filed on behalf of the petitioners in W.P.(C) No. 24840 and 24843 of 2019. It is stated that the nomination of the petitioners had been rejected for cogent reasons and the reasons had been furnished in writing to the petitioner. In respect of the petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 24840 of 2019, it is stated that the petitioner was the President of the Society from 1993 to 05.10.2018 and that he had allowed several loans in favour of his son and daughter-in-law. It is stated that the term of the loans has expired and that there is default in the loans. A total amount of the said loan comes to Rs.97,20,000/-. With respect to the petitioners in W.P.(C) No. 24843/2019, it is stated that they were also members of the Committee till 05.10.2018 and that the loans had been issued in favour of the close relatives of the petitioners including wife, sister and mother and that the said loans are in default. 6. It is submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the Kerala State Co-operative Election Commission that the petitioners in W.P.(C) No. 24843/2019 were committee members of the society till 05.08.2019. They had themselves issued loan in favour of their close relatives. They were sureties to the loans as well. It is stated that they were very well aware of the default in the loans in question and have taken no steps to issue due notice with regard to the loan. Relying on the decision of this Court in Molsy Eldhose Vs. They were sureties to the loans as well. It is stated that they were very well aware of the default in the loans in question and have taken no steps to issue due notice with regard to the loan. Relying on the decision of this Court in Molsy Eldhose Vs. Secretary Valakom Service Co-operative Bank Limited [2010 ICO 1670 (W.P.(C) No.20845 of 2010 dated 02.08.2019)], it is contended that this Court construed provisions of Rule 44 (1) (c) (i) and held that mandate in Rule 44 (1) (C) (i) is only that a person who wishes to submit nomination for election should be aware of the default in loans in which they stood as surety. It is contended that after considering the provisions of Rule 44 (1) (c) as well as proviso to Rules 44 (2) (c) and the decisions on the point, this Court held that once it is shown that the petitioners are former committee members and are perfectly aware of the default in repayment of the loan by their close relatives, this Court would not be justified in directing the respondents to permit such persons to contest for the elections. This Court held that as the sureties have full knowledge of the default in repayment by the borrower, even if, prior notice had not been issued to him the rigour of Rule 44 (1) (c) (i) would be attracted and the action of electoral Officer in rejecting the nomination would be justified. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the society would contend that the petitioners, being instrumental in the grant of loan as the President and Committee members of society having been at the helm of the affairs of the society till 05.10.2018, they were the persons responsible for issuance of notices to the principal borrower and the sureties. It is contended that the petitions cannot be permitted to take advantage of their own failure in issuance of such notices. Relying on the decision of this Court in Rajasekharan Nair V. Vs Returning Officer and another, (2008) 4 KHC 1003 , it is contended that this Court had specifically held that the provision with regard to the accrual of disqualification after one month from the date of receipt of notice occurs in a proviso to sub rule (2) to Rule 44. It was held that the said proviso, therefore, applies to that Rule alone and cannot be imported into Rule 44 (1) (c) (i). It was held that the proviso at the foot of Rule 44 (2) (c) only postpones the effect of disqualification of a member of a committee with reference to Rule 44 (1) (c) (i) r/w Rule 44 (2) (c) until expiry of the period of one month from the date of receipt of notice by the member concerned from the society. It is therefore contended that in view of the fact the petitioners in W.P.(C) Nos. 24840 and 24843 of 2019 being well aware of the default committed by the principal debtors who are close relatives, in the loan in which they have stood as surety, the action of the electoral officer in having declined their nomination is perfectly in order. 8. In respect of W.P.(C) No.25149/2019, which was moved only on 23.09.2019, it is submitted that one of the petitioners is the principal debtor and therefore would not be entitled to any notice in respect of default and in the other case, the reason for rejection of nomination was duly intimated. 9. I have considered the contentions advanced. Rule 44 (1) (c) provides that no member of a society shall be eligible for being elected, or appointed as a member of the committee of the society under Section 28 if he is in default to the society or to any other society in respect of any loan or loans taken by him or loan in which he had surety, for such period, as is prescribed in the bye-laws of the society concerned or in any case for a period exceeding three months. The nominations of the petitioners have been rejected on the ground that they are sureties in loans which are in default. The specific contentions raised is that the loans were availed by the close family members including wife, son, mother and daughter-in-law. It is stated that the petitioners are well aware of the existence of the loan, the default committed in the same and fact that such default would render them ineligible in terms of Rule 44 (1) (c) to contest the election. 10. This Court, in Rajasekharan Nair's case [cited supra], specifically held that the proviso under Rule 44 (2) (c) cannot be imported into Rule 44 (1) (c) (i). 10. This Court, in Rajasekharan Nair's case [cited supra], specifically held that the proviso under Rule 44 (2) (c) cannot be imported into Rule 44 (1) (c) (i). It is contended by the learned Government Pleader as well the learned counsel appearing for the society that the reason for incorporating Rule 44 (1) (c) (i) is to see that the persons who are in default to the society in question or even to other societies are not eligible to contest the election to the managing committee of the Co-operative society. 11. The learned single Judge of this Court Molsy Eldhose [cited supra] has considered the mandate of Rule 44 (1) (c) (i) and held that the intention of the Rule is only to ascertain that the persons who intend to contest the election is made aware of the default committed on a loan availed by him or a loan where he has stood as surety. The said judgment was rendered considering the earlier decisions including Abdul Rasheed's case [cited supra] and Rajasekharan Nair's case [cited supra]. 12. In the instant case, the contention is that the petitioners in W.P.(C) No. 24840 and 24843 of 2019 were members of the committee till 05.10.2018. In the above view of the matter, there is no doubt that the petitioners who are instrumental in granting the loan and who remained members of the committee till 05.10.2018 were very well aware of the default committed by the their close family members in the loan granted by the society. In view of the view expressed by this Court in Rajasekharan Nair's case and Molsy Eldose's [cited supra], the rejection of the nominations of the petitioners who are well aware of the default committed by their kith and kin cannot be said to be arbitrary or unsustainable. 13. It is stated that the 2nd petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 25149/2019 was himself the principal borrower and he cannot claim to be unaware of the default committed by him on the loan. With regard to the 1st petitioner, it is submitted that the loan was availed by his wife and he was surety and was very well aware of the default. In the above view of the matter, the rejection of the nomination in respect of the petitioners cannot be said to be illegal and unsustainable. Writ Petitions fail and same are accordingly dismissed.