JUDGMENT : 1. This writ petition is under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, wherein order dated 06.12.2018 (annexure-5) passed in a petition filed under Order 6 Rule 17 in Title (Eviction) Suit No.11 of 2013, is under challenge, whereby and whereunder, the amendment sought for, is disallowed. 2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the writ petition is that the plaintiff has filed a suit for eviction being Title (Eviction) Suit No.11 of 2013 under Section 14 read with Section 11 (1) (c) of the Bihar Building (Land, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (now, Jharkhand Building (Land, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 2000. On the basis of the pleading made in the plaint claiming therein the absolute owner of the suit premises, the defendant was allowed to live in the house of the plaintiff in the month of June, 2000 for one year because the defendant has shifted from Lohardaga to Ranchi for education of the children and requested the plaintiff that after one year he will vacate the premises but after lapse of aforesaid one year period the plaintiff requested the defendant to vacate the house in the month of January, 2001. Thereafter, defendant has requested that he may be allowed to live as tenant and agreed to pay Rs.500/-per month as monthly rent and since then he is residing from month to month tenant in the suit premises of the plaintiff, the defendant thereafter has started claiming the suit property on the basis of forged and fabricated documents, although, he had no right, title and interest over the portion of the suit property and thereafter the defendant became defaulter in payment of rent from the month of June, 2012. The plaintiff since is in need of the said premises for her personal use and accommodation for residential house and as such, the present suit has been filed. 3. The petitioner/defendant was filed the written statement, wherein, the relationship of landlord and tenant has been disputed. 4. The petitioner has filed a petition under Order 6 Rule 17 of the C.P.C. on 18.09.2018 for amendment in the written statement, as due to inadvertence, there were some mistakes in the written statement, which is required to be amended but the same having been disallowed, the present writ petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 5. 5. The matter has been heard on 26.02.2019 and a notice was issued upon the respondent, in terms thereof, due appearance has been made by the respondent/plaintiff who has filed the counter affidavit. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent has submitted that the impugned order does not warrant any interference, if the same would be allowed, it would amount to resiling from the statement made in the written statement and therefore, the amendment sought for, is not worth to be considered. According to him, the specific plea has been raised by the petitioner at paragraph-9 to the written statement that the area of suit land is 8 decimal which was settled by the ex-landlord (Jamindar) Late Sarju Dayal Singh in favour of Sri Badri Narayan Agarwal (father of the defendant) through Sada Hukumnama dated 10.05.1944. Therefore, the stand of the petitioner with respect to the title over the said land was by way of settlement in favour of the ex-landlord namely late Sarju Dayal Singh in favour of Badri Narayan Agarwal (father of the defendant) but the amendment which has been sought to insert in third line of paragraph no.6 is:- “as per R.S. record of right of Khata No.18, the land is recorded in the name of Lohar Oraon and the name of landlord is Ishwar Dayal singh and the ame of Lohar Oraon and others has been mentioned as tenant (Raiyat) of Khata No.18, Village-Hesal, Thana No.202, District-Ranchi”. The aforesaid proposed amendment is contrary to the statement made at paragraph-9 to the written statement and therefore, the same is contrary which amounts to resiling from the statement made in the written statement, hence, the said amendment is not permissible, otherwise the entire nature of suit would be changed and furthermore, the present amendment has been sought for after lapse of 5 years that to when the plaintiff evidence has been closed and the date was fixed for evidence of the defendant and furthermore the aforesaid fact was prior to filing of the suit as well as the written statement and hence the petitioner has failed to show as to what prevented him in incorporating the said statement made in the written statement warranting him to file amendment petition under Order 6 Rule 17 of the C.P.C., after such delay. 7. 7. This Court before appreciating the finding recorded by the trial Court, deem it fit and proper to deal with the provision of Order 6 Rule 17 of the C.P.C. along with the relevant pronouncement regarding the scope thereof, Order 6 Rule 17, which is being quoted hereinbelow:- “[17. Amendment of pleadings:-The Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties: Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial.]” 8. The scope of Order 6 Rule 17 has been discussed in the judgment rendered in the case of Rajkumar Gurawara (Dead) Through LRS. Vrs. S.K. Sarwagi and Company Private Limited and Another, reported in (2008) 14 SCC 364 , as also the judgment rendered in the case of Revajeetu Builders and Developers Vrs. Narayanaswamy and Sons and Others, reported in (2009) 10 SCC 84 , wherefrom, it is evident that the amendment cannot be allowed:- (i.) when the nature of it is changed by permitting amendment; (ii.) when the amendment would result in introducing new cause of action and intends to prejudice the other party; (iii.) when allowing amendment application defeats the law of limitation, if a fresh suit on the amended claims would be barred by limitation then as a general rule, it would be rejected but to avoid multiplicity, it can be allowed. As has been held in the judgment rendered in the case of Rajkumar Gurawara (Dead) Through LRS. Vrs. S.K. Sarwagi and Company Private Limited and Another, reported in AIR (2008) SC 2303 that during trial, amendment is to be allowed as the opposite party would not be prejudiced because, he will have an opportunity of meeting the amendments. As has been held in the judgment rendered in the case of Rajkumar Gurawara (Dead) Through LRS. Vrs. S.K. Sarwagi and Company Private Limited and Another, reported in AIR (2008) SC 2303 that during trial, amendment is to be allowed as the opposite party would not be prejudiced because, he will have an opportunity of meeting the amendments. It is further settled position as has been effected after the amendment in the C.P.C. that a no new provision, whereby a new provision has been added to the Rule, no application for amendment of the pleading shall be allowed after the trial has commenced unless the Court has come to a conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered in the case of Chander Kanta Bansal Vrs. Rajinder Singh Anand, reported in (2008) 5 SCC 117 , Sumesh Singh Vrs. Phoolan Devi and Ors., reported in (2009) 12 SCC 689 , as also the judgment rendered in the case of Abdul Rehman and Anr. Vrs. Mohd. Ruldu and Ors., reported in (2012) 11 SCC 341 . It is equally settled that mere delay cannot be ground of dismissal of amendment but apart from the delay the other part i.e., if the parties have failed to show the due diligence or the nature of suit will be changed or the admission made in the pleading is sought to be resiled or recalled, the amendment should not be allowed. 9. In the recent judgment rendered in the case of Ram Niranjan Kajaria Vrs. Sheo Prakash Kajaria and Ors., reported in 2015 (10) SCC 203 , it has been held therein that admission made in the pleadings cannot be resiled/recalled. In the light of the above legal position as also the judgment rendered hereinabove, the factual aspect of the case has been examined by this Court along with the finding recorded by the trial Court, wherefrom it is evident that the suit is for eviction and the petitioner/defendant is disputing the relationship of landlord and tenant and therefore at paragraph-9, statement has been made to the effect:- “9. That the fact is that the area of suit land is 8 decimal which was settled by the ex-landlord (Jamindar) Late Sarju Dayal Singh in favour of Sri Badri Narayan Agarwal (father of the defendant) through Sada Hukumnama dated 10.05.1944. That the Jamindari Malgugari receipt was issued in by landlord his favour. Therefore Sri Badri Narayan Agrawal came in to possession of the aforesaid land settled with him.” 10. It is evident from the aforesaid statement made in the aforesaid paragraph that the petitioner is claiming title over the suit property on the basis of the transfer made by one Sarju Dayal Singh in favour of Badri Narayan Agarwal (father of the defendant), who has got the title over the said land by virtue of settlement through Sada Hukumnama dated 10.05.1944 in favour of ex-landlord namely late Sarju Dayal Singh but the amendment sought for by virtue of the petition filed under Order 6 Rule 17 is to the effect:- “as per R.S. record of right of Khata No.18, the land is recorded in the name of Lohar Oraon and the name of landlord is Ishwar Dayal singh and the name of Lohar Oraon and others has been mentioned as tenant (Raiyat) of Khata No.18, Village-Hesal, Thana No.202, District-Ranchi”. Therefore, the statement made in paragraph-9, wherein, the title by virtue of Sada Hukumnama is being claimed and being confirmed upon late Sarju Dayal Singh while in the proposed amendment the title of the land in question is said to be recorded in the name of Lohar Oraon and the name of landlord is Ishwar Dayal Singh, therefore, there is complete contradiction in between the admission made by the petitioner/defendant of the statement made at paragraph-9 of the written statement to that of proposed amendment sought for in the petition filed under Order 6 Rule 17 of the C.P.C., therefore, it would be said to be resiling from the original statement made in the written statement for the reason that paragraph-3, the admission is with respect to the land not recorded in the name of Lohar Oraon, the recorded Raiyat while in the proposed amendment the nature of land is shown to be different being recorded in the name of Lohar Oraon by the landlord i.e., Ishwar Dayal Singh, therefore, the entire nature of land is sought to be changed. 11. 11. Admittedly, the fact about the record of right is prior to the institution of the case but even though, the statement at paragraph-9 in the written statement and now the proposed amendment is to be incorporated but without showing any due diligence as to what precluded the petitioner in bringing the said fact on record at the time of filing of the written statement. 12. Although, the amendment can be allowed at any stage of the proceeding but after amendment in the C.P.C., the parties is to show the due diligence as to what precluded the parties in bringing on record the fact and to that effect the specific reason is to be furnished for its appreciation by the Court below but as has been recorded by the trial Court with respect to the effect of the insertion of the word “due diligence” after the amendment in the C.P.C dated 01.07.2002 as has been held in the judgment rendered in the case of Chander Kanta Bansal Vrs. Rajinder Singh Anand, Sumesh Singh Vrs. Phoolan Devi and Ors., as also the judgment rendered in the case of Abdul Rehman and Anr. Vrs. Mohd. Ruldu and Ors., (supra), no such ground has been raised. 13. This Court has examined the contention of the petitioner with respect to the ground taken to the effect of resiling the statement made from the written statement and found substance in the same as per the discussion made hereinabove and therefore, applying the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Niranjan Kajaria Vrs. Sheo Prakash Kajaria and Ors. (supra). Furthermore, the trial Court has recorded that after closing of the evidence of plaintiff, the said amendment has been sought to be incorporated, therefore, has disallowed the same. 14. The writ petition has been filed invoking the jurisdiction conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, so far as the scope of Article 227 of the Constitution of India is concerned, the same has been laid down in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty Vrs. 14. The writ petition has been filed invoking the jurisdiction conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, so far as the scope of Article 227 of the Constitution of India is concerned, the same has been laid down in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty Vrs. Rajendra Shankar Patii, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 329 has been pleased to laid down therein regarding the scope of Article 227 which relates to the supervisory powers of the High Courts and by taking aid of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Full Bench of Calcutta High Court in the case of Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. Vrs. Sukumar Mukherjee, reported in AIR 1951 Calcutta 193, wherein it has been laid down that Article 227 of the Constitution of India does not vest the High Court with limit less power which may be exercised at the court’s discretion to remove the hardship of particular decisions. The power of superintendence confers power of a known and well recognized character and should be exercised on those judicial principles which give it its character. In general words, the High Court’s power of superintendence is a power to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of the authority, to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner. (i.) The power of superintendence is not to be exercised unless there has been; (a) An unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, not vested in a court or tribunal; or (b) Gross abuse of jurisdiction; or (c) An unjustifiable refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in courts or tribunals. (ii.) Further, in the aforesaid judgment the Hon’ble Apex Court has taken aid of a judgment rendered in the case of Mani Nariman Daruwala Vrs. Phiroz N. Bhatena, reported in (1991) 3 SCC 141 wherein it has been laid down that in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court can set aside or reverse finding of an inferior court or tribunal only in a case where there is no evidence or where no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the court or tribunal has come to. (iii.) The Hon’ble Apex Court has made it clear that except to this limited extent the High court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the finding of facts. (iii.) The Hon’ble Apex Court has made it clear that except to this limited extent the High court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the finding of facts. (iv.) Further, the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani Vrs. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 576 it has been laid down that the High Court under Article 227 cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. Its exercise must be restricted to grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law and justice. (v.) It has been laid down at paragraph 47 of the aforesaid judgment that the jurisdiction under Article 227 is not original nor is it appellable. This jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 is for both administrative and judicial superintendence. Therefore, the powers conferred under Article 226 and 227 are separate and distinct and operate in different fields. Another distinction between these two jurisdictions is that under Article 226 the High Court normal annuls or quashes an order or proceedings but in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court, apart from annulling the proceeding, can also substitute the impugned order by the order which the inferior tribunal should have made. (vi.) It has further been laid down regarding the powers to be exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence, can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it within the bounds of its authority, in order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested with them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. Apart from that, High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (vii.) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. (vii.) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. 15. In view of the scope of Article 227 of the Constitution of India as referred hereinabove as well as on the basis of the pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and for the reason recorded, so far as the factual aspect on merit is concerned as has been discussed hereinabove, according to the considered view of this Court, the impugned order does not warrant any interference in exercising the power conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 16. Accordingly, the writ petition fails, hence, it is dismissed.