JUDGMENT : This is not the first time-and certainly may not be the last-that a person seeking a Trade License under the Kerala Municipality Act, 1961, has had to approach this Court. However, what is consterning is that, inspite of repeated judgments from this Court, finally culminating in Tommy Thomas Vs. State of Kerala [ 2019(3) KLT 987 ], few statutory Authorities still remain oblivious to the breadth and contours of their duties and obligations under the applicable provisions of law, thus forcing this Court to intervene and restate. 2. In this case, instead of considering an application for Trade License, the Secretary of the respondent Panchayat placed it before its committee and when they adopted a resolution to reject it, the Secretary invoked Section 182 of the Panchayath Raj Act to address the Government. This has caused the afore writ petition to be filed by the rival parties, interestingly, both sides challenging the Secretary's action of approaching the Government-with the applicant for licence asserting that she ought not to have referred its application for licence to the Panchayat Committee and the objectors to the grant of license contending that the Secretary should have accepted the resolution of the Panchayat Committee without approaching the Government. 3. These two writ petitions have been heard by me together on account of the inter-dependent nature of the factual circumstances involved and because the reliefs to be granted in one will certainly impact the reliefs to be granted in the other. 4. The first among the afore two cases, namely W.P. (C)No.1553/2019, has been filed by the petitioners, namely Dr.N.Madhava Menon and five others (who will hereinafter be referred thus), impugning Ext.P7 communication issued by the Secretary of Vayalar Grama Panchayat to the Government of Kerala under the second proviso to Section 182 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, ('the Act' for short), dissenting from a resolution taken by the Panchayat rejecting Trade Licence and the requisite No Objection Certificate (NOC) to the 3rd respondent-Sri.Xavior.J.Ponnezhathu to set up a Liquified Petroleum Gas Godown ("LPG Godown for short"). The petitioners assert that the Secretary of the Vayalar Grama Panchayat has egregiously erred in issuing Ext.P7 to the Government, because, if she had any disagreement with the said resolution adopted by the Committee of the Panchayat, she should have first informed the same to them and only, thereafter, could she have addressed the Government, as is clear from the afore mentioned proviso to section 182 of the Act. The petitioners, therefore, pray that Ext.P7 be set aside and the Panchayat be directed "to recall the licence already granted to the 3rd respondent to construct the shed, housing the LPG Godown” (sic). 5. While so, WP(C)No.2664/2019 was filed by the afore mentioned Sri.Xavior.J.Ponnezhath (who will hereinafter be referred by his name), impugning Exts.P18 and P21 communications received from the Vayalar Grama Panchayat. The pleadings show that Ext.P18 is a communication of the Panchayat dated 13/12/2018, informing Sri.Xavior.J.Ponnezhath that his application under the Dangerous and Offensive Trade Licence Rules ('D&O licence' for short) has been rejected by the Committee of the Panchayat; while Ext.P21 is the decision of the Committee, based on which, Ext.P18 has been issued. Sri.Xavior.J.Ponnezhath, therefore, prays that Exts.P18 and P21 be set aside and that the Secretary of the Panchayat be directed to give him a valid Trade Licence based on his application, namely Ext.P14, in the light of the earlier resolutions of the Panchayat, namely Exts.P19 and P20. Alternatively, the petitioner-Sri.Xavior.J. Ponnezhath asserts that since Ext.P14 application was preferred on 19/09/2018 and Ext.P18 order rejecting the same was communicated to him only after 13/12/2018, he is entitled to operate the godown under a deemed licence under the provisions of Section 236(3) of the Act; and therefore, that this Court declare so. 6. I have heard Sri.R.Rajasekharan Pillai, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in WP(C) 1553/2019; Smt.M.A Vaheeda Babu, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in WP(C) No. 2164/2019; Sri. Deepu Lal Mohanlearned standing counsel appearing for the Vayalar Grama Panchayat; Sri. Gopikrishnan Nambiar-learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Bharath Petroleum Corporation Ltd in WP(C) No. 2664/2019 and the learned Government Pleader Smt.Pooja Surendran, appearing on behalf of the official respondents in both these cases. 7. As is clear from the afore compendious narration of the essential facts involved, the constitutive dispute is as to whether Sri.Xavior.J.Ponnezhathu should be granted the Trade Licence to operate his LPG Godown or otherwise. 7. As is clear from the afore compendious narration of the essential facts involved, the constitutive dispute is as to whether Sri.Xavior.J.Ponnezhathu should be granted the Trade Licence to operate his LPG Godown or otherwise. While Sri.Xavior.J. Ponnezhathu asserts that he is in possession of necessary and imperative permissions, consents and licences from all the other statutory Authorities; the objectors, namely Sri.Dr.Madhava Menon and others, contend to the contrary, alleging that establishment of an LPG Godown in a high density residential locality, would cause great danger to its residents in future. 8. That said, however, the real question involved in these cases is not whether establishment of an LPG Godown would be dangerous to the local residents or whether it would pose to be a polluting danger in future; but as to how and in what manner, the application for Trade Licence preferred by Sri.Xavior.J.Ponnezhathu is to be dealt with and decided by the competent Authorities. 9. The pleadings on record and the materials available would show that Sri.Xavior.J.Ponnezhathu had already obtained permission to establish the godown from the Panchayat and that he had completed the construction for such purpose, leading to allotment of a building number for the same. It is also luculent from the pleadings that Dr.Madhava Menon and others have challenged the decision taken by the Secretary before the Panchayat Committee, which was also, however, dismissed and that a further appeal has been preferred before the Tribunal for Local Self Government Institutions which is still pending. This, however, is not a matter directly concerning this Court in these cases, since I notice that none of the parties have impelled or urged any contentions or reliefs with respect to those proceedings in either of these writ petitions. Therefore, the only question is whether the approach of the Secretary and the Panchayat Committee as regards the application of Sri.Xavior.J.Ponnezhathu for Trade Licence is in order or otherwise. 10. Sri.Deepu Lal Mohan-learned counsel appearing for the Vayalar Panchayat submits that, even though in normal circumstances, the application of Sri.Xavior.J.Ponnezhathu ought to have been considered by the Secretary of the Panchayat under the provisions of Section 232 of the Act, the said Authority decided to refer this particular application to the Panchayat Committee because certain earlier decisions had already been taken by the said Committee to decline any permission to start an LPG Godown within its territory. He says that this was done bonafide by the Secretary but that the Panchayat Committee rejected the application solely on the ground that there was wide spread public resistance to the establishment of such a godown. He says that after the Committee took the initial decision to the afore effect, the Secretary requested for a review, because Sri.Xavior.J. Ponnezhathu is armed with necessary licences and consents from all other statutory Authorities; but that the Committee still refused to grant permission and consequently, that she was constrained to make a reference to the Government under the second proviso to Section 182 of the Act. He asserts that, therefore, the action of the Secretary cannot be found at fault and that the challenge to Ext.P7 in WP(C)No.1553/2019 is not tenable. 11. As regards the contentions of Sri.Xavior.J. Ponnezhathu with respect to a deemed Trade Licence is concerned, Sri.Deepu Lal Mohan submits that this is also not acceptable because the Secretary had initially communicated to him on 17/10/2018, through Ext.R2(h)-produced along with WP(C) No.2664/2019, that his application is still pending before the Committee and that a final decision was, thereafter, communicated through Ext.R2(k) in WP(c) 2664/2019 (which is the same as Ext.P18 produced by the petitioner in the said writ petition), that his application stood rejected. He says that, therefore, since Ext.R2(h) had been issued to the petitioner on 17.10.2018, which is within the period under Section 236(3) of the Act, he cannot claim deemed licence and then operate the godown. The learned counsel completed his submissions by saying that since the matter is now pending before the Government, this Court may issue no further orders against the Panchayat. 12. Sri.Rajashekaran Pillai-learned counsel appearing for Dr.Madhava Menon and others-petitioners in WP(C) No.1553/2019-submitted that Ext.P7 communication therein, issued by the Secretary of the Panchayat to the Government is illegal and improper, since, if the said Authority had any reason to disagree with the decision of the Panchayat Committee, she ought to have first communicated it to them rather than "frog leaping" to the Government through the said communication. He, thereafter, submitted that, as per Ext.P2, which is the Gas Cylinders Rules, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Cylinder Rules") Sri.Xavior.J.Ponnezhathu can establish and run an LPG Godown only if a No Objection Certificate is obtained from the Panchayat, thereby to mean from its Committee; and therefore, that the Secretary was right in referring his application for Trade Licence to the Committee for such purpose. He says that in the peculiar circumstances involved in this case, the judgment of a learned Full Bench of this Court in Tommy Thomas (supra) would have no application and therefore, that Ext.P7 be set aside. 13. In response to the above, Smt.M.A.Vaheeda Babulearned counsel appearing for Sri.Xavior.J.Ponnezhathu-petitioner in WPC No.2664/2019-commenced her submissions by asserting that the entire procedure followed by the Secretary of the Panchayat in this matter is flawed and contrary to the provisions of law. She contended vehemently that the application of her client could not and ought not to have been referred by the Secretary to the Committee, since, it has now been unequivocally declared by a Full Bench of this Court in Tommy Thomas (supra) that the statutory obligation to consider such applications is on the Secretary and no other Authority. She says that, however, the Secretary incorrectly placed this application before the Committee, solely because they had apparently taken an earlier illegal decision not to allow any LPG Godown within their territory; and therefore, the steps and procedure adopted thereafter will have to be found to be without legal sanction. She asserts that, therefore, both Exts.P18 and P21, which are the orders issued by the Secretary intimating the decision of the Panchayat Committee and the said decision of the Committee respectively, are also bad in law and consequently, liable to be struck down. She, therefore, prays that WP(C) No.2664/2019 be allowed. 14. When I consider the afore narrated facts and the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, it is clear that at least two vital aspects are interlayered in these cases. 15. The first among them is whether the course adopted by the Secretary in having referred the application of Sri.Xavior.J. Ponnezhathu to the Panchayat Committee can be found to be in order and the second is whether Sri.Xavior.J.Ponnezhathu can legally claim that he is entitled to a deemed licence under the provisions of Section 236(3) of the Act. 15. The first among them is whether the course adopted by the Secretary in having referred the application of Sri.Xavior.J. Ponnezhathu to the Panchayat Committee can be found to be in order and the second is whether Sri.Xavior.J.Ponnezhathu can legally claim that he is entitled to a deemed licence under the provisions of Section 236(3) of the Act. Once I am able to obtain clarity on these issues, all the other aspects, which are only corollary in nature, would also fall in line. 16. As regards the first issue is concerned, none of the learned counsel appearing for the rival parties have a case that, as per the provisions of the Act, the obligation to consider the application for Trade Licence and to issue the same is not on the Secretary of the Panchayat. The only contention of Sri.Rajashekharan Pillai is that on account of the Cylinder Rules afore mentioned, the Panchayat Committee has to give a No Objection Certificate to the Petroleum Company and therefore, that it is only logical and apposite that the said Committee takes a decision on the application of Sri.Xavior.J.Ponnezhathu for Trade Licence also. However, to a pointed query of this Court, he affirms that going by Section 232 of the Act, the obligation to issue licence is solely on the Secretary and no other. 17. In the afore backdrop, the reasons that caused the Secretary to place the application before the Committee of the Panchayat becomes relevant. As Sri.Deepu Lal Mohan submitted, the Secretary thought it better and prudent to do so because the said Committee had earlier taken a general decision that no LPG Godowns would be allowed within their territory. The Secretary, therefore, was perhaps under the bonafide impression that he would not be in a position to grant the licence, particularly when the Panchayat Committee opposes it with such force. 18. However, there is no doubt that at this stage, the provisions of Section 232 of the Act had been violated. The Secretary, therefore, was perhaps under the bonafide impression that he would not be in a position to grant the licence, particularly when the Panchayat Committee opposes it with such force. 18. However, there is no doubt that at this stage, the provisions of Section 232 of the Act had been violated. This is particularly because, as per Section 185(b) of the Act, when an Authority is vested with the power to do a particular thing under the Act, no other Authority, including the President or the Committee as a whole, can interfere in the same; and therefore, as long as the statutory obligation was on the Secretary to deal with the application, she could not have referred the matter to the Panchayat Committee. Consequently, the entire proceedings thereafter, which led to a resolution to be adopted by the Panchayat Committee, namely Ext.P21 in WPC No.2664/2019, and the resultant communications of the Secretary to the Government under Section 182 of the Act are bereft of force in law and obviously, cannot obtain imprimatur from this Court. Certainly, the Secretary ought to have taken a decision independently without referring the application to the Panchayat Committee and hence its subsequent resolution and the dissent of the Secretary to it, leading to the communication made to the Government under section 182 of the Act are all superflous and unnecessary. Indubitably thus, as rightly pointed out by Smt.M.A.Vaheeda Babu, both Exts.P21 and P18 in WPC No.2664/2019 have to fail. 19. That said, the remaining of the primary questions is whether Sri.Xavior.J.Ponnezhathu can seek that he is entitled to a deemed licence under Section 236(3) of the Act. I am afraid that I cannot find strength in the contentions of Smt.M.A.Vaheeda Babu in this regard, because, as correctly pointed out by Sri.Deepu Lal Mohan, Ext.R2(h) was issued on 17.10.2018 informing the petitioner that his application is still under process and therefore, it is indubitable that some orders had been issued on his application, though it was not rejected as on that date. Subsequently, through Ext.R2(k), dated 13.11.2018, the Secretary of the Panchayat has communicated to Sri.Xavior.J.Ponnezhathu that his application had been rejected by the Panchayat Committee. Subsequently, through Ext.R2(k), dated 13.11.2018, the Secretary of the Panchayat has communicated to Sri.Xavior.J.Ponnezhathu that his application had been rejected by the Panchayat Committee. I, therefore, cannot find any cause for Smt. Vaheeda Babu to assert that her client has secured a deemed licence, though I am aware that her submission is that, under Section 236(3) of the Act, it is only if an application is either allowed or rejected within the time granted therein, can the claim for deemed licence be turned down. I am afraid that these submissions do not appeal to me either, because, as per Section 236(3), only if “orders on application for any such licence or permission are not communicated to the applicant within 30 days" or such other prescribed period, can the said applicant obtain the benefit of a deemed licence. In the case at hand, Ext.R2(h), produced in WP(C)No.2664/2019, was admittedly issued within the afore mentioned statutory time frame and axiomatically, I cannot see the submissions of Smt.Vaheeda Babu to be on firm ground. 20. Once I have decided the afore two primary issues as above, the corollary question is whether, as asserted by Sri.Rajashekharan Pillai, the Panchayat, being the Authority to issue the No Objection Certificate under the Cylinder Rules, must also be construed to be the "logical Authority" to issue the licence under Section 232 of the Act. I have examined the Cylinder Rules, produced along with WPC No.1553/2019 as Ext.P2, and it is perspicuous, that those Rules apply to the storage of LPG Cylinders released by the Petroleum Company to the applicant. It is without doubt therein that storage of LPG Cylinders will be permitted only if a No Objection Certificate is obtained from the local Body, namely, the Grama Panchayat or the Urban Local Body concerned. This does not, however, automatically mean that the Trade Licence also has to be issued by the Panchayat or the Urban Local Body if the provisions of the applicable Act for such purpose prescribe to the contrary. 21. In any event of the matter, the Cylinder Rules are not intended to be operated in conflict with the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, but only complementary to it. 21. In any event of the matter, the Cylinder Rules are not intended to be operated in conflict with the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, but only complementary to it. I am, therefore, of the firm view that merely because the Cylinder Rules provide that a person who seeks to store LPG Cylinders must obtain No Objection Certificate from the concerned Local Self Government Institution, it does not mean that the licence under the Act has also to be issued by the Committee of such body and not by its Secretary, even though section 232 speaks to the contrary. 22. In summation, there is no doubt that Ext.P7 in WPC No.1553/2019 and Exts.P21 and P18 in WPC No.2664/2019 are without forensic support and hence liable to be set aside. Resultantly and as a necessary consequence, I direct the Secretary of the Vayalar Grama Panchayat to take up the application of Sri.Xavior.J. Ponnezhathu, produced as Ext.P14 in WPC() No.2664/2019, and to deal with it in terms of law and after ensuring that all other necessary licences, consents and permissions have been obtained by him; and thereafter, issue to him the resultant order as expeditiously as is possible but within the time frame as is sanctioned in the Panchayath Raj Act. While the afore exercise is completed, the Secretary of the Panchayat will adhere and confirm with the directions in Tommy Thomas (supra) and the licence, if any, will be issued only after verifying all relevant and germane inputs. Once the afore process is concluded, the petitioner will be at liberty to approach the Petroleum Company for necessary permission to store the LPG Cylinders and at that stage, he will be obligated to comply with all valid and legal directions to be issued by them, including under the Cylinder Rules. After I dictated this judgment, Sri.Rajashekaran Pillai submitted that when the Secretary considers the application for Licence of Sri.Xavior.J.Ponnezhathu his clients-Dr.Madhava Menon and others -may also be given an opportunity of being heard. This request, I am certain, is one that can be acceded to and I therefore, direct the Secretary to do so, while the afore directed exercise is completed. These writ petitions are thus ordered.