JUDGMENT : SANJAY KUMAR MEDHI, J. The revisional jurisdiction of this Court conferred by Section 115 of the CPC is sought to be invoked by filing this petition against a judgment and decree dated 30.04.2013 passed in Title Appeal No. 05/2012, whereby, the learned Civil Court, Jorhat had affirmed the judgment and decree dated 23.12.2011 passed in Title Suit No. 14/2008 by the learned Munsiff No. 2, Jorhat. 2. The facts of the case can be put in a nutshell in the following manner: (i). The respondents as plaintiffs had instituted Title Suit No. 14/2008 before the learned Court of the Munsiff No. 2, Jorhat for ejectment, arrear of rent and compensation against the respondent (petitioner) who was a tenant. It is pertinent to be mentioned that on an earlier occasion also the respondents had filed Title Suit No. 69/1988 for ejectment of the present petitioner/defendant on the ground of bona fide requirement of the suit premises. (ii). The said earlier suit was dismissed by the learned Assistant District Judge, Jorhat against which the respondents had preferred Title Appeal No. 01/1996 before the learned District Judge, Jorhat. (iii). The appellate Court in the said proceeding, namely, Title Appeal No. 01/1996, decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs. Thereafter, the petitioner had preferred Second Appeal No. 186/1996 and this Court vide judgment dated 02.09.2003 had remanded the Title Suit No. 69/1988 to the Court of the Assistant District Judge, Jorhat with a direction to frame issue on the bona fide requirement. The learned Additional District Judge, Jorhat on remand had passed judgment dated 21.03.2006, dismissing the suit as the plaintiffs could not prove anything with regard to the bona fide requirement as well as defaulter. The earlier proceeding rested thus. (iv). The petitioner as defendant had contested the present suit by filing written statement. The case of the petitioner, as projected in the written statement is that the plaintiff was not the Landlord and the petitioner defendant was not the tenant of the Landlord so far as the premises in question is concerned. The earlier proceeding rested thus. (iv). The petitioner as defendant had contested the present suit by filing written statement. The case of the petitioner, as projected in the written statement is that the plaintiff was not the Landlord and the petitioner defendant was not the tenant of the Landlord so far as the premises in question is concerned. In paragraph-10 of the written statement it has been stated that the premises in question which was the subject matter of Title Suit No. 69/1988 was a different premises and so far as the present premises is concerned, since the plaintiff was not the Landlord, there was no requirement for paying any rent and therefore, the question of being defaulter would not arise. (v). The learned Munsiff No. 2, Jorhat vide judgment and decree dated 23.12.2011 had allowed the suit. Amongst the various issues framed, issues No. 4 & 5 are the relevant issues which are quoted here in below: “(iv). Whether the defendant is a tenant under the plaintiff in respect of the suit premises. (v). Whether the defendant is a defaulter.” (vi). The plaintiffs had examined 3(three) PWs and had exhibited 3(three) documents. The defendant examined 2(two) numbers of witnesses. (vii). As regards the relevant issues are concerned, namely, as to whether the defendant is a tenant under the plaintiff in respect of suit premises, the Trial Court, after perusal of the records of Title Suit N. 69/1988 had come to a finding that the properties of the said suit was described in Schedule A & B of the plaint and the suit premises stood on land covered by Dag No. 4570 and Block No. 2, Jorhat. It was finally held that the suit premises of Title Suit No. 69/1988 are similar to the suit premises of the present suit. The learned Court took into consideration the cross-examination of DW-1 who stated that the boundary of the previous suit premises and the present suit land was similar. Since, the aforesaid issue was held in favour of the plaintiffs, coupled with the fact that non-payment of rent was admitted, the suit was decreed in favour of the respondents/plaintiffs. (viii). Against the aforesaid judgment and decree, the present petitioner, as appellant had instituted Title Appeal No. 5/2012. The learned First Appellate Court, however, did not interfere with the judgment of the Trial Court. (ix). (viii). Against the aforesaid judgment and decree, the present petitioner, as appellant had instituted Title Appeal No. 5/2012. The learned First Appellate Court, however, did not interfere with the judgment of the Trial Court. (ix). Aggrieved, the present revision has been filed by invoking the provisions of Section 115 of the CPC. 3. I have heard Shri T.J. Mahanta, learned Sr. counsel assisted by Ms. P. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the petitioner. I have also heard Shri B. Banerjee, learned Sr. counsel assisted by Shri A. Mubarak for the respondents. 4. The LCR which were called for vide order dated 02.04.2014 have also been carefully perused. 5. Shri Mahanta, the learned Sr. counsel for the petitioner submits that the earlier proceeding initiated vide Title Suit No. 69/1988 is in respect of another plot of land and therefore, the findings of the Court below that the petitioner is a tenant is a perverse finding. 6. Referring to the written statement filed in the present Title Suit, the learned Sr. counsel would submit that the Landlord-tenant relationship has been categorically denied and the land in question along with the house was not belonging to the plaintiff and therefore, the question of paying rent do not arise. Referring to the deposition of PW-3(wrongly described as PW-4, Shri Atul Chandra Bora) who deposed that notice was issued by the Government to the petitioner to vacate the land in question, it is contended that the same is prima facie demonstrative of the fact that the petitioner was possessing Government land and not the land of the plaintiff/respondent. 7. Referring to the cross-examination of DW-1, it has been submitted that the lands of the two proceedings are different and the present land is a Government land. Reference is also made to the schedule of the plaint of the present suit and also to the certified copy of the judgment passed in Title Suit No. 69/1988 (Ext. 2) to show that the plots of land are different in the two proceedings. In view of the above, it is submitted that the impugned judgments are not sustainable in law. 8. In support of his submission, Shri Mahanta, learned Sr. counsel relies upon the following case laws: (i). 2008 (2) GLT 77 (Dolly Khonglah v. Dilip Kumar Singhania). (ii). 2006 (4) GLT 389 (Jadu Thakur v. Ram Sundari Devi Legal Heirs of Kedar Prasad). (iii). 8. In support of his submission, Shri Mahanta, learned Sr. counsel relies upon the following case laws: (i). 2008 (2) GLT 77 (Dolly Khonglah v. Dilip Kumar Singhania). (ii). 2006 (4) GLT 389 (Jadu Thakur v. Ram Sundari Devi Legal Heirs of Kedar Prasad). (iii). 2008 (2) GLT 186 (Gaffar v. Jakrun Nessa) 9. In the case of Dolly Khonglah (Supra) this Court had held that under the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC, an Appellate court is required to formulate the point for determination which is a mandatory requirement of law. In the case of Jadu Thakur (Supra) this Court while interpreting the aforesaid provision of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC, has laid down a similar view. In the case of Gaffar (Supra), the duty of an Appellate Court to formulate points of determination under Order 41 Rule 31 CPC, has been reiterated. 10. Per-contra, Shri B. Banerjee, learned Sr. counsel for the respondent submits that the power vested by Section 115 of the CPC is a circumscribed one. After the amendment, the revisional powers of a High Court have been restricted to certain situations only. Such situations are acting without jurisdiction, failing to exercise jurisdiction vested by law and acting in material illegality and irregularity. It has been submitted that a revisional Court will ordinarily not interfere with findings of fact and in this case, such findings of facts are concurrent findings arrived at by both the Courts below after appreciation of evidence. It is further been laid down that mere error in appreciation of evidence are not matters of interference and the error in question has to be glaring, blatant and the findings are perverse vis-à-vis the materials on record. It is further submitted that only because another view based on the materials on records is available, a revisional Court will not substitute the view taken by the Courts below if the same is a plausible view. 11. Specifically referring to the written statement filed in these proceedings, Shri Banerjee, learned Sr. counsel would contend that the claim of the defaulter has not been denied at all. 12. As regards the claim that the land in question is a different land than the land concerned with Title Suit No. 69/1988 is concerned, the Sr. 11. Specifically referring to the written statement filed in these proceedings, Shri Banerjee, learned Sr. counsel would contend that the claim of the defaulter has not been denied at all. 12. As regards the claim that the land in question is a different land than the land concerned with Title Suit No. 69/1988 is concerned, the Sr. counsel for the respondent has referred to the judgment of the learned Munsiff No. 2, more particularly paragraph-13, therefore, wherein, the learned Court has come to a finding that the land concerned was the same land and that finding was recorded after discussing the evidence including the cross examination of the DW-1. While deciding issue No. 4 regarding Landlord-tenant relationship, the learned Trial Court in paragraph-14 of the judgment had came to a specific finding that the premises in question was the same and that there was no dispute that the defendant was a tenant under the plaintiff. The 5th issue regarding ‘defaulter’ is also decided in favour of the plaintiff by citing cogent reasons. 13. The First Appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 30.04.2013 had concurred with the findings of the Trial Court on the aforesaid issues of the land being the same as Title Suit No. 69/1988 as well as of the that that the petitioner was a defaulter in payment of rent. The learned First Appellate Court in paragraph-5 of the judgment took into consideration the judgment and order dated 02.09.2003 by which this Court had held that the plaintiff/respondent has a right title and interest over the suit land and that the present petitioner was a tenant. As stated above, the aforesaid judgment dated 02.09.2003 was rendered by this court in continuation of Title Suit No. 69/1988 which was appealed in Title Appeal No. 01/1996 and ultimately, the Second Appeal No. 186/1996 was filed. 14. In support of his submission, Shri Banerjee, learned Sr. counsel relied upon the following decisions: (I). 1995 (3) GLT 610 (Sudhir Chandra Mitra v. Sujauddin Ahmed). (ii). (2008) 7 SCC 293 (Yunus Ali (Dead) through his LRS v. Khursheed Akram) 15. In the case of Sudhir Chandra Mitra (Supra) this Court has held that under the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31, the appellate Court should state the points for determination which is a requirement of law. (ii). (2008) 7 SCC 293 (Yunus Ali (Dead) through his LRS v. Khursheed Akram) 15. In the case of Sudhir Chandra Mitra (Supra) this Court has held that under the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31, the appellate Court should state the points for determination which is a requirement of law. In the case of Yunus Ali (Supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the restrictions imposed in a revisional Court while adjudicating a concurrent finding of fact. The Apex Court in specific terms has laid down in paragraph-20 as follows: “It is well-settled position in law that under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure the High Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and cannot set aside the concurrent findings of the Courts below by taking a different view of the evidence. The High Court is empowered only to interfere with the findings of fact if the findings are perverse or there has been a non-appreciation or non-consideration of the material evidence on record by the courts below. Simply because another view of the evidence may be taken is no ground by the High Court to interfere in its revisional jurisdiction.” 16. Citations relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner may not be of much aid inasmuch as, the same is not a principal issue raised in the present proceedings. Rather, the scope of determination in this petition has been circumscribed because of the findings rendered in the earlier proceedings including by this Court while deciding Section Appeal No. 186/1996 arising out of the earlier Title Suit No. 69/1988 17. The rival contentions of the respective parties have been duly considered and the LCR have been carefully perused. Though it is the consistent stand of the petitioner that he is not the tenant of the respondent, the findings of the Courts below in this regard is a concurrent finding arrived at, after appreciation of findings. 18. As stated earlier, Shri Atul Chanda Bora who was the Lath Mandal produced as a witness has PW-3(wrongly cited as PW-4) in clear terms has stated that the land in question is in the name of the respondent. The petitioner himself as DW-1 has categorically admitted that the boundary of the land involved in the earlier litigation and those in the present litigation was the same. The petitioner himself as DW-1 has categorically admitted that the boundary of the land involved in the earlier litigation and those in the present litigation was the same. The aforesaid finding read with the judgment of this Court dated 02.09.2003 passed in Second appeal No. 186/1996, leads to the conclusion that the petitioner in question was indeed a tenant over the scheduled land and house owned by the respondent. The aforesaid findings of fact, being concurrent finding based on evidence on record, this Court in exercise of power under Section 115 would be loath in interfering with such concurrent finds of fact. 19. As laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, this Court in exercise of powers under Section 115 of the CPC is empowered only to interfere with the findings of fact, if such findings are perverse or there has been non-appreciation or non-consideration of the evidence on record. In the instant case, the findings of fact arrived at by the learned Trial Court, as affirmed by the learned First Appellate Court cannot be said to be based on no evidence. Further, as stated earlier, major issues concerned with the present petition has already been decided and had attained finality in the earlier round of litigation between the parties. 20. In view of the aforesaid discussions and by following the guidelines prescribed by various judicial pronouncements while interpreting Section 115 of the CPC, this Court does not find any merit in the present challenge and accordingly, the same is dismissed. 21. Registry is directed to transmit back the records of the case to the learned Court of Munsiff No. 2, Jorhat, forthwith.