JUDGMENT : Ma'din Public School at Melmuri in Malappuram District, a school affiliated to the Central Board of Secondary Education (for brevity 'CBSE'), represented by its Principal Shri. Saidalavi Koya, is the petitioner in this writ petition. The petitioner has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of mandamus commanding the 1st respondent Regional Transport Officer, who is the Registering Authority, to effect reclassification of vehicle bearing registration No.KL-07/AD-708 as Educational Institution Bus, without any further delay, on the strength of Ext.P4 proceedings. 2. On 03.07.2018, when this writ petition came up for admission, the learned Senior Government Pleader sought time to file statement. 3. 1st Respondent has filed a counter affidavit opposing the relief sought for in this writ petition. The petitioner has also filed a reply affidavit. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the 1st respondent Regional Transport Officer and also for the additional 2nd respondent Transport Commissioner. 5. As per Ext.P2 certificate of registration dated 04.07.2016 issued by the 1st respondent, the petitioner is the registered owner of a Contract Carriage (LMV) bearing registration No.KL-07/AD-708, with effect from 27.06.2016, which is a 2001 model TATA 407 vehicle with a seating capacity of 20 in all. Going by the averments in the writ petition, the petitioner purchased the said vehicle, on 27.06.2016, to be used for the purpose of transportation of its students. Based on Ext.P1 notice of transfer of ownership dated 27.06.2016 in Form 29, the 1st respondent issued Ext.P2 certificate of registration, after effecting transfer of ownership of the vehicle, in the name of the petitioner, with effect from 27.06.2016, as per the provisions of Rule 55 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989. 6. On 27.06.2016, along with Ext.P1 notice of transfer, the petitioner submitted Ext.P3 application to alter the class of the vehicle as Educational Institution Bus and grant permit accordingly. Based on that application, the 1st respondent, by Ext.P4 proceedings dated 27.06.2016, accorded sanction for altering the class of Contract Carriage bearing registration No.KL-07/AD-708 as Educational Institution Bus, and directed the petitioner to produce the vehicle before the Assistant Motor Vehicles Inspector for inspection, along with the records of that vehicle, after making necessary alteration. Based on that application, the 1st respondent, by Ext.P4 proceedings dated 27.06.2016, accorded sanction for altering the class of Contract Carriage bearing registration No.KL-07/AD-708 as Educational Institution Bus, and directed the petitioner to produce the vehicle before the Assistant Motor Vehicles Inspector for inspection, along with the records of that vehicle, after making necessary alteration. As evident from Ext.P5 receipt dated 30.06.2016, the petitioner has remitted Rs.50/- towards alteration of motor vehicle (permission), Rs.150/- towards transfer of ownership and Rs.90/- towards service charges. As per Ext.P6 receipt dated 01.07.2016, the petitioner has remitted a sum of Rs.3,000/- towards compounding fee of LMV Contract Carriage. 7. Going by the averments in paragraph 6 of the writ petition, even after the lapse of more than two years from the date of Ext.P4 proceedings, the reclassification of the vehicle as Educational Institution Bus has not been done by the 1st respondent, as a result of which, the petitioner is compelled to run the vehicle on payment of tax applicable to Contract Carriage. Paragraph 6 of the writ petition reads thus; “6. However even after a lapse of more than nearly two years from the date of Exhibit.P4 proceedings the reclassification of the vehicle as Educational Institution Bus has not been done so far by the respondent as a result of which the petitioner is compelled to run the vehicle on payment of tax applicable to contract carriage vehicle and hence left with no other efficacious or alternative remedy the petitioner is preferring this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, on the following among other:-” (underline supplied) 8. Grounds A to E of the writ petition read thus; “A. The respondent has no reason to effect alteration of class of vehicle of Bus No.KL-07AD-708 even after complying with the statutory requirements prescribed under the Motor Vehicle Act and Rules. B. On account of the delay in effecting reclassification of the vehicle in question, the petitioner is compelled to pay motor vehicle tax applicable at contract carriage rate, while the petitioner is entitled to pay tax at the rate applicable to Educational Institution Vehicle. C. Every day's delay in making an entry in the registration certificate of the vehicle in question in reclassifying the vehicle as an Educational Institution Bus will seriously prejudice the petitioner. C. Every day's delay in making an entry in the registration certificate of the vehicle in question in reclassifying the vehicle as an Educational Institution Bus will seriously prejudice the petitioner. D. The petitioner is also suffering monitory loss by nearly Rs.8000/- per quarter on account of the delay in effecting reclassification of the vehicle in question. E. The respondent has not attributed any reason for the delay in entering the reclassification of the vehicle in the registration certificate of vehicle mentioned in Exhibit P2.'' (underline supplied) 9. On 26.07.2018, when this writ petition came up for consideration, taking into consideration the averments and grounds raised as above, this Court passed the following order; ''1. The petitioner shall produce the vehicle bearing registration No.KL-07-AD/708 referred to in Ext.P4 proceedings dated 11.07.2016 before the respondent Regional Transport Officer, Malappuram for inspection within one week from this date. 2. The respondent shall conduct a detailed inspection of the said vehicle, with specific reference to the nature of alternations made, and thereafter, submit a report before the court. 3. The respondent shall also file a counter affidavit in this writ petition.'' (underline supplied) 10. On 08.08.2016, when this writ petition came up for consideration, the learned counsel for the petitioner sought an adjournment. On 17.08.2018, the writ petition was adjourned to 21.08.2018 and thereafter, to 10.09.2018. On 10.09.2018, when this writ petition came up for consideration, it was submitted by the learned Special Government Pleader that, despite the order of this Court dated 26.07.2018, the petitioner has not produced the vehicle for inspection before the 1st respondent. 11. On 23.10.2018, when this writ petition came up for consideration, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner shall produce the vehicle covered by Ext.P2 certificate of registration before the 1st respondent, within two weeks. After recording the said submission, it was ordered that, if the vehicle is produced before the 1st respondent, he shall conduct an inspection of that vehicle and submit a report before this Court, within two weeks thereafter. 12. On 12.11.2018 and 16.11.2018, this writ petition was listed for the inspection report of the 1st respondent. On 11.12.2018, when this writ petition came up for consideration, the learned Special Government Pleader, on instructions, submitted that the petitioner has not chosen to produce the vehicle before the 1st respondent for inspection. 12. On 12.11.2018 and 16.11.2018, this writ petition was listed for the inspection report of the 1st respondent. On 11.12.2018, when this writ petition came up for consideration, the learned Special Government Pleader, on instructions, submitted that the petitioner has not chosen to produce the vehicle before the 1st respondent for inspection. The learned counsel for the petitioner, on instructions, submitted that vehicle covered by Ext.P2 certificate of registration was destroyed in the recent floods and in such circumstances, the petitioner is not in a position to produce the same for inspection. 13. On 19.12.2018, when this writ petition came up for consideration, the learned counsel for the petitioner, on instructions, submitted that vehicle bearing registration No. KL- 07/AD-708, covered by Ext.P3 application, is presently lying in the school premises at Melmuri in Malappuram District. The learned Special Government Pleader submitted that the Assistant Motor Vehicle Inspector in the office of the 1st respondent shall inspect the said vehicle on 20.12.2018 and the report shall be placed on record by 21.12.2018. 14. On 21.12.2018, when this writ petition came up for consideration, the learned Special Government Pleader submitted that, on inspection by the Circle Officer in the office of the 1st respondent, it was found that the vehicle in question is lying at Melmuri, near the premises of Ma'din Public School, since September, 2016 and at present the vehicle is in a dilapidated condition. The Principal of the School intends to scrap the vehicle, for which an application has been made in the office of the 1st respondent, wherein it has been stated that the vehicle was not being used from 01.09.2016, as it is not roadworthy, which was damaged further in the recent floods. The learned Special Government Pleader submitted that, based on the inspection conducted on 20.12.2018, the counter affidavit of the 1st respondent shall be placed on record within three weeks. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner shall file an affidavit explaining the facts and circumstances, in the light of inspection report, and the averments in the request made on 19.12.2018 to scrap the vehicle. 15. On 11.01.2019, the 1st respondent has filed a counter affidavit, wherein it has been stated that, after the permission granted in Ext.P4 proceedings dated 11.07.2016 for alteration of the class of vehicle, the petitioner failed to produce the same before the Motor Vehicles Inspector. 15. On 11.01.2019, the 1st respondent has filed a counter affidavit, wherein it has been stated that, after the permission granted in Ext.P4 proceedings dated 11.07.2016 for alteration of the class of vehicle, the petitioner failed to produce the same before the Motor Vehicles Inspector. In the said counter affidavit, it has also been stated that, based on the orders of this Court dated 19.12.2018, the Circle Officer conducted an enquiry and found that the vehicle is kept at Alathurpadi, near the premises of the petitioner's school, since September, 2016 and at present the vehicle is in a dilapidated condition. Ext.R1(a) is a copy of the report dated 19.12.2018 of the Assistant Motor Vehicles Inspector. The said officer has also reported that the Principal of the school has made an application for permission to scrap the vehicle. A copy of that application dated 19.12.2018 is placed on record as Ext.R1(b), along with the counter affidavit of the 1st respondent. Paragraphs 4 to 7 of the counter affidavit read thus; ''4. It is respectfully submitted that, the petitioner has alleged in the Writ Petition that even after lapse of more than nearly 2 years from the date of Exhibit P4 proceedings, the reclassification of the vehicle as Educational Institution Bus has not been allowed so far by this respondent and as a result, the petitioner is compelled to run the vehicle as Contract Carriage vehicle. 5. It is respectfully submitted that the above said statement of the petitioner is absolutely false and baseless. It is a fact that, as per Exhibit P4 proceedings, sanction was accorded for alteration of the vehicle, but the petitioner has not produced the vehicle for inspection till date. In fact, this Honourable Court had directed the petitioner to produce the vehicle before this respondent for inspection as allowed in Exhibit P4 proceedings. But, even then, the petitioner failed to produce the vehicle as the vehicle is not in a condition to operate. 6. It is respectfully submitted that, this Honourable Court, as per interim order dated 19.12.2018, directed this respondent to conduct an inspection of the vehicle and to file a report before this Honourable Court. Accordingly, a direction was issued to the Circle Officer to conduct a detailed enquiry about the matter and to report the present condition of the vehicle. 6. It is respectfully submitted that, this Honourable Court, as per interim order dated 19.12.2018, directed this respondent to conduct an inspection of the vehicle and to file a report before this Honourable Court. Accordingly, a direction was issued to the Circle Officer to conduct a detailed enquiry about the matter and to report the present condition of the vehicle. Pursuant to that, the Circle Officer has conducted an enquiry and reported that the vehicle was found detained at Alathoorpadi near to the premises of Ma'din Public School since 9/2016 and at present vehicle in question is in a dilapidated condition. The Inspector has also reported that the Principal of Ma'din Pubic School intent to scrap the vehicle and to dispose of the same for which an application has been submitted in the office of this respondent. A true copy of the Inspection Report submitted by the Assistant Motor Vehicle Inspector dated 19.12.2018 is produced herewith and marked as Exhibit R1(a) and a true copy of the application submitted by the petitioner for permission to scrap the vehicle is produced herewith and marked as Exhibit R1(b). 7. It is submitted that, the inspection report reveals that the vehicle in question is in a dilapidated condition and it cannot be used either as a Contract Carriage or as an Educational Institution Bus. So, the only course available to the petitioner is to dismantle the vehicle with the permission of this respondent after clearing all dues to the State as sought for in Exhibit R1(b).'' (underline supplied) 16. A reply affidavit has been filed by the petitioner to the counter affidavit filed by the 1st respondent, wherein it has been stated that the application for reclassification of vehicle as Educational Institution Bus was filed on 27.06.2016, immediately after the transfer was effected. The certificate of fitness of the vehicle had expired on 03.06.2016. Since the vehicle has to be reclassified as Educational Institution Bus, it could be painted in yellow colour prescribed for such vehicles only after getting the reclassification effected in the certificate of registration. The 1st respondent did not give due consideration to the request made by the petitioner, as evidenced by Ext.P2, even after a lapse of more than two years and hence for redressal of the grievances, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing this writ petition. The 1st respondent did not give due consideration to the request made by the petitioner, as evidenced by Ext.P2, even after a lapse of more than two years and hence for redressal of the grievances, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing this writ petition. At the time of filing this writ petition, almost two years have been elapsed from the date of making of Ext.P2 request and the vehicle was exposed to sun and rain. The petitioner thought it necessary to conduct fitness test, after getting orders from this Court. In the meanwhile, in the unprecedented floods occurred in the State during August- September, 2018, the vehicle was submerged in the flood water, whereby it is not capable to be put on road any further and hence the petitioner made an application dated 19.12.2018 to the 1st respondent seeking permission to dismantle the vehicle as the same has been damaged due to the recent floods. Paragraphs 4 to 6 of the reply affidavit read thus; ''4. It is respectfully submitted that the vehicle in question was purchased by the petitioner for transportation of the students in the school who are residing within the vicinity of the school within a radius of 4 k.m. The application for reclassification of the vehicle as an Educational Institution Bus was filed on 27.06.2016, immediately after the transfer of ownership was effected. The certificate of fitness of the vehicle had expired on 03.06.2016 and since the vehicle was to be reclassified as an Educational Institution Bus colour code prescribed for the said vehicle was Yellow color which was to be painted only after getting reclassification effected in the Registration Certificate. 5. The respondent did not give due consideration to the request made by the petitioner as evidenced by Exhibit.P2 request even after a lapse of more than two years and hence for getting redressal of the grievances the petitioner was constrained to approach this Hon'ble Court by filing the above writ petition for appropriate reliefs. At the time of filing the writ petition almost two years have elapsed from the date of making Exhibit.P2 request and the vehicle was exposed to sun and rain and the petitioner had thought of doing necessary for conducting fitness test after getting orders from this Hon'ble Court. 6. At the time of filing the writ petition almost two years have elapsed from the date of making Exhibit.P2 request and the vehicle was exposed to sun and rain and the petitioner had thought of doing necessary for conducting fitness test after getting orders from this Hon'ble Court. 6. In the meantime due to the unprecedented flood havoc occurred in the State of Kerala during August/September, 2018, the vehicle had submerged in flood water whereby the vehicle is not capable to be put on road any further and hence the petitioner had made an application dated 19.12.2018 addressed to the respondent seeking permission to dismantle the vehicle as the same has been damaged due to the recent flood.'' (underline supplied) 17. The application made by the petitioner on 19.12.2018 seeking permission to scrap vehicle bearing registration No.KL-07/AD-708, which is placed on record as Exhibit R1(b) along with the counter affidavit filed by the respondent, reads thus:- xxx xxx 18. The averments in the reply affidavit would show that, though permission was granted vide Ext.P4 proceedings dated 11.07.2016, for making necessary alterations and thereafter to produce the vehicle for inspection before the concerned Assistant Motor Vehicles Inspector, as on the date of filing of this writ petition, i.e., as on 21.06.2018, the vehicle was lying unused for nearly two years, without making any such alterations. Further, the certificate of fitness of the vehicle had expired on 03.06.2016. On 01.07.2016, the petitioner has remitted Rs.3,000/-, as evident from Ext.P6 receipt, towards compounding fee for LMV Contract Carriage. The petitioner has filed this writ petition, which is one accompanied by an affidavit sworn to by the Principal of the school, without disclosing the fact that the fitness certificate of the vehicle had expired on 03.06.2016 and it is lying unused from 01.09.2016, as it is not roadworthy. Suppressing those material facts, it has falsely been stated in paragraph 6 of the writ petition that, even after the lapse of more than two years from the date of Ext.P4 proceedings, the reclassification of the vehicle as Educational Institution Bus has not been done by the 1st respondent, as a result of which, the petitioner is compelled to run the vehicle on payment of tax applicable to Contract Carriage. 19. 19. In the reply affidavit, the petitioner has stated that, in the recent floods in the State, during August/September, 2018, the vehicle was submerged in flood water, whereby it is not capable to put on road any further and in such circumstances, the petitioner had made an application dated 19.12.2018 [Ext.R1(b)] before the 1st respondent, seeking permission to dismantle the vehicle. It is pertinent to note that, on 26.07.2018, this Court directed the petitioner to produce the vehicle before the 1st respondent for inspection, within one week from that date, and the 1st respondent was directed to conduct a detailed inspection of that vehicle, with specific reference to the nature of alterations made, and to submit a report before this Court. Based on that order, the petitioner could have produced the vehicle for inspection, before the recent floods in the State, which was from 08.08.2018. However, the petitioner failed to produce the vehicle for inspection before the 1st respondent. 20. On 11.12.2018, it was submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the vehicle was destroyed in the recent floods and in such circumstances, the petitioner is not in a position to produce the same for inspection. Thereafter, on 19.12.2018, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the vehicle is presently lying in the school premises at Melmuri in Malappuram District. Then the Special Government Pleader submitted that the Assistant Motor Vehicle Inspector in the office of the 1st respondent shall inspect the vehicle on 20.12.2018 and the report shall be placed on record by 21.12.2018. 21. As stated in the counter affidavit filed by the 1st respondent, at the time of inspection, the vehicle was lying at Alathurpadi, near the premises of the petitioner's school. In the reply affidavit it is stated that, as the vehicle was submerged in flood water, it is not capable to be put on road any further and as such, the petitioner made an application on 19.12.2018 seeking permission to dismantle the vehicle. The petitioner has not produced any materials to show that in the recent floods the level of flood water raised at Alathurpadi in Melmuri to such a height to submerge a TATA 407 model vehicle, with an overall height of 2.27 meters. Moreover, as admitted by the Principal of the school in Ext.R1(b) application dated 19.12.2018, the vehicle was lying idle since 01.09.2016, as it is not roadworthy. 22. Moreover, as admitted by the Principal of the school in Ext.R1(b) application dated 19.12.2018, the vehicle was lying idle since 01.09.2016, as it is not roadworthy. 22. As already noticed, this writ petition is accompanied by an affidavit sworn to by the Principal of a school affiliated to CBSE, who has also sworn to a reply affidavit to the counter affidavit filed by the 1st respondent. As stated by Scrutton, L.J., in R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners [1917 (1) KB 486], an applicant who does not come with candid facts and 'clean breast' cannot hold a writ of the court with 'soiled hands'. Suppression or concealment of material facts is not an advocacy. It is a jugglery, manipulation, maneuvering or misrepresentation, which has no place in equitable and prerogative jurisdiction. 23. In Avinash Nagra v. Navodaya Vidyalaya Samithi [ (1997) 2 SCC 534 ], the Apex Court quoted the words of Mahatma Gandhi, the Father of the Nation, that a teacher cannot be without character. If he lacks it, he will like salt without its savour. A teacher must touch the hearts of his students. Boys imbibe more from the teacher's own life than they do from books. If teachers impart all the knowledge in the world to their students but do not inculcate truth and purity amongst them, they will have betrayed them. Paragraph 10 of the said decision reads thus; “10. Mahatma Gandhiji, the Father of the Nation has stated that "a teacher cannot be without character. If he lacks it, he will like salt without its savour. A teacher must touch the hearts of his students. Boys imbibe more from the teacher's own life than they do from books. If teachers impart all the knowledge in the world to their students but do not inculcate truth and purity amongst them, they will have betrayed them." Shri Aurobindo has stated that "it is the teacher's province to hold aloft the torch, to insist at all times and at all places that this nation of ours was founded on idealism and that whatever may be the prevailing tendencies of the times, our children shall learn to live among the sun lit peaks." Dr. S. Radhakrishnan has stated that "we in our country look upon teacher as gurus or, as acharyas. An Acharya is one whose achar or conduct is exemplary. S. Radhakrishnan has stated that "we in our country look upon teacher as gurus or, as acharyas. An Acharya is one whose achar or conduct is exemplary. He must be an example of Sadachar or good conduct. He must inspire the pupils who are entrusted to his care with love of virtue and goodness. The ideal of a true teacher is andhakaraniridhata gurur itya bhidhiyate. Andhakar is not merely intellectual ignorance, but is also spiritual blindness. He who is able to remove that kind of spiritual blindness is called a guru. Are we deserving the noble appellation of an acharya or a guru?" Swami Vivekananda had stated that "the student should live from his very boyhood with one whose character is a blazing fire and should have before him a living example of the highest teaching. In our country, the imparting of knowledge has always been through men of renunciation. The charge of imparting knowledge should again fall upon the shoulder of Tyagis." (underline supplied) 24. In Avinash Nagra's case (supra) the Apex Court noticed that the Indian society has elevated the teacher as 'Guru Brahma, Gurur Vishnu Guru Devo Maheshwaraha'. The teacher is placed on the pedestal below the parents. The quality, competence and character of the teacher are, therefore, most significant to mould the calibre, character and capacity of the students for successful working of democratic institutions and to sustain them in their later years of life as a responsible citizen in different responsibilities. Without a dedicated and disciplined teacher, even the best education system is bound to fail. It is, therefore, the duty of the teacher to take such care of the pupils as a careful parent would take of its children and the ordinary principle of vicarious liability would apply where negligence is that of a teacher. Paragraph 11 of the said decision reads thus; “11. It is in this backdrop, therefore, that the Indian society has elevated the teacher as 'Guru Brahma, Gurur Vishnu Guru Devo Maheshwaraha'. As Brahma, the teacher creates knowledge, learning, wisdom and also creates out of his students, men and women, equipped with ability and knowledge, discipline and intellectualism to enable them to face the challenges of their lives. As Vishnu, the teacher is preserver of learning. As Maheswara, he destroys ignorance. Obviously, therefore, the teacher was placed on the pedestal below the parents. As Vishnu, the teacher is preserver of learning. As Maheswara, he destroys ignorance. Obviously, therefore, the teacher was placed on the pedestal below the parents. The State has taken care of service conditions of the teacher and he owes dual fundamental duties to himself and to the society. As a member of the noble teaching profession and a citizen of India he should always be willing, self-disciplined, dedicated with integrity to remain ever a learner of knowledge, intelligently to articulate and communicate and imbibe in his students, as social duty, to impart education, to bring them up with discipline, inculcate to abjure violence and to develop scientific temper with a spirit of enquiry and reform constantly to rise to higher levels in any walk of life nurturing Constitution ideals enshrined in Article 51A so as to make the students responsible citizens of the country. Thus, the teacher either individually or collectively as a community of teachers, should regenerate this dedication with a bent of spiritualism in broader perspective of the Constitutionalism with secular ideologies enshrined in the Constitution as an arm of the State to establish egalitarian social order under the rule of law. Therefore, when the society has given such a pedestal, the conduct, character, ability and disposition of a teacher should be to transform the student into a disciplined citizen, inquisitive to learn, intellectual to pursue in any walk of life with dedication, discipline and devotion with an inquiring mind but not with blind customary beliefs. The education that is imparted by the teacher determines the level of the student for the development, prosperity and welfare of the society. The quality, competence and character of the teacher are, therefore, most significant to mould the calibre, character and capacity of the students for successful working of democratic institutions and to sustain them in their later years of life as a responsible citizen in different responsibilities. Without a dedicated and disciplined teacher, even the best education system is bound to fail. It is, therefore, the duty of the teacher to take such care of the pupils as a careful parent would take of its children and the ordinary principle of vicarious liability would apply where negligence is that of a teacher. Without a dedicated and disciplined teacher, even the best education system is bound to fail. It is, therefore, the duty of the teacher to take such care of the pupils as a careful parent would take of its children and the ordinary principle of vicarious liability would apply where negligence is that of a teacher. The age of the pupil and the nature of the activity in which he takes part, are material factors determining the degree and supervision demanded by a teacher.” (underline supplied) 25. In Tomy P Joseph v. Union of India and others [judgment dated 16.06.2016 in O.P.(CAT)No.165 of 2016], a Division Bench of this Court observed that the decision of the Apex Court in Avinash Nagra's case (supra) highlights the role of a Teacher, who is to mould the character and conduct of a student and the high esteem a Teacher is holding in the community/society. 26. The Principal of a school, being the head of that institution and the leader of Teachers, is holding high esteem in the society. The Principal is also placed on the pedestal below the parents, who has to take such care of the pupils as a careful parent would take of his children. 27. In M.C.Metha v. Union of India [( 1998 (1) SCC 676 ], in the context of management and control of traffic in National Capital Region and National Capital Territory, the Apex Court has issued various directions which, inter alia, includes directions to ensure the safety of school children. 28. Taking into consideration the directions contained in the aforesaid order of the Apex Court dated 16.12.1997 and also the provisions in the CBSE Affiliation Bye-laws, read with CBSE Circular No.28/2004 dated 26.07.2004, Circular No.01/2012 dated 08.06.2012, Circular No.20/2014 dated 06.02.2014 and Circular No.04/2016 dated 28.10.2016, which contain exhaustive provisions, which are to be followed by every school affiliated to CBSE, for safety of school children during transit, the CBSE issued Circular No.08/2017 dated 23.02.2017, enclosing therewith a comprehensive guidelines for transport facilities in schools (as Annexure I), which should be scrupulously followed and complied with by all affiliated schools, as an integral part of Affiliation Bye-laws. As per the said circular, the faith, trust and responsibility reposed in schools by parents should be a cardinal guiding beacon for every school to meet the expectations and contribute towards nurturing of young citizens of the country. As per the said circular, the faith, trust and responsibility reposed in schools by parents should be a cardinal guiding beacon for every school to meet the expectations and contribute towards nurturing of young citizens of the country. It is made clear in that circular that, the Management and the Head of the CBSE affiliated schools will be held responsible for any lapse in this regard, which would invite appropriate action including the disaffiliation of the school as per the provisions under the Affiliation Byelaws. Paragraphs 2 to 6 of CBSE Circular No.08/2017 dated 23.02.2017 read thus; “2. Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, vide judgment dated 16.12.1997 in W.P.(Civil) 13029 of 1985 in the case of Shri. M.C Mehta Vs. Union of India & others, sensing the gravity of the issue has issued the order which, inter alia, includes guidelines for safe plying of school buses and to ensure the safety of school children travelling in the bus. 3. However, the recent unfortunate instances reported in the media about callous approach by certain schools with respect to the safety of school children during transit to and fro to the school have again agitated deep concern regarding the safety of the school children. The time has come to make the schools sensitive to this serious issue and to take proactive remedial measures to ensure that safe transport for school children becomes one of the paramount safety objectives for every CBSE affiliated school. 4. CBSE Affiliation bye-laws (Chapter II, Rule 8.5) read with CBSE Circulars No.28/2004 dated 26.07.2004, No.01/2012 dated 08.06.2012, No.20/2014 dated 06.02.2014 and No.04 dated 28.10.2016 bear exhaustive provisions which are to be followed by every CBSE affiliated school for safety of school children during transit. The faith, trust and responsibility reposed in schools by parents should be the cardinal guiding beacon for every school to meet the expectations and contribute towards nurturing of young citizens of the country. 5. Taking into consideration the judgment pronounced by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the statutory provisions, directives of the State Governments, provisions in Affiliation bye-laws and circulars issued by CBSE from time to time, a comprehensive guidelines have been consolidated, which is enclosed as Annexure-I. These guidelines should be scrupulously followed and complied with by all affiliated schools, as an integral part Affiliation bye-laws. 6. 6. The Management and the Head of the CBSE affiliated schools will be held responsible for any lapse in this regard which would invite appropriate action including the disaffiliation of the school as per the provisions under Affiliation bye-laws.” (underline supplied) 29. Annexure I guidelines for transport facilities in schools provides, inter alia, that the affiliated schools shall not own or hire any transport service, which does not have valid permit or do not fulfill the requisite permit conditions prescribed by the State Transport Departments; periodical fitness certificates regarding roadworthiness of the school bus shall be obtained as per the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; any school authority and/or the driver of the school bus found to have violated the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the rules framed thereunder, as well as the directions of CBSE, State Government and the courts, must be penalised; etc. 30. Despite the issuance of Circular No.08/2017 dated 23.02.2017, a copy of which was marked to all Principals and Managers of the schools affiliated to CBSE, for information and compliance, the Director of Secondary Education of all States, etc., a calculated attempt has been made by the petitioner, which is a school affiliated to CBSE, by filing this writ petition supported by an affidavit sworn to by its Principal, to secure orders from this Court for reclassification of the vehicle covered by Ext.P2 certificate of registration as Educational Institution Bus, which is lying unused for nearly two years, without making any alterations, despite the permission for alteration granted in Ext.P4 proceedings dated 11.07.2016, the fitness certificate of which had expired on 03.06.2016. As evident from Ext.R1(a) application dated 19.12.2018, made by the Principal of the school before the 1st respondent seeking permission to scrap the vehicle, which is lying idle since 01.09.2016, as it is not roadworthy. As per Ext.P1 notice of transfer of ownership, the petitioner purchased the said vehicle, which was classified as LMV Contract Carriage, on 27.06.2016. As evident from Ext.P2 certificate of registration the said vehicle had crossed 15 years of age on 14.03.2016. As per Ext.P1 notice of transfer of ownership, the petitioner purchased the said vehicle, which was classified as LMV Contract Carriage, on 27.06.2016. As evident from Ext.P2 certificate of registration the said vehicle had crossed 15 years of age on 14.03.2016. The admission made in Ext.R1(b) application dated 19.12.2018 of the Principal of the school that the vehicle is lying idle since 01.09.2016, as it is not roadworthy, would make it explicitly clear that the attempt made by the petitioner was to use the said vehicle, which was discarded to road use as a contract carriage, as an Educational Institution Bus, showing scant regard to the safety of the children, which should be the prime concern of a school, while providing transportation facility to its children. 31. In Siddique P.K.A. and others v. Regional Transport Authority, Kozhikode and others [ILR 2013 (1) Ker 829] a Division Bench of this Court, in the context of clause (11) of Section 2 and Section 74 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, held that, whatever may be the nomenclature given in the permit, Contract Carriage (Educational Institution Bus) attracts provisions of Section 74 of the Act, so far as issuance of a permit is concerned. Another issue before the Division Bench was as to whether the Regional Transport Authority acted without authority or power, in violation of various provisions under the Motor Vehicles Act, while imposing a condition that vehicles which are 15 years of age cannot be permitted to be used on roads by the educational institutions. The Division Bench noticed that such a restriction came to be imposed, as there is reasonable thinking that stage carriage, which is discarded for road use practically and functionally cannot be put to use on road as a contract carriage, where the safety of the children has to be the prime concern. So far as the object it is laudable as paramount consideration is the welfare measure apart from awareness. So far as the object it is laudable as paramount consideration is the welfare measure apart from awareness. On the question as to whether such welfare measure was exercised in accordance with the power vested with the authorities under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Division Bench noticed that, in Subash Chandra v. State of U.P. [ (1980) 2 SCC 324 ] the Apex Court, in the context of Section 51 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was concerned with a case arising from Uttar Pradesh, where a rule had been framed by that State Government as to the age of the vehicle in relation to omnibus and the vires of the said rule had been questioned and the said rule was held to be within the competence of the State Government. Under Section 74 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 a similar sentence is used at sub-section (xiii) which means 'any other conditions which may be prescribed'. The authority who has to prescribe such condition, as held in Subhash Chandra's case (supra) was the State, which has the power to frame rules as contemplated under the Motor Vehicles Act. However, the State has not prescribed any conditions i.e., restriction with regard to the age of Contract Carriages (Educational Institution Vehicles). Paragraphs 38 and 39 of the said judgment read thus; “38. The above conditions clearly indicate, the intention was to bring discipline in the work culture of the drivers and create safety awareness so also motor vehicle and other related issue awareness in the minds of children apart from other stakeholders, staff, management faculty and the guardians of the student population; with these safety measure in their mind, according to the State, restriction of the present nature came to be imposed, as there is reasonable thinking that stage carriage, which is discarded for road use practically and functionally cannot be put to use on road as a contract carriage, where safety of the children has to be prime concern. So far as the object it is laudable as paramount consideration is the welfare measure apart from awareness. This has to be seen from the very provisions, which deal with the procedure imposing such restriction or conditions, which could take into its fold restriction of age also. 39. So far as the object it is laudable as paramount consideration is the welfare measure apart from awareness. This has to be seen from the very provisions, which deal with the procedure imposing such restriction or conditions, which could take into its fold restriction of age also. 39. So far as the judgment in Subhash Chandra's case (supra) as already stated above, Section 51 of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 was the subject matter. There the State imposed condition No.18 therefore having regard to the words used 'any other conditions which may be prescribed' the Apex Court said that this is very much within the jurisdiction of the State to impose such condition and therefore the restriction with regard to the age pertaining to contract carriage also was held to be valid. Apparently, under Section 74 of 1988 Act similar sentence is used at sub-section (xiii) which means 'any other conditions which may be prescribed'. The authority who has to prescribe such condition as held in Subhash Chandra's case (supra) was State which has the power to form rules as contemplated under the Motor Vehicles Act. In the present case, State has not prescribed any conditions i.e., restriction with regard to the age of the contract carriage (educational Institution vehicles).” (underline supplied) 32. In Siddique's case (supra), the Division Bench noticed the difference between the words used in Section 72 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which deals with grant of stage carriage permit and Section 74 of the Act, which deals with grant of contract carriage permit. Sub-section (2) of Section 72 clearly indicates that the Regional Transport Authority is empowered to grant a permit for a stage carriage of a specified description. Specified description has taken into its fold even the age of the vehicle, as indicated in the judgment of the Apex Court in Subhash Chandra's case (supra), so also this High Court and other High Courts. Specified description has taken into its fold even the age of the vehicle, as indicated in the judgment of the Apex Court in Subhash Chandra's case (supra), so also this High Court and other High Courts. Since Contract Carriage (Educational Institution Vehicles) could neither be called a Stage Carriage nor the conditions imposed would attract provisions of Section 74(2)(ix) or 74(2)(xiii), the conditions now imposed restricting the user of the vehicle owned by educational institutions as 15 years is outside the purview of the jurisdiction vested with the transport authorities, as such conditions could be prescribed only by the State and transport authority can vary or add conditions only with reference to Section 74(2)(i) to (viii). Though the notification issued by various transport authorities restricting the user of the vehicle by the educational institutions beyond 15 years were quashed on the aforesaid ground, the Division Bench has made it clear that the State Government is empowered to prescribe any conditions in pursuance of powers vested with it as understood from clause (xiii) of sub-section (2) of Section 74 of the Act. Further, it is also the duty of the State Government to impose such conditions having regard to the care and caution already it has taken so far as the vehicles used by educational institutions with reference to the persons who man these vehicles, as indicated in the counter affidavit filed by the State. By the said judgment, the Division Bench has also disposed of W.P.(C)No.29975 of 2007, which was a public interest litigation, seeking a writ of mandamus commanding the Regional Transport Authority, Kozhikode, not to grant/renew permit to old vehicles of more than 15 years old to run as educational institution buses and to cancel the permits already issued to such vehicles to run as educational institution buses. In that writ petition, the Division Bench directed the State Government to consider the matter in the light of the observations made in the judgment and lay down necessary terms and conditions in accordance with the procedure, in the light of such observations. Paragraphs 40 to 42 and also the last paragraph of the said judgment read thus; “40. Then coming to the argument of learned Government Pleader that under sub-section (ix) (a) and (b) would take into its fold the restriction now imposed by the transport authorities. Paragraphs 40 to 42 and also the last paragraph of the said judgment read thus; “40. Then coming to the argument of learned Government Pleader that under sub-section (ix) (a) and (b) would take into its fold the restriction now imposed by the transport authorities. Section 74 deals with 'grant of contract carriage permit' and such permit could be granted as per sub-section (2) subject to one or more of the conditions referred. From Section 74(2)(i) to (ix) several restrictions and conditions are envisaged. Subsection (ix) says only after giving notice of not less than one month the conditions of the permit can be varied or add additional conditions. Entire reading of sub-section 74(i) along with sub-section (ix) would only indicate if there is any variance of the conditions of the permit with reference to Section 74(2)(i) to (ix) or additional conditions to be attached to the conditions already indicated in the permit, one month notice has to be given before such exercise is undertaken. The entire Section would indicate addition of conditions or variation of conditions would refer only to conditions under Section 74(2)(i) to (viii) and not otherwise. In that view of the matter, the argument of the learned special Government Pleader that the conditions of the present nature restricting the age of the vehicle will also fall within subsection (ix) of Section 74(2) cannot be accepted. 41. Then coming to the other decisions as discussed above, all pertain to stage carriages. We have already mentioned the difference between the words used in Section 72 and Section 74. Section 72(2) clearly indicates the Regional Transport Authority is empowered to grant a permit for a stage carriage of a specified description. Specified description has taken into its fold even the age of the vehicle as indicated in the judgment of the Apex Court so also this High Court and other High Courts relied upon by the learned Government Pleader. Section 72(2) clearly indicates the Regional Transport Authority is empowered to grant a permit for a stage carriage of a specified description. Specified description has taken into its fold even the age of the vehicle as indicated in the judgment of the Apex Court so also this High Court and other High Courts relied upon by the learned Government Pleader. Having regard to the fact that in the present case neither the vehicle could be called as stage carriage nor the conditions imposed would attract provisions of Section 74(2)(ix) or 74(2)(iii), we have to hold that the conditions now imposed restricting the user of the vehicle owned by educational institutions as 15 years is outside the purview of the jurisdiction vested with the transport authorities as such conditions could be prescribed only by the State and transport authority can vary or add conditions only with reference to Section 74(2)(i) to (viii). 42. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion, the notification issued by various transport authorities pertaining to different districts restricting the user of the vehicle by the educational institutions beyond 15 years deserves to be quashed. However, we make it clear that the State is empowered to prescribe any conditions in pursuance of powers vested with it as understood from Section 74(2)(xiii). It is also the duty of the State to impose such conditions having regard to the care and caution already it has taken so far as the vehicles used by educational institutions with reference to the persons who manner these vehicles as indicated in the counter affidavit filed by the State. With the above observations, the writ petitions are disposed of. So far as the Public Interest Litigation, i.e. W.P.(C)No.29975 of 2007, we direct the State Government to consider the matter in the light of the observations made and lay down necessary terms and conditions in accordance with the procedure in the light of the observations made above.” (underline supplied) 33. With the above observations, the writ petitions are disposed of. So far as the Public Interest Litigation, i.e. W.P.(C)No.29975 of 2007, we direct the State Government to consider the matter in the light of the observations made and lay down necessary terms and conditions in accordance with the procedure in the light of the observations made above.” (underline supplied) 33. Despite the direction of the Division Bench in Siddique's case (supra), the State Government has not so far prescribed any conditions, in exercise of its powers under clause (xiii) of sub-section (2) of Section 74 of the Motor Vehicles Act, in order to prevent the conversion and use of stage carriages and contract carriages, which are discarded for road use practically and functionally, as Educational Institution Buses, for the purpose of transportation of school children, where safety of the children has to be the prime concern. The absence of any such condition imposed by the State, in exercise of its powers under clause (xiii) of sub-section (2) of Section 74 of the Act, prompted the petitioner to make an attempt to seek alteration of the class of the vehicle covered by Ext.P2 certificate of registration, which is lying idle since 01.09.2016, as it is not roadworthy, to use it as Educational Institution Bus, showing scant regard to the safety of the children, which should be the prime concern of a school, while providing transportation facility to its children. 34. When, the vehicle referred to in Ext.P4 proceedings of the 1st respondent is admittedly lying idle since 01.09.2016, as it is not roadworthy, the petitioner is not entitled for a writ of mandamus commanding the 1st respondent Registering Authority to effect reclassification of that vehicle as Educational Institution Bus, on the strength of the said proceedings. Therefore, this writ petition is liable to be dismissed on that sole ground. 35. In Prestige Lights Limited v. State Bank of India [ (2007) 8 SCC 449 ] the Apex Court held that a prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. Therefore, in exercising extraordinary power, a Writ Court will indeed bear in mind the conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full facts or suppresses relevant materials or is otherwise guilty of misleading the Court, the Court may dismiss the action without adjudicating the matter. Therefore, in exercising extraordinary power, a Writ Court will indeed bear in mind the conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full facts or suppresses relevant materials or is otherwise guilty of misleading the Court, the Court may dismiss the action without adjudicating the matter. The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of Court by deceiving it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If the material facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the Writ Courts would become impossible. 36. In Prestige Lights' case (supra) the Apex Court held further that, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court is exercising discretionary and extraordinary jurisdiction. Over and above, a Court of Law is also a Court of Equity. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that when a party approaches a High Court, he must place all the facts before the Court without any reservation. If there is suppression of material facts on the part of the applicant or twisted facts have been placed before the Court, the Writ Court may refuse to entertain the petition and dismiss it without entering into merits of the matter. 37. In K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. [(2008) 12 SCC 481], the Apex Court held that the party who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Apex Court under Article 32 or of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is supposed to be truthful, frank and open. He must disclose all material facts without any reservation even if they are against him. He cannot be allowed to play 'hide and seek' or to 'pick and choose' the facts he likes to disclose and to suppress (keep back) or not to disclose (conceal) other facts. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true and complete (correct) facts. If material facts are suppressed or distorted, the very functioning of Writ Courts and exercise would become impossible. The petitioner must disclose all the facts having a bearing on the relief sought without any qualification. This is because, "the Court knows law but not facts". 38. If material facts are suppressed or distorted, the very functioning of Writ Courts and exercise would become impossible. The petitioner must disclose all the facts having a bearing on the relief sought without any qualification. This is because, "the Court knows law but not facts". 38. In K.D. Sharma's case (supra), the Apex Court held further that, if the primary object as highlighted in R. v. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners [1917 (1) KB 486] is kept in mind, an applicant who does not come with candid facts and 'clean breast' cannot hold a writ of the Court with 'soiled hands'. Suppression or concealment of material facts is not an advocacy. It is a jugglery, manipulation, maneuvering or misrepresentation, which has no place in equitable and prerogative jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose all the material facts fairly and truly but states them in a distorted manner and misleads the Court, the Court has inherent power in order to protect itself and to prevent an abuse of its process to discharge the rule nisi and refuse to proceed further with the examination of the case on merits. If the Court does not reject the petition on that ground, the Court would be failing in its duty. In fact, such an applicant requires to be dealt with for Contempt of Court for abusing the process of the Court. 39. Therefore, it is well settled that, a litigant who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution must come with clean hands and clean objects. The judicial proceedings are sacrosanct, and no person would be allowed to abuse the judicial process, particularly, in public law remedy. In writ proceedings, the Court places implicit faith on the parties and their pleadings, as it does not indulge in any fact finding or roving enquiry of what has been asserted. Since Article 226 of the Constitution of India espouses equity jurisprudence, a litigant who has approached the Court with unclean hands, without disclosing full facts, is not entitled for any reliefs. 40. As held by the Apex Court in Dnyandeo Sabaji Naik's case (supra) a litigant who takes liberties with the truth or with the procedures of the Court should be left in no doubt about the consequences to follow. Others should not venture along the same path in the hope or on a misplaced expectation of judicial leniency. 40. As held by the Apex Court in Dnyandeo Sabaji Naik's case (supra) a litigant who takes liberties with the truth or with the procedures of the Court should be left in no doubt about the consequences to follow. Others should not venture along the same path in the hope or on a misplaced expectation of judicial leniency. Exemplary costs are inevitable, and even necessary, in order to ensure that in litigation, as in the law which is practised in our country, there is no premium on the truth. 41. The attempt made by the petitioner, which is a school affiliated to CBSE, by filing this writ petition supported by an affidavit sworn to by its Principal, to secure orders from this Court for reclassification of the vehicle covered by Ext.P2 certificate of registration as Educational Institution Bus, suppressing the fact that the said vehicle is lying idle since 01.09.2016, as it is not roadworthy, and that the fitness certificate of the said vehicle had expired on 03.06.2016, has to be viewed seriously. By suppressing those material facts, it has falsely been stated in paragraph 6 of the writ petition that, even after the lapse of more than two years from the date of Ext.P4 proceedings, the reclassification of the vehicle as Educational Institution Bus has not been done by the 1st respondent, as a result of which, the petitioner is compelled to run the vehicle on payment of tax applicable to Contract Carriage. The attempt made by the petitioner was to use the said vehicle, which was discarded to road use as a contract carriage, as an Educational Institution Bus, showing scant regard to the safety of the children (which should be the prime concern of a school, while providing transportation facility to its children) in flagrant violation of Circular No.08/2017 dated 23.02.2017 of CBSE, a copy of which was marked to all Principals and Managers of the schools affiliated to CBSE, for information and compliance, along with the Director of Secondary Education of all States, etc. 42. A litigant who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India must come with clean hands and clean objects. Any attempt made by a litigant to mislead this Court, either by suppressing materials facts or by filing false affidavits or giving false statements should be curbed with an iron hand. 42. A litigant who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India must come with clean hands and clean objects. Any attempt made by a litigant to mislead this Court, either by suppressing materials facts or by filing false affidavits or giving false statements should be curbed with an iron hand. Dismissal of such writ petitions imposing exemplary costs is inevitable, and even necessary, in order to prevent abuse of the process of this Court and to preserve the purity of judicial proceedings. 43. In the result, this writ petition is dismissed imposing a cost of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand only) payable by the petitioner to the Chief Minister's Distress Relief Fund, to provide relief to flood victims in Kerala. The petitioner shall remit the said amount in the Chief Minister's Distress Relief Fund, within three weeks from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. Failing which, the State Government shall recover the said amount by initiating revenue recovery proceedings against the petitioner. 44. The remittance/recovery of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand only) as cost by/from the petitioner shall be brought to the notice of this Court by way of a memo filed by the learned Senior Government Pleader. 45. The Transport Commissioner, who is suo motu impleaded as the additional 2nd respondent, shall take necessary steps to ensure that no application for altering the class of a stage carriage or a contract carriage as Educational Institution Bus shall be entertained by any Registering Authority in the State, without the vehicle being produced for inspection, along with its current records, and after satisfying that such request is in respect of a vehicle which is roadworthy. The application for altering the class of vehicle shall contain the particulars of the alterations proposed, and the Registering Authority shall consider that request, strictly in accordance with the provisions under Section 52 of the Motor Vehicles Act and the law laid down by the Apex Court in Regional Transport Officer v. K.Jayachandra [2019 (1) KLT 435 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 31] and that laid down by this Court in Raju Chacko v. State of Kerala and others [2019 (1) KHC SN 32 : 2019 (1) KLT 668 ]. Registry shall forward a copy of this judgment to (i) The Principal Secretary, Transport, Government of Kerala, Main Block, Government Secretariat, Thiruvananthapuram-695 001; (ii) The Director of Public Instruction, Directorate of Public Instruction, Jagathi, Thiruvananthapuram-695 014; and The Regional Officer, Central Board of Secondary Education, Block-B, 2nd Floor, LIC Divisional Office Campus, Pattom, Thiruvananthapuram-695 004 for information and necessary action to ensure the safety of children in the transportation facility provided in every school in the State.